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HomeMy WebLinkAboutRISK MANAGEMENT SIMI W~t~m WEST COAST i~0~~ DIVISION GENERAL. PLOT PLAN SE~R DEHY/ WA TER, COG~ PLAN~ ' AMMONIA , WA ~R EAST ~ GATE FI~WA~R CONNEC~ON , FIRE FO~M CONNECTION ~304tB Shell Westem E4P I~. WEST COAST t~ROOUCTION DIVISION AMMONIA SYSTEM PLOT PLAN .SEIO~ COGEN PI. ANT ACCUMUI. A TOR AND BLOWERS ' SWITCH' GEAR r-] i ~'-~.j BUILDING ~~, ___.~]nu r~/ IIIIII ~'"'~  HRSG-01 -- U SUBSTATION WEST COAST 1~ GEWERAL 'PLOT ~v ~...~ z, EHY, WA TER / COG.EN PLAN7 ' GATE ' AMMONIA ' ~ ,S~GE TANK' WA~R EAST GATE ESO - .... STATION ' ' · VEHICLE '1 ' . , ~ ' ESO VEHICLE "2 FIVE MINUTE EGRESS HOOD , THIRTY MINUTE ,~CBA MANUAL MSO893039B RTSK MANAGEFIENT AND PREVENTTON PROGP. AI~ FOR THE AMFIONZA SYSTE# AT THE SOUTH EAST KER~ RZVER CO.G£NERATZON FACTLITY Prepared for: Shell Western E&P, Inc. 5060 California Avenue Bakersfield, California 93309 Prepared by: Science Applications Znternational Corporation 1710 Goodridge Drive HcLean, Vtrginia 22102 SWEPI P.O. No. ACF-70563 January, 1989 TABLE OF CONTENTS Sectfon Paae 1.0 INTRODUCTION ...................... ! 2.0 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM .............. 1 3.0 NATURE, AGE AND CONDITION OF THE EQUIPMENT; TESTING AND MAINTENANCE .................... 2 4.0 DESIGN, OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE CONTROLS THAT MINIMIZE RISK ..................... 3 4.1 Design F?tures .................. 3 4 2 Controlling Deviations · 4 4.3 Other Relevant Considerations ........... 5 5.0 HAZARDS ASSESSMENT ................... 5 5.1 Hazards Identification ........ 6 5.2 Quantitative Frequency E~a(u~tio~ 5.3 Dispersion Analysis . 9 5.4 Summary of the Findi~g~ ~f"t~e'H~z~rJs'A~s~s~m~n~ . 10 5.4.1 From the Hazards Identification ...... 10 5.4.2 From the Quantitative Analysis ~,. ..... 11 5.4.3 From the Dispersion Analysis ........ 12 6.0 RMPP RECORD-KEEPING, AUDIT AND INSPECTION PROGRAM . . . 12 ATTACHMENT 1: PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION DRAWINGS ATTACHMENT 2: EQUIPMENT LIST GLOSSARY AA Administering Agency AHM Acutely Hazardous Materials A[ChE American Institution of Chemical Engineers APCO Air Pollution Control Oistrict CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety CIFtAH Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (UK Risk Management Program) HRSG ~ Heat Recovery Steam Generator IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health, i.e. that concentration which could incapacitate a person to the point that he or she could not take evasive action after thirty minutes KCFD Kern County Fire Department KCAPCD Kern County Air Pollution Control District LCso Concentration of a gas that is fatal to fifty percent of those exposed to it Pa Pascal - metric unit of pressure: 1 bar - 105 Pa PCIO Piping and Instrumentation Drawing RHPP Risk Management and Preventio~ Program SAIC Science Applications International Corporation SCBA Self Contained Breathing Appartus SWEPI Shell WeStern Exploration & Production, Inc. Te Tonne - metric unit of mass; I Tonne - 1,000 kg -2,200 lb. UKHSE United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive RZSK P, ANAGEHENT AND PREVENTION PROGRAN FOR THE AHHOHIA SYSTEM AT THE SOUIH r~ST KE~ RIVER COGENER~TION FACILI'~ 1.0 INTRODUCTION The following document constitutes Shell Western E&P, [nc.'s Risk Hanagement and Prevention Program (RMPP) for the ammonia injection system at the new South East Kern River Cogeneration Facility. The document is intended to be in compliance with California Law as set forth in Chapter 6.95 of the Health and Safety Code, Article 2, Sectton Z5531 et seq. The guidance issued by the Governor's Office of Emergency Services in July 1988 was consulted. Further guidance was received in discussions with the local Administering Agency (AA), the Kern County Fire Department. The law requires that an RMPP should contain the following: (i) A report on the nature, age and condition of equipment used .to handle acutely hazardous materials (AHHs) and the schedule for testing and maintenance. (ii) A description of design, operating and maintenance procedures that minimize risk. (iii) A hazards assessment - that is, an assessment .of the processes, operations and procedures associated with the handling of AHMs. (iv) An RMPP Record-keeping, audit and inspection program. ~.O BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEH Ammonia is stored in a 12,000 gallon pressurized storage tank with an operating limit of 10,400 gallons. The tank is designed for a pressure of 300 psig, well in excess of that which can be caused by atmospheric heating (255 pstg). The tank is protected by two 300.psig relief valves, one of which ts always in service. Ammonia vapor at 80 psig is withdrawn from.the top of the tank and fed to an intermediate accumulator where the pressure is held at about 50 psig. The pressure in the storage vessel is prevented .from falling below 80 psig by two liquid ammonia evaporators. The ammonia is fed from the accumulator, diluted with air to a concentration of less than two percent by volume, and is then injected into the turbine exhaust. There, it helps control the emissions of oxides of nitrogen (NOx) in a catalytic reaction of NOx and NH3 to form water vapor and nitrogen. The storage vessel only needs to be refilled three or four times a year. At that time, a tank truck will be ordered and will be connected to the liquid unloading and vapor return lines viaa loading arm. The lines are protected by a pull-away valve, several excess flow valves and a check valve in the liquid line. The piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs) are provided as' Attachment 1. In addition, refer to Attachment 2 which lists equipment. 