Loading...
The URL can be used to link to this page
Your browser does not support the video tag.
Home
My WebLink
About
RISK MANAGEMENT (4)
CRYSTAL G EYS E R WATER' COMPANY BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA AN'D RISK MANAGEMENT PREVENTION PROGRAM OCTOBER, .t990 REVISED FEBRUARY, 1991 REVISED APRIL, 1991 SUBMITTED ,TO CITY OF BAKERSFIELD FIRE DEPARTMENT HAZARDOUS MATERIALS DIVISION BY WZl INC. 4800 Eastan Drive, Suite 114 Bakersfield; California 93309 805 / 326-1112 4800 Easton Drive, Suite 114 Bakersfield, California 93309 Post Office Box 9217 Bakersfield, California 93389 805/326-1112 805/326-0191 FAX Crystal Geyser Water Company Bakersfield, California Risk Management and Prevention Program October, 1990 Revised February, 1991 Revised April, 1991 Submitted to the City of Bakersfield Fire Department Hazardous Materials Division by WZI Inc. 4800 Easton Drive, Suite 114 Bakersfield, California 93309 0332.0010A Table of Contents k 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 Purpose Introduction Certification Revision Record Background 1.1 General Business Information 1.2 Description of Acutely Hazardous Materials (AHM) Used 1.3 General Ammonia Refrigeration Processes 1.4. Operation of the Ammonia System Description of AHM Accidents 2.1 Accidents at this Location 2.2 Underlying Causes 2.3 'Measures Taken to Prevent Recurrence 2.4 Accident Investigation Procedures 2.5 .-Release Reporting Procedures Equipment Report 3.1 Nature, Age and Condition 3.2 Testing Schedules 3.3 Maintenance Schedules Procedures Report 4.1 Daily Operating Procedures 4.2 Maintenance Procedures Design, Operating and Maintenance Control Systems 5.1 Design Control Systems 5.2 Operating Control Systems 5.3 Maintenance Control Systems Detection, Monitoring or Automatic Control Systems 6.1 Detection Systems 6.2 Monitoring Systems 6.3 Automatic Control Systems Page 1 1 1 3 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 '6 6 7 8 8 12 12 13 13 14 16 16 16 16 17 17 17 !7 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 Proposed Risk Reduction Measures 7.1 Written Operating ProCedures 7.2 Written Maintenance Procedures 7.3 Increased Inspections 7.4 Better Labeling 7.5 Safety and Training Program 7.6 Fire Prevention 7.7 Physical Plant Changes 7.8 Reduction of Risk to Neighboring Homes or Businesses Emergency Contingency Plans 8.1 General Evacuation 8.2 Fire 8.3 Earthquake 8.4 Significant Leak from the Ammonia System 8.5 Emergency Responders Auditing Program Inspection Program Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP) Implementation 11.1 11.2 11.3 Personnel Responsible for RMPP Implementation Implementation Schedule Training Program for RMPP Implementation RMPP Record Keeping 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 Accident Records Ammonia Charge Records Training Records Audit Records Qualifications of Certifiers 13.1 Qualified Person 13.2 Facility Operator Page 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 19 19 2O 2O 2O 2O 2O 21 22 23 24 24 25 26 28 28 28 28 28 29 29 29 References 30 Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5 Exhibit 6 Exhibit 7 Exhibit 8 Exhibit 9 Exhibit 10 Exhibits Location Map Facility Diagram Surrounding Area Schematic of the Ammonia Refrigeration System Ammonia Incident Report Operator's Log Maintenance Record Evacuation Routes Ammonia Charge Record Training Required/Completed Record Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendices Business Plan Hazards Analysis Introduction Summary Hazards Identification Hazard and Operability Study Results Vulnerability Analysis Risk Analysis Ammonia Safety Audit Ammonia Material Safety Data Sheets I_. Purpose This Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP) has been developed to minimize the potential for release of Acutely Hazardous Materials (AHM) from the Crystal Geyser Water Company, Bakersfield, California bottling facility. I1_ Introduction This RMPP has been requested pursuant to Section 25534 of Chapter 6.95, Article 2 of the California Health and Safety Code (CHSC) by the City of Bakersfield Fire Department to reduce the risk of and prevent accidents involving AHM. A risk management and prevention program is defined in Section 25532 as: "all of the administrative and operational programs of a business which are designed to prevent acutely hazardous materials accident risks, including, but not limited to, programs which include design safety of new and existing equipment, standard operating procedures,, preventive maintenance programs, operator training and accident investigation procedures, risk assessment for unit operations, or operating alternatives, emergency response planning, and internal or external audit procedures to ensure that .these programs are being executed as planned." This RMPP is based upon an assessment of processes, operations, and procedures of ~.this facility and considers results of the hazard and operability study that has identified hazards associated with handling of anhydrous ammonia, an AHM. Ammonia-system operators and other employees will use procedures detailed in this plan to improve facility safety. As specified in Section 25534 (f)., Chapter 6.95, Article 2, CHSC, all records involving the RMPP shall be kept for a minimum of five years. Section 25534 (h). requires that the RMPP shall be reviewed and revised, if necessary, at least once every three years. If a modification is made to the facility that affects AFIM handling, a revision of the RMPP must be made within 60 days of the modification. III. Certification Section 25534 (j) of the CHSC requires that the RMPP and any revisions be certified as complete by a qualified person and the facility operator. Section 25532 of the CHSC defines a qualified person as "a person who is qualified to attest at a minimum, to the validity of the hazard and operability studies performed pursuant to Section 25534, and the relationship between the corrective steps taken by the handler following the hazard and operability studies and those hazards which were identified in the studies". Qualifications of the certified person, Mary Jane Wilson, and the facility operator, Alex Manns, are contained in Section 13.0 of this RMPP. Page 1 I hereby certify that this RMPP is complete, that the hazard and operability studies performed on the behalf of Crystal Geyser, Bakersfield are valid and that programs included in this RMPP will mitigate potential hazards determined through the hazard and operability study. Registere~ I. REA-00050 , ~)/ironmental Assessor ~of California Expiration Date: June 30, 1991 I hereby certify, as facility operator, that this RMPP is complete. / Alex Manns Plant Manager Crystal Geyser, Bakersfield Page 2 IV.. Revision Record All records concerning this Risk Management and Prevention Program shall be kept for at least five years (Section 25534 (f)). Necessary revisions to the RMPP will be made at least every three years. The RMPP must be modified within 60 days of a modification that materially affects the handling of an AHM (Section 25534 (h.)). All revisions to this RMPP are to be recorded here. Revision Number 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Pages Date of Affected Revision Signature of Person Making the Revision Page 3 1.0 Background 1.1 General Business Information Name and Location Crystal Geyser Water Company 1233 East California Avenue Bakersfield, California 93307 Exhibit 1 is a location map. Exhibit 2 is a facility diagram. The area immediately surrounding the plant is used for commercial, industrial, and residential purposes, as shown in Exhibit 3, a diagram of the surrounding area. Business Telephone Number (805) 323-6296 Nature of Business The Crystal Geyser Water Company Bakersfield plant formulates and bottles Crystal Geyser Brand juice drinks and flavored waters. For process cooling, an ammonia refrigeration system is used. 1.2 Description of AHM Used Amount Used The ammonia system holds approximately 300 pounds of liquid and vapor ammonia. One or two 150 pound cylinders are stored outside of the plant. Hazardous Properties Because of its physical properties, a release of liquid ammonia has a greater potential to cause serious injury to receptors than gaseous ammonia. Liquid ammonia released at a high rate can form a dense, ground hugging cloud of small liquid particles dispersed in air. A dense gas dispersion has the potential to move through surrounding areas, endangering neighboring receptors. Ammonia vapors, lighter than air, rise quickly in the atmosphere and are less likely to cause serious injury to receptors. Ammonia vapors released into an unventilated area could reach high concentrations that present a risk to employees who enter the area unprotected. Page 4 BERNARD~ $1 TE Wy. aC,-. 1:! $~reet =NUE ~UXTUN CRYSTAL GEYSER BAKERSFIELD Lake Henley St.. Potomac Fig St. STATE · SCI-f. -- E. Belie' O Terrace · Feliz McNew L:t. Cannon Ave. Smith St. I --BRUNDAGI Terrace · Virpinla Texas St. · ,4NIMAL* ,SHE L TE ~ Scale O Feet 2000' 4000' 0 Mile: ~mi. ~:mi. :/.mi. 0 Kilometer: .50km 1kin IN WZI INC, BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA CRYSTAL GEYSER BAKERSFIELD Location Map 5/1/90 DN 20991 EXHIBIT Ammonia Equipment is Highlighted ['-J WZl INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA CRYSTAL GEYSER BAKERSFIELD Facility Diagram DATE S/DO ID. 21o~JExHnB'T 2 Ammonia, a colorless gas with an extremely pungent odor, can be detected by smell at concentrations at 3.5 to 37 mg/m3 (5 to 53 ppm). Ammonia is corrosive and irritating to the skin. High concentrations can cause dermal burns, inflammation and swelling of the eyes and is potentially blinding to exposed receptors. Levels of 500 mg/m3 (700 ppm) can cause eye irritation. Coughing occurs at a level of 1200 mg/m3 (1700 ppm). Exposure to higher concentrations can result in debilitating injury and death through pulmonary edema. Ammonia is not recognized as a carcinogen, and it does not cause adverse environmental impacts. 1.3 General Ammonia Refrigeration Processes Mechanical refrigeration is the process of lowering the temperature of a substance to below that of its surroundings. The cooled substance, ammonia, removes heat from process materials. In a single stage refrigeration process two pressures, high and Iow, are used to enable a continuous cooling process. Low pressure vapor is compressed, raising temperatures and pressure levels. During compression', heat of compression is added to the vapor as the pressure is raised. At the condenser the high pressure vapor is liquefied by cooling. The liquid refrigerant flows from the condenser to an expansion valve where its pressure is reduced and temperature is further reduced. The liquid ammonia then moves to the evaporator where it absorbs heat from a fluid being cooled and revaporizes. Vaporized ammonia then flows to the compressor suction for recompression to liquid'to complete the refrigeration cycle. 1.4 Operation of the Ammonia System · Exhibit 4 is a schematic diagram of the ammonia system. The system is designed to operate when cooling is needed. Gaseous ammonia enters the compressors and is compressed to a higher pressure and temperature. After exiting the compressors, the hot gas enters the evaporative condensers. Water running through the condensers cools the hot gas into a liquid. The liquid ammonia flows to and is contained in the outdoor receiver. A level control, controlled by a solenoid valve, allows ammonia to flow from the outdoor receiver into the indoor receiver. Ammonia is charged into the indoor receiver from a 150 pound cylinder. The cap is kept on the cylinder while it is transferred through the building. For charging, the cap is removed. The indoor receiver sight glass is watched during delivery to ensure that the proper amount of ammonia is transferred into the system. From the indoor receiver, liquid ammonia flows through the lines to the cooling equipment, the carbo coolers. In this flooded system, liquid ammonia flows through exchanger plates while the material to be cooled, flowing countercurrently, is cooled by the phase change of the boiling ammonia. From the carbo coolers, vapor and liquid ammonia travels back to the indoor receiver from which vapors are pulled by the compressors. Liquids are recycled from the receiver back to the coolers while vapors travel through insulated lines to be compressed to high pressure and then cooled into a liquid, completing the cycle. Page 5 liquids and vapors SV Carbo Coolers Solenoid Valve controlling Flow to Carbo Coolers liquids prv vapors to compressor suction Compressor SV Compressor discharge pry: pressure relief valve sv: shutoff valve Ammonia Receiver Level (Inside) Control Solenoid Vessel Valve SV SV SV Ammonia Added to The System from 150 lb Cylinder Ammonia Receiver (Outdoor) . Evaporative Condenser Evaporative Condenser WZl INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA CRYSTAL GEYSER BAKERSFIELD Ammonia Schematic Diagram DATE S/9015/1 IEXHIBIT 4 Ill ..-I 2.0 Description of AHM Accidents 2.1 Accidents at this Location On March 23, 1989 a release involving the ammonia system caused neighbors to complain of an ammonia smell. A power failure caused the system to shut down. When power was returned, the initial startup blew three-thirty amp fuses in the condenser panel, shutting down both compressors. The operator did not know that the condenser were not operating and turned on the ammonia compressors. Pressure in the system quickly rose, forcing ammonia through the high pressure relief valve. 2.2 Underlying Causes The release was caused by the operator who turned on the compressors although the condensers were not working. 2.3 Measures Taken to Prevent Recurrence The operator is now required to check the condensers every time he turns on the ,;,compressors. He has received substantial training to ensure that this type of release does not recur. Only trained personnel are allowed to operate the ammonia system. 