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RISK MANAGEMENT FILE 1/25/1993
~ NAME [~ ' ~:~:' ADDRESS CITY PHONE ~'~'~:' ~- '~"'~::~ P~,.TSO~ ~.CHI SIZE OF PRINT . ENCL~ED FI:M S~Z~ - ¢ ~IN CHECK TIME IN: ~:~ 3x 4x Enl. Other DUE OU q.3/ ........ ~ TOTAL ~=~~~]~~~ ~ ~ P~OTO 2000 ~ · Same Day Color Print Servico · Reprints · Enlargements I Prints from Slides ~,~ · Copies =---- ~e use,~ -PMO~O I~g~ THE KODAK -- sign up NOW! TICKETS NOW ON SALE! ' ~v'ednesda~ February' 5th. ~:0Op~m. to 10:0Op.m. Learn the lateSt photo Tickets $12 Noti~et sales at the doorl techniques from one of Presented by~ a Kodak's ~st a~omplished HCN[CYS staff photographerS! Sure to be a sellout~ Call for mom information 324-9484 MEMORANDUM "WE CARE" APril 7, 1993 TO: Esther Duran ' FROM: Barbara Brenner SUBJECT: ' RMPP Billing Please generate biffs for time.spent reviewing ~RMPP docUments or conducting RMPP implementation inspections at the following locations. 1. Gist-brocades 9 hr x 47.25/hr = $425.25' /~'~- / ~ 2: Crystal Geyser 2.5 hr x 47.25 = $118.13 3, Pacific Bell (#896) 1 hr x 47.25 = $47.25 4,, Pacific Bell (#895) 1 hr x 47.25 = $47.25 5. Pacific Bell (#653) 1.25 hr x 47.25 = $59.06 ~;? 'Valley Propeller 3.5 hr x 47.25 = $165.38 7. '~Nestle (#1407) 3.'0 hr x 47.25 = $141175 8. San ,Joaqu!n Commuhity Hospital. 3.5 x 47.25 = $165.38 9. A"~go Chemical 5.25 x 47.25 = $248.06 Total RMPP Billings 1st quarter of 1993 = $1,417.51 cc: Ralph Huey ' · ~ MATER ~oUs IAI~DIVISION TIME CHARGED BUSINESS/DEAPRTMENT NAME: _(f'~,'5-~- .~r~v425 ADDRess: 0-'q,55 ~,'~Tr,.c~ q3~/~ PROJECT NUMBER: · : TIME DATE: NAME: :' CHGD: COMMENTS: PROJECT COMPLETION: DATE: ZARDOUS ffATERIALS DIVIS ION~'~ FIRE DEPARTMENT T I ME CHARGED 2101 H STREET S. D. JOHNSON BAKERSFIELD, 93301 FIRE CHIEF 326-3911 TIME DATE: N~E: CHGD: CO~ENTS: H~g~RDOUS ~TERI~LS FIRE DEPARTMENT ~ I ~E CHARGE D 2101 H STREET S. D. JOHNSON BAKERSFIELD, 93301 FIRE CHIEF 326-3911 DATE: N~E: CHGD: C0~ENTS: 7 ~~// /] "WE CARE" FIRE DEPARTMENT T I ME CHARGED 21oi H STREET S. D. JOHNSON BAKERSFIELD, 93301 FiRE CHIEF 326-3911 PROJECT DESCRIPTION: %~-', . ~h~5 ~¢Qn~ TIME DATE: N~E: CHGD: CO~ENTS: '~ ' -01' "~J 1-~ -~ ~~ i. 5 ~: ~ ~ ~c~/~'~ ........... CITY°f BAKERSFIELD "WE CARE" . FIRE DEPARTMENT 2101 H ~TREET s. o. JOHNSON AugUst 3, 1993 ~KERSFmLD. 93301 FIRE CHIEF 326-3911 Mr. Lloyd Fry Gist-brocades Food Ingredients, Inc. 5455 DistriCt Blvd. Bakersfield, CA 93313' Lloyd' Thank you for conducting the plant tours for our first responders and haz mat teams. The following items need some follow up attention. 1. We need a copy of your revised site map as soon as possible. 2. The method of restraint for the 150# chlorine cylinder was insufficient. Compressed gas cylinders must be restrained around the body of the cylinder. Never attach restraints around the valve or neck of a cylinder. The restraint must be attached to a sturdy support. The chlorine cylinder at Gist was attached to what appeared to be a rather wobbly electrical conduit. As we discussed, this situation needs to be corrected immediately. 3. Several of the drum chemicals had inadequate labels. For instance the 40% sulfuriC acid - 15% phosphoric acid had a hand written, almost illegible label. Container labeling must clearly state the hazardous ingredients or display the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) hazard ratings. I have attached the NFPA classification definitions and placarding standard for your use. 4. Several of the haz mat storage tanks bear only small labels that are placed Iow and are impossible to see from a distance. Labeling on tanks needs to be large and visible from a distance for purposes of hazard assessment during a fire or haz mat incident. The Fire Department does require the use of the NFPA hazard identification diamond on all hazardous material above ground storage tanks. 5. Section 80.401 (c)2B of the Uniform Fire Code requires emergency shutoff valves to be identified and the location to be clearly visible and indicated by raeans of a sign. We particularly wish to see the shutoff valves in the systems handling acutely hazardous materials marked per the UFC requirement. 6. Due to the fact that the generation of hydrogen is possible in the event of a sulfuric acid spill, we request that your emergency planning include provisions to extinguish ignition sources on the exterior deck if a sulfuric acid spill occurs. We understand that it is not likely that hydrogen would be able to accumulate in this area. However, hydrogen has a very broad explosive range, and our ability to monitor for the lower explosive limit would be inhibited by the corrosive nature of the acid vapors. Corrosive environments will quickly burn out our detection equipment. We especially appreciate your efforts toward labeling the tanks that contain only molasses and water. In an industrial setting, identification of non-hazardous materials is also very valuable to emergency responders. I have added the location of the lock box and weather station to your hazardous materials management plan. Please address the items.listed above as soon as possible. I will contact you with in the next month to follow up on the resolution of these items. Thanks again for all of your cooperation. Sincerely, Barbara Brenner Hazardous Materials Planning Technician cc:' Ralph Huey ANHYDROUS AMMONIA AT GIST-BROCADES 1,535,151 FT3 = 68,533 LBS = 13,256 GAL (BULK STORAGE) CHEMICAL HAZARDS: 'CORROSIVE, TOXIC REACTS VIOLENTLY WITH ACIDS AND OXIDIZERS FLAMMABILITY LIMITS = 16 - 25% IN AIR RUN OFF HAS HIGH pH TOXIC FIRE PRODUCTS PHYSICAL HAZARDS: COMPRESSED GAS ---> MAY BLEVE IF EXPOSED TO EXCESS HEAT EXTREME COLD AT THE POINT OF LIQUID RELEASE OR EVAPORATION ACTS AS A HEAVY GAS EVACUATION: 2,000 - 3,000 FEET DOWNWIND (NTC) ISOLATE 300 FEET, PROTECT DOWNWIND FOR 1 MILE (DOT) PPE: FULLY ENCAPSULATED PROTECTIVE CLOTHING, SCBA-(DOT) LEVEL A (NTC) RESPONSE: COOL CYLINDERS THREATENED BY FIRE STAY AWAY FROM ENDS OF CYLINDERS DuE TO POSSIBLE BLEVE VAPOR PLUMES MAY BE ABSORBED,USING WATER FOG DO 'NOT ADD WATER TO LIQUID AMMONIA POOL DUE TO INCREASE OF EVAPORATION RATE COVERING A LEAK WITH A TARP MAY CAUSE IT TO FREEZE CLOSED CONTAIN RUNOFF FOR NEUTRALIZATION DECON: REMOVE CONTAMINATED CLOTHES - LAUNDER OR DOUBLE BAG SHOWER-WITH soAP AND WATER WASH EQUIPMENT WITH WATER FIRST AID: MOVE VICTIM TO FRESH AIR REMOVE CONTAMINATED CLOTHING FLUSH EXPOSED EYES AND SKIN WITH RUNNING WATER FOR 15 MIN PROVIDE OXYGEN / CPR IF NECESSARY ,- 2 · ~ GIST-BROCADES " ANHYDROUS AMMONIA CONVERSION SYSTEM , Set at , ......... .~ 25 psig AQUA To Exco VENI' Fermentation Val~,os >[] ~ & TANK Towers Liquid Ammonia Line Excess Flow Pressure Reducing Valve Set at 120 psig Valve CHLORINE AT GIST-BROCADES 18,720 FT3 = 3744 LBS (2, ONE TON CYLINDERS) CHEMICAL HAZARDS: CORROSIVE, ToxIC, OXIDIZER REACTS VIOLENTLY WITH ACIDS AND OXIDIZERS NOT FLAMMABLE RUN OFF HAS LOW pH - FORMS HYDROCHLORIC ACID WITH WATER TOXIC FIRE PRODUCTS PHYSICAL HAZARDS: COMPRESSED GAS ---> MAY BLEVE IF EXPOSED TO EXCESS HEAT EXTREME COLD AT THE POINT OF LIQUID RELEASE OR EVAPORATION ACTS AS A HEAVY GAS EVACUATION: 0.7 - 1.0 .MILE DOWNWIND (N.TC) ISOLATE 1,500 FE.ET, PROTECT DOWNWIND FOR 5 MILES (DOT) PPE: FULLY ENCAPSULATED PROTECTIVE CLOTHING, SCBA (DOT) LEVEL A (NTC) RESPONSE: COOL CYLINDERS THREATENED BY FIRE STAY AWAY FROM ENDS OF CYLINDERS DUE TO POSSIBLE BLEVE VAPOR PLUMES MAY BE ABSORBED USING WATER FOG DO NOT APPLY WATER DIRECTLY TO A LEAKING LINE OR CYLINDER THE FORMATION OF HYDROCHLORIC ACID WORSENS THE LEAK TURN A CYLINDER THAT IS LEAKING LIQUID UNTIL THE HOLE IS IN TOWARD THE TOP OF THE CYLINDER AND IS LEAKING GAS CONTAIN RUNOFF FOR NEUTRALIZATION DECON: REMOVE CONTAMINATED CLOTHES - AIR OUT/LAUNDER SHOWER WITH SOAP AND WATER AIR OUT EQUIPMENT, WASH IT WITH WATER, WIPE DOWN WITH SODIUM BISULFITE FIRST AID: MOVE VICTIM TO FRESH AIR REMOVE CONTAMINATED CLOTHING FLUSH EXPOSED EYES AND SKIN WITH RUNNING WATER FOR 15 MIN PROVIDE OXYGEN / CPR IF NECESSARY 2 GIST-BROCADES , COOLING TOWER. CHLORINATI©N SYSTEM " Typical to Ton Container Automatic ~> } other Ejectors " Control Valve % Feed Residual Regulator 4-20 mA Chlorine Signal :~:>.; Analyzer To Cooling Tower Basin ~ To Spargers in the Cooling Tower-Basin Ejector ~ PIPING KEY Circulation System Cooling Tower Turbine Pump Thin Lines = Vacuum Lines · Bold Lines = Pressure Lines Dashed Lines = Electronic Signal 93% SULFURIC ACID AT GIST-BROCADES 7OO GALLONS (BULK STORAGE) CHEMICAL HAZARDS: CORROSIVE, OXIDIZER REACTS VIOLENTLY WITH WATER - BOILS, SPATTERS, FUMES LIQUID IS NOT FLAMMABLE BUT MAY IGNITE COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS REACTS WITH MANY METALSAND CONCRETE RELEASING HYDROGEN RUN OFF TO SEWER IS AN EXPLOSION HAZARD RUN OFF HAS LOW pH TOXIC FIRE PRODUCTS PHYSICAL HAZARDS: VAPORS ARE HEAVIER THAN AIR OILY LIQUID IS DIFFICULT TO WASH OFF EVACUATION: ISOLATE SILL AREA FOR AT LEAST 50 FEET (DOT) PPE: CHEMICALLY PROTECTIVE CLOTHING, SCBA (DOT) SCBA AND ENCAPSULATED SUIT (NTC) RESPONSE: MONITOR AREA FOR FLAMMABLE HYDROGEN GASES' 'SUPPRESS SMALL FIRES WITH' DRY CHEMICAL, CO2 OR HALON SUPPRESS LARGE FIRES BY FLOODING WITH WATER FROM A DISTANCE ALLOW SPILLS TO DRAIN INTO PLANT SPILL CONTAINMENT SYSTEM WITHOUT ADDING ANY' WATER CONTAIN RUNOFF FOR NEUTRALIZATION DECON: REMOVE CONTAMINATED CLOTHES QUICKLY- LAUNDER OR DOUBLE BAG SHOWER WITH SOAP AND WATER, CHECK CAREFULLY FOR BURNS WASH EQUIPMENT WITH WATER, WIPE DOWN WITH BICARBONATE OF SODA FIRST AID: MOVE VICTIM TO FRESH AIR REMOVE CLOTHING AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE FLUSH EXPOSED EYES AND SKIN WITH RUNNING WATER FOR 15 MIN, BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ~' PROVIDE OXYGEN ! (::;PR IF NECESSARY 2 GIST-BROCADES ., SULFURIC ACID SYSTEM FERMENTATION TANKS ~YORTH SCALE: 1"=100' BUSINESS NA~XE: Busch Industrial Products Fr~OOR: 1 OF 2 Anheuser Busch Inc. DATE: 6/£ / 87FACir. ITY NC~.E:J~akersfie]d Yeast Plant, b~IT -:1 OF 1 (CHECK ONE) SiTE DrAGR.