3.0 NATURE, AGE AND CONDXTXON OF THE EQUIPMENT; TESTXNG AND MAXNTENANCE Attachment 2 describes a) each item of equipment and its manufacturer; b) the materials of construction; c) the design conditions; d) the tests carried out on the .equipment prior to operation and e) the purpose of the item of equipment. The philosophy adopted is to minimize risk by the careful choice and installation of hardware, with conservatisms incorporated. All equipment is new and in good condition. The testing procedures for individual items of equipment include a) relief valves; b) rupture disks; c) safety showers and eyewash stations; e) self-contained breathing apparatus; f) shutdown system equipment; g) non- destructive testing of the storage vessel and the evaporator outlets to monitor corrosion; h) insulation; i) dilution air blower check valves; .1) excess flow valves; k) car sealed open valves; 1) the loading arm; m) fire extinguishers; n) procedures for monitoring otl contamination. Training programs for testing and maintenance have been developed and implemented. 4.0 DESIGN, OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE CONTROLS THAT MINIMIZE RISK 4.1 Destqn Features There are numerous design features that minimize risk. The design pressure of the storage vessel is 300 psig, which is ten percent higher than the minimum required by the relevant California and industry codes. The accumulator is not subject to the same elevated pressure as is seen in the storage vessel; nonetheless, it has the same design pressure. The vessel has been stress relieved to minimize the possibility of stress corrosion cracking. SWEPI's careful purging procedures before operation and after maintenance ensure that there is very little oxygen in the system ( the presence of oxygen has been shown to be a major contributor to the occurrence of stress corrosion cracking). In addition, the system is self-purging during Operation and the grades of ammonia that will be purchased by SWEPI contain very little oxygen. There is annual non- destructive testing of two spots on the vessel and one spot on each of the evaporator outlets to ensure that there is early warning of corrosion, if any. The storage vessel, accumulator and above-ground pipework is insulated. This has the effect of minimizing external corrosion. In addition, the insulation allows a stable operating environment in the vessel and piping, thus reducing fatigue due to cycling. Welded and flanged construction was used, even in small lines because welded and flanged joints have a significantly lower probability of leaking than do threaded joints. Schedule 80 carbon steel piping was used, whereas the codes require only schedule 40. Long above-ground piping runs have been avoided to mtnimize the chance of mechanical damage, especia]]y across p]ant roads and near the unloading rack. Excess flow valves.have been flanged onto most of the nozzles of the vessel and accumulator. These will close tn the event of a downstream leak, thus minimizing the chance of a large release of ammoniafollowtng rupture of the ptpework. Pull-away valves have been Installed on the vapor return 11ne and the 11quid line to ensure that, if the truck should be moved while st111 connected, the 11nes will part at a deliberately engineered weak spot and 'excess flow valves and or check valves will close. The unloading facilities also utilize steel pipe and swivel joints, whtch are considered superior to flexible hoses. The unloading facilities are protected by stout truck bumpers. There are two relief valves on both the storage vessel and the accumulator. There ts a three way valve beneath the rellef valves whtch ensures that one of the valves on each vessel ts always tn service and remains tn service when the other valve is removed for maintenance. There are rupture disks beneath all of the relief valves, Including those on the evaporators,'to ensure that the valves are only exposed to ammonia when they are needed to relieve pressure, thus minimizing the chance of corrosion. Note that one of the recommendations of the hazards assessment was to tnsta11 a rupture disk under the evaporator reltef valves (tn the origtnal design, rupture disks were placed under only the accumulator and storage vessel reltef valves). Thts one recommendation had the effect of reductng the predicted frequency of spurious opentng of the evaporator reltef valves by three orders of magnitude. Ftnally, tn order to provide protection agatnst earthquakes, the ammonia system has been destgned to the most stringent requirements of the Uniform Butldtng Code, namely those for seismic zone 4. 