2.4 Accident Investigation Procedures After an accident has occurred, an ammonia incident report (Exhibit 5) shall be filled out. A post accident review shall be held in which potential causes of the accident are discussed. When the cause of the accident has been determined, a method shall be developed to ensure that the accident will not recur. System design, operating and maintenance procedures'that need updating or alteration shall be noted, and a time schedule set for implementation of improvements. Responsibilities: The Plant Manager: o ensures that accident report is complete. o conducts the accident investigation. o guides accident response. The Maintenance Manager: o provides technical details of reports. o assists with the accident investigation. o directs physical plant changes. o makes changes to the training program, if changes are necessary. All employees: o assist with the accident investigation. Page 6 AMMONIA INCIDENT REPORT FACILITY: DATE OF INCIDENT: TIME OF INCIDENT: SEVERITY OF INCIDENT: VERY SERIOUS SERIOUS LOW THREAT Caused evacuation of the plant or neighbors, or serious injury, and required the use of SCBA (self contained breathing apparatus) to contain. Caused injury and or damage to property and required the use of SCBA (self contained breathing apparatus) to contain. Required breathing equipment but caused no injury or damage. LOCATION IN FACTORY: SOURCE OF DISCHARGE (TYPE OF EQUIPMENT) COMPONENT OR ITEM DISCHARGING (SUCH AS SEAL, VALVE, WELD...) CAUSE OF DISCHARGE: AMMONIA INCIDENT REPORT PAGE 1 · EXHIBIT 5 ACTIVITY AT TIME OF DISCHARGE: . DETAILS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE: DEGREE OF CONTROL LOW MODERATE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMERGENCY PLAN LOW DEFICIENCIES IN THE EMERGENCY PLAN: HIGH MODERATE HIGH CONSEQUENCES OF DISCHARGE: NUMBER OF PEOPLE HURT NUMBER HOSPITALIZED EVACUATION: IMMEDIATE DISCHARGE AREA ENTIRE FAC]/_,ITY ~ (Y/N) NEIGHBORS ~ (Y/N) ESTIMATED COST OF INCIDENT: EMPLOYEES OTHERS EMPLOYEES OTHERS __ (Y/N) PROBABLE RECURRENCE OF INCIDENT: LOW MODERATE HIGH FULL DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT (INCLUDING RELEVANT EVENTS LEADING TO THE INCIDENT; ACTS, FAILURES TO ACT AND/OR CONDITIONS THAT CONTRIBUTED DIRECTLY TO THE INCIDENT; WHAT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN T© CONTROL THE INCIDENT; WHAT REMEDIAL ACTION HAS BEEN.TAKEN TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE. AMMONIA INCIDENT REPORT PAGE 2 EXHIBIT 5 2.5 Release Reporting Procedures Releases of acutely hazardous materials that threaten human health and safety or the environment must be reported. The Plant Manager is responsible for determining the significance and reportability of a release. If an ammonia release exceeds 200 cubic feet during a 24-hour period or constitutes a threat to life, health or the environment, the event is reportable and the following agency must be notified immediately. City of Bakersfield Fire Department Hazardous Materials Division Telephone' (805) 326-3979 California Office of Emergency Services Telephone: 1-800-852-7550 The Plant Manager is responsible for reporting a release. Page 7 Ill Ill m 0 3.0 Equipment Report 3.1 Nature, Age and Condition The following equipment makes up the ammonia refrigeration system at Crystal Geyser Bakersfield. Each piece of equipment will be listed along with its nature, age and condition. _Equipment: Nature: Age: Condition: _Equipment: Nature: Age: Condition: ~q_c_j.pm e nt: Nature: Age: Condition: ~ment' Nature: Age: Condition: Ammonia Compress_or #1 This 75 hp compressor is used to compress arnrnonia vapors. Model Number: Vilter #446 Built in 1964 Well maintained, good condition Ammonia Compressor #2 This 75 hp compressor is used to cornpress ammonia vapors. Model Number: Vilter #446 Built in 1964 Well maintained, good condition _Oil Separator # !. This oil separator removes oil from the high pressure ammonia vapor discharging from the #1 compressor. Oil is drained from the separator for reuse in the compressor. Brand: Mojannier, Maximum pressure: 250 psia @ 650 o F Built in 1964 Well maintained, good condition Oil Separator # 2 This oil sepa. rator removes oil from the high pressure ammonia vapor discharging from the #2 compressor. Oil is drained from the separator for reuse in the compressor. Brand: Mojannier, Maximum pressure: 250 psia @ 650 o F Built in 1964 Well maintained, good condition Page 8 Equipment: Nature: Age: Condition: Equipment: Nature: Age: Condition: Equipment: Nature: Age: Condition: Evaporative Condenser #1 This Baltimore AirCoil condenser cools the high pressure vapor ammonia to a liquid. Air flows up through the condenser, blown by fans. Water flows down through the condenser, evaporating and cooling ammonia flowing through small lines. Model Number: VNC-110-A, Baltimore AirCoil, Serial No. 77-0531 Built in 1977 Good Evaporative Condenser #2 This Baltimore AirCoil condenser cools the high pressure vapor ammonia to a liquid. Air flows up through the condenser, blown by fans. Water flows down through the condenser, evaporating and cooling ammonia flowing through small lines. Model Number: VNC-110-A, Baltimore AirCoil, Serial No. 77-0532 Built in 1977 Good Outdoor Ammonia Receiver This ammonia storage vessel, 56 inches by 19 inches in diameter, is located outside of the building and holds high pressure liquid ammonia from the evaporative condensers. Ammonia is added to the system at this receiver. The receiver has two pressure relief valves. Built in 1964. Good Page 9 Eauipment: Nature: Age: Condition: Eqopment: Nature: Age' Condition: Eqopment: Nature: Age: Condition: Equipment' N atu re: Age: Condition: Indoor Ammonia Receiver This ammonia storage veSsel is located in the carbo cooler room and holds high pressure liquid ammonia from the outdoor receiver. Ammonia is added to the system at this receiver. A pressure relief valve is located on a line from the receiver. The pressure relief valve is vented in the room. Liquids flow from this vessel to the carbo coolers, while vapors are suctioned by the compressors. HSB No. 6074, Serial No. 2999 Built in 1956 Good Solenoid Valve Controlling Level in the Indoor Ammonia Receiver This solenoid valve controls liquid flow from the indoor receiver into the carbo cooler plates. · 'Rebuilt in 1990 Good (;;arbo Cooler #1 Liquid ammonia flows through tubes in the carbo cooler. Heat is absorbed from liquids being cooled by the evaporating ammonia. HSB No.: 1533, Serial No. 2999 Built in: 1955 Good Carbo Cooler #2 Liquid ammonia flows through tubes in the carbo cooler. Heat is absorbed from liquids being cooled by the evaporating ammonia. HSB No. 1535, Serial No. 2999 Built in: 1955 Good Page 1 0 Equipment: Nature: Age: Condition: Ammonia Lines The ammonia lines carry the ammonia through the system. The lines have been in place in this system for about 6 years. Good, suction lines are insulated Page 1 1 3.2 Testing Schedules Testing of control equipment is necessary to ensure that the equipment will work when it is needed. High Pressure Cutouts Test Schedule Tested during compressor maintenance Pressure Relief Valves 3.3 Maintenance Schedules Tested when the vessel being protected undergoes maintenance The compressors require more maintenance than any other part of the ammonia system. The compressors are given a detailed inspection each month. Every day, operators monitor the equipment and Icg normal operating variables in addition to unusual conditions. Exhibit 6 is a copy of a Icg typical of the operator's Icg used at Crystal Geyser. Conditions that may require maintenance include: o High temperatures o High or Iow pressures o High oil consumption o Unusual noises o Excessive vibration o Unbalanced operation When problems or potential problems are detected, the equipment is scheduled for maintenance. Equipment Compressors Maintenance schedules for regularly maintained equipment follows: Maintenance Schedule Monthly Inspection Page 1 2 OPERATORS (typical) TIME PRESSURE TEMPERATURE OIL ADDED? COMMENTS EXHIBIT 6 0 0 0 4.0 Procedures Report 4.1 Daily Operating Procedures Operating procedures include: Daily Operatina Duties 1. Inspect work area and overall system operation 2. Check suction temperatures and pressures constantly. to 40°F and average pressure 28 to 60 psig. 3. Check discharge temperature and pressure constantly. to 85°F and average pressure 60 to 140 psig. 4. 5. Average temperature 15°F Average temperature 40°F Log in data once per day Check oil levels in compressors. Normal level is mid-point to one-third of sight glass. 6. Check oil pressure in compressors. Average pressure 30 to 60 psig. 7. investigate abnormal conditions Addition of Oil to the Compressors 1. Open crankcase valve, making sure that the check valve is in place 2. Oil is pumped into crankcase with a high pressure pump 3. When finished, the crankcase valve is closed 4. Compressor is in continuous operation Page 1 3 4.2 Maintenance Procedures Maintenance procedures include: Ammonia System Shutdown 1. Shut suction valves on compressors 2. Shut king valve on receiver to pump all ammonia into the receiver 3. Turn compressor motor off 4. Shut compressor discharge valves 5. Lock out electrical panel 6. Tag warning on the electrical panel 7. ©pen discharge valves before starting Isolating a Compressor for Maintenance 1. Shut suction valve, allow compressor to pump down (remove ammonia) 2. Turn compressor motor off 3. Close discharge valve 4. Lock out electrical panel 5. Tag warning on the electrical panel 6. Open discharge valves before starting the compressor 7. Hook bleed off hose to the crankcase to bleed off excess ammonia into a bucket of water Page 1 4 .Restarting a ComCressor 1. Disconnect bleed off hose 2. Open discharge valve at compressor '3. Check oil level in crankcase 4. Remove lockout on the electrical panel 5. Turn on compressor motor 6. Check oil pressure 7. Open suction valve at the compressor Page 1 5 m Om m_~ ffi 5.0' Design, Operating and Maintenance Control Systems 5.1 Design Control Systems Design control systems include proper design of piping to minimize slug formation, automatic control devices (for a listing, see Appendix B-IV of the Hazards Analysis, included in this document as Appendix B), and proper sizing of process equipment. 5.2 Operating Control Systems The operator's Icg (Exhibit 6) is an effective control of the operating system. Process variables are noted and action is taken if required. Other operating control systems include labeling to ensure that proper actions are taken, and safe operating procedures training. Inexperienced workers are not allowed to operate the ammonia system or to perform work on the system. Any new employees must be trained thoroughly before they are allowed to operate the system. 5.3 Maintenance Control Systems ":'.~¥he Maintenance Manager is responsible for controlling maintenance of the system. Maintenance is recorded on the daily operators Icg, Exhibit 7. The daily operators Icg is reviewed by the Maintenance Manager and retained on file for future reference. '-Maintenance'records are a control method. ,.Purchase orders are issued for maintenance work requiring contractors. Completed purchase orders are retained by the Plant Manager. Page 1 6 CRYSTAL GEYSER MAINTENANCE RECORD EQUIPMENT: DATE: WORK'PERFORMED: CAUSE: COMMENTS: EQUIPMENT: DATE: WORK PERFORMED: CAUSE: COMMENTS: EXHIBIT 7 O0 6.0 Detection, Monitoring or Automatic Control Systems 6.1 Detection Systems Abnormal or hazardous conditions are detected by: Automatic controls (see Appendix B-IV of the Hazards Analysis, Appendix B of this report) Sight: Smell: Hearing: Experience: 6.2 The following variables equipment: Ammonia pressure- Ammonia liquid flow- Vibration, discolorations, rust, holes, worn spots Ammonia leaks, hot oil Unusual sounds, lack ?f usual sounds A knowledge of what can go wrong with the system will help in detection of hazardous conditions. Monitoring Systems are continuously monitored by automatic controlling Monitored by pressure cutouts, pressure relief valves Monitored by solenoid valves 'The" following variables are monitored by the operator: Ammonia pressure- Checked by operator, Temperature- Checked by operator Oil levels- Checked by 'operator Ammonia Level- Low levels are detected by a rise in the temperature of · -'" the process materials. 6.3 Automatic Control Systems Automatic control systems act as a backup to operatnr detection and actions. A listing of automatic controls on the refrigeration system is included as Appendix B-IV of the Hazards Analysis, Appendix B of this report. Page 17 mb 'o ~0 m~ 7.0 Proposed Risk Reduction Measures 7.1 Written Operating Procedures Written operating procedures (Section 4.1 of this RMPP) ensure that operators are well trained for their positions. Written procedures ensure that safe practices are continued despite turnover in personnel. These procedures will be kept in the maintenance manager's office and in this RMPP document, easily accessed by operating personnel. 7.2 Written Maintenance Procedures Training using the maintenance procedures (Section 4.2 of this RMPP) as a guide, ensure that workers are well trained to perform maintenance on ammonia refrigeration equipment. Written procedures ensure that safety is continuous despite turnover in personnel. If contract help is required, written maintenance procedures may prevent accidents caused by contractor unfamiliarity with the ammonia system. These procedures will be kept in the maintenance manager's office and in this RMPP document, easily accessed by maintenance personnel. 