~[ FACILI2'Y D[AGP~Y X DIS-l-PICT BB/D, -- --~ ~UINM~ ~ ~ I~.o I ~ GATE ~ I ~ .... ~- ,. ,~ ,METAL 'l- ~ ~[ ~. , M~© N~Y - PAVEMENT -- .... - .. "- '"-'.' , :.. "'5 05/06/93 GIST BRoCADEs FOOD INGREDIENTS 215-000-000438 Page 1 00 - Overall Site . <H> RMPP DATA <1> Release Containment COOL CHLORINE AND AMMONIA CYLINDERS WITH WATER IF EXPOSED TO FIRE. EXPOSURE TO HEAT MAY CAUSE PRESSURE RELEIF DEVICES TO DISCHARGE GASES. CHLORINE "B" REPAIR KIT ONSITE. TURN CYLINDER TO LOCATE LEAK IN THE VAPOR SPACE. .~ SULFURIC ACID'REACTS WITH SOME METALS AND CONCRETE TO RELEASE HYDROGEN GAS. HYDROGEN EVOLUTION RATE IS NOT EXPECTED TO BE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT COMBUSTION. HOWEVER, THE AREA SHOULD BE MONITORED FOR FLAMMABLE HYDROGEN GAS CONCENTRATIONS. THE NEAREST IN PLANT IGNITION SOURCE IS 80 FT. AWAY AT THE . SULFURIC ACID TANK IS VENTED TO ATMOSPHERE. OVERPRESSURIZATEION IS NOT A CONCERN. ADDITION OF WATER TO SULFURIC ACID WILL EVOLVE HEAT AND CAN CAUSE OFF GASING OF CORROSIVE FUMES. SULFURIC ACID SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO FLOW INTO SPILL CONTROL SYSTEM. AVOID WASHING SPILL AREAS WITH WATER PRIOR TO NEUTRALIZATION OF THE ACID.' <2> Offsite Consequences CAMEO VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS: CHLORINE: WORST CASE VAPOR RELEASE ESTIMATED TO BE 14.6 LB/MINUTE WIND SPEED = 5 MPH 2.5 PPM (LOC): AT NIGHT PLUME EXTENDS 1'6 MILES DURING DAY PLUME EXTENDS 0.32 MILES 25 PPM (IDLH): AT NIGHT PLUME EXTENDS 0.4 MILES DURING DAY PLUME EXTENDS 0.1 MILES AMMONIA: 2" DELIVERY HOSE OR LINE FAILURE RELEASE~ESTIMATED AT 996 LB/MIN WIND SPEED = 5 MPH 50 PPM (LOC): DURING DAY PLUME EXTENDS 0.5 MILES 500 PPM (IDLH): DURING DAY PLUME EX~ENDS 0.16 MILES IF THE ANHYDROUS AMMONIA TANK IS SUBJECTED TO FIRE EACH PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE WILL OPERATE AT A MINIMUM OF 6835 FT3/MIN = 305 LB/MIN. THE AMMONIA SYSTEM EXCESS FLOW VALVES SHOULD CLOSE IF THE AMMONIA FLOW .RATE EXCEEDS: 05/06/93 GIST BROCADES FOOD INGREDIENTS 215-000-000438 Page. 2 00 - Overall Site ~ <H> RMPP DATA <2> Offsite Consequences (Continued) VALVE THREADED INTO THE STORAGE TANK - 225 GAL/MIN = 1159 LB/MIN VALVE PROTECTING 1" LIQUID FEED LINE - 24 GAL/MIN = 124 LB/MIN VALVE PROTECTING VAPOR RETURN LINE - 95 GAL/MIN = 489 LB/MIN ANY UNCONTROLLED RELEASES DOWNSTREAM OF THE EXCESS FLOW VALVES SHOULD BE AT RATES LESS THAN THESE SET POINTS FOR VALVE CLOSURE. SULFURIC ACID: CORROSIVE FUMES FROM A SPILL ARE NOT EXPECTED TO MIGRATE OFFSITE. <3> In HoUse Capabilities PLANT STAFF ARE TRAINED TO USE THE 3 SCBA ON SITE FOR ROUTINE OPERATIONS SUCH AS FILLING OF THE ANHYDROUS AMMONIA TANK. THEY ARE PREPARED TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TO ACTIVATE SHUTOFF VALVES IF A RELEASE OCCURS DURING FILLING OPERATIONS.. SEE SECTION G<i> FOR A LIST OF EMPLOYEES TRAINED TO USE THE SCBA. PLANT STAFF ARE NOT TRAINED TO OSHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE LEVEL FOR RE-ENTRY, CONTROL AND CONTAINMENT OPERATIONS. <4> Plant Shutdown Instruction PLANT MANNED 24 HRS/DAY. SECURITY SERVICE ONLY ONSITE BETWEEN ANHYDROUS AMMONIA AT GIST-BROCADES 1,535,151 FTs = 68,533 LBS = 13,256 GAL (BU..LK STORAGE) CHEMICAL HAZARDS:. 'CORROSIVE, TOXIC REACTS VIOLENTLY WITH ACIDS AND OXIDIZERS FLAMMABILITY LIMITS = 1.6 - 25% IN AIR RUN OFF HAS HIGH pH TOXIC FIRE PRODUCTS PHYSICAL HAZARDS: COMPRESSED GAS ---> MAY BLEVE IF EXPOSED TO EXCESS HEAT EXTREME COLD AT THE POINT OF LIQUID RELEASE OR EVAPORATION ACTS AS A HEAVY GAS EVACUATION: 2,000 - 3,000 FEET DOWNWIND (NTC) ISOLATE 300 FEET, PROTECT DOWNWIND FOR 1 MILE (DOT) PPE: FULLY ENCAPSULATED PROTECTIVE CLOTHING, SCBA (DOT) LEVEL A (NTC) . RESPONSE: COOL CYLINDERS THREATENED BY FIRE STAY AWAY FROM ENDS OF CYLINDERS DuE TO POSSIBLE BLEVE VAPOR PLUMES MAY BE ABSORBED USING WATER FOG DO NOT ADD WATER TO LIQUID AMMONIA POOL DUE TO INCREASE OF EVAPORATION RATE COVERING A LEAK WITH A TARP MAY CAUSE IT TO FREEZE CLOSED CONTAIN RUNOFF FOR NEUTRALIZATION DECON: REMOVE CONTAMINATED CLOTHES - LAUNDER OR DOUBLE BAG SHOWER WITH SOAP AND WATER WASH EQUIPMENT WITH WATER FIRST AID: MOVE VICTIM TO FRESH AIR REMOVE CONTAMINATED CLOTHING FLUSH EXPOSED EYES AND SKIN WITH RUNNING WATER FOR 15 MIN PROVIDE OXYGEN / CPR IF NECESSARY GIST-BROCADES ANHYDROUS AMMONIA CONVERSION SYSTEM I Sol at ' ......... ~ 25 psig HYDROMETER STORAGE TANK Return Line / ~'~T''f°r~tO- TANK ' Exce VENT To Valves ...~i,~ /"¢;%/'~ TANK Fermenlation Liquid Ammonia Line ? Excess Flow PressUre Reducing Valve Valve Set at 120 psig CHLORINE AT GIST-BROCADES 18,720 FT3 = 3744 LBS (2, ONE TON CYLINDERS) CHEMICAL HAZARDS: CORROSIVE, TOXIC, OXIDIZER REACTS VIOLENTLY WITH ACIDS AND OXIDIZERS NOT FLAMMABLE RUN OFF HAS LOW pH - FORMS HYDROCHLORIC ACID WITH WATER TOXIC FIRE PRODUCTS PHYSICAL HAZARDS: COMPRESSED GAS ---> MAY BLEVE IF EXPOSED TO EXCESS HEAT EXTREME COLD AT THE POINT OF LIQUID RELEASE OR EVAPORATION ACTS AS A HEAVY GAS EVACUATION: 0.7- 1.0 MILE DOWNWIND (NTC) ISOLATE 1,500 FEET, PROTECT DOWNWIND FOR 5 MILES (DOT) PPE: FULLY ENCAPSULATED PROTECTIVE CLOTHING, SCBA (DOT) LEVEL A:(NTC) RESPONSE: COOL CYLINDERS THREATENED BY FIRE STAY AWAY FROM ENDS OF CYLINDERS DUE TO POSSIBLE BLEVE VAPOR PLUMES MAY BE ABSORBED USING WATER FOG DO NOT APPLY WATER DIRECTLY TO A LEAKING LINE OR CYLINDER THE FORMATION OF HYDROCHLORIC ACID WORSENS THE LEAK TURN A CYLINDER THAT IS LEAKING LIQUID UNTIL THE HOLE IS IN TOWARD THE TOP OF THE CYLINDER AND IS LEAKING GAS CONTAIN RUNOFF FOR NEUTRALIZATION DECON: REMOVE CONTAMINATED CLOTHES - AIR OUT/LAUNDER SHOWER WITH SOAP AND WATER AIR OUT EQUIPMENT, WASH IT WITH WATER, WIPE DOwN WITH SODIUM BISULFITE FIRST AID: MOVE VICTIM TO FRESH AIR REMOVE CONTAMINATED CLOTHING FLUSH EXPOSED EYES AND SKIN WITH RUNNING WATER FOR 15 MIN PROVIDE OXYGEN / CPR IF NECESSARY ~2 GIST-BROCADES COOLING TOWER _CHLORINATION SYSTEM } Typical to other Ton Container Automatic Ejectors ~ Chl°rine~l°w R°t°meters I Control Valve % Vacuum Feed Residual Regulator 4-20 mA /,Chlorine Signal :~>; ,¢~¢/Analyzer To Cooling Tower Basin To Spargers in the Cooling Tower Basin Ejector PiPiNG KEY Circulation System Cooling Tower Turbine Pump Thin Lines = Vacuum Lines Bold Lines = Pressure Lines Dashed Lines = Electronic Signal 93% SULFURIC ACID AT GIST-BROCADES 700 GALLONS (BULK STORAGE) CHEMICAL HAZARDS: CORROSIVE, OXIDIZER REACTS VIOLENTLY WITH WATER - BOLLS, SPATTERS, FUMES LIQUID IS NOT FLAMMABLE BUT MAY IGNITE COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS 'REACTS WITH MANY METALS AND CONCRETE RELEASING HYDROGEN RUN OFF TO SEWER IS AN EXPLOSION HAZARD RUN OFF HAS LOW pH TOXIC FIRE PRODUCTS PHYSICAL HAZARDS: VAPORS ARE ,HEAVIER THAN AIR OILY LIQUID IS DIFFICULT TO WASH OFF EVACUATION: ISOLATE SILL AREA FOR AT LEAST 50 FEET (DOT) PPE: CHEMICALLY PROTECTIVE CLOTHING, SCBA (DOT) SCBA AND ENCAPSULATED SUIT (NTC) RESPONSE: MONITOR AREA FOR FLAMMABLE HYDROGEN GASES SUPPRESS SMALL FIRES WITH DRY CHEMICAL, CO2 OR HALON SUPPRESS LARGE FIRES BY FLOODING WITH WATER FROM A DISTANCE ALLOW SPILLS TO DRAIN INTO PLANT SPILL CONTAINMENT SYSTEM WITHOUT ADDING ANY, WATER CONTAIN RUNOFF FOR NEUTRALIZATION DECON: REMOVE CONTAMINATED CLOTHES QUICKLY- LAUNDER OR DOUBLE BAG SHOWER WITH SOAP AND WATER, CHECK CAREFULLY FOR BURNS WASH EQUIPMENT WITH WATER, WIPE DOWN WITH BICARBONATE OF SODA FIRST AID: MOVE VICTIM TO FRESH AIR REMOVE CLOTHING AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE FLUSH EXPOSED EYES AND SKIN WITH RUNNING WATER FOR 15 MIN, BEGIN IMMEDIATELY PROVIDE OXYGEN ! CPR IF NECESSARY GIST-BROCADES / SULFURIC ACID SYSTEM STORAGE '/'" DOSING T~S FE~ATIO~ TA~S · ' ._ ITE/~ACILITY : ~ 0 ~M ~ NORTH SCALE: 1"=100' BUSIh'ESS N~E: Busch Industrial Products FLOOR: 1 CFi2 Anheuser Busch Inc. DATE: 6./2 / 87FACILITY ~%XE:J3akersfield Yeast Plant. b~T ~:1 OF 1 (CHECK ONE) SITE DIAGR.