4.2 Gontro111ng Deviations A reliable, state-of-the-art computerized control system has been installed that automatically responds to deviations tn temperature, 4 pressure, level and flow in various parts of the system and corrects them. It also contains various alarm and monitoring devices that alert the technicians. 4.3 Other Relevant Considerations There are in effect the following measures; a) a training program whereby personnel learn how to operate the plant safely; b) security controls, including fencing and control of admission to the plant; c) SWEPI's rigorous policy on alcohol, drugs, firearms and weapons; d) SWEPI's comprehensive safety awareness program that motivates all employees to work safely at all times; e) SWEPI's safety policy for contractor personnel. In addition SWEPI has plans for emergency response. 5.0 HAZAROS ASSESSHENT California law requires that the RMPP should be based on a hazards assessment, which must contain; "(1) The results of a hazard and operability study which identifies the hazards associated with the handling of an acutely hazardous material due to operating.error, equipment failure and external events, which may present an acutely hazardous materials accident risk. "(2) For the hazards identified in the hazard and operability studies, an offsite consequence analysis which, for the most likely hazards, assumes pessimistic air dispersion and other adverse environmental conditions." In order to fulfill the requirements of the law, SWEPI performed a) a hazards identification exercise; b) a quantitative frequency evaluation to determine the most likely hazards and c) atmospheric dispersion calculations. 5.! Hazards Identification SWEP! assembled a team to perform a hazards identification exercise using an approach known as the qualitative fault tree. This approach is one of those discussed in the American institute of Chemical Engineer's recently published 'Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures.' The law requires that the technique used should be consistent with this guidebook. The team tncluded a) a chaiman or moderator who was experienced tn the use of the technique and who also is a recognized expert on the modes of release of ammonta and its subsequent atmospheric dispersion; b) a recording secretary who also has several years of experience as a process or project engineer in ammonia manufacturing and handling facilities; c) SWEPi's project engineer;.d) two facilities engineers; e) the operations foreman; f) an instrument technician; g) a senior support engineer from Shell Otl's Head Offtce tn Houston and h) SNEP['s geotechnical consultant, in addition, calls were made to Shell's Nesthollow Research Center in Houston, TX and to various manufacturers when needed. Therefore, the team was able to provide comprehensive coverage of all questions that arose during the hazards identification exercise. 5.20uantttattve Frequency Evaluation The predicted frequency of several possible sequences of events whereby ammonia could accidentally be released into the atmosphere was calculated using the techniques of fault tree analysts. The basic data needed to calculate the frequencies - the probability of valve failures, ruptUre disk failures, etc. - was obtained from a data set that is being compiled by the AiChE's Center for Chemical Process Safety using information provided by its member coapantes. This data was supplemented by information on ptpe rupture frequencies-from arttcles in reputable Journals such as 'Reliability Engineering." Human error probabilities - e.g. the failure, to read gauges correctly - were calculated using well established correlations that have been developed over a period of several years by engineers working with Industrial psychologists. 6 The most likely releases are small ones such as valve packing leaks, leaks at flanges or gaskets and so forth. These have a predicted frequency of occurrence of about once in every ten (10) years and have small release rates, so that they are a problem that SWEP! can correct without any danger to the public. The next most likely category of releases consists of failure of a rupture disk followed by the spurious opening of a relief valve (see Figure ]). Here, "spurious" means opening at the operating pressure, which is far below the relief valve set pressure. The most probable of these releases is the spurious opening of an evaporator relief valve, which would lead to the release of about 20 lb. of liquid an~onia. The closing of excess flow valves on the lines from the vessel to the evaporator would prevent the release from being any larger. The spurious opening of relief valves on the storage vessel would. release vapor at a rate of about 0.32 lb of vapor per second and would continue until an operator could put on protective gear and turn the three way valve beneath the relief valve to bring the spare reltef valve into operation. The rate of release from the accumulatorrelief valve, which has a much smaller orifice, would be about 0.006 lb/sec of vapor and could be terminated by operation of the emergency shutdown system, after which the small amount of ammonia vapor in the accumulator would blow down. All other accidental releases of ammonia