7.3 · Increased Inspections ,Increased.emphasis on inspections will ensure that deficiencies or problems are 'detected before they result in a release of ammonia. The inspection program is described in Section 10.0 of this RMPP. 7.4 Better Labeling -Labeling and warning signs are an effective means of communicating hazards to new employees and/or visitors to the plant. Emergency responders may need to know the contents of lines or types of materials in use. Improved labeling of lines or specific hazards will help to reduce the risk of release of AHM. Ammonia lines will be labeled. 7.5 Safety and Training Program Employees will receive training under Crystal Geyser Bakersfield's safety program. The training program is described in Section 11.3, Training Program for RMPP Implementation. Release prevention and emergency response training will reduce the risk of releases and minimize consequences of releases. 7.6 Fire Prevention Plan The fire prevention plan at Crystal Geyser Bakersfield relies upon employee safety training, and good housekeeping practices. A sprinkler system protects the building from fires. ..... Page 1 8 7.7 Physical Plant Changes A pressure relief valve (PRV) has been added to the inner receiver. The storage location of the ammonia cylinders will be moved to the totally enclosed canopied and sprinklered compressor area in 1991. 7.8 Reduction of Risk to Neighboring Homes or Businesses The ammonia system is turned off during times when the plant is unoccupied. Maintenance practices coupled with operations training reduce the risk of ammonia releasing accidents. Proposed changes to the physical plant further reduce risk to neighboring facilities. An ammonia diffusion system to be added will absorb the ammonia before it can present a risk to receptors. The plant engineer (maintenance manager) is responsible for operation of the diffusion system. He will designate a trained employee to operate the ammonia system during his absence. Page I 9 m m 8.0 Emergency Contingency Plans 8.1 General Evacuation Employees are verbally notified of emergencies by the plant manager or his designee. All employees are to leave immediately through the nearest exit and regroup at the parking lot at East California and Lakeview. Emergency responders will be notified through 911. Exhibit 8 is a map showing emergency evacuation routes. This route has been planned to bypass ammonia systems that may be leaking. 8.2 Fire The sprinkler system will engage when it has detected a fire. All employees are to leave immediately through the nearest exit and regroup at the parking lot at East California and Lakeview. Emergency responders will be notified through 911. The sprinklers will extinguish fires in the plant. 8.3 Earthquake Employees should remain in safe, stable locations (in doorways, under sturdy desks) until earth movement has ceased. After the earthquake, all employees are to leave immediately through the nearest exit and regroup at the parking lot at East California and Lakeview, far enough from the building to avoid falling masonry. 8.4 Significant Leak from the Ammonia System Employees are.verbally notified of the leak. Notify the Bakersfield City Fire Department through 911. Ammonia operators will work to isolate the leak, if possible. All non essential employees are to leave immediately and regroup at the parking lot at East California and Lakeview. Clean up procedures for an ammonia release will mitigate the effects of the release: o Ventilation will reduce concentrations of ammonia in enclosed areas o If liquid ammonia is on the floor, spray it with large quantities of cold water o Water will absorb ammonia: high concentrations of ammonia vapor or dispersed ammonia can be diluted with water spray. During a release, the plant engineer (maintenance manager) will: o Stop leaks o Supervise the use of self contained breathing apparatus. The plant engineer has an in-depth knowledge of the ammonia system. years of experience with refrigeration systems. He has many Page 2 0 8.5 Emergency Responders In an emergency, the following agencies may be needed: H~$pita! Memorial Hospital 420 34th Street Bakersfield, California (805) 327-1792 Fire Department Call 911 P~e 21 9.0 Auditing Program A copy of the aUdit used at Crystal Geyser Bakersfield is included as Appendix C. The purpose cf the ammonia safety audit is to ensure that the ammonia system is operated and maintained in a manner that ensures the minimum possible risk to personnel, the general public, environment and product safety. Other goals to be achieved by the ammonia safety audit are: o To pinpoint actual and potential safety hazards due to design, location, operation and maintenance of the ammonia system. o To provide a means of objectively assessing and documenting plant safety. To provide a means of objectively defining needs for upgrading modification. To provide feedback on safety issues. and o The ammonia safety audit will be conducted on a yearly basis. Page 22 Z .,~ m 0 Z 0 1 0.0 Inspection Program An inspection program is necessary for the assessment of hazards present in the work place. The person responsible for inspection must be familiar with the process and system being inspected. Hazards, deficiencies, out-of-normal variables or unusual observations or occurrences must be recognized and recorded during the inspection. Potential hazards identified through the inspection will be assessed and assigned priorities for correction. Action will be taken to reduce the risk presented by identified hazards. The maintenance manager is responsible for inspecting the work area at the beginning of the shift. Any nbtes resulting from the inspection will be noted in the Icg. In addition to daily inspections by the quality control manager and the maintenance manager, the ammonia safety audit includes an intensive inspection of the ammonia refrigeration system. Inspections of the system may be scheduled after process changes, upsets, oraccidents. P~e 23 11.0 RMPP Implementation "Implementation of the RMPP shall include carrying out all operating, maintenance, monitoring, inventory control, equipment inspection, auditing, record keeping, and training programs as required by the RMPP." 11.1 Personnel Responsible for RMPP Implementation The title of each person charged with RMPP implementation duties are listed below, along with their respective responsibilities. Title Plant Manager Maintenance Manager .... Quality Control Manager All Employees RMPP Implementation Responsibilities Supervise audits, inspection and record keeping, responsible for RMPP implementation Supervise equipment inspection, emergency response training, operating and maintenance training, inventory control and labeling Coordinate emergency response training Undergo emergency response and evacuation training Page 2 4 11.2 Implementation Schedule The following schedule will be followed for RMPP Implementation. Program. Inspection Program Ammonia Safety Audit RMPP Record keeping Safe Operating Procedures Training Maintenance Procedures Training Evacuation Training Emergency Response 'l'raining Labeling Airpack Respirator Training Move Cylinder Storage to Canopied and Sprinklered Area Ammonia Diffusion System Date of Full Implementation Ongoing July, 1991 August, 1991 March, 1991 June, 1991 June, 1991 June,' 1 991 May, 1991 December, 1991 June, 1 991 December, 1 991 Page 2 5 11.3 Training Program for RMPP Implementation The RMPP training program must ensure that standard operating procedures are easily understood by operators. Training should be able to provide a continuity of safety despite employee turnover or changes in personnel. Training ensures that plans and programs such as emergency evacuation plans will work as designed when they are needed. During training sessions, employees speaking both Spanish and English serve as translators for employees that speak only Spanish. The following subjects will be covered by the training program: Use of Safety Equipment o When to wear a respirator o What type of respirator is appropriate; limitations o How often must the respirator be replaced o Respirator maintenance During 1991 ,,~an.airpack respirator will be obtained for use during emergencies. Ammonia First Aid Procedures o Keep a rope available to retrieve overcome employees o If an employee is overcome by ammonia: 1. Move victim to an area clear of ammonia 2. Call a doctor 2.' Remove contaminated clothing 3. Keep the patient still and covered with blankets o For skin burns, wash immediately with water Review of Material Safety Data Sheets, Chemical Hazards Fire Prevention and Response Release Reporting (Section 2.5) Evacuation Procedures (Section 8.1) . Earthquake, Procedures (Section 8.3) large quantities of Page 2 6 Spill Containment and Dilution Procedures (Section 8.4) Daily Operating Procedures (Section 4.1) Maintenance Procedures (Section 4.2) Page 2 7 '13 m c) rn m 12.0 RMPP Record Keeping Record keeping, required by RMPP legislation, ensures 'that RMPP programs are implemented and maintained. 1 2.1 Accident Records Documentation of accidents is necessary to prevent recurrence. Section 2.0 of this report is a description of accidents involving ammonia, including accident investigation - procedures and measures taken to avoid a repetition of the accident or release. 1 2.2 Ammonia Charge Records Ammonia charge records (Exhibit 9) will document amounts and dates of ammonia deliveries. Inventory control is a significant aspect of RMPP implementation. 12.3 Training Records Training records will be kept to ensure that each employee receives required training. All employees must be trained in emergency evacuation procedures. Certain employees need training in specific procedures related to the' handling of acutely hazardous materials. Exhibit 10 is the format for the record of training Required/Completed Record. 1 2.4 Audit Records .,Results of the ammonia safety audit are kept for future reference. Documentation ensures that hazards identified through the safety audit are addressed in a timely manner. A copy of the ammonia safety audit is contained as Appendix C. Page 2 8 CRYSTAL GEYSER AMMONIA CHARGE RECORD Date Ammonia in Plant Amt. Added Initial (Pounds) (Pounds) EXHIBIT 9 CRYSTAL GEYSER WATER COMPANY TRAINING REQUIRED / DATE COMPLETED EMPLOYEE AMMONIA AMMONIA FiRE EMERGENCY EVACUATION SPILLS AND NAME HANDLING DIFFUSION SCBA SAFETY NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES DILUTION EXHIBIT 10 13.0 Qualifications of Certifiers 13.1 Qualified Person Mary Jane Wilson, President, WZI Inc. Ms. Wilson received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Petroleum Engineering from Stanford University in 1972. She is registered as an Environmental Assessor in California. Ms. Wilson is the President and Corporate Executive Officer of WZI Inc. She monitors WZI Inc. projects to maintain technical standards. She has extensive experience (17 years total) in the petroleum and environmental consulting industries. She has participated in the design of numerous compliance programs related to the environmental safety of operating facilities. 13.2 Facility Operator ........ A._le_x.._M_Ma_nns, Plant Manager Mr. Manns, Plant Manager of Crystal Geyser, has worked as plant manager for Crystal ;,Geyser for one and 1/2 years. Previous duties included a combined 19 1/2 years as plant manager for the Coca Cola and the Pepsi Companies. Page 29 References 1. The Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedure,";, 1985, American Institute of Chemical Engineers. 2. Office of Emergency Services, Hazardous Materials Division, Risk Management and Prevention PrQgr~m G~idance, 1989, State of California. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency- and the U.S. Department of Transportation, Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis: Emergency Planning for Extremely Hazardous S.ubstance$., 1987. 4. National Response Team, Hazardous Materials Emerqency Planninq Guide, 1987. Page 3 0 m z X 2130 'G' STREET BAKERSFIELD, ca. 93301 (805) 326-3979 OFFICIAL U~E ONLY u ~ Z d ': 8 BUSINESS NAME INSTRUCTIONS; ID# HAZARDOUS MATERIALS Q BUSINESS PLAN AS A WHOLE RECEIVE FORM 2A HAY 19 1989 Ans'd ............ 1. To avoid further action, return this from within 30 days of receipt. 2. TYPE/PRINT ANSWERS IN ENGLISH. 3. Answer the questions below for the business as a whole. 4. Be as brief and concise as possible. $~CT];QN 1; A. B, BUSINESS ID~NT][F];CATION DATA LOCATION / STREET ADDRESS: 1233 E. California Avenue CITY:. Bakersfield' ZIP: 93307 BUS. PHONE: (805) 323-629§ SECTION 2: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS In'case of an emergency involving the release or threatened release of a hazardous material, call 911 and 1-8OO-852-7550 or 1-916-427-4341. This ','.will notify your local fire department and the State Office of Emergency Services as required by law. EMPLOYEES TO NOTIFY IN CASE OF EHERGENCY: NAME AND TITLE A Alex Manns B. Gerhard Gaugel C. Norman Ambrose DURING BUS. HRS. .,PH# (865)' 323-6296 PH#(805) 323-6296 (805) 323-6296 AFTER BUS. HRS. pH#(805) 589-6906 pH#(805) 392-8747 (805) 854-5465 SECTION 3: LOCATION OF UTILITY SHUT-OFFS FOR BUSINESS'AS A WHOLE PROPANE TANK: Middle of west side of building. 55 north of alley fence. A. NATURAL GAS/~.Inside fence next to southwest corner of building. B. '.,ELECTRICAL: Inside southwest corner of building on both sides of exit door. C. WATER: In alley next to fenqe and southwe~ corner of building. 330' west of Lakeview. D. SPECIAL: Ammonia shut off %n northwest corner of buildin~ ~n fenced'off area. E. LOCK BOX: YES / N~ IF YES, LOCATION: IF YES, DOES IT CONTAIN SiTE PLANS? YES / NO MSDSS? YES / NO FLOOR PLANS? YES / NO KEYS? YES / NO SECTION PRIVATE RESPONSE TEAM FOR @USiNES$ AS A WHOLE See attached. LOCAL EMERGENCY M~DICA~ ASSISTANCE FOR See attached. YOUR BUSINESS AS A-WHO~ SECTION 6: EMPLOYEE TRAINING EHPLOYERS ARE REQUIRED TO HAVE A TRAINING PROGRAH WHICH PROVIDES EHPLOYEES WITH INITIAL AND REFRESHER TRAINING IN THE SAFE HANDLING OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS.' A. NUMBER OF EHPLOYEES AT THIS FACILITY 19 B. 