%~[ FACILITY DIAG~%~ X D STR C¥ BLVD, GA~ WATEPr · XX 1 ~ PAVEMENT (Inspector.' s:. Comments) -OFFICIAL. USE ONLY- ® 05/06/93 GIST BROCADES FOOD INGREDIENTS 215-000-000438 Page 1 00 - Overall Site <H> RMPP DATA <1> Release Containment COOL CHLORINE AND AMMONIA CYLINDERS WITH WATER IF EXPOSED TO FIRE. EXPOSURE TO HEAT MAY CAUSE PRESSURE RELEIF DEVICES TO DISCHARGE GASES. CHLORINE "B" REPAIR KIT ONSITE. TURN CYLINDER TO LOCATE LEAK IN THE VAPOR SPACE. SULFURIC ACID REACTS WITH SOME METALS AND CONCRETE TO RELEASE HYDROGEN GAS. HYDROGEN EVOLUTION RATE IS NOT EXPECTED TO BE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT COMBUSTION. HOWEVER, THE AREA SHOULD BE MONITORED FOR FLAMMABLE HYDROGEN GAS CONCENTRATIONS. THE NEAREST IN PLANT IGNITION SOURCE IS 80 FT. AWAY AT THE . SULFURIC ACID TANK IS VENTED TO ATMOSPHERE. OVERPRESSURIZATEION IS NOT A CONCERN. ADDITION OF WATER TO SULFURIC'ACID WILL EVOLVE HEAT AND CAN CAUSE OFF GASING OF CORROSIVE FUMES. SULFURIC ACID SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO FLOW INTO SPILL CONTROL SYSTEM. AVOID WASHING SPILL AREAS WITH WATER PRIOR TO NEUTRALIZATION ~OF THE ACID. <2> Offsite Consequences CAMEO VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS: CHLORINE: WORST CASE VAPOR RELEASE ESTIMATED TO BE 14.6 LB/MINUTE WIND SPEED = 5 MPH 2.5 PPM (LOC): AT NIGHT PLUME EXTENDS 1~6 MILES ~DURING DAY PLUME EXTENDS 0.32 MILES 25 PPM (IDLH): AT NIGHT PLUME EXTENDS 0.4 MILES DURING DAY PLUME EXTENDS 0.1 MILES AMMONIA: 2" DELIVERY HOSE OR LINE FAILURE RELEASE ESTIMATED AT 996 LB/MIN WIND sPEED = 5 MPH 50 PPM (LOC): DURING DAY PLUME EXTENDS 0.5 MILES 500 PPM (IDLH): DURING DAY PLUME EXTENDS 0.16 MILES IF THE ANHYDROUS AMMONIA TANK IS SUBJECTED TO FIRE EACH PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE WILL OPERATE AT A MINIMUM OF 6835 FT3/MIN = 305 LB/MIN. THEAMMONIA SYSTEM EXCESS FLOW VALVES SHOULD CLOSE IF THE AMMONIA FLOW RATE EXCEEDS: 05/06/93 GIST BROCADES FOOD INGREDIENTS 215-000-000438 Page 2 00 - Overall Site <H> RMPP DATA <2> Offsite Consequences (Continued) VALVE THREADED INTO THE STORAGE TANK - 225 GAL/MIN = 1159 LB/MIN VALVE PROTECTING 1" LIQUID FEED LINE - 24 GAL/MIN = 124 LB/MIN VALVE PROTECTING VAPOR RETURN LINE - 95 GAL/MIN = 489 LB/MIN ANY UNCONTROLLED RELEASES DOWNSTREAM OF THE EXCESS FLOW VALVES SHOULD BE AT RATES LESS THAN THESE SET POINTS FOR VALVE CLOSURE. SULFURIC ACID: CORROSIVE FUMES FROM A SPILL ARE NOT EXPECTED TO 'MIGRATE OFFSITE. <3> In House Capabilities PLANT STAFF ARE TRAINED TO USE THE 3 SCBA ON SITE FOR ROUTINE OPERATIONS SUCH AS FILLING OF THE ANHYDROUS AMMONIA TANK. THEY ARE PREPARED TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TO ACTIVATE SHUTOFF VALVES IF A RELEASE OCCURS DURING FILLING OPERATIONS.. SEE SECTION G<i> FOR A LIST OF EMPLOYEES TRAINED TO USE THE SCBA. PLANT STAFF ARE NOT TRAINED TO OSHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE LEVEL FOR RE-ENTRY, CONTROL AND CONTAINMENT OPERATIONS. <4> Plant Shutdown Instruction PLANT MANNED 24 HRS/DAY. 'SECURITY SERVICE ONLY ONSITE BETWEEN . GIST-BROCADES SULFURIC ACID SYSTEM GIST-BROCADES ANHYDROUS AMMONIA CONVERSION SYSTEM ' Set at ' ......... '~ 25 psig AQUA AMMON STORAGE TANK Am'monia Vapor Return Line -1 IxM-i (Nm)') , -- TANK r~ To Excess Flow , VENT Fermentation Valves TANK Towor. s Liquid Ammonia Line Excess Flow Pressure Reducing Valve Valve Set at 120 psig GIST-BROCADES COOLING TOWER CHLORINATION SYSTEM ~;:~} Typical to other Ton Container Automatic Ejectors Control Valve % Feed Residual Regulator 4-20 mA / Chlorine Signal ;~>; ,~ Analyzer To Cooling Tower Basin To Spargers in the Cooling Tower Basin Ejector To Cooling Tower PIPING KEY Circulation System Cooling Tower Turbine Pump Thin Lines = Vacuum Lines Bold Lines = Pressure Lines Dashed Lines = Electronic Signal PROOF OF PUBLICATION Proof of Publication of: State of California ~ss County of Kern ~ 6942 I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County aforesaid: I am over public notice the age of 18 years, .and not a party to or interested in the above entitled matter. I am the assistant principal clerk of the printer of The Bakersfield Californian, a newspaper of gen~[al--'circula- ~~0n ~anag~t~dPrev~(R~P) ~ ~n tion, printed and published daily in the City of ~-,,~, Slvd., Bakersfield CA. ~ The ~pp deser~s ~rogra~ ~ ~d ~n~ designed ~ P~v~t a Bakersfield, county of Kern, ~R~9~lala~ld~L~s and which newspaper has been adjudged a newspaper of general circulation by the Superior Court of the County ~ ~, ~ (6~) of Kern, State of California, under date of February 5, 1952, Case Number 57610; that the notice, of which the annexed is a printed copy, has been published in each regular and entire issue of said newspaper and not in any supplement thereof on the following dates, to wit: 3/26 all in the year 1993 I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and corr- ect. ~fg~ature Dated at Bakersfield, Ca MAR. 26, 1993. Michelle McPhetrid~e PROOF OF PUBLICATION "R EP O-RT :NAME':!:'.' A:F FIDAV:I.TS -. i~EGALS 'AFFIDAV'IT':RE:P.0R~[~.:i, FOR 3f/:26t93:. HAZ. MAT. DIV. ... . 'Th e B A K E R S F IEL O C A:L:IFO RN I,AN Ad. NUm~ber 6942 The BAK~ERSF~[ELD 'CJl:a'$~ ~ 5ZO, P~,O, BOX ~.4~0 GB/PO BAR B AR~ BREN. " ' B:AK E R~.F"~ ELD T~o:;¢al cOs~ ~9'.7Z :Rate: E-z Accou'n~ 3:2f3979F'~R BAKERS F:;IE~;D; .-' CA 933,0Z K~' N~J/nberS- 69/,2 ' The '8AKERSFIEL'D:~CALIFORNiAN lass 520 Ga/PO.' B'A:'~B'~RA 8REN P~O~ BOX' :,:,:.' BAKERSFIELD ~ S~art. 3/26 Sto .... - ..... ,---~ ,,, ,,. p 3/26 Run t~mes I ' Run, days(dates 2b 17 Bi Iling lines 1.~1 Inches Solici, tor .O.%a'l. Scost 19~72,.-. '~':,Rate-~,L1 ..,,,,: .... . ' ACC"ount ~;:~? "?¥'::' '".: ....... ~':~',':'~:?,;~" ,:,":S"¢,:'~'.· ?~,~?'~:;;,~;'~ ': '~: ':" , '. ;;"~-~ ,. '"~: ~:.:,F~;~ :¢;~::.,,. g. ~,O?.~ ~, :f.:: :. A ~.~;t,:~ ,;?~':,=R:~ B L-} C,:~,. N 0 ~ I.C E , A,. R- i-s' ~.; ~ ';~'~,~t~'"~:~ ]. -,, -'"; '.,' ,.., =:?,:'> , :.'~: .':',~.:;~'" 7,;z.??."'. ~ ;~' ": S~t'..:~'; ."] . f;.' ,.,' , · .~ ,, · ~?>. w. ,~.,.~,',.~,-t ~¢??',.~ ,,,?~ ~..?,~' .',,~ "FZRE'DEPT ENNA" C'.Z'TY 'eF BKF'L'D' '' . ; ~,~t;:.~ ?:.'~ ',.::'::. BAKERSFIELD CA 9330~ ~£PORT..,~,'NA:~E,;.:~A;EF~.ID,'A'VI IS '~ .... · ....... ,' , ,~ ' "' ,' A~ Number 69~2 The B~KERSFiELD CALIFORNIAN GB/PO BAABARA BREN BAKERSFiELD~ CA '~'330'~' 17 Bi Ilin9 line's 1ofil Inches Solicitor I,O,:"~' iOCHARLE'TTE' lgo72 '~, Rate Li : _. , Accoun't 3263gT~FIR ,, , FI~E DEPT E~,A CITY OF BKFLD ' ,, 2130 ~G'' STREET "WE CARE" FIRE DEPARTMENT 2101 H STREET S. a. JOHNSON April 2, 1993 BAKERSFIELD,93301 FIRE CHIEF 326-3911 Mr. Robert Deedy Plant Manager Gist-brocades Food Ingredients, Inc. 5455 District Blvd. Bakersfield, CA 93313 Bob: · We have integrated RMPP information which may be useful for emergency responders into the hazardous materials business plan for Gist-brocades. Please review the attached copy of your plan for accuracY. Make any corrections necessary and make additions in..the spots which I have highlighted, You will also notice that we have converted the units of measure for the anhydrous ammonia .inventory to cubic feet because it is a compressed gas. The conversion is based on 5.15 lb/gallon and 22.4 cubic feet/lb for anhydrous ammonia. Please complete this revision of Gist-brocades' hazardous materials inventory' and business plan and return it to me by May 5, 1993. Call me at 326-3979 if you have any questions 'regarding the information added. Sincerely, Barbara Brenner Hazardous Materials Planning Technician cc: Ralph Huey FIRE DEPARTMENT 2101 H STREET S. O. JOHNSON March 22, 1993 BAKERSFIELD. 93301 FIRE CHIEF 326-3911 Mr. Robert Deedy Plant Manager Gist-brocades Food Ingredients, Inc. 5455 District Blvd. Bakersfield, CA 93313 Bob: Bakersfield Fire finds the risk management and prevention plan (RMPP) addendum prepared by Luft Environmental regarding the use of 93% sulfuric acid at the Gist-brocades plant, 5455 District Blvd., to be complete in scope and content. Bakersfield Fire Department will conduct follow up inspections to verify compliance with the risk management measures described in this plan. Notice of completion of this RMPP will be published in the Bakersfield Californian. Gist-brocades RMPP will then be subject to a 45 day review period during which Bakersfield Fire will consider all public comments regarding the adequacy of this RMPP. Please call me if I can provide any further assistance or clarification regarding the risk management plan'. Sincerely, Barbara Brenner Hazardous Materials Planning Technician cc: Ralph Huey Karl Luft CITY of BAKERSFIELD "WE CARE" FIRE DEPARTMENT 2101 H STREET S. D. JOHNSON March 22,1993 BAKERSFIELD, 93301 FIRE CHIEF 326-3911 Mr. Robert Deedy Plant Manager Gist-brocades Food Ingredients, Inc. 5455 District Blvd. Bakersfield, CA 93313 Bob: Bakersfield Fire finds the risk management and prevention plan (RMPP) addendum prepared by Luff Environmental regarding the use of 93% sulfuric acid at the Gist-brocades plant, 5455 District Blvd., to be complete in scope and content. Bakersfield Fire Department will conduct follow up inspections to verify compliance with the risk management measures described in this plan. Notice of completion of this RMPP will be published in the Bakersfield Californian. Gist-brocades FIMPP will then be subject to a 45 day review period during which Bakersfield Fire will consider all public comments regarding the adequacy of this RMPP. Please call me if I can provide any further assistance or clarification regarding the risk management plan. Sincerely, Barbara Brenner Hazardous Materials Planning Technician cc: Ralph Huey Karl Luff FAX COVER SHEET CITY OF BAKERSFIELD FIRE DEPARTMENT-HAZARDOUS MATERL4LS DMSION 2130 "G" Street ~~~ .. Bakersfield, Ca. 93301 Office (805)326-3979 PLEASE ROUTE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO: Company/Organization: Fax No. Sending Message to: 3oc1~--7%~0 FROM: Contact Person:C~,cto,~r~, c~-fe.m-r,~c Number of Pages (including cover sheet):' Description of Materials Sent/Special Instructions: CITY of BAKERSFIELD ' " vE CARE" FiRE DEPARTMENT 2101 H STREET S. D. JOHNSON March 22,1993 BAKERSFIELD, 93301 FIRE CHIEF 326-3911 The Bakersfield Californian Legal Notice Division P.O. Bin 440 Bakersfield, CA 93302 Dear Sir: Please publish the following public notice one time only. A Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP) has been prepared by Gist-brocades Food Ingredients, Inc. located at 5455 District Blvd., Bakersfield, CA. The RMPP describes programs and controls designed to prevent a hazardous material accident. This RMPP will be available for public review for the next 45 days at the Bakersfield Fire Department, Hazardous Materials Division 2130 G St. Bakersfield, CA 93301. Contact Barbara Brenner for information regarding this RMPP. The bill for this service should be charged to City of Bakersfield Fire Department EMMA account. Invoices should be sent to me at the Hazardous Materials Division 2130 G St., Bakersfield, CA 93301. Please send me proof of publication of this