investigated by SWEPI are extremely unlikely. One of the principal reasons for this is that so many lines are protected by excess flow valves. If there should be a pipe rupture downstream of an excess flow valve, the valve will close, leading to a very small release of ammonia. It is often the case that accidents during truck unloading are the most frequent causes of releases of ammonia that could be a threat to the public. However, the ammonia loading lines are protected by excess flow valves, check valves, pull-away valves and procedures to avoid incorrect connections and overfilling of the storage vessel. · . ~'~:~:~: IZA11GAL VAPOR R- lB SPURIOUS ~ENING ~ ACCUMU~TOR ~ ~v~ ~UEF V~ R - 1C SPURIOUS OPENING vBnIG~ VMOR aLT OF 8TORAGE VESSEL RELIEF VALVE °1 ' ~ RB,I], VALVE FIGURE I 8 Finally, the hazards identification team determined that it is virtually impossible to have a fire under the vessel that might lead to tank rupture. 5.3 DtsDerston &nalysts The dispersion analysis was performed using state-of,the art computer models, SADENZ, SACRUNCH, and SAPLUME. that take into account the unique characteristics of ammonia - for example, the well-established experimental fact that, when a liquid release occurs from pressurized containment, the immediately resulting mixture of ammonia and air is denser than the surrounding atmosphere. The above-identified release from the evaporator relief valves is such a case. It forms a heavy, slumping 'puff' that hugs the ground. The dispersion calculations show, that for this release, the initial dilution in the first few seconds takes the concentration below any' potentially fatal limit, so that such concentrations cannot propagate more than a few yards from the vessel. Concentrations at the IDLH might be observed offsite, however. The IDLH (Immediately Damaging to Life and Health) concentration is, loosely speaking, that whichwould incapacitate a person to the extent that he or she could not take evasive actions after thirty minutes. In average weather conditions, the IDLH contour could reach. up to 150 yards downwind. In the most unfavorable weather conditions, it might reach up to 250 yards downwind. The nearest places where the public is likely to be found are further away than either of these distances. A consideration of the uncertainties in the dispersion calculations shows that these distances might perhaps double, in which case the nearby gun club and highway patrol pistol range would be affected above the IDLH. In that case, the average concentrations seen by the public would be much reduced, certainly to below the level of the.IDLH, if they were to shelter in a building with the doors and windows closed. The time taken for the ammonia plume to travel a few hundred yards is at most a few minutes. Sheltering.should therefore be seriously considered as an alternative to evacuation as an effective emergencycounte~asure tn the event of an accidental release of ammonia. The otherreleases considered by SWEPI - the spurious opening of the accumulator and storage vessel relief valves have no effect offsite because they are released vertically with high momentum and dilute rapidly before the lower edge of the plume returns to the grOund. 5.4 )u~mnar¥ of the Ftndtnqs of the Hazards Assessment 5.4.1 From The Hazards Identification The principal conclusions are as follows. The vessel is very unlikely to fail. The materials of construction of it and of its appurtenances have been carefully selected for ammonia service. The design exceeds the requirements of various industry codes; for example, the design pressure is 300 psig where 265 pstg would havesufftced. The vessel welds have been subject to radiographic inspection, the vessel has been stress relieved and any oxygen in the system will be purged. As a result, vessel failure due to stress corrosion cracking is extremely unlikely. There is a bi-annual non-destructive testing program thatwill give early warning of corrosion problems, if any, and the vessel has a corrosion allowance of about one seventh of an inch, about double that recommended by the applicable codes. Finally, the hazards identification team determined that various potential means of pressurizing the vessel, such as external fires, are extremely unlikely to occur. The principal recommendations arising from the hazards identification are as follows. These recommendations were made in order to reduce risk. (1) Raise the set point of the evaporator relief valves to 330 pstg to ensure that they do not open when the relief valve on the storage vessel opens. The.evaporator relief valves are principally there to relieve pressure by releasing a small amount of liquid ammonia if the need should lO artse whtle the evaporators are blocked tn for matntenance. They.are not tntended to rel leve htgh pressure in the storage vessel. (2) Install speed bumps on 'the site to ensure that the driver maintains the posted speed limit of 10 mph. (3) VariouS procedural recommendations were made, including; (i) A SWEPI employee should check to ensure that the truck driver has correctly and tightly connected the truck to the loading arm before permitting unloading to begin. (ii) A SWEPI employee should make a visual check of the level in the storage vessel before allowing unloading to commence. (iii) Add a procedure for checking for the presence of oil contamination in the level gauge, level transmitter and heaters. (iv) The operations foreman was present during the hazards identification and used the opportunity to refine the operating procedures in ways that were not explicitly recorded by the secretary. 