'DO YOU HAVE MSDS (HATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS) FOR EACH HAZARDOUS MATERIAL YOU HANDLE ? yes C. GIVE A BRIEF SUMHARY OF YOUR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRAINING PROGRAM: See attached. SECTION 7; EXEMPTION REQUEST. I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT MY BUSINESS IS EXEHPT FROM THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF CHAPTER 6.95 OF THE CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE FOR THE FOLLOWING. REASONS: WE DO NOT HANDLE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS. " : '" WE DO HANDLE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, BUT THE QUANTITIES AT NO TIHE EXCEED THE MINIHUM REPORTING QUANTITIES. OTHER (SPECIFY REASON} SECTION 8: CERTIFICATION I, AlexManns , certify that the'above information i accurate. I understand that this information will be used to fulfill my firm's obligations under the new California Health and Safety code on Hazardous Materials (Div. 20 Chapter 6.95 Sec. 25500 Et Al.) and that inaccurate information constitutes perjury. SIGNATURE ~ ~~ TITLE Plant Manager DATE 5-17-89 SECTION 4: Each supervisor is responsible for a particular area. They are assigned the task of evacuating employees in their area, plus the shut down of various systems. Each supervisor is to be trained in the use of CPR, first aid, and the use of a fire ex- tinguisher. Each supervisor has the authority to dial 911 in the case of a medical emergency. The plant manager will notify the proper authorities in the case of a. hazardous spill or leak. The plant manager also will supervise clean-up activities. SECTION 5: Each supervisor will be trained in CPR and first aid. For minor injuries, Bakersfield Occupational Medical Group will be used. For serious injury or injury due to a haz- ardous material, San Joaguin Hospital will be used. Memorial or Kern Medical'Center will be given second consideration. Any supervisor has the authority to dial 911 for medical emergencies. SECTION 6: Each employee involved in the use of hazardous material will be given instruction in the safe handling and use of each product before they begin use. Each employee will be provided with safety equipment required for each product handled. Safety procedures for spill clean-up of hazardous material will be taught. New hazardous materials in- troduced into inventory will be reviewed with each individual before use. Refresher courses in safe handling of hazardous material will be required of each employee in- volved in the use or handling during the year. BAKERSFIELD CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT 2130· 'G" STREET' BAKERSFIELD. CA. 93301 (805) 326-3979 OFFICIAL USE BUSIN--$S NAME ID# HAZARDOUS MATERIALS BUSINESS PLAN AS A WHOLE FORM 3A ~NSTRUCTION~ 1. To avoid further action, this form must be returned by:.' 2. TYPE/PRINT YOUR ANSWERS IN ENGLISH. 3, Answer the questions below for THE FACILITY UNIT LISTED BELOW 4. Be as BRIEF and CONCISE as possible FACILITY UNIT ~ I FACILITY UNIT NAME: C. C. BAKERSFI~L~ .. SECTION 1: MITIGATION, PReVeNTION, ABATEMENT PROC~DURE~ To prevent the release or spill of hazardous material at this facility, only individuals required to use hazardous materials in the course of their work will be allowed to handle them. Each of these individuals will be trained in the safe handlin§ and use procedures for each product. Procedures for containment or clean-up will be those recommended by the manufacturer of the product as described in the Material Safety Data Sheet. ~ECTION ~; NOTIFICATION 'ANO EVACUATION PROCEDURES AT THE UNIT ONLY In the case of a hazardous material spill, the plant manager upon..notification will use the paging system to notify all employees to evacuate the facility. The plant manager will immediately call 911 to report the incident to the local fire department. The State Office of Emergency Services will also be notified as required. Each supervisor is to direct the employees in his area to the safest exit and make sure that his area has been vacated by all personnel. Ail employees evacuated will report to a designated area outside of the facility. ~CTION 3: HAZARDOUS MATERIALS FOR THIS UNit ONLY A. Does this Facility Unit contain Hazardous Materials? ...... YES NO If Yes, see B. If NO, continue with SECTION Are any of the hazardous materials a bona fide Trade Secret? YES NO If NO, complete a separate Hazardous materials inventory form marked: NON-TRADE SECRETS ONLY (white form #4A-1) If YES, complete a hazardous materials inventory form marked: TRAOE SECRETS ONLY (Yellow form ~4a-2) in addition to the non-trade secret form. List only the trade secrets on form 4A-2. SECTION 4: PRIVATE FIRE PROTECTION This facility is equiped with automatic overhead, sprinklers i~ all areas. The sprinkler system is monitored by ADT Security Systems. We, have fire extinguishers in all areas of the facility for emergency use. SECTION' 5: LOCATION OF WATER SUPPLY FOR USE BY ~M~RG~NCY RESPONDERS (Fire Hydrant) On the nort~ side of E. California Ave.,_. 120 feet west of the northwest, corner of the %~hacility a fire de. partment hook-up to our main sprinkler.system riser exists. It is in e alley, 220 feet west of Lakeview Avenue. ~ , '~TION 6: tOCATION OF UTILITY SHUT-OFFS AT THIS UNIT ONLY A, NATURAL GAS/PROPANE: NATURAL GAS: Inside fence next to southwest corner of building. PROPANE TANK: Middle of west side of building. 55 feet north of alley fence. 8. ELECTRICAL: Inside southwest corner of building on both sides of exit door. WATER: In alley next to fence and southwest corner of building. 330 feet west of Lakeview Avenue. SPECIAL: Ammonia shut off in northwest corner of building in fenced off area. E. LOCK BOX: YES''/ ~ IF YES, LOCATION: IF YES, SITE PLANS? FLOOR PLANS? YES / NO MSDSs? YES / NO YES / NO KEYS? YES / NO - 3B- I--1 t1233 . E. Cl)LIFORNI[t · ........ ~--~-'-'r ~_~_r ~, '~---. ~,,~L . :..'l ~- ALLEY ROLt.-UF ~ OFFICE ~J '1so" i j~,.% L [/.' Jl it i: II C.P,L. I FOt~N IIfl EX~T/ ["x ROLL-U P Door t \VI4RC. HOUSF- i: ,..- // ~ Aoa ~1 ] I ->E LOT ' ....... czrr of NON--TRADE SECRETS ~ustu~ss ~a~: C. ~. B~ERSFIELD o~g~ ~as~: Peter Gordon/Leo Soong ~a~ or ~ raClCXTY:c' G. B~ERSFIELD UOCaT~ON: iZ33 K. Calitornia Avenue ADDRESS: 501 Washington Street STANDARD IND. CLASS CODE 5i49 CITY, ZIP: Bakersfield~ CA 93307 CITY, ZIP: CalistoKa, CA 94515 DUN AND BRADSTREET NUMBER Not listed ?HON£ I: (805/ $2326296 ' PHONE ~: (707) 942-0500 - - ~ ~O INS~UCT~O~ FOR ~ROF~ COD~ I ; 3 4 S i 1 I ! I0 II I~ 13 14 ~/,/,..~ I ./~',..~ / ~/:,~.~ ' I -:~n,~O I=,:.'-I .,,..~ !.' · ' "'"" ' ' ' I(~x 411 t~c ac,ply) ' ' ' /t?~; ~'~.L t/ ~'~- "" ~/ ' ' ''~ , ~ , .,-;',~',' , .. · ...... .. , ..... :' ...... ':' [,*; I I~, I z.f' i~,'~,,",'. ..... r/~",~,~,',~ -', ,.'.,,,+.... ~> ...', .......... (C~k ali CSt ao~ly) : ,?*'t-I ,",'i>-/L': ~ [:~"0"'"] ' ,' ?' " : ' '"" - ~-- [-] [-: ~? ~, ,, ,,. & c.~.s. ,~ Hea lib of Pr~sur, ~,41 t~ ~=~GE~CY C~aC]S . Alex ~anns Plane Hanager 589-6906 . Gerhard Gaugel Q.C. ~anager 392-8767 LliE' .[li 2l'~i-P~i' li~ ntli · " ' NI~'P*i ...... . : for autasns~ t~ ifliQrNcJm. ! ~lieve IMf t~ suMitt~ inlo~ci~ ~s tm. 4ccurltl. ~d c~~ · /~'~/~,/x,~ __. Z~;f.Z~<~: ............. s'~T-~~ ~ :/:; NON--TRADE SECRETS ' Pige ..-- of .... BUSINESS NAME: C. G. BAKERSFIELD OWNER NAME: Peter Gordon/Leo Soong NAME oF T~ FACILITY:c' G. BAKERSFIELD LOCATION: 1233 E. California Avenue. ADDRESS: 501 Washingto.n Street STANDARD IND. CLASS CODE 5149 CITY. ZIP: Bakersfield, CA 93307 CITY. ZIP: CalistoKa, CA 94515 DUN AND BRADSTRE£T NUMBER Not listed ?,ONE ,: (805) 323-6296 PflONr ,: (~07) 942-0500 __ - - RF, FF~ TO IM$2'RUCT~OM~ FOR PROP~ COD~ (~, C~e ~.~C /, ~ ~ ~ Units ~ Sit~ Ty~ Pr~s lMo C~e St~ In Fac~ltCy Vt ~ InsertErs -. /.'~, I:'z- I'/. i/:?j:c~¥. ,.,, .... .~?, ., ,.., _.. ~ -., . ,. .. ,., ~. , - i~i~ll l~i ~ill~ ~MLL ;'-'~ L I~ ill l~c lpply) ...... ,/;,'tl~ ~..4.,I~'~ ,, ,~ ' .... ~ ] Fire Hazard' ~--~ ~t 13 .~ i C.A.5. ~ -. ~/, Irt I :;'~%' /,/,~' / ..~.~ !~.[~[ '.t.¢ L~. / l~/ 1~ I ~.~/-, ,~..~,.~..~-.~,. ~.-.;~4,~¢:~.~-./:~ ...~. ¥ _ Health of Pr~sure Health / ...... ' :": ' -' - ' : '" ' .... ~NERG~NCY C~TACTS 81 Alex Manns Plant Man,set 589-6906 ~" . Gerhar~ GauEel Q]"~. Man~Eer 392-8747 .: ..:. CITY of KERSFIELD NON--'JTRADE SECRETS ' NAME: C. G. BAKERSFIELD OWN£R NAME: Peter Gordon/Leo Soong NAME OF T~ FACILITY:C' G. BAKERSFIELD LOCATION: 1233 E. California Avenue aDDRESS: 501 Wa. shington Street STANDARD IND. CLASS COPE 5149 CITY, ZIP: Bakersfield: CA 93307 .' CITY, ZIP: Caljsto~a, CA 94515 DON AND BRADSTREET NUMBER Not listed PHO,E ,: .(805} ~2~-6296 ~HO~ ~: (707) 942.0500 ._- - ~ zo x~s~crzo~ ~o~ ..., . . .... , ,i . ,,, ..... Health of Pr~sure Mia Ich ~X~RG[NCy CmT~CTS II Alex Manns Plant Manager 589-6906 12 Gerhard Gaugel Q.C. Manager '392-8~47 Cert~ficatim (Read and sJKn after compleCJnE ail sectJons) .: ~,- ,., o.~c;,~-~;n, .T ~,r,o~,.o. O; ~.~o,,,~ s ,.c~.~.,o.s,.,~[,.. s~;i;~;i~-- ..... ......... ' ......................................................... O~i];]E~ ....:CITY of KERSFIELD NON--'I?. RADE SECRETS · 80$IN£SS NAME: C. G. BAKERSFIELD OWN£R NAME: Peter Gordon/Leo Soong ~a~g OF I~ FACILITY:C' G. B~ERSFIELD LOCATION: 1733 E. California Avenue ADDRESS: 50~ Washington Street STANDARD IND. CLASS CODE 5149 CITY, ZIP: Bakersfield~ CA 93307 CITY, ZIP: Calis,toga, CA 94515 DUN AND BRADSTREET NUMBER Not listed P,O,E ,: (805) 923-6296 PNONE #: (707) 942-0500 - - RF~'KR ~0 INS~U~IO~ ~OR PROP~ COD~ lran~ Ty~ ~x lveriql ~uli ~asu~ I ~ Cmt ~t ~C he [~lCl~ ~'l ~ ~ lam of Nlxtu~/~cS HEa I~h ct P~sur~ H~ Ich ........... H~ Ith of P~ i~lth ~ ' Hca hh of Pr~sur, Health ~ .......... :.[aO["CY :~CIS II Alex Manns Plant Manager 589-6906 It Gerhard Gaugel Q.C. Manager " 392'-'8747 Cartfficatiun (Read and siKn after co=pieCing ail sections) . : [ certify under D~alty of li. t~t I ~ve ~rsmelly examin~ and am /..iltir .ith t~ tnfor~cim su~tttK tn this ~ e11 IttlC~ d~ts. ~ thc ~s~ NON--TRADE SECRETS BUSINESS NAME: C. G. BAKERSFIELD OWNEm NAME: Peter Gordon/Leo Soong NAME OF T~ FACILITY:C' G. BAKERSFIELD LOCATION: 1233 E. California Avenue ADDRESS: 501 Washingto.n Street STANDARD IND. CLASS CODE 5149 CITY. ZIP: Bakersfield} CA 93307 CITY, ZIP: Ca. listoga, CA 94515 Do, AND BRADSTREET NDMBER Not listed P,ONE ~: (805) }2}-6296 PHO,E ~:' (707) 942-0500 __- - ~ ~0 I~S~UCrIO~ FOR PRop~ CODR~ i ~ 3 4 S ' t 1 I I I0 II 1~ 13 I1 -~tl.f'_l ," ' ..... ' .... L_I ....... ] .... I. I J,..l..-_t~_ I I ,1 I' , ...... ~ic~l ~d H~Jth ~azird C.l.S. ~ tC~ all t~c aooly) Hflith of P~.m H~lth .i_~_~_-L__.I I ,., I t .... ! I , (C~K ail t~c aOoly) ~ ..... ~_j Fire Hazard ~--~ Reactivity [ ~ ~14~ ~--~ ~dd~ ~elflse ~--u I~iate .... I__L_,._L, ....... 1 I ~__t_2. t 1_ P~czi ~ Hfllth Hizird C.1.$. lu~r (C~x all c~c a~ly) --u Fire HIzard ~--u ~CtJViCy ~i4~ ~dd~ qeleise ~--~ Hca Ich ot Prflsure Heelch ~kERG[NCY Cffi[lCl$ II Alex Manns Plant Manager 589-6906 , Gerhard Gaugel Q.C. ~anager 392-'8747 Cert,ficattm (Read and siKn after compJet~lnE ail secCJonsl . ~ I certify ~der ~ity of li, t~t I ~ve ffrsmally examn~ and ie feailtar ,ith tM' tnforMtim suMitt~ in this ~ ii1 ettlcM ~cs. ~ t~C ~s~ m ~ 1~1W of t~e t~lvi$11s ru~sible for aotitnt~ tM jnf~MCi~. I ~lieve tMc tM SUMiCCK J~JO~tJ~ iS tr~. Kcurice. ~dc~iec~ / t _ ..-.. ~ ..... ....., CITY of ~ERSFIELD " ", NON--'rRADE SECRETS ' ;~ge .._ of .... BUSINESS NAME:_ C. G. B~ERSFIELD OWNER NAME: Peter Gordon/Leo Soong NAME OF T~ FACILITY:C' G. B~ERSFIELD ue ADDR£SS:-5-01 Wa. shington Street STANDARD IND. CLASS CODE 5149 'CITY, ZIP: CalistoKa, CA 94515 DUN AND BRADSTRFET NUMBER Not listed ?.ONE ~: (707) 942-0500 -___- ~t 13 Nm i C.i.S. ~ O~ Pr~surg XI4tlh :~::' LOCATION: 1233 E. California Avenue CITY, ZIP: Bakersfield, CA 93307 PHONE I:. (805) 323-6296 ' ICh~x ii] t~t lo, iv) ~_d FI~ H4zird ~ hecttvtty L--~ hll~ X~lth ' '" --' k Xfl Ich [-~ Fire Hazard ~] Iflctivity [ ] hll~ [ Hca I th ' Z ] 4 S frans ~y~ Pl4x Av~rlqa A~nual C~e (:~e ~c hC Est ~l~h .E~GEHCYCONTA(:T$ It Alex Manns Plant Manager 589-6906 ,2 Gerhard Gaugel Q.C. Manager 392-8747 ,rClfiCaClon (Read and siKn after co,,pleCJn~ aJJ sections) . : ...... CITY of KERSFIELD NON--TRADE SECRETS ' P~c;e ..-- of BUSINESS NAME: C. G. BAKERSFIELD OWNER NAME: Peter Gordon/Leo Soong NAME OF T~f~J FACILITY:c' G. BAKERSFIELD LOCATION: 1233___~E. California Avenue ADDRESS: 501 Washington Street STANDARD IND. CLASS CODE 5149 CITY. ZIP: Bakersfield, CA 93307 'CITY, ZIP: Calls.toga, CA 9~15 DUN AND BRADSTREET NUMBER Not listed PHONE I:. (805) 323-6296 PHONE #: (707) 942-0500 ' __ - --__ - J~'~ ~'0 I~$~UC~ZO~ FOR FROP~ COD~ I Hea ich o~ Pr~re H~ }th ........... '. ~c 13 ~AC.l.S. ~ I i~; ~ .... ~ ~.~ ~ . 