notice. If you need any further information regarding this legal notice, please call me at 326-3979. Sincerely, Barbara Brenner Hazardous Materials Planning Technician cc: Ralph Huey RECEIVED I~AR 1 9 1995 LUFT ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING 3701 Pegasus Drive, Suite 121 · Bakersfield, California 93308 o (805) 399-5838 March 16, 1993 Bakersfield City Fire Department 2101 H Street Bakersfield, CA 93301 Attn' Barbara Brenner On behalf of Gist-brocades Food Ingredients, Inc., we are submitting the enclosed Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP) addendum for their sulfuric acid system. This RMPP addendum addresses the maintenance of the sulfuric acid equipment, the acid strength, and proper labeling of the piping diagram as you discussed in a phone conversation on March 15, 1993 with Todd Rook of our staff. The enclosed RMPP has also been signed as required by Section 25534(j) of the Health and Safety Code. Should you have any questions regarding the enclosed material, please call Todd Rook, or me at (805) 399-5838. Karl W. Luff Principal Mechanical Engineer cc: Bob Deedy, Gist-brocades Food Ingredients, Inc with enclosure Enclosures RTR GB-06 LEC-93-0119 LUFT ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING 3701 Pegasus Drive, Suite 121 · Bakersfield, California 93308 e (805) 399-5838 March 3, 1993 Bakersfield City Fire Department 2101 H Street RECEIVED Bakersfield, CA 93301 ~&R 0,5 '~99~ Attn: Barbara Brenner HA~. M~T. O~V. On behalf of Gist-brocades Food Ingredients, Inc., we are submitting the enclosed Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP) addendum for their sulfuric acid system. This RMPP addendum includes the additional information requested in your letter dated January 25, 1993 regarding completion of the RMPP. Further details concerning item #4 and item #6 of your letter are attached. Please note that the computer model used for estimating the temperature resulting from adding sulfuric acid to water has been refined. Figure 2 shows the results of the new model. The temperatures calculated by the new model are lower and the peak temperature shifted from an acid/water ratio of 1-to-1 to a ratio of 1.8-to-1. Should you have any questions regarding the enclosed material, please call Todd Rook, or me at (805) 399-5838. Karl W. Luft Principal Mechanical Engineer cc: Bob Deedy, Gist-brocades Food Ingredients, Inc with enclosure Enclosures GB-06 LE0-93-0101 Gist-brocades Food Ingredients Inc. RISK MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTI'ON PROGRAM (RMPP) ADDENDUM FOR SULFURIC ACID Prepared By Luft Environmental Consulting 3701 Pegasus Drive, Suite 121 Bakersfield, CA 93308 February 1993 CERTIFICATION BY QUALIFIED PERSON AND FACILITY OPERATOR Section 25534 (j), H & S Code requires that the RMPP shall be certified as complete by a qualified person and the facility operator. These certifications are provided below. I certify that I am qualified to attest to the validity of the hazard and operability studies performed pursuant to Section 25534, and the relationship between the corrective steps taken by Gist-brocades Food Ingredients Inc. following the hazard and operability studies and those hazards which were identified in the studies. Additionally, I certify that this risk management and prevention program for sulfuric acid is complete per the requirements of the Bakersfield City Fire Department. This certification is based on my understanding that the data and documents provided by Gist-brocades Food Ingredients Inc. are true and correct and that the plans, programs, and procedures will be implemented as described. ,,Principal Mechanical Engineer Signature Title Karl W. LvfL R.E.A. Name Date As facility operator, I hereby certify that this .risk management and prevention program is complete and will be implemented. Plant Manager Signature Title Robert Deedy Name Date Gist-brocades/Sulfuric Acid/RMPP Page I Luff Environmental Consulting GIST-BROCADES FOOD INGREDIENTS, INC. ~, ~ ~'~ SULFURIC ACID SYSTEM RMPP A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY Gist-brocades Food Ingredients Inc.'s Bakersfield plant produces baker's yeast. The yeast is grown in a batch process in fermentation tanks. During this batch process, the yeast solution is fertilized in the fermentation tanks with phosphoric ~ a~sulfuric acid and ammonium hydroxide. After the fermentation process is c~)~ C~mplete, the yeast is dried and/or packaged for the industrial market. B. DESCRIPTION OF SULFURIC ACID PROCESS AND EQUIPMENT The sulfuric acid system has been maintained in excellent condition since it began service in 1985. The system consists of a 700 gallon storage tank, a 20 gallon dosing tank, and associated transfer and distribution piping as shown in Figure 1. Material of construction for the sulfuric acid system is 316L stainless steel. All tanks and pipelines are welded. The 700 gallon storage tank is an atmospheric pressure tank. The dosing tank is a pressure vessel that is equipped with a pressure relief valve set at 35 psig. This pressure relief valve relieves back to the acid storage tank. Sulfuric acid is delivered to the storage tank by the vendor using a pneumatically driven diaphragm type pump. After the delivery is complete, the acid remaining in the fill line is blown into the storage tank using compressed air from the plant air system. The storage tank overflow line is piped directly to the plant wastewater system. Since the yeast production process is a batch process, sulfuric acid is added to the yeast solution in a batch process. To accomplish this, sulfuric acid is gravity fed from 'the storage tank to the dosing tank when needed. Once the dosing tank is isolated (valved out) from the storage tank, compressed air from the plant air system is used to force the acid from the dosing tank into the acid distribution piping.--The dosing tank is normally empty and is filled only when sulfuric acid is to be fed to the fermenters or the yeast storage tanks. Phosphoric acid is also used dUring the yeast production process. Normally, the phosphoric acid is delivered to the process through its own distribution piping. Gist-brocades/Sulfuric Acid/RMPP Page2 Luft Environmental Consulting ~ . STOOGE However, phosphoric acid can be delivered to the sulfuric acid dosing tank for distribution to the fermenters or the yeast storage tanks. Phosphoric acid (37%) and sulfuric acid (93%) are compatible compounds. A minor amount of heat may be generated if the two acids are mixed due to the relative strengths (water content) of the acids. C. ACCIDENT HISTORY Gist-brocades Food Ingredients Inc. has not had an accident involving sulfuric acid at the Bakersfield Plant within the last three years. D. RECORDKEEPING PROCEDURES The sulfuric acid storage tank level is checked once per week at a minimum 'Written weekly and monthly inventories are kept that include a record of the storage tank level. An order for sulfuric acid is placed when the inventory indicates that the tank level is below the reorder point. All documents relating to the RMPP are maintained for a minimum of five years. E. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING All operations personnel are specifically trained for their responsibilities within the plant. In addition to the equipment training, the operations personnel receive training in fire prevention, fire control, accident prevention, and safety and first aid, in accordance with Gist-brocades Food Ingredients Inc. standards. All personnel at the plant are instructed in the site specific environmental and safety requirements on a periodic basis. The general subject matter for this training inciudes the following elements: * Hazardous materials handling * Hazard communication program * . Emergency response and evacuation procedures Annual safety training includes first aid procedures for individuals exposed to acids used at the facility. Emergency evacuation routes and the locations of possible hazards are included in the safety program. Gist-brocades/Sulfuric Acid/RMPP Page3 Luff Environmental Consulting The Plant Manager and Maintenance Engineer are responsible for the implementation of the RMPP and for the training of the Gist-brocades Food Ingredients Inc. employees. F. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES In the event of a large volume acid spill, the acid would be allowed to drain into the wastewater system. Depending on the nature of the spill, plant personnel may don the appropriate personnel protective equipment and attempt to stop the spill. A large volume spill would be permitted to drain into the wastewater system. Following the acid spill, plant personnel would wash any residual acid into the wastewater system using copious amounts of water. G. HAZARD ANALYSIS The HazOp study generated release events for the sulfuric acid system based on the design of the system, potential operator error, and external events, such as an earthquake. The HazOp study indicated that the possible release events were a hose failure during acid delivery and a tank or pipeline failure as the result of an earthquake. These release events were reviewed to determine whether there was a high likelihood of occurrence or a significant consequence if the release were to occur. None of the release events had a high probability of occurrence. The worst credible release would involve a large volume acid spill onto the concrete and into the wastewater system. The maximum volume of acid that could be released from the sulfuric acid system is 700 gallons from the storage tank. Due to the Iow vapor pressure of sulfuric acid, a significant airborne release from a spill of the acid is very unlikely. 