5.4.2 From the Quantitative Analysis The principal conclusions are as follows. (l) Host accidental releases of ammonia have very low predicted frequencies that are less than one chance in a hundred thousand per year. It follows that the risk associated with the ammonia system is small. (2) Apart from small releases arising from valves, flanges and pipes, spurious operation of reltef valves is the most ltkely cause of an ammonia release. ]1 (3) Reltable excess flow valves and reltef valves are important contributors to the conclusion that the plant presents a low risk. It is therefore crucial that these components be well maintained. (4) Rupture disk reliability and the daily 'monitoring of its integrity are Important. (5) The quantitative analysis confirmed the conclusion of the hazards identification team that a large release during truck unloading ts extremely unlikely. The following recommendation arose from the quantitative frequency analysis. Rupture disks should be installed beneath the evaporator relief valves. This reduces the probability of a release of liquid ammonia through a spuriously opening relief valve by a factor of a thousand. This recommendation has been implemented. 5.4.3 From The Dispersion Analysis The principal conclusions are as follows. (1) For the most likely releases (those with predicted frequencies'of one in a hundred thousand per year or greater), effects above the IOLH do not propagate beyond a few hundred yards from the vessel. Potentially fatal vapor clouds do not propagate off-site. (2) The plume reaches the closest points.at which the public might be found tn a few minutes. Sheltering is an effective emergency actton that should be seriously considered as preferable to evacuation for the protection of the publtc. 6.0 P. qPP RECORD-KEEPING, AUDIT AND INSPECTION PRO6RAN The following measures have been implemented. 12 SWEPI will assemble a team once every two years to perform a Safety Audit of the ammonia system. The team will consist of a minimum of a) the Unit Safety Representative (who does not report to the facility management); b) an engineer who knows the facility; c) a technically knowledgeable individual from outside the facility; d) the unit production foreman. The team will report its findings to the Production Division Manager who will review them and ensure that the recommendations are implemented, thus ensuring senior management involvement. The Production Division Manager is also the individual who is responsible for the RMPP. The elements of the safety audit are as follows: a) an initial walk- through; b) systems review; c) review of testing and maintenance procedures; d) review of outstanding recommendations from previous audits; e) review of operating procedures and logs; f) interviews with key supervisors and technicians and g) review of emergency plans and emergency drills. The audit will be fully documented and kept in the plant records for five years. SWEPI has comprehensive accident investigation procedures. All accidents will be'conducted with a view to determining why they happened, what lessons can be learned and making recommendations for design or procedural changes that will be implemented. The investigation will be documented and kept in the plant files. SWEPI's comprehensive safety training programs will be continued during the life of the ammonia system. Finally, future proposed modifications will be carefully examined to determine whether they materially affect the handling of the AHM. This determination will be made by the Environmental Conservation Department in consultation with the appropriate Engineering Departments. The reasons for the determination will be documented and kept in the plant files. If the handling of the AHM is materially affected, the modifications will be discussed with the Administering Agency and, if necessary, the IbMPP will be updated. 13 APPENDZX A AgNONIA RELEASE ENERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN ATTACHMENT 1 PXPING AND ~NSTRUI~ENTATION DRAgINGS ATTACHlqENT ~ EQU:~PIqENT LIST ATTACHMENT 2 SOUTH EAST KERN RIVER COGENERATION FACILITY AI4MONIA SYSTEM EQUIPMENT LIST DESIGN OPERATION EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION MATERIALS AND CONSTRUCTION CONDITIONS TESTS 'DESCRIPTION 1. Anmmnia Storage Tank: Shell and Heads SA-516-70 300 psig Shop: 450 psig Storage of liqutd 120~0 gallon horizontal carbon steel, actual at 650°F Field: 450 psig ammonia cylindrical tank, 7'10" I.O. corrosion allowance 0.14". x 30'4" tangent to tangent #elded. Built to ASME Code straight length. Mfgr: A.M. Section VIII Div. I and Code Cuellar Engineering & Mfg., Stamped. Stress Relieved. Sugarland, TX. Radiograph Inspection: 100~ Tag: M-]5-V01 on long. seams, spot on circ. seams. 