4 -,,- · .. ~ . , ~ . · ,. ' H~lth Of P~ H~Jth ~ ~"~;GE,CY C~TACIS II Alex Banns Plant Manager 589-6906 12 Gerhard Gaugel Q.C. Manager 392-8747 .: Certify ~der ~lty of lay t~t [ ~ve ~rs~mlly examin~ and mm familiar vith t~' tnfor~tJm suhittK in this ~ mil lttlC~ ~CS. K thc hs~ m ~ i~i~ of t~e (~tvi~iiS ~sibte I~ HAZARDS ANALYSIS Crystal Geyser Water Company Bakersfield, California Appendix B Submitted to the Hazardous Materials Division of the Bakersfield City Fire Department August, 1990 Revised October 1, 1990 Revised April, 1991 TABLE OF CONTENT~ Section 1.0 2.0 3.0 Introduction Summary Hazards Identification 3.1 Chemical Identity of Acutely Hazardous Materials 3.2 Location of Acutely Hazardous Materials 3.3 Quantity 3.4 Nature of Hazard 4.0 Hazard and Operability.Study Results 5.0 6.0 4.1 Summary 4.2 Release Scenarios 4.3 Offsite Consequences 4.4 Onsite Consequences 4.5 Human Error Analysis Vulnerability Analysis 5.1 Vulnerable Zone 5.2 Human Populations 5.3 Critical Facilities Risk Analysis 6.1 Release Probability 6.2 Severity of Consequences Page 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 '6 6 6 9 10 10 13 13 14 15 16 16 16 EXHIBITS Exhibit B-1 Exhibit B-2 Exhibit B-3 Exhibit B-4 Exhibit B-5 Exhibit B-6 Exhibit B-7 Exhibit B-8 Exhibit B-9 Location Map Hazards Analysis Flowchart Facility Diagram Ammonia Schematic Diagram Map of Surrounding Area Factors Affecting Vulnerable Zone Estimations Neighboring Receptors Worst Case Vulnerable Zone Map Worst Case IDLH Exposure Map TABLES Table 1 Physical Properties of Ammonia Appendix B-I Appendix B-II Appendix B-Ill Appendix B-IV APPENDICE~ Hazard and Operability Study Guideline Hazard and Operability Study Forms Modeling Results Alarms and Control Devices 1.0 INTRODUCTION This hazards analysis of the use of Acutely Hazardous Materials (AHM) has been prepared for the Crystal Geyser Bakersfield bottling facility, located at the corner of East California Avenue and Lakeview Avenue, Kern County, California (Exhibit B-l). This analysis has been prepared in accordance with the EPA/FEMA/USDOT document "Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis: Emergency Planning for Extremely Hazardous Substances, 1987." There are three, basic components in hazards analysis (Exhibit B-2) which provide the outline of this report: o Hazards Identification o Vulnerability Analysis o Risk Analysis Page I $1 T£ ~'" ENUE $?A7'£ ''i Scale 0 Miles Ami. ~,mi. g,-ni. I~i. 0 Kilometers .50kin 1kin I t IN WZI INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA CRYSTAL GEYSER BAKERSFIELD Location Map DATE 5/1/90 ID.N 209gI EXHIBIT B-1 IDENTIFICATION VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS VULNERABLE ZONE HUMAN POPULATIONS CRITICAL FACILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ANALYSIS LIKELIHOOD OF A RELEASE OCCURING SEVERITY OF THE CONSEQUENCES REFERENCE: EPA/FEMA 1987 EXHIBIT B-2 2.0 ~ The potential for offsite and onsite consequences is presented by the ammonia refrigeration system in operation at the Crystal Geyser' Bakersfield beverage formulation and bottling facility. Ammonia releases could occur leading to possible exposure of workers and receptors above the Level of Concern (LOC), 50 ppm, and the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health Level (IDLH), 500 ppm. The worst case credible scenario, determined through the hazard and operability study, was determined to be the formation of dispersion cloud of ammonia released by the rupture of a liquid ammonia line outdoors. Liquid ammonia released at high rate could form a liquid/air dispersion cloud that could migrate to neighboring residential areas. The immediate area surrounding the Crystal Geyser plant is both residential and industrial. Apartment buildings are immediately adjacent to the Crystal Geyser plant. Worst case credible onsite consequences may be experienced with the rupture of a line at the indoor receiver, releasing the liquid contents in a liquid/air dispersion, followed by the subsequent release of liquids and vapors remaining in the system into the building. The extent of the vulnerable zone for a worst case credible release of the contents of the ammonia receiver, 216 pounds of ammonia, determined through modeling, is approximately 2.3 miles (3.7 km) at 30 minutes after release. LOC exposure at 2.3 miles from point of release is expected to last approximately 30 minutes. The IDLH level, 500 ppm, may be reached at up to 0.8 miles (1.3 km) away 11 minutes after release. The IDLH exposure is expected to last approximately 12 minutes at 0.8 miles from the point of release. This Hazards Analysis showed the Crystal Geyser ammonia refrigeration system to be highly automated. The design of the system is such that employees need only to switch on the system in the morning and periodically add oil. Less frequently, make-up ammonia is added to the system. The system design needs to be better documented: no drawings of the system were located. Only two employees, the Maintenance Manager and the Mechanic and Production Supervisor, are authorized to perform maintenance on the ammonia system. As part of the RMPP, Crystal Geyser will implement a safety audit of the refrigeration system. The RMPP should focus on minimizing risk and on emergency response. Employee training and training documentation will be supplemented, as will inventory and procedural record keeping. Page 2 3.0 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION 3.1 Chemical Identity of Acutely Hazardous Materials Anhydrous ammonia is stored and used in reportable quantities at the Crystal Geyser Bakersfield facility. 3.2 Location of AHM at Facility The ammonia in use at the Crystal Geyser facility is contained in the ammonia refrigeration system. Exhibit B-3 is a facility diagram. Exhibit B-4 is a schematic diagram of the ammonia system. Liquid anhydrous ammonia is stored in the two receivers, one outdoors and one indoors. An ammonia cylinder is chained outside of the building at the southwest corner. When ammonia is needed, the cylinder is unchained from its outdoor storage location and wheeled into the room containing the indoor receiver and carbo coolers. The ammonia system is recharged from the cylinder into a line connected to the inside receiver. 3.3 Quantity The ammonia system holds up to 300 pounds of ammonia. A 150 pound cylinder is stored outside and is used to replace ammonia lost as fugitive emissions from the system. 3.4 .Nature of Hazard Ammonia presents the risk of death or debilitating injury to humans exposed to high concentrations. Major releases from the ammonia system may cause high concentrations of ammonia to reach receptors, either in the plant or in surrounding areas. Psge 3 ' < ] ~ ~'~) ~ I ..... "~ -~ ~ ~7,~,f / · / '~ /~1 * I~:1 ~ "' I I ' · Ill ' 1 .... ~'~' ~;*~ ~,',.~ '~ ', I ):Il (~,.,:~,/~) ] ,~--- . ;,;, 4 . ..._~',~2~t ~_~, · ~,. ~ ..... ,~,"',.,~ ~/i~ ...... . /.~ v~) r" ~' .III~.'':'' ~ - ~l/;X A WZl INC, KERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA ....................... CRYSTAL GEYSER Ammonia Equipment is Highlighted IN BAKERSFIELD Facility Diagram bATE. 5/90 IDN EXHIBIT B.3- liquids and vapors sv Carbo Solenoid Coolers Valve controlling Flow to Carbo Coolers liquids. prv vapors to compressor suction. Compressor Compressor SV discharge prv: pressure relief valve sv: shutoff valve Level Control Vessel Ammonia Receiver (Inside) SOlenoid Valve SV SV' SV Ammonia Added to The System from 150 lb Cylinder Ammonia Receiver (Outdoor) Evaporative Condenser Evaporative Condenser WZl INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA CRYSTAL GEYSER BAKERSFIELD Ammonia Schematic Diagram DATE I !EXHIBIT B'4 5/15/90 Because of its physical properties, a release of liquid ammonia is most likely to cause serious injury to receptors. Liquid ammonia released at a high rate can form a dense, slow moving cloud of liquid ammonia dispersed in air. Ammonia vapors, lighter than air, rise quickly in the atmosphere and are less likely to cause serious injury to receptors. Ammonia vapors released into an unventilated area can present high concentrations to receptors entering the area. Ammonia, a colorless gas with an extremely pungent odor, can be detected by smell at concentrations at 3.5 to 37 mg/m3 (5 to 53 ppm). Ammonia is corrosive and irritating to the skin. High concentrations can cause dermal burns, inflammation and swelling of the eyes and is potentially blinding to exposed receptors. Levels of 500 mg/m3 (700 ppm) can cause eye irritation. Coughing occurs at a level of 1200 mg/m3 (1700 ppm). Exposure to higher concentrations can result in debilitating injury and death through pulmonary edema. Ammonia is not recognized as a carcinogen nor does it present a threat to the environment. Table 1 lists physical properties of ammonia. Page 4 Table 1. Physical Properties of Anhydrous Ammonia (NH3) MOLECULAR WEIGHT 17.03 LATENT HEAT 327 BOLLING POINT -27.4 SOLUBILITY 89.9 SPECIFIC GRAVITY (LIQUID) 0.682 VAPOR DENSITY 0.59 AUTOIGNITION TEMPERATURE 651 EXPLOSIVE LIMITS 16 TO 25 CRITICAL TEMPERATURE 132.9 CRITICAL PRESSURE 11.5 IDLH 350 LOC 35 STEL 25 RATIO OF SPECIFIC HEATS 1.31 1 PPM LBM/LBMOLE CALORIE/GRAM oF G/100 mi AT 0 oC (-33.35 oC/4 °C) (AIR=l) @25 oC, 760 mm HG oC (1204 oF) % BY VOLUME IN AIR oC ATM mg/m3 mg/m3 mg/m3 (-77.7 oC) (500 ppm) (50 ppm) (35 ppm) 0.7 mg/m3 @ 25 oC AND 760 mm HG The molecular structure of ammonia is composed of one Nitrogen (N) and three Hydrogen atomS (H). The molecular weight of ammonia, 17 Ibm/Ibmole, is significantly less than that of air which is approximately 29 Ibm/Ibmole. As a result, ammonia in the vapor phase is much lighter than air and rapidly dses when released. Page 5 4.0 Hazard and ODerability Study Results Appendix B-I is a copy of the guideline used for the Hazard and Operability Study. Forms used during the Hazard and Operability Study are included as Appendix B-II. Appendix B-Ill contains modeling results, and Appendix B-IV lists alarms and control devices in the ammonia system. Each study node was reviewed for possible deviations from normal operation, and potential consequences resulting from the deviations were recorded. The severity and probability of consequences were rated. It was determined that the greatest risk is presented by release of liquid ammonia, which can form a dense ammonia/air dispersion. A dense dispersion can hug the ground, potentially inflicting injury upon receptors. In summary, the most likely worst case release at the Crystal Geyser Bakersfield plant is a release of the contents of the outdoor ammonia receiver through a line broken during a severe earthquake. Appendix B-Ill contains results of modeling the worst case credible release. 4.2 ,Release Scenarios Accidents such as fires or hazardous material releases are often not caused by a single factor but are the result of a chain of circumstances. A scenario is an abbreviated description of a specific chain of events that causes a particular outcome such as an AHM release related death, injury, property loss, or other incident. Release scenario characteristics include: o o o o 0 o o o Condition: Temperature, pressure of the material released Equipment at which the release originates Time of incident: Day, night, .morning, afternoon Cause of release: Over pressurization, ruptured lines, operator error Direct cause of loss: Exposure to high levels of ammonia Type of loss: Death, injury and/or property loss Receptors: Employees, sensitive receptors Magnitude of loss: Number of people affected, property lost Page 6 Release scenarios at the Crystal Geyser Bakersfield plant are based upon the most likely hazards that were developed through the hazard and operability study. Probabilities of accidents can be determined through a study of reliability data. Two · main types of reliability data are required: O O Equipment and instrument failure rate and repair rate data Human error probabilities and recovery probabilities The following causes of accidents that can occur in processing plants were reviewed in preparation for the hazard and operability study: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Improper maintenance methods Modifications to equipment Human error Improper labeling Improper operating methods Wrong materials used in construction Faulty Equipment Fire Earthquake Deviations that result in situations that could severely affect onsite or offsite receptors were denoted by a high-medium designation on the HAZOP form. Potentially severe consequences determined through the hazard and operability study included those due to the following deviations: O Major leak in system 1. Pooled liquid ammonia outdoors (presents a high concentration of ammonia in a localized area) Dispersed liquid ammonia outdoors (greatest potential to affect large numbers of offsite receptors) Pooled liquid ammonia indoors (presents a high risk to employees in an unventilated buildings) Page 7 Dispersed liquid ammonia indoors (presents a severe risk to employees in the building, ventilated or unventilated) Release of vapor ammonia outdoors (presents a localized risk due to high concentrations in the immediate area: ammonia will likely rise before it reaches great distances; dispersion is affected by temperature and wind speed) Release of vapor ammonia indoors (presents a high risk to employees in an unventilated building, lesser risk in a ventilated building; risk is dependent upon amount, rate of release) O Earthquake (pipes may be ruptured in a severe earthquake, quickly releasing large quantities of ammonia within or outside the building. High pressure shutdown failure (high pressure may lead to an ammonia release through pressure relief valves) Pressure relief valve (prv) failure (high pressure may lead to a rupture in a line or vessel) Exit valve to compressor closed (high pressure may lead to pry release) Exit valve to receiver closed (high pressure may lead to pry release) Fire (high temperatures may result in high system pressures, causing ammonia release) o Release during ammonia loading (human error, equipment failure) Deviations that result in scenarios that are likely to occur were listed with a medium to a high probability. Situations of concern that were determined to be likely to occur were results of the following deviations. o Valve closed incompletely (human error) o Power failure (compressor seals fail) o Minor leak in system (fittings, corrosion) o Earthquake Page 8 One deviation from normal operation was found to have a medium to high probability combined with a medium to high severity; an earthquake. The possibility of a release due to an earthquake is mitigated by the design and anchoring of the system. The greatest potential for major release from the Crystal Geyser Bakersfield bottling facility was found to be circumstances over which the operators have no control, such as earthquake or fire conditions. Human errors were determined to be likely to result in lesser, non-reportable releases. 4,3 .O_o.