1. ACID SPILL ON CONCRETE The worst case release from the sulfuric acid system involves an external event, such as an earthquake, that causes a catastrophic failure of the main sulfuric acid storage tank. If the release were to occur shortly after an acid delivery,-a maximum of 700 gallons of sulfuric acid could be released. The area around the acid storage tank is sloped so that any liquid spill would flow toward a storm drain and into the wastewater system. The sulfuric acid storage tank is mounted on a concrete pad, and is surrounded by concrete and rubber coated concrete. Gist-brocades/Sulfuric Acid/RMPP Page4 Luft Environmental Consulting In the event of a release, the acid would move in a fairly narrow stream toward the storm drain and would react with any concrete in its path. This chemical reaction would release hydrogen gas. In order to ignite the hydrogen, the hydrogen concentration in the air at the combustion source would have to exceed the lower explosive limit (LEL) of 4% (40,000 ppm). Discussion with a sulfuric acid manufacturer1 indicates that the rate of evolution of hydrogen is not expected to be sufficient to support combustion. Since the combustion sources are located approximately 80 feet from the acid tank and the acid spill would flow away from the combustion sources due to drainage grading, an explosion and/or fire is very unlikely. Additionally, there are no confined spaces above the sulfuric acid system to trap the hydrogen gas. In this release event, it is possible that employees would exit the building on the south side through a door located near the sulfuric acid storage tank. These workers could be inadvertently exposed to the acid as it drained from the tank to the wastewater system. Injury could result from individuals walking through the acid by splashing the acid on clothing and exposed areas of skin. However, there are emergency eyewash/shower stations located near the acid storage tank and the acid fill connections. Use of (hese emergency eyewash/shower stations would minimize the injuries to exposed workers. 2. ACID SPILL IN WATER Sulfuric acid could be released to the wastewater system as a result of a catastrophic failure of the storage tank or as the result of overfilling the storage tank. The compartmentalized vendor trucks carry a maximum of 650 gallons of sulfuric acid. Based on normal reorder quantities, overfilling the storage tank could release a maximum of 60 gallons of acid to the wastewater system. A catastrophic failure of the storage tank could release 700 gallons of acid to the wastewater system. Since the mixing of sulfuric acid and water produces heat, the possibility of an offsite consequence if the acid enters the wastewater system was investigated. If an acid spill reached the wastewater system, the acid would react with the water in the wastewater system. This reaction would evolve heat. Temperatures in excess of 400° F could be obtained depending on the rate 1jerry Mitchell, Cargill Inc., Telephone communication on December 17, '1992. Gist-brocades/Sulfuric Acid/RMPP Page5 Luff Environmental Consulting the acid is added to the water and the relative amounts of water and acid that are present.2 Engineering calculations also indicate that temperatures above 325° F (163° C) are possible as shown in Figure 2. Since the wastewater system contains a minimum of 5,600 gallons of water at all times, the highest ratio of acid to water is 0.13 which corresponds to a temperature of approximately 125° F, as shown in the figure. At that temperature, no steam or acid mists are expected to form. Also, the vapor pressure of a 93% sulfuric acid solution is relatively Iow, even at elevated temperatures (see Attachment 1)3. If sulfuric acid (100%) is heated to temperatures above 572° F (300° C), it begins to decompose and release sulfur oxides. Further heating and higher temperatures accelerate the decomposition process. As stated above, the acid used at the Gist-brocaQes iacility is a 93% solution. The reduced conCentration of sulfuric acid lowers the vapor pressure of the sulfur oxides substantially. The reduced vapor pressure substantially raises the temperature required for the evolution of sulfur oxides from the acid. Since there are no combustible materials present near the storage tank, heating of the tank due to a nearby fire is extremely unlikely. It is, therefore, unlikely that the storage tank could be heated sufficiently to cause decomposition of the acid. H. OFFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS The hazard analysis indicated that a worst case release of sulfuric acid could release 700 gallons of sulfuric acid to the wastewater system. Large volumes of water are contained in the wastewater system, so the heat produced by this reaction would not be sufficient to cause decomposition of the acid or produce steam that could carry sulfuric acid into the air. Since the sulfuric acid would not be carried offsite, no offsite consequences are expected. Emergency eyewash/shower stations are available for onsite personnel who may be exposed to the acid. 2jerry Mitchell, Cargill Inc., Telephone communication on December 17, 1992. 3perry's Chemical Engineer's Handbook, 6th ed., McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, NY 1984 Gist-brocades/Sulfuric Acid/RMPP Page 6 Luft Environmental Consulting TEMPERATURE OF SULFURIC ACID ADDED TO WATER 35O 300 '-' 250 D 200 ,,, 150 ,,, 100 0 I i I I I I I I I J I I I I I I ; I I ~- I I I I I I I I I 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 RATIO OF ACID TO WATER Gist-brocades/Sulfuric Acid RMPP Figure 2 Luft Environmental Consulting GIST-BROCADES FOOD INGREDIENTS, INC.-SULFURIC ACID HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY Item # H2SO4 Equip. .~uide Wor~ Deviation Poss~le Cause Probability Severity Consequence Comments 1 Fill No No Row Fill valve dosed or blocked. Medium Low Delivery pump deadheads... Delivery pump is a diaphram type pump. Connections Hose is rated for 500 psig. No recirculation system is provided on the true. RECOMMEND-Written operating procedures. More More Flow Hose failure. Low Lo~ Release contents of hose and short section Hose is rated for 500 psig. Pump delivery of verticle pipe. Tank contents will not drain3rassure is ~ psig. Delivery rate is 20 gpm. since tank is filled trom the top. May RECOMMEND-Written operating procedures. discharge from tanker until Ilow is stopped. SG-Gist-brocades personnel witness hook-up. **SG=Safeguard Pipe failure. Low Medium Release c°ments of pipe. Tank contents Pipe is stainless steel. All pipe joints are welded will not drain since tank is filed from the except valve bodies and pipe sections on top lop. Ma-~di.--sch'~'fge:from;tanker untO;flow of storage tank downstream of union. :Vendor tanker overfills storage tank ~ Medium Low Tank vents to sewer system. No public consequence. Acid added to water in the sewer system. Less Less Flow , Paffially pIt~cjged o~ blocked line. Medium Low Slow product transfer. Increase in delivery No public consequence. )rassure. SG-Line blown clean after delivery. Vendor truck pump failura - 'Low Low No product transfer. No public consequence. insufficient pressure. Reveme Reverse Flow Delivery pump fails. Low Low Product could flew back to delivery truck. No public consequence. Tanker operator doesnl blow line Low " Low ' 'Contents of delivery hose and vertical pipe dean after deliveR/end disconnects sp~ls. without closing block valve. Other Truck hits valves. Low Low Not possible due to proximity of valves and filling station.) I n~ of plant air. Low Low Can't blow line clean. Low volume leak to sewer system. 2 Sulfuric Acid No No Flow System idle. manual valves closed, High Low Tank level remains constant. No public consequence. Storage Tank loss of plant air. More More Flow Vendor tanker overfills storage tank Low Low ITank vents to sewer system. No public consequence. Acid added to water in the sewer system. SG-C)rder is placed for 500 gallons when tank level is 110 gallons or less. Page 1 of 3 GIST-BROCADES FOOD INGREDIENTS, INC.-SULFURIC ACID HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY Item # H2SO4 Equip. Guide Won Deviation Possible Cause Probability Seve~y ', ,. Consequence ~ Comments 2 Sulfuric Acid Mom More Row Opening of open-ended valves. Low Low Max release thrbugh orifice. SG-AII open ended valves are pl~ged. Storage Tank (cont.) Sight ~llass failure. Low Low Discha~le until system can be isolated or SG-Sight glass is enclosed in a metal holder. system empty. Pipe failure. Low Medium Sulfuric acid release corresponding to Stainless steel pipe is welded and block valves size of opening, are located on tank outlets. Worst credible case, 700 gal. liquid release. Less Less flow Liquid line plugged or blocked. Medium Low Slow product transfer, increase in delivery No public consequence. 