2. Ammonia Accumulator: Shell SA-IO6B, heads SA- 300 pstg Shop: 450 pstg Provides vapor ammonta 10 ~ubic foot verttcaY 516-70 carbon steel, actual at 650°F Field: 450 psfg surge for controls cylindrical vessel, 18" 0.0. corrosion allowance 0.11". x 6'0" seam to seam straight Melded. Built to ASME Code length. Mfgr: A.M. Cuellar Section VIII Div. 1 and Engineering & Mfg., Sugarland. stamped. TX. Tag: M-16-V01 3.. Evaporators: All flanged construction. 650 ps~g Shop:' Mfg. std. Evaporates ammonia when 4.5'Kid electric resistance All wetted parts 304 stain- at 125°F Fteld: 450 pstg needed to raise storage heater, Hatlow Industries less steel. Electrical tank pressure Model CFMS 7ZSJE3, for use system tn accordance with with 240 volt 3 phase power. NERR VII, Class I (or NEC Approx. 5" diameter x 3' Class 1, Group D, Oivtsion long. Tags: ML15-EXO1A/O1B 1, Explosion proof). Tank ts ASME Certified. ATTACHMENT 2 (Continued) DESIGN OPERATION EqUIPNENT DESCRIPTION MATERIALS AND CONSTRUCTION CONDITIONS TESTS DESCRIPTION · 4. Truck Unloading Riser: All f]anged construction, 700 psig+ Shop: Mfg. Std. "Flexible' connection LTV Energy Products Chem. 2" and 1" sch. 80 carbon (flange Field: 450 pstg for receiving ammonia Series, 2" style 535 ammonia steel pipe, steel and limits) by tank truck unloader with 1" style 53 stainless steel swivel vapor return, 2" Gall-Thompson joints, elastomer packing GT200 and 1" REGO A2141AG .fOr ammonia Pull-away valves. Tag: None 5. Relief Valves: Carbon steel body and 300 psig Shop and Field: Consolidated safety relief spring, stainless steel with 20% 300 pstg valve by Dresser Industries trim accum. 300# ANSI flanged inlet and 150~ outlet. A. 2" x 3" type Hc, capacity .7279 SCFM Tag: PSV-8501A/B Storage Tank Protect storage tank. B. 1" x 2' type Dc, capacity 1020 SCm Tag: PSV-8512 Evaporator "A" Protect evaporators. PSV-8517 Evaporator "B~ C. 1" x 2" type Fc, capacity 2846 SCFI~ Tag: PSV-8524AfB Accumulator Protect accumulator 6. Rupture Disks: Carbon steel holder and 316 Burst No test Prevent Relief Valve BS&B rupture disk holder Model stainless steel rupture 300 psig leaks. SRB-TRS for mounting between disk. +/- 5% 3001 ANSI raised face flanges, and s-go rupture disk. Tags: PSE-8501A/B Storage Tank PSE-8524A/B Accumulator AI'[ACHMENT 2 (Continued) DESIGN OPERATION EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION MATERIALS AND CONSTRUCTION CONDITIONS TESTS DESCRIPTION 7. ~ransmitters: Cadmium plated carbon steel 2000 psig Shop: Mfg.std. Transmit signal of Rosemount electronic process housing with 316 stainless Field: 300 pstg process condition transmitter. Pressure: Model steel internals, for to control system 1151GP-E12B3D2 hazardous locations Class 1, Tags: PT-8502 Storage Divisions I and 2, Groups B, PT-8521 Accumulator C, O. Level: Model 11510P-ElgB302 Tag: LT-8505 Accumulator Flow: Model 1151DP-E12B302 Tag: FT-8526 Ammonia from Accumulator. 8. Control Valves Steel WCB body and stain- 750 pstg Shop: 1125 pstg Control flow of Fisher Controls diaphagm less Steel Internals, TFE Field: 450 pstg ammonia. actuated control valves with composition seat for bubble 1" 300t ANSI flanged bodies tight shutoff Tag: PV-8521 Accumulator Inlet PV-8528 Accumulator Outlet 9. Excess Flow Valves: Carbon steel guide, nut and 300 pstg Field: Pressure Limit ammonia flow Metal Goods Mfg. Co. flange body, and stainless steel to 450 psig if 1the ruptures. type, spring loaded valves for head, stem and spring. Flow Stop: with Installation between 3001 ANSI NOTE: All nozzles on Nitrogen Flanges. Accumulator and Storage Tank 2" size-Model W166:I, 1" have excess flow valves except: size-Model W217F with A. Relief valve nozzles special flange to match 2' B. Nozzles with blind flanges 1. Blinds 2. Blinds with thermowells 3. Blinds with t54 drilled holes. ATTACIMENT 2 (Continued) DESIGN OPERATION EqUIPHENT DESCRIPTION HATER[ALS AND CONSTRUCT[ON CONDITIONS TESTS DESCRIPTION 10. ~: Carbon steel body, 1065 pstg Field: 330 pstg Allow vtsual monitoring Dante~l~~ies godel RL borosiltcate glass at IOOOF of liquid level. reflex type gauge glass with Hodel 2 S valves. Tags: LG-8504 Stora e Tank LG-8525 Accumulator 11. Level Switches: Carbon steel body, statn- 400 pstg Fteld: 330 pstg Provtde remote. Magn~trol Hodel J30-1B20-BKD less steel float, float at IO0°F indication when liquid external float cage level designed for minimum 0.5 reaches preselected switch S.G. liquid. NEC Class I, hetght. Tag: LSH-8525 Accumulator Groups C & D, Division 1, Explosion proof. 12. Pressure Gauges: Stainless steel bourdon Range Field: to max. Indicate system Ascroft Models 45-1279 and tube, socket and tip. varies on scale pressure. · 451188 bourdon type pressure gauges. Tags: P[-8503 8522 8501A 13. ~~e Switch: 304 Statnles steel thermo- 1000 pstg Field: 450 pstg Cut.off power to Static-O-Ring ~~ure well ts only pressure or,ore evaporatortf swttch, Model 203LC-KK12STT containing part. NEC Class temperature gets' too' Tags: TSHH-8513 Evaporator "R' l, Groups C & D, Dtviston I,. high. TSHH-8518 Evaporator "B" Explosion proof. ATTACHMENT 2 (Continued) DESIGN OPERATION EqUIPHENT DESCRIPTION MATERIALS AND CONSTRUCTION CONDITIONS TESTS DESCRIPTION 14. Flow Element: 316 stainless steel pipe and 740 psig Fteld: 450 psig Flow measuring device Foxbaro 1" integral flow orifice plate at IO0°F element for small flows, Model IFOA-O1S1SV. Tag FE-8526 Ammonia from Accum. GENERAL NOTES: 1. All equipment is new (built or purchased in 1988). 