~ite Cons_e..g~._ences The compressors, the most probable origin of ammonia release are located outside of the plant, protecting the rest of the plant from high levels of ammonia due to a release from the compressors. A relaase of ammonia vapor from the compressors is likely to occur at a slow rate. The outdoor location prevents the slow concentration of high levels in the immediate area. A release of ammonia in the vapor form will rapidly rise in the atmosphere, out of the range of receptors. Past ammonia releases from the compressors (due to human error and described in the RMPP) annoyed neighbors but did not cause injury to offsite receptors or employees. An indoor release could affect Crystal Geyser's 17 permanent employees and an undetermined number of temporary workers (the number varies' from day to day). Any indoor release is dangerous, large or small, because of the potential for a high concentration to build in areas that are not well ventilated. Evacuation and emergency response training help to mitigate the potential for onsite consequences. Doors at either side of the building can be opened for ventilation if ammonia concentrations in side the building. The room in which the indoor ammonia equipment is held is somewhat isolated from the rest of the building. The indoor receiver is connected to a relief valve that vents above the roof line. Page 9 4.4 Offsite ConseQuences The outdoor ammonia receiver contains the largest amount of liquid ammonia located where a dispersion cloud could be released towards offsite receptors. The most likely potential release of the contents of the receiver to the outdoors was determined to be through a break in the liquid ammonia line leading from the evaporative condensers to the receiver or lines from the outdoor receiver to the indoor receiver. A cloud of dispersed ammonia from a rapid, large release presents the greatest danger to offsite 'receptors. 4.5 Human Error Analysis The purpose of a human error analysis is to identify potential human errors and their effects. Causes of human errors that have occurred in the past may also be identified. Human Error: Normal Ooeration During normal operation the highly automated ammonia system requires little operator action. The maintenance manager, the main ammonia system operator, will, in the future, record information regarding system variables onto a log. Oil is regularly drained manually from the oil receivers. Potential areas for operator error during normal operation include: Areas for Oper¢or error Improper logging Valve not shut off after oil drain Open wrong compressor valve Proposed ¢ol3seouences Severity/Likelihood Mitioation Poor records Low/Low Employee training Potential for Low/Med Employee training sm. ammonia release Damage to Low/Low Employee training compressor Forget to Damage to Low/Low Log, Employee add oil compressor Training Neglect Relief valve Med/Low high pressures release Auto controls, relief valves, employee training Page 1 0 l-lume, n Error: Ammonia Addition When necessary, ammonia is added at the indoor receiver. The maintenance manager supervises ammonia addition. An ammonia canister is carried from outside the building to inside the carbo cooler room. A hose is attached from the canister to the connection below the indoor receiver. The sight glass on the indoor receiver is watched while the ammonia is added. After a sufficient amount of ammonia is added, the hose is disconnected and the cylinder removed. The following errors are possible during ammonia addition: Areas for Proposed Ooerator error Conseauences Severity/Likelihood Miti(~ation Sight glass Too much ammonia Low/Meal Employee not read properly in system; Relief Training valves may relieve Valve not shut Ammonia leak Low/Low Employee off properly Training Worn hose not Ammonia leak Med/Low Replace hose noticed possible when worn Hose not disconnected Ammonia release Med/Low Inspect hose possible H~Jrn~n Error: Emergency Situations Emergency situations include fi'res, equipment difficulties, ammonia leaks, and earthquakes. Areas for Proposed Ooer~tor error C¢orisequences Severity/Likelihood Mitigation Improper use of Employee injury Med/Low breathing equipment Employee training Improper fire Employee injury, Med/Low fighting procedures ammonia release Employee training Earthquake response: Increased risk of Low/Low Employee Improper evacuation employee injury training procedures Earthquake response: Possible increased Low (relative to Employee Improper shutdown ammonia release severity of earthquake)/ training procedures ' Low Page 1 1 Human Error: Maintenance Procedures · Areas for Proposed Ooerator error Conseouences ~ Mitigation Compressor Small/medium Med/Low Employee not pumped down ammonia release; training/ for maintenance possible emp, injury supervision In summary, AHM releases due to human error were found to be likely to be smaller in magnitude than potential releases from events such as an earthquake or fire. The automation of the ammonia system reduces the risk of human error. Increased training of workers will further reduce the risk of human errors in normal, maintenance and emergency operations at the Crystal Geyser Bakersfield plant. Page 1 2 Vulnerability Analysis 5.1 Vulnerable Zone The worst case vulnerable zone radius is the maximum distance from the release to the point at which the airborne chemical concentration equals or exceeds the L.O.C. Exhibit B-5 is a map of the area surrounding the Crystal Geyser plant. Factors affecting vulnerable zone estimations are summarized in Exhibit B-6. Neighboring receptors are shown in Exhibit B-7, and the Worst Case Vulnerable Zone is shown as Exhibit B-8. Exhibit B-9 shows the area which could be exposed to ammonia concentrations above the IDLH in a worst case release. EPA/FEMA/DOT guidelines (1987) indicate that decisions about evacuation are incident specific and are to be made at the time of actual release. An estimated vulnerable zone should not automatically be used as the basis for evacuation during emergency response. In this study, the vulnerable zone radius is estimated using assumptions for a credible worst case scenario. A. Quantity and Rate of Release to Air The vulnerable zone is proportional to the quantity and rate of release. In this study of credible worst case scenarios, a break in an outdoor liquid ammonia line was determined to present the greatest risk to offsite receptors. In the worst case release 216 pounds of ammonia would be released from the outdoor ammonia receiver. Computer modeling determined that release could occur in as little as 1/2 minute. B. Meteorological Conditions Wind speed and atmospheric stability have a significant effect on the size of estimated vulnerable zones. Increased wind speed and the accompanying atmospheric stability will result in' greater airborne dispersion and a decrease in the size of the estimated vulnerable zone. Low wind speeds are used in worst case scenarios. Page 1 3 ~treet Street ~tree! Industrial /~e~' / /;/ Vintage Air East California Avenue Jobl Crystal Shack Geyser Storage ILot Alley Crystal Geyser Bottling Facility Orystal~ Geyser I ParkingI Housing Complex Housing Complex Potomac FORNIA ;larendon St BET~ Henley S Lucl IN WZI INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA CRYSTAL GEYSER BAKERSFIELD Surrounding Area DATE"5/1/90 I JEXHIBIT B'5 II III Exhibit Factors Affectin-~ Vulnerable Zone Estimations 0 0 0 Quantity of Release Physical State (solid, liquid, gas) of Material Temperature of Stored Material Pressure of Stored Material Physical Characteristics of Material Pressure, etc.) Surface Area of Spill, if Liquid Type of Release (Leak, Explosion, etc.) .Rate of Release (Molecular Weight, Vapor Meteorological Conditions (Wind Speed, Cloud Cover, Temperature) Surrounding Topography o Level of Concern of Material 22nd r~l P~k Street LStreet Special Services School Williams School Center Our Lady 5-~-'G-~adalupe Sch. Owens Sct~dol St. -'Terrace I "ATE ': :*/. 0 - E. Belle' Terrace Feliz Smith St. FORNIA Bethel Christian School' "~;';om, c l, I :--BRUNDAG __ Mt. Vernon School -L 2000" Terrace ~CVONAt OCCU~ rto/vaLI: : it-'''AG'CENTER$CHOO['' · 6 Feet 2000' 4000' ,0 Miles '/,mi. · . . ½mi. 'Y~i. 1mi. wzI iNC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA CRYSTAL GEYSER BAKERSFIELD Neighboring Rece~ tors EXHIBIT B-7 5/1/90 WZl INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA CRYSTAL GEYSER BAKERSFIELD Worst Case Vulnerable Zone Map Terrace u~Feet 2000' 4000' : 0 Mi~es ~ni. .. ~.m.i. ~',~i. ~ Kilometers .50~km l~m ,REGIONAL OCCUPATIONAI~ ~AG. CENTER SCHOOL ~ j.'- WZI INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA CRYSTAL GEYSER BAKERSFIELD Worst Case IDLH Ex Ma EXHIBIT B-9 5/1/90 Surrounding Topography The Crystal Geyser plant is surrounded by residential apartments, open areas and industrial offices and warehouses.' D. Levels of Concern (L.O.C.) The L.O.C. for anhydrous ammonia is 50 ppm (0.035 g/m3)· 5.2 Human Populations The community surrounding the Crystal Geyser Bakersfield facility is shown in Exhibit B-5. Immediately surrounding the facility to the South is a residential apartment complex, currently uninhabited and undergoing renovation. Sensitive receptors located near the facility include: Receptor Approximate Distance (miles) Owens School 3/8 SW Special Services School 7/16 ENE Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. 11/16 W Williams School 11/16 NE Mt. Vernon School 15/16 ESE Bethel Christian School 1 E Prevailing wind direction is from the Northwest. A worst case release (Exhibits B-8 and B-9) of dispersed ammonia could reach and affect receptors at these locations. Page 1 4 5.3 Critical Facilities Critical facilities near Crystal Geyser Bakersfield are' Kern Medical Center 1830 Flower Bakersfield, California Telephone: (805) 326-2000 Bakersfield City Fire Department, Station #2 716 East 21st Bakersfield, California Telephone' 911 Page 1 5 6.0 RISK ANALYSIS 6.1. Release Probability The ammonia system at the Crystal Geyser plant has been in operation for approximately five years. The hazard and operability study determined that the probability of minor releases of ammonia through fugitive emission points or through compressor shaft seals during system shutdown was fairly high. The risk of a major release due to human error or system malfunction is much lower, but can be further reduced through procedural changes and an improved training and record keeping program. A release resulting from a major earthquake is likely to be large. 6.2 Severity of Consequences The severity of consequences from an ammonia release is moderate because: 1. The quantity of ammonia in the ammonia system is sufficient to cause injury to neighboring receptors in a worst case release. 2. It meets the criteria provided by the EPA/FEMA (1987) of "high" severity of consequences to people. Those criteria are: Low: Chemical is expected to move into the surrounding environment in negligible concentrations. Injuries expected only for exposure over extended periods or when individUal personal health conditions create complications. II. Medium: Chemical is expected to move into the surrounding environment in concentrations sufficient to cause serious injuries and/or deaths unless prompt and effective corrective action is taken. Death and/or injuries are expected only for exposure over extended periods or when individual personal health conditions create complications. Page 1 6 III. High: Chemical is expected to move into the surrounding environment in concentrations sufficient to cause serious injuries and/or deaths upon exposure. Large numbers of people would be expected to be affected. Page 1 7 APPENDIX B-I HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY GUIDELINE Appendix B-I Hazard and Operability Study Guideline Contents 1. Introduction 2. Hazard and Operability Study Team Members and Qualifications 3. Study Nodes 4. Intention: Normal Operation of the Ammonia System 5. Deviations 6. Causes of Deviations 7. Consequences 8. Guide Words 9. Focus of Study 1. Introduction A HAZOP study is used to identify hazards and operability problems. The primary objective of the HAZOP study is identification of problems. Possible solutions to problems may be discussed and recorded during the study. This HAZOP study will focus on the .ammonia refrigeration system. 2. Hazard and O.Derabilit¥ Study Team Members and Qualifications The Crystal Geyser HAZOP team is made up of the following individuals: Alex Manns: Plant Manager, Crystal Geyser Bakersfield Mr. Manns has worked as plant manager for Crystal Geyser for one and 1/2 years. Previous to his employment with Crystal Geyser, he worked five years as plant · manager for Calvin Coolers which operated at this location. Mr. Manns previously worked as plant manager for the Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola Companies. Norm Ambrose: Plant Engineer, Crystal Geyser Bakersfield Mr. Ambrose has worked in maintenance departments for bottlers and wineries for 25 years. He has been at Crystal Geyser for one and 1/2 years. He will perform quality control for this study. Gerhard Gaugeh Crystal Geyser Bakersfield Mr. Gaugel has worked as assistant plant manager for Crystal Geyser for one year. He was quality control manager at Pepsi for six years. Appendix B-I Page 1 Linda Knowles, Staff Chemical Engineer, WZl Inc. Linda Knowles is a degreed chemical engineer (Texas A&M University, 1980). She has two years of experience in the chemical process industries and two years of experience in the environmental consulting industry, focusing on safety and risk assessment. She will lead the HAZOP team, conduct the consequence analysis and perform a human error analysis as described in the Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, AICHE, 1985. Norman Ambrose and Linda Knowles will walk through the facility; Gerhard Gaugel and Alex Manns are on site and available for consultation. Study Nodes The study nodes (locations at which the process parameters are to be investigated for deviations) in the Crystal Geyser plant are listed below: 1. Compressor#1 and #2 2. Evaporative Condensers #1 and #2 3. Outdoor Ammonia Receiver 4. Indoor Ammonia Receiver 5. Carbo Coolers (2) 6. Ammonia Receiving 7. Ammonia Lines 8. Outdoor Ammonia Storage 4...,. Intention: Normal Ooeration of the Ammonia System The plant is designed to operate continuously. Gaseous ammonia enters the compressors and is compressed to a higher pressure and temperature. After exiting the compressors, the hot gas enters the evaporative condensers. Water running through the condensers cools the hot gas into a liquid. The liquid ammonia enters the outdoor receiver. From the receiver, liquid ammonia flows through the lines to the indoor ammonia receiver. Ammonia is charged from 150 lb. (3000 cubic feet) ammonia storage canisters (supplied by Hopper) into the indoor receiver. The ammonia flows from the receiver into the carbo cooler level control vessel, and then into the carbo cooler. The carbo coo~er has an expansion valve that allows the liquid ammonia to expand into a gas. The phase change of the ammonia takes in heat, cooling the carbo coolers. The expanded, now gaseous ammonia is then cycled back to the indoor receiver, where vapors are pulled by the compressor suction and liquids go to the carbo coolers. Appendix B-I Page 2 5. Deviations Deviations are potential departures from the intention of the plant. Possible deviations are discovered by systematically applying HAZOP guide words (no, more) to process parameters such as pressure and temperature. 