3reSSUre. More Mom Level Vendor tanker overfills storage tank Low Low Tank vents to sower system. No public consequence. Acid added to water In the sewer system. SG-Order is placed for 500 gallons when tank level is 110 gallons or less. 3 Sulfuric Acid No No Flow System idle, valve closed. High Low Tank level remains constant or empty. No public consequence. Dosing Tank Air pressure failure (plant air). High Low No product transfer. No public consequence. More More Row Operator overfills day tank. Medium Low Day tank vents beck to storage tank. No public consequence. SG-Operater present during loading. SG-Sight glass to observe level of acid in tank. RECOMMEND-Written operating procedures. Sight glass failure. Low Medium Discharge until system can be isolated, or Discharge only when acid is presen! in tank. system empty. SG-Sight glass is enclosed in a metal holder. ~ SG-Operatcr present dudng loading. RECOMMEND-Written operating prpcedures. Pipe failure. Low Medium Sulfuric acid release con~esponding to Stainless steel pipe is welded and block valves size of opening, are located on tank outlets. Discharge Womt credible case, 20 gal. li¢luid .release only when acid is present in tank. SG-Operato~ present during loading. RECOMMEND-Written operating procedures. Less Less Flow Partially plugged or blocked line. Medium Low Slow product transfer. No public consequence. Page 2 of 3 GIST-BROCADES FOOD INGREDIENTS, INC.-SULFURIC ACID HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY Ite~t # H2S04 Equip. Guide Won: Deviation Possible Cause Probability Severity Conseq.uence Comments Sulturic Acid More More Pressure Air pressure re~julator fa'Is, Medium Low Day'tank vents back to storage tank I No public consequence. Dosincj Tank. !SG-Operator present during loading. [cont.) .... SG-,~ght glass to deserve level ot acid in tank. R~MEND-Written operating procedures. Less Less Pressure Air ~mssure recjulator fails. Medium Low No acid transfer 1o termentem, ! No public consecluence. More More Level Operator overfills day tank. Medium Low Day tank vents back to storage tank. :No public consecluence. SG--Operat~ present dudng loading. SC.--Sight glass to observe level o! acid in tank. RECOMMEND-Written operating procedures. Other Composition Phosphoric acid added to dosing Medium Low Acids are compatible and do not react. No public consequence. 'tank. RECOMMEND-Written operatincj procedures. Page 3 of 3 Attachment #1 Sulfuric Acid Vapor Pressure PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL DATA TABLE 3-14b Sulfuric Acid Partial Pressure, bar, over Aqueous Sulfuric Acid' 80 .786E-06 130 277E-04 150 .~9E-04 i60 .152E-03 180 .4 I6E-Oc] 2[0 .i59E-02 220 .239E- 02 230 .354E-02 260 10SE-01 270 .147E - 01 280 .20GE--01 290 .278E-01 300 376E-01 310 504E-01 320 .670E-01 ~ .883E-01 340 .116 Weight percent, H2SO4 °C I00.0 0 .228E--08 I0 .827E--08 20 .273E--07 30 .824E--07 40 .230E--06 50 .600E - 06 60 .147E--05 70 .339E--(}6 ~ .?~E-O~ .155E--04 100 .310E--04 IlO .595E-04 120 .IlOE-OG 130 .I97E-03 140 .341E--03 150 .574E--03 160 .941E--0~ 170 .150E-02 180 .235E--02 190 .359E-02 200 .53gE--02 210 .791E--02 230 .162E-01 250 ,314E-01 260 .427E--01 270 .574E--01 .~0 .762E-01 290 A00 3OO A30 310 330 .269 340 I .317 .336 350 [ .394 .417 *Vermeulen, Dong, Ro/oinson. Nguyen. and Cmitro, AIChE meeting. Anaheim, Calif., 1982; and private oommunication from Prof. Theodore Ver- meulen. Chemical Engineering Del)(.. Unive~ity of California. Berkeley. VAPOR PRESSURES OF SOLUTIONS 3-69 TABLE -15 Total Pressure, bar, of Aqueous Sulfuric Acid Solutions' lO.O 20.0 30 (I 40 (1 50 0 60 o 70.0 75 0SO.O 85 0 0 .iI7E-01 107E-OI .909E- 02 670E- 02 408E- 02 180E-02 467E-O3 175E- O,S 490E -04 .952E 05 IO , .22.3E - 01 205E - OI .174E-01 13OE -OI 802E - O2 367E - 02 995E - O.q 9~,S~K - 0:] 115t-~ - O3 2451{-04 20 .404E--01 373E-01 .319E-(11 241E-01 151E OI 710,q--02 2OIE 02 811F-(k3 ~.5~E--O~ .589E-O4 30 .70~E--01 649E- 01 558E-01 427E-O1 272E -01 I3IE--Oi 387 E--02 162E- fi2 .531 E- 03 134E-O3 40 .109 939E -01 725E--01 470E-01 2-32E- 0i .715E-02 30~E- 02 .106E--O2 50 , .117 60 .189 .175 152 .119 782E-01 395E-01 .127E-01 .565E- 02 204E-02 .584E-O3 70 .296 .275 Z39 188 126 651E--OI .217E-01 .997E-01 376E-02 114E-02 80 .449 417 .3&5 .290 It. R5 104 .360E - 01 I70E -01 668E- 02 213E -02 617 .542 434 298 161 578E - 01 281E -01 I I5E -01 383E -02 100 ' ..957 891 78~ CoG4 441 244 905E-- 01 452E- 0l 192E--01 666E- O2 110 1.349 1258 1.113 904 63~ .'360 138 708E-01 312E -01 112E -01 120 1.863 1.740 I 544 1.264 90.3 .519 206 108 493F,- 01 IS3E -01 130 9524 2.~61 2.101 1.732 1.253 .734 .301 .162 76OE- OI 291E-01 140 .3.561 3.149 2.810 2.3-3,3 1708 1.020 .431 ~ 115 451E--01 150 4.404 4.132 3.697 3.og0 2.289 1.392 .605 339 170 .683E--01 160 5.685 5.342 4793 4.0Gl 302[ 1.870 .837 478 246 101 170 7~236 6.810 6.127 5 185 39,30 2475 I 138 .662 .350 .147 180 g. Og3 8571 7 731 6.584 5.045 q 9~33 1.525 902 .489 209 190 11.289 10.658 9640 8.259 6.397 4169 2017 1.212 .673 .292 ~00 1~861 13.107 11 887 10.245 $020 5.312 2633 1.606 913 402 210 16-841 15.951 14.505 12.576 9.948 6696 3396 2 101 1221 544 220 20.264 I 9.2Z5 17.529 15.287 12.217 8.354 4.331 2.715 1.610 726 230 24.160 '22.960 20.992 18 4 ] 4 14.864 10.322 5.466 3468 2098 956 240 28.561 27.188 24.927 21.992 17.929 12.641 6.832 4382 2.701 I 242 2.50 33.494 31.939 29.364 26.056 2[.452 15.351 8.459 5.481 3.439 1.594 ~60 3&984 37.240 34.334 30.642 25.472 18.496 10.384' 6.791 4.332 2.023 270 45.065 43.116 39.865 35.784 30030 .22.122 12.642 8.337 5.402 2.540 280 5]~-726 49.590 45.984 41.514 ~5.168 26.275 15.272 10.147 6673 3.157 290 59:015 56.681 52.715 47.866 40.926 31.(K)4 189,15 12.250 8170 3.886 300 ..66.ed~4 64.40? 60081 54.869 47.347 ~.361 21.614 14 675 9.916 4.740 310 : .T5;495 7Z781 68.101 ' 62.553 54.470 42.398 25.812 17.453 I 1.939 5.732 :~0 "~4.705 81.816 76.792 70.947 62.538 49.168 30.355 20.611 14.264 6876 ~30 9:4~5o"7 · 91.518 86.172 80078 70.990 56.727 35.489 24.182 16.916 8.185 340 ..105.083 101.894 96.252 89,970 80.4(~i 65.130 41,262 28.193 19.920 9.672 ~ 116.251' 112.947 107.043 100.647 90.806 74.437 47.723 32.674 '23.303 11.351 ~: Weight pereent~ HzSO4 oC ;. ?!gO.O. : 92.0 94.0 96.0 97.0 ~8.0 98.5 99.0 99.5 100.0 0 ,~( .518E--06 .243E--06 .109E--06 .416E--07 .235E-07 .117E-07 .768E-0~ .479E-0~ .313E-08 .323E--08 10 .7 .159E'7Og .765E--06 .348E--06 .13~E--06 .774E-- 07 .391E--07 .261E--07 .IfoE-07 .113E--07 .124E--07 20 ,',, 449E--05 .221E--~5 .102E-05 .407E --06 .235E- 06 .121E--06 .812E-07 .528E -07 .373E- 07 .435E--07 · 30 :-; :.117E--O4 .590E-- 05 .279E --O5 ,113E--05 .659E--Og .344E--06 .234E --06 .155E-06 .114E--06 .141E--06 40 !'~.585E ~ 04 .147E--04 .708E-05 .293E-=05 .173E-05 .914E-06 .630E--06 .425E-06 .323E-06 .425E--06 "'..SO :-?.-653E --04 .344E--04 .IOgE'~04 :712E--05 .425E --05 .2`28E --05 .159E--05 .109E-Og .861E--06 .120E -- (i6 !fO . ):'::.141E--03.759E--04 ,380E--04 .164E--O4 .987E--05 .538E--06 .379E--66 .264E-05 .216E--05 .319E-05 :70 ~'L~?,~91E~03 .159E--03 .813E--04 .357E--O4 .218E--04 .120E--04 .856E --0/5 .605E--05 .514E--05 .804E --05 ".i -87'~O "! i~IE~'Og .319E--03 .IfOE--03 .742E--04 .458E--O4 .257E--04 .184E--04 .132E--O4 .117E--O4 .193E--O4 ! L:.~';~IO7E--(~ .612E--03 .324E-03 .148E--03 .921E-04 .524E--04 .390E-O4 .277E-04 .253E-04 .441E--04 Iog ; ~ .:-- ':i95E ~02 .113E--02 .fo7E--0~ .283E--03 .178E--03 .103E--03 .751E--O4 .555E-04 .527E--04 .96~E--O4 IlO i ?" ;~lOE --02 .201E--02 .IIOE-02 .521E--08 .332E-Og .194E--08 .143E,03 .107E-03 .106E--03 .204E--08 ~:.'i~0.~: .575E~02 .346E--02 .192E--02 .929E--03 .598E--0~ .354E-03 .263E--03 .201E-03 .206E--0~ .414E--Og 1~0 -i ~,~' '.944E--O2 ,578E--02 .327E -02 .161E~-02 .104E--02 .626E --03 .470E --03 .3~3E -og .38'/E -- 0~.814E--Og 140 · i~:'~ .151E--OI .9~E--02 .539E--02 .270E--02 .177E-02 .107E--02 .815E~06 .639E-08 .708E--03 .155E--02 :150 "' .235E--01 .149E--01 .Sfo6E--02 .441E--02 .29~E--02 .180E--02 .137E--02 .IOgE-02 .128E--02 .287E--02 Ifo ,-, .357E--01 .Z3OE--OI .136E--01 .703E--O2 .471E--02 .293E--02 .226E--02 .183E-02 .219E--02 .516E--02 170 i(. ,532E--01 .347E--01 .206E-91 .IIOE--01 .741E-02 .466E-02 .363E-02 .299E-02 .372E-02 .905E--02 150 :,i .775E--01 .514E--01 .312E--01 .167E--O1 .114E--OI .726E --02 .571E--Og .478E - 0~..619E-02 .155E--01 190 ,',.~'i..!11 . .747E--01 .460E--01 .250E--01 .172E--01 .IIIE--01 .880E--02 .749E-02 .;01E-01 .26OE--01 ~og '" .156 .107 .665E--01 .~67E--01 .255E--01 .166E--01 .133E--01 .II5E-01 .161E--OI .427E--01 210 ,....216 .150 .944E-01 .530E--01 .371E-01 .245E--01 .198E--01 .175E-01 .2.53E-O1 .687E--01 220 -" .295 .207 .132 .752E--01 .531E--01 354E--01 .289E--01 .260E-01 .392E- 01 .lOg 230 '- :-.396 .282 .182 .105 .749E--01 .505E--01 .417E--01 .382E-01 .596E--01 .169 240 ._ ' .525 .379 2`47 .145 .104 .710E--01 .592E--01 .553E-01 .395E--01 .Z58 250 :..688 .503 .3,31 .197 .1,43 .985E--01 .830E--01 .790E--01 .132 .3~9 ~aO .98] 66~ .439 .264 '~5~ .135 . J 15 . ] 12 . ] 93 .577 2'/0 .... 1.141 . .956 .575 .351 .153 .157 .156 .279 .846 280' ' 1.447 I.og9 .744 .460 1341 2`45 .213 .215 .398 1.225 2fo 1.817 1.398 .954 .597 .446 .324 .285 295 .562 1.751 300 2-261 1.761 1.211 .767 578 .425 .379 .3Og .785 2.476 310 .:· 2.791 2.199 1.524 .977 .742 .553 .498 .536 '..085 3.465 1120.'::~ 3.417 2.723 1.901 1.234 .944 .713 .649 .714 1.486 4.800 330 ' 4.153 3.347 2.353 1.545 1.191 .gl I .840 .944 2.018 6.5~6 340 '"&0Il 4.084 2`889 1919 1.491 1.156 1.078 1.239 2.718 8.957 350 6.006 4.949 3.523 2.366 1,852 1.456 1.374 1.614 3.651 12`079 'Vermeulen. Don8' Robinson, Nguyen. and Gmitro. AIChE meeting. Anaheim. Cali[.. 