2. All equipment is highly reliable and, wtth one exception, ts expected to have a service 11re ofmore than 30 years. The exception is the heating element tn the evaporators, whtch ts expected to last more than 5 years. (A 1003 spare ts Installed for this 1tee.) SECTION III FACILITY PLOT PLAN AND LAYOUT AND LOCATION OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT PLEASE SEE THE ATTACHED DRAWINGS REVISED AUGUST 1993 Page 4 AMMONIA RELEASE E~IERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN SOUTH EAST KERN~ RIVER- COGENERAT~ON FACILITY 3500 ALFRED HARRELL HIGHWAY ~BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA - SITE INFORMATION VISITOR BOOKLET SHELL WESTERN E&P INC. WEST COAST PRODUCTION DIVISION P.O. BOX 11164 BAKERSFIELD~ CA 93389 SECTION II GENERAL DISCUSSION 0)I AIqMONIA GAS/LIQUID A. BRIEF REVIEW At atmospheric temperatures and pressures, anhydrous ammonia is a pungent,' colorless gas that may easily be compressed or cooled to a colorless liquid. More detailed information is summarized in Appendix I. Pure liquid ammonia is lighter than water, and pure gaseous ammonia is lighter then air. A-cloud of pure ammonia.gas will be buoyant and rise into the atmosphere; however, depending on the pres.sur~ and tem- perature, air-ammonia mixtures denser than air may also be formed. This can occur when evaporating ammonia cools itself and the surrounding air. A saturated air-ammonia mixture, therefore, may 'r~main close to the ground and not disperse very readily.. Water readily absorbs ammonia to make ammonia liquor {an~onium hydroxide or aqua ammonia}. 'B. TOXICOLOGICAL AND HEALTH EFFECTS Depending on the concentration, the effects of exposure to mnmonia gas range from mild irritation to severe corrosion of sensitive membranes of the eyes, nose, throat and lungs. Because of the high solubility of .ammonia in water, it is particularly irritating to moist skin su~aces. A concentration of 500 ~om has been designated as the IDLH concentraticn /Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health!, which is based on a 30-minute exposure. Table One summarizes the predicted human health effects from increasing1 concentrations of ammonia gas. Ammonia is immediately recognizable at low concentrations because of its pungent odor. Ammonia is not a cumulative metabolic poison; ammonium ions are actually important constituents of living systems. However, inhalation of high levels of ammonia gas may have fatal consequenc_~s because of the spasm, inflammation and edema of the larynx and bronchi, chemical pneumonitis and pulmonar~y edema. Exposure of the eyes to' high concentrations may result in ulceration of the conjunctiva and cornea and destruction of all ocular tissues. To understand hazards of different levels of the ammonia concmntration, please refer to Table One. Contact of' the skin with liquid amnonia may cause freezing of the tissue, since liquid ammonia vaporizes rapidly until reaching -28°F when released to the atmospher~ and will absorb heat from any substance it, contacts. If .the skin is moist, it ma), also cause severe burns from the caustic action of the. ammonium hydroxide produced. C~,AB8904501 - 0004.0.0. ('REV. '2/17/89) TABL£ ONE. PREDICTED NUMAN HEALl~ EFFECTS OF 'EXI~OSURE TO VARIOUS CONCENTRATIONS OF ANHYDROUS AMMONIA -pp~ Effect 5 Least perceptible odor 20-50 Readily detectable odor 40 A few individuals may suffer slight eye irritation 100 Noticeable irritation of eyes and nasal passages after a~few minutes exposure '. i50-200 General discomfort and eye tearing; no lasting effect from short exposure 400 Severe irritation of the throat, nasal passages, and upper respiratory tract 700 Severe eye irritation; no permanent effect if the' exposure is limited to less than 1/2 hour 1700 Serious coughing, bronchial spasms, burning and blistering of the skin; less than 1/2 hour of exposure may be fatal 5000-10000 Serious edema, strangulation, asphyxia, rapidly fatal 10000 Immediately fatal Source: Control of Accidental Releases of An~nonia, Vol. ¢, Air & Energy Engineering Research Lab, EPA, August 1987, EPA/60O/8-87/O34d. CPABSgQ4§O1 - 0005.0.0 (RE~. 2/17/89) SHIPPING NAM~ ~h~mus ~monia~r mn~~~ (~] ~I~ FORMU~ ~ N~ ~. J_ ~SURE MATER~ Ammani~ NHa 7~1-7 ~ ~9~ ~ ~am ~ oam .- I APP~CE ANO OOOR: Calorie~ g~ ar li~ ~ ~eme~ ~gent g~ble. J I COND~CNS~ AVOI~f Na~li~l~ POLYM~qI~T1ON ~II Not O~ J I Call CHEMTREC Let ammonia e~te or s~ak into ~round: ~e~e of - ' 1~ ~ounO~r more at N~ ~in 24 h~ m~t ~ m~ ~ ~ Na~ ~ C~t~ - ~r ha=rdou= ~e reguladon= ~11800~2~ ~e R~ ~ady t~ue~ lnhala~am ~e g~ ~ pungent and ~n be ~ff~ It ~ ~ i~ng la the mucus methanes severe iteration ~r. Skin Contac: Imm~ia/e~y flu~ ~th large quan~ez of ~ f~r~/le~ ~ ~ut~ while reaping ~=~ing. Clowning frc:~n the skin s~culd be ~v~ wi~n waler ~eiore rem~L S~ m~ aid. ETe ~n~c: ~ ~m I~e ~mcunc ai ~t~r for ~ Never give ~ing by maut~ to ~ un~o~ ~mo~ . - · RE,Pt RATORY: protection ~egen~ an t~e ~e and magnitude of ~a~(~ ~:~ l~ RuO~er gl~e~ and ~b~er or ~C~ylon/~C l~inate am~ ~{~ ~u~ be ~ to a~v~nt s~in c:ntzcL A ~c~ ~out~ be ~ad wh~ ~roariate to 0~enl c~n~m~~u~ O~ER PR~E~ EQUIPM~: · ' PREC~a, LFTIC)N~ TO BE TAKEN IN HANDLING AND b'TGFLAG~' Protect cantainer~ from e:u:e-_.h-ive heat {greater than 120eF') ar ~tnt~c:~ d~maa_e. Use on~ ~==mved ~re~sure ve~e Is --oor~oriata reiief de~c~.