6. Causes of Deviations Causes of deviations may be human error, equipment failure, etc. causes will be listed during the HAZOP study. Deviations and 7.~. Conseauences Consequences are results of deviations from normal process operation. Consequences which could negatively impact process safety will be discussed and recorded. Deviations which have no effect on process safety will be dropped from the HAZ©P study. 8. Guide Words Guide words are simple words used to identify, qualify or quantify possible deviations. The following guide words will be used in the HAZOP study: Guide Word Example Meaning No Less More Other Part of As Well As Reverse Other Than Power Shutoff Low FIowrate High temperature Partial Power Shutoff Water added to NH3 Flow in Wrong Direction Earthquake Conditions Conditions Negation of Design Intent Quantitative Decrease Quantitative Increase Qualitative Decrease Qualitative Increase Logical Opposite of the Intent Substitution from Design Each guide word will be applied to process variables at each study node. This purpose of this study is to determine the most likely point of release and most damaging release of ammonia to the atmosphere. 9. Focus of Study The following specific consequences will be considered in this study: O O Threats to Employee Safety Threats to Safety of Offsite Receptors Appendix B-I Page 3 APPENDIX B-II HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY FORMS Crystal Geyser Bakersfield Study Node Number: I Equipment: Guide Word Deviation Consequences Causes Risk J As Well As 3rystal Geyser Bakersfield Study Node Number: '~. Equipment: ~.,¥~.~orc~4,~tc:.. ~o~ctev,_~e~--~ [ a~,.& ~ 7__.~ /;r~¢~: ~ro Guide Word Deviation Consequences causes ¢o,,,Fr~,o~, Risk Mi(igation {everse Guide Word Deviation Conse.quences Causes Ris[(' ............. Mitigation ;Power noJc o-9~,t;.~te- .... ~ , ~s Well As {everse 3rystal Geyser Bakersfield Study Node Number: _~ Equipment: Crystal Geyser Bakersfield Study Node Number: ~ Equipment: Guide V~ord Deviation Consequences Causes Risk Mitigation ~ Well As .... ~everse Crystal Geyser Bakersfield study Node Number: Equipment: Guide Word Deviation Conse, quences Causes Risk Mitigation ,_ Power po~ ~p~e~xe ~ '~ .ess ~art o~ Is Well As ~eve~se APPENDIX B-III MODELING RESULTS Appendix B-Ill Modeling Results Summary. The Automated Resource for Chemical Hazard Incident Evaluation (ARCHIE). computer program was used to model theorized worst case credible releases. The Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures (F.E.M.A., U.S.D.O.T., and U.S.E.P.A., 1989) was used as a guideline for modeling. Modeling results indicated that a worst case credible release could pose a significant risk to offsite receptors. Crystal Geyser, Bakersfield is committed to making changes that minimize releases. Worst Case Credible Scenario The worst case credible release, as determined through the hazard and operability study, was found to be a potential release of the liquid contents of the outdoor ammonia receiver into outside air. The potential release scenario judged to be dangerous to offsite receptors is a release of ammonia during an earthquake. Lines from and to the outdoor ammonia receiver contain liquid ammonia. A break in this liquid ammonia line could release all of the ammonia in the receiver to outside air. In this potential worst case scenario, the rapid release of liquid ammonia could form a air/ammonia dispersion that would act as a cloud of dense gas. Choice of Modeling Options Option a, Estimate discharge rate of liquid or gas, was chosen to model the release of liquid ammonia into the atmosphere. This model was chosen because the potential worst case scenario involves the emptying of the receiver through open lines. Option b, Estimate area of liquid pool, and Option c, Estimate of vaporization rate of liquid pool, are not valid for the ammonia release because the release would be made up of both liquid and gas. Option d, Evaluate toxic vapor dispersion hazards, was used to model the following releases: Scenario: Release from broken lines during an earthquake Appendix B-Ill Page 1 Modeling Results A discharge from a broken liquid line may release 216 pounds of ammonia in 30 seconds. Scenario results have been plotted in Exhibit B-8, Vulnerable Zone, and Exhibit B-9, Extent of 500 PPM Concentration. Modeling printouts are attached. The following table contains mean wind speeds and prevailing wind directions for the Bakersfield area. Climatological data was gathered at Meadows Field Airport and compiled by the National Climatic Data Center. 1989 Mean Wind Speed and Direction, Bakersfield Area Month Wind Speed (mph) Wind Direction January 5.2 NW February 5.8 ENE March 6.5 NW April 7.1 NW May 7.9 NW June 7.9 NW July 7.2 'NW August 6.8 NW September. 6.2 WNW October 5.5 NW November 5.1 ENE December 5.0 ENE The yearly average mean wind speed for 1989 is 6.4 mph, originating from the Northwest. Appendix B-Ill Page 2 CURRENT PARAMETER VALUES FOR DISCHARGE RATE ESTIMATION METHODS 4 DISCHARGE HOLE DIAMETER = 5 DISCHARGE COEFFICIENT = 6 LIQUID HEIGHT IN CONTAINER = 7 WEIGHT OF CONTAINER CONTENTS = 8 TEMPERATURE OF TANK CONTENTS = 9 AMBIENT TEMPERATURE = 10 CHEM VAP PRES IN CONTAINER 12 NORMAL BOILING POINT 13 LIQUID SPECIFIC GRAVITY 15 LIQUID SPECIFIC HEAT MODEL RESULTS: Peak discharge rate Duration of discharge Amount discharged State of material 1 inch(es) .62 .9 feet 215.72 lbs 60 deg F 90 deg F = 104.7 psia = -27.4 deg F = .682 = 1.31 BTU/lb-F = 454 lbs/min = .476 minutes = 215.72 lbs = Mix of gas and aerosols CURRENT PARAMETER VALUES FOR TOXIC GAS OR VAPOR HAZARD EVALUATION 1 MOLECULAR WEIGHT = 17 2 TOXIC VAPOR LIMIT = 500 3 VAPOR/GAS DISCHARGE HEIGHT = 10 4 ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS = F 5 WIND VELOCITY AT SURFACE = 4.5 6 AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE = 90 7 VAPOR/GAS EMISSION RATE = 454 8 DURATION OF EMISSION = .476 MODEL RESULTS: Downwind toxic hazard distance at groundlevel at exit height = 4429 = 4398 Peak concentration on ground is 36358.7 at a downwind distance of 312 ft ppm feet mph deg F lb/min minutes feet feet ppm Downwind Distance (feet) (miles) Contaminant Arrival Time at Downwind Location (minutes) Contaminant Departure Time at Downwind Location (minutes) 100 .02, .3 1 410 .08 1.1 2.6 719 .14 1.9 4.2 1028 .2 2.6 5.7 1337 ,26 3.4 7.3 1646 .32 4.2 8.8 1956 .38 5 10.4 2265 .43 5.8 12 2574 .49 6.5 13.5 2883 .55 7.3 15,1 3192 .61 8.1 16.6 3501 .67 8.9 18.2 3811 .73 9.7 19.8 4120 .79 10.5 21.3 4429 .84 11.2 22.9 CAUTION: See guide for assumptions used in estimating these times! Want to rerun the model with different input values (Y/N or <cr>)? Downwind Distance Groundlevel Concentration (feet) (miles) (pPm) Source Height Concentration (ppm) Initial Evacuation Zone Width* (feet) 100 .02 113 436074 73 410 .08. 32150 32019 300 719 .14 16978 14939 530 1028 .2 9950 9032 750 1337 .26 6372 5929 980 1646 .32 4322 4087 1200 1956 .38 3064 2929 1430 2265 .43 2254 2171 1650 2574 .49 1709 1656 1880 2883 .'55 1331 1294 2100 3192 .61 1059 1034 2330 3501 .67 859 840 2550 3811 .73 708 694 2780 4120 .79 591 581 3000 4429 .84 500 492 1 *Usually safe for < 1 hour release. Longer releases or sudden wind shifts may require a larger width or different direction for the evacuation zone. ****** Press ENTER to Continue ****** CURRENT PARAMETER VALUES FOR TOXIC GAS OR VAPOR HAZARD EVALUATION 1 MOLECULAR WEIGHT = 17 2 TOXIC VAPOR LIMIT = 50 3 VAPOR/GAS DISCHARGE HEIGHT = 10 4 ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS = F 5 WIND VELOCITY AT SURFACE = 4.5 6 AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE = 90 7 VAPOR/GAS EMISSION RATE = 454 8 DURATION OF EMISSION = .476 MODEL RESULTS: Downwind toxic hazard distance at groundlevel at exit height· = 11961 = 11933 Peak concentration on ground is 36380.7 at a downwind distance of 304 ft ppm feet mph deg F lb/min minutes feet feet ppm *** Press ENTER to View Various Tables *** Downwind Distance Groundlevel Concentration (feet) (miles) (ppm) Source Height Concentration (ppm) Initial Evacuation Zone Width* (feet) 100 .02 113 436074 73 948 .18 11312 10185 690 1795 .34 3645 3467 1310 2642 .51 1614 1565 1930 3489 .67 865 847 2540 4336 .83 525 517 3160 5184 .99 348 343 3780 6031 1.15 245 242 4390 6878 1.31 180 .. 178 5010 7725 1.47 138 137 5630 8572 1.63 108 107 6240 9420 1.79 86.7 86.1 6860 10267 1.95 71.1 70.6 7480 11114 2.11 59.2 58.9 8090 11961 2.27 50 50 1 *Usually safe for < 1 hour release. Longer releases or sudden wind shifts may require a larger width or different direction for the evacuation zone. ****** Press ENTER to Continue ****** ~ownwind Distance (feet) (miles) Contaminant Arrival Time at Downwind Location (minutes) Contaminant Departure Time at Downwind Location (minutes) 100 .02 .3 1 948 .18 2.4 5.3 1795 .34 4.6 9.6 2642 .51 6.7 13.9 3489 .67 8.9 18.1 4336 .83 11 22.4 5184 .99 13.1 26.7 6031 1.15 15.3 31 6878 1.31 17%4 35.3 7725 1.47 19.6 39.5 8572 1.63 21.7 43.8 9420 1.79 23.8 48.1 10267 1.95 26 52.4 11114 2.11 28.1 56.7 11961 2.27 30.3 60.9 CAUTION: See guide for assumptions used in estimating these times! Want to rerun the model with different input values (Y/N or <cr>)? APPENDIX B-IV ALARMS AND CONTROL DEVICES Equipment Solenoid High Pressure/ Temperature Cutoff: Compressors Smoke alarms Sprinklers Pressure Relief Valves Outdoor Receiver Pressure Relief Valve Connected to Indoor Receiver Appendix B-IV Alarms and Control Devices Type Automatic Details Rebuilt in 1990, Operates control valve for indoor receiver level Automatic Manual reset Automatic Proposed to alert employees in case of fire Automatic Throughout building Automatic Two valves, 8' high, 3/4" pipe Automatic One valve vented indoors, plans are to extend pry to above level roof AMMONIA SAFETY AUDIT FACILITY: ADDRESS: TELEPHONE: DATE OF AUDIT: CRYSTAL GEYSER, BAKERSFIELD 1233 E. CALIFORNIA AVENUE (805) 323-6296 KEY FACILITY PERSONNEL PLANT MANAGER: QUALITY CONTROL MANAGER: MAINTENANCE MANAGER: ALEXANDER MANNS GERHARD GAUGEL NORMAN AMBROSE AMMONIA SAFETY AUDIT TEAM PLANT MANAGER: QUALITY CONTROL MANAGER: MAINTENANCE MANAGER: ALEXANDER MANNS GERHARD GAUGEL NORMAN AMBROSE Appendix C Page I WZl AmmQni~, Safety Audit Continued This safety audit is a review of the ammonia system equipment and operation. Do employees responsible for the ammonia system have a thorough understanding in the following areas? Basic refrigeration fundamentals Compressor functions and limitations Operation, set point and purpose of safety controls Location, operation and normal position of isolation valves Relief valve location, purpose, setting and proper operator response if activated RecognitiOn and response to abnormal conditions Correct procedures for system charging and oil drainage Emergency planning: is there a wdtten emergency plan?__ System design: the attached forms should be filled out for each piece of ammonia containment vessel. The ammonia incident report should be filled out after an ammonia incident has occurred. INC. Appendix C Page 2 '~ApPENDI× C A~MONIA VESSEL SAFETY INSPECTION DATA (COM?LETE ONE FOR~ FOR EACH VESSEL) VESSEL NAME OR USE LOCATION (BLDG.): ": " : ........ :' 2. LOCATION OF. VESSEL IN BUILDING:~ ~ DESCRIPTION OF VESSELS USE: ..... ~: NORMAL PRESSUP~E IN VESSEL ~HEN THE REFRIGERATI?.~ SYSTEM IS IN OPERATION: PSIG':. VESSEL M.M'~ F ACTIJR.ER DESIGN WOP~KING PP~ESSUR~: ! PSIG IS VESSE~ ASME (OR EQUIVALEt~T AUTHORITY)' STAMPED: VESSEL REGISTRATION NO.: 9. VESSEL LENGTH: ' ' 10. VESSEL DIAMETEK: feet inches 11. YEAR OF MANUFACTURE/{: 12. DOES VESSEL HAVE A P~ELIEF VALVE7 13..IS RELIEF VALVE SINGLE OR DUALT:i ~. ..... 14. ~qAT IS THE RELIEF VALVE PRESSURE sET~ING? 15. WHAT IS'THE'RELIEF VALVE RATING? PSIG ;~.~' ~,._ lbs. air per minute 16. WHAT IS RELIEF VALVE YEAR OF f~d~UFAC~7 ~:;'- 17 'W~T. IS THE. SIZE OF TH.E?~ELIEF VAL%rE OUTLET7 '.. . . AND. OUTLET PIPE 18. IS THE''' RELIEF VALVE PROPEPdLY PIPED TO THE ATMOSPHERE? 19. TO YOUR K/qOWLEDGE HAS THIS VESSEL EVER BEEN A~TEKED O~ ~D'IFI.E,D? ~ .. 20. DO YOU..HAVE ANY A'SME CERTIFIED PRINTS OR U-1 ~CERTIFICATE (OR LOCAL EQUIVALF-NT) AT THE FACTORY SITE? (Y/H) PAGE. 3' AMMONIA VESSEL SAFETY INSPECTION DATA (COMPLETE ONE FORM FOR EACH VESSEL) VESSEL NAME OR USE LOCATION (BLDG.): "Plant '~ LOCATION OF. VESSEL IN BUILDING: DESCRIPTION OF VESSELS USE: 4. NORMAL PRESSUP~E IN VESSEL WHEN THE REFRIGERATI? SYSTEM IS IN OPERATION: PSIG' :. . 