1982; and: ~rivate communication from Pro(. Theodore Vermeulen, Chemical Engineering University o{ California. Berkeley RESPONSES TO ITEMS #4 AND #6 OF THE BAKERSFIELD CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT'S CONCERNS DATED JANUARY 25, 1993 · Individuals at the plant participate in annual training concerning evacuation of the plant during an emergency. The locations of various hazards, including the sulfuric acid tank, are addressed during the training sessions. Several alternate routes are available for employees exiting the building during an emergency. Since the existing training program includes alternate escape routes, additional training will not be required. · Several acids are used at the Gist-brocades plant site. Periodic safety training includes the safe handling of acids, personnel protective equipment, and the use of safety showers that would be used in the event that an individual is exposed to an acid, including sulfuric acid. · Mixing of sulfuric acid and water results in the evolution of heat. The resulting temperatures are not high enough to cause sulfur oxides to be emitted. Figure 2 in the enclosed RMPP addendum shows the maximum temperature is expected to be slightly higher than 325° F at a ratio of 1.8:1, well below 572° F where decomposition of the acid begins to occur. · In the event of a sulfuric acid spill, Gist-brocades personnel are trained to secure the area and notify their supervisor. The spill would be evaluated and the appropriate public emergency response agency would be notified if required. The best course'of action for mitigation and clean up would be determined before Gist-brocades personnel attempt mitigation or clean up procedures. · Written operating procedures for the sulfuric acid system have been developed and implemented as recommended. "WE CARE" FIRE DEPARTMENT ' 2101 H STREET S. D. JOHNSON January 25,1993 BAKERSFIELD,·93301 FIRE CHIEF 326-3911 Todd Rook Luff Environmental Consulting 3701 Pegasus Drive, Suite 121 Bakersfield, CA 93308 Todd:- The hazard analysis and the estimation of consequences of a sulfuric acid release submitted for the Gist-brocades Food Ingredients plant are a satisfactory basis for the RMPP. As we discussed, it would be helpful if you noted in the,text of the hazard analysis the potential volume of a delivery truck release scenario. Per your request, I have reviewed the Health and Safety Code'to determine what additional information will be needed to complete the RMPP. These items are listed below. ~1. Report of any accidents within the last three years relating to the sulfuric acid. v/~. Add the age and condition of'the equipment to the existing description of the process and equiPment. ,,/~. Record keeping procedures for verification of the acid reorder schedule should be included.. 4_,,/ Operator training is listed as a safeguard. Include a description of the training program for the operators. It was noted that evacuation routes cross areas that may be contaminated with acid Will additional training be required for general personnel so that they will know what to do if exposed to sulfuric acid during a release? Are there alternative evacuation routes that could be used if an acid spill occurs? It was noted that acid/Water mixing ratios of about 1 result in high temperatures that may cause the release of sulfur oxides. If the acid is allowed to flow into the drainage system and into the large tank, this problem is avoided. However, if operators wash down the plant deck,during a release the situation could worsen. Should operators be trained specifically about the possible effects of washing down a spill area? What are the operators expected-to do during an emergency release? 5.-''/''' Include a section formally titled Offsite Consequence Analysis and report the findings. 6../,/'' Include a schedule for'development of the recommended written operating procedures. Indicate by title the person responsible for implementing the RMPP. 7,/ -Include a certification that the RMPP is complete. As this project is again behind schedule, please call me to discuss the revised schedule for completion of this RMPP. SinCerely, Barbara Brenner Hazardous Materials Planning Technician cc: Ralph Huey LUFT ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING 3701 Pegasus Drive, Suite 121 · Bakersfield, California 93308 · (805) 399-5838 January 5, 1993 Bakersfield City Fire Department ~-.~ ~, =~---'-" 2101 H Street l~:~~~ Bakersfield, CA 93301 JAN 15 1993 Attn' Barbara Brenner By. On behalf of Gist-brocades Food Ingredients, Inc., we are submitti ~-th~-~-d'~'lb-§b-d cl~'aft of the system description and hazard analysis for their sulfuric acid system. Please review and comment on the enclosed analysis. We will be happy to discuss the analysis with you at your convenience. Should you have any questions regarding the enclosed material, please call Todd Rook, or me at (805) 399-5838. Karl W. Luff Principal Mechanical Engineer cc: Bob Deedy, Gist-brocades Food Ingredients, Inc with enclosure Enclosures -- RTR LEC-93-0003 GIST-BROCADES FOOD INGREDIENTS, INC. HAZARD ANALYSIS - SULFURIC ACID SYSTEM A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY Gist-brocades Food Ingredients Inc.'s Bakersfield plant produces baker's yeast. The yeast is grown in a batch process in fermentation tanks. During this batch process, the yeast solution is fertilized in the fermentation tanks with phosphoric acid, sulfuric acid and ammonium hydroxide. After the fermentation process is complete, the yeast is dried and/or packaged for the industrial market. B. DESCRIPTION OF SULFURIC ACID PROCESS AND EQUIPMENT The sulfuric acid system consists of a 700 gallon storage tank, a 20 gallon dosing tank, and associated transfer and distribution piping as shown in Figure 1. Material of construction for the sulfuric acid system is 316L stainless steel. All tanks and pipelines are welded.. The 700 gallon storage tank is an atmospheric pressure tank. The dosing tank is a pressure vessel that is equipped with a pressure relief valve set at 35 psig. This pressure relief valve relieves back to the acid storage tank. Sulfuric acid is delivered to the storage tank by the vendor using a pneumatically driven diaphragm type pump. After the delivery is complete, the acid remaining in the fill line is blown into the storage tank using compressed air from the plant air system. The storage tank overflow line is piped directly to the plant wastewater system. Since the yeast production process is a batch process, sulfuric acid is added to the yeast solution in a batch process. To accomplish this, sulfuric acid is gravity _. fed from the storage tank to the dosing tank when needed. -Once the dosing tank is isolated (valved out) from the storage tank, compressed air from the plant air system is used to force the acid from the dosing tank into the acid distribution piping. The dosing tank is normally empty and is filled only when sulfuric acid is to be fed to the fermenters or the yeast storage tanks. Phosphoric acid is also used during the yeast production process. Normally, the phosphoric acid is delivered to the process through its own distribution piping. However, phosphoric acid can be delivered to the sulfuric acid dosing tank for Gist-brocades/Sulfuric Acid/RMPP Page I Luft Environmental Consulting STORAGE F-t F-2 aA~: ~/ay/9~ n~ws~o SULFURIC ~CID distribution to the fermenters or the yeast storage tanks. Phosphoric acid (37%) and sulfuric acid (93%) are compatible compounds. A minor amount of heat may be generated if the two acids are mixed due to the relative strengths (water content) of the acids. C. HAZARD ANALYSIS The HazOp study generated release events for the sulfuric acid system based on the design of the system, potential operator error, and external events, such as an earthquake. The HazOp study indicated that the possible release events were a hose failure during acid delivery and a tank or pipeline failure as the result of an earthquake. These release events were reviewed to determine whether there · was a high likelihood of occurrence or a significant consequence if the release were to occur. None of the release events had a high probability of occurrence. The worst credible release would involve a large volume acid spill onto the concrete and into the wastewater system. The maximum volume of acid that could be released from the sulfuric acid system is 700 gallons from the storage tank. Due to the Iow vapor pressure of sulfuric acid, a significant airborne release from a spill of the acid is very unlikely, unless the acid adversely reacts with another compound. D. ACID SPILL ON CONCRETE The worst case release from the sulfuric acid system involves an external event, such as an earthquake, that causes a catastrophic failure of the main sulfuric acid storage tank. If the release were to occur shortly after an acid delivery, a maximum of 700 gallons of sulfuric acid could be released. The area around the acid storage tank is sloped so that any liquid spill would flow toward a storm drain and into the wastewater system. The sulfuric acid storage tank is mounted on a concrete pad, and is surrounded by.concrete and rubber coated concrete. In the event of a release, the acid would move in a fairly narrow stream toward the storm drain and would react with any concrete in its path. This chemical reaction would release hydrogen gas. Ir~ order to ignite the hydrogen, the hydrogen concentration in the air at the combustion source would have to exceed the lower explosive limit (LEL) of 4% (40,000 ppm). Discussion with a sulfuric acid manufacturer1 indicates that the rate of evolution of hydrogen is not expected to 1jerry Mitchell, Cargill Inc., Private communication on December 17, 1992. Gist-brocades/Sulfuric Acid/RMPP Page2 Luft Environmental Consulting be sufficient to support combustion. Since the combustion sources are located approximately 80 feet from the acid tank and the acid spill would flow away from the combustion sources due to drainage grading, an explosion and/or fire is very unlikely. Additionally, there are no confined spaces above the sulfuric acid system to trap the hydrogen gas. ~ In this release event, it is