~.~. Zinc. c:~o0er and c:,o~er base 3tla~ ~ ~ ~ am m0ic(Iy ~rrr.~ed Oy moist ammonia.. [~eL ~eri~ Natioo~ S~d~ I~ti~te. P~ohlet O~ER COMME~: ~longed inhalation o~ high con~nt~o~ m~ ~e b~ ~/~ ~mon~ ~Gh ~me ~i~U~ reduction in nc~o~ ~ymo/oms al lung edema ar~ often later (~llya f~ ~u~]. ~d ~ agg~;~ ~ ~h~i~l efio~ [H~n~lin~ (Oc~a=aon~ O~e~ A guide to Their Rec=gnition, ~ ~L ~W. Ig~ Can~ i~s~ould n~t be ~rn when ~ing with ~moni~ ~e(her a ~hemi~l c=~ge ~imlor or 3 ~tf~n~ ~i~g ~aOamtus is sui~en~ reso~lo~ grot~ion de~ds uoan ~e ~e ~ ~g~e o~ ~i~ info.arian i~ ~ken lmm ~ou~s or b~ ~ dam befi~ lo be mfia~e: h~vet, Latitude ln~u~fi~ Inc m~es SECTION XII SOUTHEAST KE~ RIYER CDGENE'RATION FACILIl~ E~ERGE~CY EYACUATIO~ PROCEDURE 1. PURPOSE: This procedure is meant to provide safe and orderly evacuation of the plant in any~ emergency, including fire, earthquake, mmnonia leak, and bomb threat. To ensure that no one is trapped inside the facilities, all personnel must congregate at a designated gathering area and remain there until instructed otheraise by the senior SWEPI representative present. 2. SIGNAL: Red emergency beacons are provided throughout the facility as well as an air horn to signal all personnel of imminent or current dangerous conditions. Wind socks are located at each end of the main No~h-South pipe rack, hear the control mom and in the Dehy. Any time the red beacon is flashing, or if the air horn sounds, all personnel must immediately proceed to the designated gathering area. The red beacon may be tested from time to time; personnel will be advised prior to such testing. 3. INSTRUCTION RESPONSIBILITY: Anyone entering the plant must be informed of this procedure and the meaning and locations of the air horn and red emergenc~, beacons.. The plant technician shall inform non-SWEPI personnel including maintenance and construction supervisors of the purpose of the horn and beacons and the evacuation procedure and routes. 4. EIqERGENCY GATHF. RING AREAS: (Refer to the attached figure) The primary gathering area is immediately inside the auto entrance (West) gate. In the event that location is inaccessible due to fire, smoke, or ammonia in the area, proceed to the seconda~ gathering area at the manual (South) gate. In the event both of the above are blocked, proceed to area ~3 northeast of the contr~l room. ' 5. AI~ONIA LEAKS: Ammonia has a distinct odori if personnel smell ammonia, check the nearest wind sock and then travel cross-wind. If the odor becomes stronger, reverse the path to safety. For locations of wind socks, refer to the attached "Emergency Gathering Areas and Wind Sock Locations.' CPAB8904501 - 0025.0.0 (REV. 2/17/89) Shell Western E&P Ina. .. WEST COAST PRODUCTION DIVISION GENEI~L PLOT PLAN · SEICR DEHY/WATE~COG~ PLANT EMERGL~CY GATHERING AREA &. WINDSOCK LOCATIONS "d"~H .H LOADING GAI'E .AUMONiA o STORAGE TANK ~ 0 ri n 0 WATER EAST, GATE 0 0 0 WATER " AUTO WELL GATE~ I ESD STATION COGEN DEHY '/ ....... '"" CONTROL · ROOM ESD FATION 'F 'WINDSOCK LOCATIONS .................... "'"'"'". ~"~ CALIFORHIA 0 GATIIERING .' AREA MANUAL . , ~ ~CAO GRAPHICS GATE ~,~ IGO289011E$ ' SHELL WESTERN E&P, 7INC. South East Kern River Cogeneration FacilitT- Minimum visitor regulations - Other requirements will be specified depending on the purpose of the visit. 1~ Hats and ~ ~. Ail visitors shall wear OSHA approved hard-hats and safety glasses in all areas of the plant. Safety glasses wil~ be loaned to personnel without their own. 2. ~ Visitors shall observe warnings contained on signs within the facilities which advise of area conditions, restrictions, hazards, and any additional requirements for Personnel Protective Equipment - especially Hearing Protection. 3. ~. Smoking within 100 feet of any facility equipment is prohibited. Smoking outside the Central Control Building is prohibited unless specific permission is granted by the SWEPI person in charge. 4. ~ ~ The Endangered Species Awareness Program brochure given to you shall govern all contract with wildlife on or around the.plant site. A plant emergency is signaled both by an air horn and by flashing red beacons located throughout the facility. When the horn sounds or beacons are flashing, the visitor is to immediately proceed - by one of the routes identified by the person giving you this form - to one of the Emergency Gathering Areas (Map Attached) and await instructions. In general, escape routes should be crosswind and away from overhead lines or congestions of equipment. Other Requirements (if any): I have read, understand, and will comply with the SEKR Cogen minimum visitor regulations and emergency action requirements and will keep the map of Emergency Gathering Areas and windsock locations on my person at all times Signature Date (PLEASE PRINT NAME) Company/Affiliation File: Plant ~ Registrations