5. VESSEL MANUFACTURERi~ ~ · ' 6. DESIGN wORKING PRESSURE: PSIG 7. IS VESSE~. ASME (OR EQUIVALENT AUTHORITY)' STAMPED: 8.' VESSEL REGISTRATION NO.: -- 9. VESSEL LENGTH: 10.' VESSEL DIAMETER: 11. YEAR OF MANUFAC~: -~ 12. DOES VESSEL HAVE A RELIEF VALVE? ; 13. iS RELIEF VALVE SINGLE OR DUAL?: '"feet ''inches 14. WHAT IS THE KELIEF VALVE PRESSURE S~TTING? PSIG 15. WHAT IS THE'RELIEF VALVE RATING? lbs. air per minute 16. WHAT IS RELIEF VALVE YEAR OF MANUFACTURE? ._ 17. WHAT .IS THE. SIZE OF THE RELIEF VALVE OUTLET? AND. OUTLET PIPE 18, IS THE RELIEF VALVE PROPERLY PIP~ TO ' THE ATMO~?HERE? 19. TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS THIS VESSEL EVER BEEN ALTERED OR MODIFIED? 20. DO YOU HAVE ANY ASME CERTIFIED PRINTS OR U-1 CERTIFICATE [OR LOCAL EQUIVALENT) AT THE FACTORY SITE? ! 21. IF ALTERED, WAS VESSEL R~CERTIFIED 22. WHAT CONTROLS AR~ FITTED TO THIS. VESSEL (Y/N)' ..-' . .....:.. : ...... Y/N .. CONDITION 7.. SE~'TING OPERATES.~ ....... .... .,- ..... (G,.-F,iP) ik,-% .. Level {Y/N) ' .~ .............. : ~! .: .; A. NONE ~ B. HI LIQUID LEVEL : ': CUTOUT C. LIQUID LEVEL CON- 'TROL · D. LOW LIQUID LEVEL' ~:' " 23. ASSESS CONTROL COLUMN DESIGN: (SCR.~ED JOINWS, STOP VALVE LOCATIONS, CONDITION) GOOD FAIR POOR '~' 24. DOES RELIEF VALVE LOOK: [E/G/F/B) .! E~CELLENT (CLEAlg WITH NO VISIBLE RUST OR CORROSION) <~fO~ (LOOKS OK BUT SOME CORROSION VISIBLE/LESS .... THAN 25 % SURFACE ONLY) : " ~) " FAIR (CONSIDERABLE SURFACE CORROSION BUT NONE VISI- BLE INTERNALLY ) BAD (SURFACE AND INTERNAL'CORROSION VISIBLE) DATE OF LAST TEST: , 25. IS THIS VESSEL COVERED WITH INSULATION? CONDITION OF INSULATION: [G/F/B) " GCX:)D FAIR (SLIGHT SIGNS OF VAPOR BARRIER LEAKS) BAD (EXTENSIVE SIGNS OF VAPOR BARRIER LEAKS) 26. ANY ABNORPLAL iCE FORMATIONS ON VESSEL? 27. ANY SIGNS OF RUST/CORROSION ON VESSEL? A. NONE : ~ .i B. SLIGHT OR TRACE C. MODERATE BUT APPEARS TO BE SURFACE ONLY D. APPEARS TO BE EXTqKNSIVE, SHOULD BE EXAMINE/3 BY CONSULTING ENGINEER E. CANNOT TELL DUE ~ INSULATION GIVE DATE !. (Y/N) ~"~:~'-~::":" 28~' HAS THIS VESSEL-BEF~N INsP'~TED BY 'oUTsIDE INSPECTOR WITHIN THg LAST 5 YEARS? ..:....': .-...~.~.~.::.... GIVE DATE ... : -... ':":~":' ':,':-?" 29, HOW LONG SINCE LAST INspECTION '2 ...... BY NDE METHODS? · .. ........ .:-.30 DOES THE VESSEL I-~VE. ~ OIL POT? ,'.' ' ' .' rT '" ' "' .: · ' " ' · · ' .' , ,.: · '.-.. 31. DOES OIL PC~ ItAVE RELIEF VALVE? :¢i':~.'i'.:-.:" 32, IS OIL POT RELIEF VALVE CORRECTLY "~:. PIPED? " 33. SPECIAL REMAJU<S ON VESSEL CONDITION OR USAGE: YIN ) ... { Y/N ) '...'Compressor'-~Room .' oil 'accumulator (Y/N) 34. SPECIFY OVERALL RATING (S.I.R.) APPENDIX C APIMOHIA COPUPRESSOR SAFETY I~SPECTIO~ DATA (COMPLETE ONE FOP~ FOR EACH COMPP~ESSOR) 1,. 'COMPRESSOR' DUTY : HIGH STAGE BOOSTER SWING 2,COMPRESSOR TYPE : RECIP VERTICAL ROTARY VANE RECIP V OR'V~W ROTARY SCREW COMPRESSOR I~A/qUFACTLSLER : MODEL NO, CAPACiT"f DRIVE ..:. DIRECT YEA~R BUILT TONS) MOTOR I~FR, BELT COMPRESSOR ILPM NAMEPLATE YPC<. RPM RELIEF VALVE TY?E : INTEPdqAL . LXTEP~AL .- iS A CHECK VALVE PROVIDED AT T~HE DISCHARGE OF EACH COMPRESSOR7 (Y/N) !0, NOP,~AL C'OMPRESSOR.PRESSURES (PSI): SUCTION ' DiSCH3~RGE M3d~UFACTIFRER RECOMI~z2fDED M3~X, DISCH3~RGE PR_ESSU-R-E 11. LOW PRESSURE CUTOUT SETTING (PSI) DESIGN ' ACTUAL CHE,CKED "~ {Y/N) OPER,ATES PROPF-~LLY 12, HIGH PiAESSUILE C~UT SET'ZING (PSI) "DESIGN ACTUAL CHEC~RD [Y/N) 'OPF~ATES PROPEP~LY (Y/N) 13. IS HIGH PRESSb-RE SWITCH HA3UD WIRED: a) TO MO'POR'STAP, TER b) TT~ROUGH PLC (Y/N 14. HIGH DISCH3~RGE TEPLP~~ CUTOUT SET~fING -DESIGN ' ACTUAL CHECKED (Y/N) OPERATES PROPERLY 15. OIL PRESSURE SAFETY SWITCH SET'ZING (PSI) CHECF~ED (Y/M) OPERATES PROPERLY 0c) ...... PAGE 6 APPENDIX C 16. IS COmPRESSOR.CONNECTED VO A FLOODED VESSEL7 IF YES, DOES HIGH LEVEL SWITCH STOP COMPRESSOR HIGH LEVEL SW. CHT~D. [Y/N) OPEtLATES OK (YIN) 17. DOES COMPRESSOR START AUTOMATICALLY? 'IF YES, IS' THEJhE ~ "AUTO STA.RTU..NOTICE' POSTED? -, 18. COMPRESSOR DRIV~ iS ELECTRIC MOTOR STE~q TlfRBIHE , GAS ENGINE AT RPM [NO. ) V BELTS CAN PRIME MOVER OVERSPEED7 19. kbFf kBHOR/TAL VIBRATIONS PRESEh~7 20. DRIVE GUAtLDS: ADEQUATE COV--~RAGE khrD SECLrPd57 21. ~Cf AJBHORMAL NOISES? (¥/~) 22. ELECTRICAL COVERS IH PLACE7 (¥/~) 23. ANY VISIBLE LEAXS7 24. IS THERE A SAFE METHOD FOR ELECTRICAL A/TD SYSTEM ISOLATION? I¥/~) 25. GE/qERAL ASSESSM~ OF COMPRESSOR UNIT (S.I.R.) : ~24 . Brakers can be locked out, but complete section of old brakers ~must be. paddle-locked. '16; No Hig.h level cut out.control. PAGE 7 i LIQUID AIR CORPORATION ALPHAGAZ DIVISION '~'. ' .. - -" ... :L, ' ' ''--'. ' '. '~ .......... Material Safety Data Sheet ALPHAGAZ Specialty Gas LIOUID AIR CORPORATION AL..~,G^Z mV,S~O. One California Plaza, Suite 350 2121 N. California Blvd. Walnut Creek, California 94596 ISSUE DATE OCTOBER 1, 1985 AND REVISIONS CORPORATE SAFETY DEPT. PRODUCT 'NAME Ammonia TELEPHONE (415) 977-6500 EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION ON PAGE 2 TRADE NAME AND SYNONYMS Ammoni FI , CAS NUMBER Anhydrous Ammonia 7564-41-7 CHEMICAL NAME AND SYNONYMS Ammonia, Anhydrous Ammonia FORMULA MOLECULAR WEIGHT CHEMICAL FAMILY NH3 17.0 i Nitrogen hydride HEALTH HAZARD DATA TIME WEIGHTED AVERAGE EXPOSURE LIMIT 25 Molar PPM; STEL = 35 Molar PPM (ACGIH, 1984-85) ; 50 Molar 1~t~M' (OSHA, 1985) SYMPTOMS OF EXPOSURE Corrosive and. irritating to the skin, eyes, upper respiratory system and all mucosal tissue. Depending on 'the concentration inhaled, it may pause burning sensations, oughing, wheezing, shortness of breath, headache, nausea, with'eventual collapse. ild concentrations of vapor will cause dermal~itis or conjunctivitis. Higher oncentrations of vapor or liquid contact will cause caustic-like dermal burns and nflammation and swelling of the eyes with possible loss of vision. Rapidly evaporating iquid contacting dermal t!ssue or the eyes will cause c.ryogenic "burns." . TOXICOLOGICAL PROPERTIES Inhalation: Affects the upper airway (larynx and bronchi) by causing caustic-like burning resulting in edema and chemical pneumonitis. If it enters the deep lung, pulmonary edema will result. Toxic level exposure to dermal tissue causes caustic-like burns and skin lesions resulting in early necrosis and scarring. Burns to the eye result in lesions and possible loss of vision. Cryogenic "burns" are like frostbite with a change in skin color to gray or white possibly followe, d by blistering. Listed as Carci'nogen National Toxicology Yes [] I.A:R.C. Yes [] OSHA Yes '._.~._ or Potential Carcinogen Program No f~ Monographs No ~ No .x_; R~-COJ?H'~ENDED FIRST AID TREATMENT C.~S~.S OF OVEREXPOSURE TO '~ ..... ~'" PRO;'IPT MEDICAL ATTENTION IS MANDATORY !;'l ALL * '- RESCUE 'PERSONNEL SHOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH SELF-CONTAINED BREATHIHG APPARATUS AHD BE COGNIZANT OF EXTREHE FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD. inhalation: Conscious persons should be assisted to an uncontaminated area and inhaie ,,._n air. Unconscious persons should be moved to an uncontaminated area and given .mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and su~gl ..... n~l oxyoen Keep ~ne victim warm and cuie.~ issu:--e, that mucus or vomited material does not obstruct the airway by positional :rainace. (Continued on last page.) assumes n3 re~;~f~s:bi;i~/2~ :~ ;r:e ~ccu:~c7 ~r ~.;:~:~b~![ty of s::c~ .~r~?;~ '.:.r ~::..:~:.c~ t: :7:~,~: ~ HAZARDOUS MIXTURES OF OTHER LIQUIDS. SOLIDS, OR GASES :..:... ,, ..... . . " .~ . J?..'.'~ -.~-. :. ,].:?'A~monia is flammable over a relatively narrow range in air. It reacts vig0'~0usly · "' with fluorine, .chlorine, hydrogen, chloride, hydrogen bromide,"nitrosyl chl0rid~, ' ':' ii. chromyl chloride,"trioxygen difluoride,'nitrogen dioxide and nitrogen trichloride. PHYSICAL DATA BOLLING POINT -28.14°F (-33.41°C) V^PORPRESSURE [3 70OF (21.1oC) = 128 psia (883 kPa) SOLUBILITY IN WATER Very soluble, liberatinq heat APPEARANCE AND ODOR Colorless gas with a pun~oent odor. FLASH POINT (METHOD USED) Gas EXTINGUISHING MEDIA Water SPECIAL FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES LIQUID DENSITY AT BOlUNG POINT _ 42.6 lb/ft3 (682.'kg/m3) GAS DENSITY AT 70'F 1 aim ..Q442 lb/ft.3 (.708 kq/m3) FREEING POINT -107.9°F (-77.74°C) Sp,:cific gravity (~70°F (Air = 1,0) is ,59, FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD DATA IAUTO IGNITION TEMPERATURE I FLAMMABLE LIMITS % BY VOLUME 1274°F (690°C) [ LEL = 15 gEL : 27 IELECTRICAL CLASSIFICATION Clas~ i, grm~n D If possible, stop the flow of gas. Since ammonia is soluble in water, it is the best extinguishing media -- not only extinguishing the fire, but also absorbing (£ontinlmd on last nag_:.) UNUSUAL FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS The minimum ignition energy for am~nonia is very high. It is approximately 500 times greater than the energy required for igniting hydrocarbons and 1000 to 1 ' ~' + ' REACTIVITY DATA STABILITY CONDITIONS TO AVOID · Unitable X Stable INCOMPATISILIT~ (Materials to avoid) - See Hazardous Mixtures of Other Liquids, Solids or Gases. HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITIO~ pRODucTs Hydrogen at. very high temperatures (1544°F; 840°C) HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION CONDITIONS TO AVOID May Occur Will Not Occur X SPILL OR LEAK PROCEDURES STEPS TO ~E TAKEN IN CASE MATERIAL JS RE~ASED OR SPILLED . Evacuate all personnel from affected area. Use appropriate protective equipment. ~f leak is in user's equipment, be certain to purge piping With an inert gas prior to attempting.repairs, if leak is in container or container valve, contact the closest Liquid Air Corporation location. WASTE DISPCSAL ,METHCD ' Co net ~ttemD~' to dis~os_~ ~ of '~,:a~te. or .,~.use,J. quantities. ~,:~u)n~'- ~n' +h~ .... ~~~ the closest Liquid Air Corporation location. ,px,ng ,'--...'iH Va]V:' ~or emergency ioN'i:NF ........... ~"'"'~" SPECIAL PROTECT oRMATION Page 3 -RES~IRATORYPROTECTION(SpecN)~t),p,) Positive pressure 1~lr I'ine'wll;ll mask or self-contained I~reathino apparatus should be available for emerge~c~"{~S'e. '"":" · ..... ""i.'':''~:' ~'~' vENTILATION- · ' ' · ' · ~-' LOCAL ~NAUST 1 0 prevent, accumu ~ aT, ion. -. SPECU, L'" .'~..'i..-.1~:~.. . ..,.~..~?;.~. · .: . /~.~.. ,-.,~:r:..]?~' . .. ..........~ .-... .- Hood'with forced ~..:i~:... above the TWA ' .i ..... ~. .. venti 1 ati On i..... MEC,A,ICAL m'".) OT,E~ .... In accordance with electrical codes. PROTECTIVE GLOVES Plastic or rubber EYE PROTECTION Safety goggles or glasses OT.HF-..R PROT~CTJV£ =EQUIPMENT ~ ' Safety shoes, safety shower, eyewash "fountain" SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS* SPECIAL LABELING INFORMATION DOT Shipping Name: Ammonia, Anhydrous (RQ 100'/45.4) I.D. No.: UN 1005 DOT Shippinq Label: Nonflammable Gas DOT Hazard Class: Nonflammable gas SPECIAL HANDLING RECOMMENDATIONS ~ Use only in well-ventilated areas. Valve protection caps must remain in place unless container is secured with valve outlet piped to use point. Do not drag, slide or roll cylinders. Use a suitable hand truck for cylinder movement. Use a pressure reducing regulator when connecting cylinder to lower pressure (<500 psig) piping or systems. Do not heat cylinder by any means to increase the discharge rate of product from the cylinder. Use a check valve or trap in the discharge line to prevent hazardous back flow into the cylinder. For additional handling recommendations consult L'Air Liquide's Encyclopedia de Gaz or Compressed Gas Association Pamphlet P-~. PECIAL STORAGE RECOMMENDATIONS ~rotect cylinders from physical damage. S'tore in cool, dry, well-ventilated area of non-combustible construction away from heavily trafficked areas and emergency exits. Do not allow the temperature where cylinders are stored to exceed 130F (54C). Cylinders should be stored Upright and firmly secured to prevent falling or being knocked over. Full and empty cylinders should be segregated. Use a "first in-first out" inventory system to prevent full cylinders being stored for excessive periods of time. Post "No Smoking or Open Flames" signs in the storage or use area. There should be no sources of ignition in the storage or use area. For additional storage recommendations consult L'Air Liquide's Encycl0pedia de Gaz or Compressed Gas Association Pamphlet P-1. SPECIAL PACKAGING RECOMMENDATIONS Gaseous or liquid anhydrous ammonia cerrodes certain metals at ambient temperatures. Oxygen presence enhances the corrosion of ordinary or semi-alloy s~eels. The addition of water inhibits this enhancement. Keep anhydrous ammonia systems scrupulously'dry. OT~£R RECOMMENDATIONS CR PRECAUTIONS Earth-ground and bond all lines and equipment associated with the a~onia system. Electrical equipment should be non-sparking or explosion proof. Con;pressed gas cylinders should not be refilled except by qualified producers of ccmpressed gases. ~pment of a comoressed gas cylinder wi3ich has not been filled by the owner or wi'th s (written) con~ent is a violation cf Federal Law (4~CFR). Government a.cencies {i.e.. ~)e~.a~m~.m! el' Transc~o,~.~tJon, Cccu:.3'Jcr,.3! ..cafe?/ .~md ~-;~ ,*'~ ~ ~'~.,..,~'-*.*:~- .--~ ~ ............ LIQUID AIR CORpoRATION ..:.... · · ":-_. :-. ..... ALPHAGAZ DIVISION :,' ..... . . ..- ~ :.....~ : -~-..-~..~,., ...... -..,,.,.,:~:.-. '. ....... "::-: "" ADDITIONAL DATA RECOh~ENDED FIRST AID TREATMENT: (Continued) Eye Contact: PERSONS WITH POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO AMMONIA SHOULD NOT WEAR CONTACT LENSES. Flush contaminated'eye(s) with copious quantities of water. Part eyelids to assure complete flushing. Continue for a minimum of 15 minutes. Skin Contact' Flush affected area with copious quantities of water. Remove affected clothing as rapidly as possible. Dermal Contact or Frostbite: Remove contaminated clothing and flush affected areas with lukewarm water. DO NOT USE HOT WATER. A physician should see the patient promptly if the cryogenic "burn" has resulted in blistering of the dermal surface or deep tissue freezing. SPECIAL FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES: (Continued) the escaped ammonia gas. Use water spray to cool surrounding containers.