pOssible that employees would exit the building on the south side through a door located near the sulfuric acid storage tank. These workers could be inadvertently exposed to the acid as it drained from the tank to the wastewater system. Injury could result from individuals walking through the acid by splashing the acid on clothing and exposed areas of skin. However, the are emergency eyewash/shower stations located near the acid storage tank and the acid fill connections. Use of these emergency eyewash/shower stations would minimize the injuries to exposed workers. E. ACID SPILL IN WATER Sulfuric acid could be released to the wastewater system as a result of a catastrophic failure of the storage tank or as the result of ovedilling the storage tank. Based on normal reorder quantities, overfilling the storage tank would release a maximum of 60 gallons of acid to the wastewater system. A catastrophic failure of the storage tank could release 700 gallons of acid to the wastewater system. Since the mixing of sulfuric acid and water produces heat, the possibility of an offsite consequence if the acid enters the wastewater system was investigated. If an acid spill reached the wastewater system, the acid would react with the water in the wastewater system. This reaction would evolve heat. Temperatures of 400° F to 500° F could be obtained depending on the rate the acid is added to the water and the relative amounts of water and acid that are present.2 Engineering calculations also indicate that temperatures above 400° F (200° C) are possible as shown in Figure 2. Since the wastewater system contains a minimum of 5,600 gallons of water at all times, the highest ratio of acid to water is 0.13 which corresponds to a temperature of approximately 150° F, as shown in the figure. At that temperature, no steam or acid mists are expected to form. Also, the vapor pressure of a 93% sulfuric acid solution is relatively Iow, even at elevated temperatures (see attached table)3, 2jerry Mitchell, Cargill Inc., Private communication on December 17, 1992. 3perry's Chemical Engineer's Handbook, 6th ed., McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, NY Gist-brocades/Sulfuric Acid/RMPP Page3 Luft Environmental Consulting If sulfuric acid (100%) is heated to temperatures above 572° F (300° C), it begins to decompose and release sulfur oxides. Further heating and higher temperatures accelerate the decomposition process. As stated above, the acid used at the Gist-brocades facility is a 93% solution. This reduced concentration lowers the vapor pressure of the sulfur oxides substantially. The reduced vapor pressure substantially raises the temperature required for the evolution of sulfur oxides from the acid. Since there are no combustible materials present near the storage tank, heating of the tank due to a nearby fire is extremely unlikely. It is, therefore, unlikely that the storage tank could be heated sufficiently to cause decomposition of the acid. F. SUMMARY The hazard analysis indicated that a worst case release of sulfuric acid could generate steam if the acid contacts a limited amount of water. The heat produced by this reaction would not be sufficient to cause decomposition of the acid. Any steam produced by the reaction could carry a sulfuric acid mist-into the air. However, since sulfuric acid is a heavy chemical and the steam would dissipate quickly, no offsite consequences am expected. Emergency eyewash/shower stations are available for onsite personnel who may be exposed to the acid. 1984 Gist-brocades/Sulfuric Acid/RMPP Page4 Luff Environmental Consulting TEMPERATURE (F) 3-68 PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL DATA I TABLE 3-14b Sulfuric Acid Partial Pressure, bar, over Aqueous Sulfuric Acid' 50 513E - 07 .;~ 70 336E-06 80 .786E-06 100 371E-05 140 .50~E- 04 · 210 .159E--02 :., 220 .239E-02 i: 240 515£-02 : '250 .740E--02 280 .208E--01 i :~. ' 290 .278E--01 .c!,; ;;. 310 .504E--01 320 .670E--01 g30 883E--01 ~i:!'i , 340 .116 - ~50 .150 ~!; .. Weight percent' H2SO4 ;r.~ ':. °C 1oo.o 0 .228E--08 l0 .827E--08 20 .273E--07 30 .824E--07 ~ 40 .230E--06 50 .600E--06 : 70 .g39E--05 80 .743E--05 100 .310E--O4 i. ;.; 110 .595E--04 120 .IIOE--0~ :fi:i? 130 .197E--~ "' 140 .341E--08 150 .574E--03 160 .941E--03 170 .150E--02 1~0 190 ,359E--02 200 .538E--02 210 .791E--02 i'.::~. 220 .II4E--0I !i: ~ .162z-0, i 240 .227E-01 250 .314E--01 260 .427E ~01 :: 270 .574E-01 280 .762E--01 290 [00 800 .130 ,, ,, 320 .213 :~i~ a3o .~60 540 .~.36 meulen, Chemical Engineering Dept., University of California. Berkeley. VAPOR PRESSURES OF SOLUTIONS 3-, TABLE 3-14o Sulfur Trioxide Partial Pressure, bar, over Aqueous Sulfuric Acid Solutions IConcludedJ ~ 10.0 20.(.) :~0 o .JO 0 ~0(} ~00 ~o 0 75.0 ~0.(} ~.(J I .95:3L--~ 117E-07 657E~-07 .302E- (gg ll4E--~ 546E-05 329l.~ -04 921E-04 253E-03 224E- 07 575E-~ 310 [ .197E-OS 245E-07 .5~5E-O7 ~53E-07 320 J .397E-08 502E-07 277E-~ 122E-05 .414E-05 176E--04 .923E-04 .245E-0:3 .621E-~3 14gE-(~ 3a4E-~ ~ J .782E--08 I~E-~ .551E-~ .237E-05 7~E-~ .308E-04 151E-~3 .391E-0:3 956E-03 :~67E-~ ~)E- ~ 9~(~E-~ 340 J 151E--07 196E~ 107E-05 .452E-05 .139E--04 529E-O4 .243E - 0:3 617E ~3 .145E-02 .5501-~ - 168E--(~ 439E-~ ~ J .2~E--07 376E-~ 204E--05 .846E--05 .246E-04 .893E--04 387E-93 9~5E-03 .219E--02 815E-C .343E-(~ ~5E-~~ Weigh~ Crcem. 128E-04 .:~ggE-~ ~ 90.0 92.0 94.0 ~.0 97.0 98.0 985 99.0 99.5 I(~0 2:~E --0.I 623E -~~ 4~4E-O4 lllE-~ 0 671E--13 .216E--12 .677E-- t2 240E-- I1 .5~E- 11 124E-10 224E-10 502E- 10 182E-~ 755E-(~ 711E--O,I .I91E-~ I IgE-(~2 :]21E-~ l0 .345E-- 12 .107E-- 11 .326E-- 11 .II4E-10 ~4E-- 10 .578E- 10 104E-~ .232E-~ .839E-~ 347E .194E--~] 526E-~ 20 .159E--11 .475E-- 11 141E-t0 482E- 10 986E- 10 .241E-~ .433E-~ 961E-~ 346E-08 142E--o 3(~E--{}~ ~40E--~~ ~E--II .192E- 10 .557E- 10 186E--~ .376E--~ .911E--~ 163E-08 .3~E--08 129E--07 482E-(~3 131E-~ 40 .~4E-- 10 .7~E-- 10 .201E--~ 655E--~ 131E--08 .315E-08 562E-08 .123E--07 .440E-07 179E-0 ~ .897E-- 10 .242E--09 669E--~ .214E-08 .424E--08 IOIE-07 179E--07 391E--07 1:39E-(~ .5601~- (~ ~mE-o2 :I~E-~ ~ .294E-~ .771E-~ .207E-08 .647E-08 127E--07 .299E-07 528E-07 .115E--~5 405E-~ l(g3E 16t E -02 .442E-~ .232E-O2 ~E-~ 70 .~E--~ 230E--08 .602E-08 .184E-07 .~7E--07 .893E--07 .146E-~ .316E-~ IIlE-05 .444E--o 329E-02 .~E-~~ .261E~08 .643E--08 165E--07 .492E--07 .946E--07 218E--~ 4~E-O2 ~ .712E--08 .171E-07 426E-07 .124E-~ .~7E--~ .541E-~ .940E-~ 201E-05 .698E-05 276E-0 ~58E- o2 I~ .184E-07 .430E-07 .105E-~ .8~E--~ 5~E--~ .127E--05 220E-05 .470E-05 162E~04 638E- 0 .11sE-ol 110 .456E~07 .I~E-~ .247E-~ .689E- ~ .128E--05 .287E-~ 494E-05 .~5E--04 .~9E-04 .14IE-O: I~E-O~ 120 .108E--~ .238E--~ .555E-~ .152E-05 .280E--~ .619E-05 .I~E-04 224E-04 764E-04 298E-0' 1~ .244E~ .5~6E-~ 120E-05 .821E-~ .586E--~ .128E--04 .219E-04 .459E-04 .156E-93 ~TE-O~ N0 .~E--~ .112E-05 .~0E--05 .~6E--05 118E--04 .257E-04 .415E-01 I~ .I12E~ .~0E-~ .504E-~ .129E~04 .231E--04 .497E--04 .~37E-04 174E~ 588E--~ 226E- u: .520E-01 1~ .229E--05 A59E--~ .983E-05 .247E--04 .438E~04 .932E--~ .156E-~ .~24E-~ .I~E-02 416E-0~ .~6E-01 170 .4~E--05 .886E--~ AB6E-04 .459E--04 .8~E~04 .iTOE--~ .2~E-~3 .586E--~ .196E-O2 746E-0; .7~E--01 l~ .870E--~ .I~E--~ .3~E--04 .829E--04 .144E--~ .301E-03 .4~E-~ A~E--02 343E-02 .130E-0 1~ .I~E~04 .~E--04 .615E-04 .146E--~ .~2E--~ .520E--~ .~9E-~ .177E--02 .587E--02 222E-O: ~ .297E--04 .548E-04 .108E-~ .~IE--~ .429E--~ .878E--~ .144E-02 .296E-02 .981E--02 870E-0 210 .5~E--04 .946E--04 .185E--~ .422E-~ .714E--~ .145E-02 .237E-02 .486E--02 161E-O1 693E-0~ .919E--04 .161E--~ .3~E--08 .694E--~ .117E--02 .~E--02 .3~E-02 .781E--02 .~8E--01 9~E--O] .157E~ .269E~ .508E~ .112E--02 .187E~02 .873E~02 .6~E-02 .I~E~01 .4~E--01 152 ~40 .261E~ .441E-~ .819E-~ .178E--02 .298E--02 .582E--02 .939E-02 .191E--01 .627E--01 .234 .428E~ .7~E--~ AgOE-02 .276E--02 .4~E--02 .891E--02 .143E-01 .291E--01 .955E--01 356 .6~E--~ .112E--02 .202E--02 .4~E--02 .6~E--02 .184E--01 .215E-01 .487E--01 .143 .532 ~70 .l~E--02 .1'74E--02 .8~E-02 .~8E--02 .I~E~OI .2~E--01 319E-01 .646E-01 .212 .786 80.0 ~.0 ~ .170E~02 .2~E~O2 .466E~02 .948E~02 .152E~01 .293E~01 .4~E-O1 .948E~01 .3~ 1.144 .261E~02 .401E~02 .694E-02 .189E--01 .221E~01 .4~E-OI .670E-01 .186 .444 1.646 .531E-- 16 .417E-- 15 ~ .3~E--02 .595E--02 .102E--01 .201E--OI .818E--01 .~4E--01 .9~E-OI .198 .~2 2.~9 .280E-- 14 ~10 '.~9E--02 .878E--02 .148E--01 .287E--01 .451E--01 .~2E--01 .184 272 .~9 3.289 .I~E--18 ~ .~E--02 .126E~01 .211E-01 .4~E--01 .~2E--01 .119 .186 .378 1.~6 4575 .~IE--18 .162E-11'. ~ .I~E--01 .181E--01 .299E-01 .5~E--01 .877E--01 .1~ .~6 .520 1.7~ 6.3~ .895E-- 12 ~0 .181E--OI .~5E--OI .4t8E--01 .7~E--01 .120 .224 348 .7~ 2.8~ 8.6~ .I~E--11 ~ .~SE--01 .~7E--01 .578E--01 .107 .1~ .8~ .470 .956 3.142 11.640 .~4E-- 11 .~E-- 10 .249E--~ .731E-- 10 .784E--~ .2~E--~ .2~E-~ ~41 [ ~ .5~E ~ .174E--08 . I~E--~2 . I~E--07 .715E-~ .~6E-07 . .575E--07 .~IE-~ . I~E--~ .7~E~ .2~E--~ .145E-~ .522E--~ ".282E~.] I~E-~ .~4E-~ .198E-~ .9~E--~ .3~E--~ .178E--~' .~E--~ .119E--04 .5~E--~ .2~E--04 .9~E~ ~ .~2E--04 .154E-~ .5~E--~ .~E~ .973E-- 04 .4~E--~ . 158E--~ .~9E--~ ' " m Pm[. Th~ore Vermeu]~ MEMORANDUM ~ "WE CARE" January11,1993 1 ~ TO: Valerie Pendergrass (~.~__,. FROM: Barbara Brenner SUBJECT: RMPP Billing Gist-brocades Food Ingredients, 5455 District Blve., 93313 A total of 2.0 hours was spent in meetings or reveiwing documents for the sulfuric acid,~PP. 2.0 hours x 47.25 $ per hour = 94.505. Please enter this amount into the computer so that a bill will be generated. Note the date that the entry is made on this memo and file it in Gist-brocades RMPP file. cc: Ralph Huey -