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Home My WebLink AboutRISK MANAGEMENTHAZA~OUS TIME BUSINESS/DEAPRTMENT NAME: PRO'JECT DESCRIPTION: pROJECT NUMBER: MATERIAI S. ~ISION ...... DATE: NAME: .CHGD: 0.5 o:5 '} · PROJECT coMPLETION:. · .-DATE: ~CITY of BAKERSFIELD "WE CARE" M.~"I' E R I ~Ls DIVI 8 FIRE DEPARTMENT S. D. JOHNSON FIRE CHIEF PROJECT DATE: NAME: TIME TIME 2101H STREET BAKERSFIELD. 93301 326-3911 CHGD: Ho-B.y~,no..' 1.5 o.3 (.0 1.0 1.0 0 2.0 HAZARDOUS CITY of BAKERSFIELD "WE CARE" MATERIALS FIRE DEPARTMENT T I ME S, D, JOHNSON FIRE CHIEF DIVI S I01~1 CHARGED 2101 H STREET BAKERSFIELD, 93301 326-3911 DATE: NAME: TIME CHGD: COMMENTS: ! RMPP TIME LOG COMPANY: Pestritto Foods · DATE REVIEWER , ACTIVITY ·TIME O.co O. co |00 "rtr~ 0.-~ '5 o,% TOTAT. T T~E = RMPP TIME LOG -' COMPANY: Pestritto Foods DATE REVIEWER ACTIVITY TIME ~¢ ~ PES'rRITTO FOOD~ ' CONTROL p, IRESSURE RECEIVER ~LINE FAILURE I : ,~ ., AMMONIA RELEASE. 325 ,LBS VAPOR-3689 LBS 'LIQUID .. ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS I 500 iPPM PLUME CONCENTRATION I i I I I I I I I I I I I WHITE LANE D S DISTRICT BLVD PANAMA LANE Figure 1~ LEGEND ~ ~rh - School - Residential Area ~T~ - Fire Station N I~1 - Proposed School [~ - Hospital : [:: - RaJlroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch 4 - Map shows the impact on the sehsitive populations sites of an ammonia release due to a control pressure receiver line failure. Va0or Source: 325 lbs Ammonia .J,~Z[zJ~L~;Z~L~: 3689 lbs Ammonia Total Dis~3ersion Distance for-500 .~Dm Plume; V .a~or Release: 227 yards [ Liouid Release: 139 yards (shSded) Adverse Weather Conditions Modelled Stability_ Class: C Wind Soeed: 5.0 mph 'Wind Direction: From the SSE Temperature: 40°F GrOund Rouohness: Urban LEC/PF-02/3-92 PESTRITTO FOODS~: I I I I ! I '~TOCKDALE HWY MING AVE WHITE LN PACHECO RD i I I I I i I I PANAMA LN HOSKING AVE ~ - School I~ - Proposed School FIGURE 3 -- Map showing Iocatio LEGEND ~ ~ - Nearest Residence ~] - Fire Station N ~ - Hospital , ....,,, - Railroad 1 Mile = 1 Inch of sensitive population sites near the Pestritto Foods facility. LEC-3/92 Name FIRE DEPARL Addp ~101 H STREET GB/PO Ad Staet 9/16/9~ Ti~es I S To~al ~17. LN# INPUT TEXT ested by [OJANELL (~FS03) on 9/t1/9~ 14=19=35 b CENSOR D Phone (805) 3~6394! LEGAL Zip 93301- top 9/t6/92 Rate El 1 4 5 6 7 10 11 14 (A~> (STYL) pu, been p~epated by Pest Inc. )ocated at 6800 Bake~-sfieId~ CA. The aatepia] accident. Th w~l] be ~va~lable ~it%o Foods, ~cDivitt ~MPP de a haza~dous public 30 G S~ infopaat I; '~ I ~LUFT~ ENVIRONMENTAL CONS'ULTING~ ~? 3701:: PegaSus Drive, Suite lr21' ,.. . .' ~ ¢~ ' .' ~ .... "'" '..~ "-~ , ' '<; ~ '' ''. ', ~'..¢~PrihtSd'on Recyc~d, Pape~:)<,s ,','~ >4~', ,' I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL PESTRITTO FOODS 'INC. DESCRIPTION AND RESULTS OF THE HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY AND OFFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS PREPARED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE RISK MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION PROGRAM .I Prepared by I Luff Environmental Consulting I 3701 PegasUs Drive, Suite 121 Bakersfield, CA 93308 I I June1991 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL PESTRITTO FOODS, INC. BAKERSFIELD FACILITY Bakersfield, California HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY for Anhydrous Ammonia June 1991 I I I I I I I I I. I I I I I I I I ! CONFIDENTIAL DESCRIPTION AND RESULTS OF THE HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY This document addresses the requirement that the RMPP be based upon an assessment of the processes, operations, and procedures of the business, and shall consider the "results of a hazard and operability study which identifies the hazards associated with the handling of an acutely hazardous material due to operating error, equipment failure, and external events, which may present an acutely hazardous materials accident risk." [§ 25534 (d)]. Additionally, Section 25532 (g) specifies that the RMPP include programs which include risk assessment for unit operations or operating alternatives. In accordance with these requirements, a Hazard and Operability (HazOp) study was conducted. The study session was held on June 3, 1991 at Luff Environmental Consulting's office. This document summarizes the results of the study. The refrigeration system at the Pestritto Foods Inc. (PFI) facility utilizes anhydrous ammonia, an acutely hazardous material, as the refrigerant. The anhydrous ammonia refrigeration system provides cooling for process water and cold storage facilities associated with the manufacturing of frozen bread dough. This system was reviewed during the HazOp study. A. HAZOP TECHNIQUE The Hazard and Operability Study (HazOp) technique that was used is the "guide word" approach. The guide word HazOp was chosen since it allows a systematic and thorough review of every part of the facility that handles acutely hazardous materials (AHMs). This approach is described in the AICHE Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures1, which is referenced in Section 25534 (I), Chapter 6.95, Division 20, California Health and Safety Code. Other publications further describe this technique, including A Guide to Hazard And Operability Studies2. 1 Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, 1985. 2A Guide to Hazard and Operability Studies, Chemical Industry Safety and Health Council of the Chemical Industries Association, London, 1985. PFI/HazOp Study/June, 1991 Page-1 Luft Environmental Consulting I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL A multidisciplinary team was formed to work together (brainstorm) to identify hazards and operability problems by searching for deviations from design intents. Prior to the HazOp study, each HazOp member reviewed piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) pertaining to the ammonia refrigeration system. The HazOp team also conducted an onsite review (during construction) of the refrigeration system and equipment covered in the HazOp study. The team leader systematically guided the team through the plant design using a fixed set of words, called "guide words". These guide words were applied at specific 'points or "study nodes" in the plant design (using the P&IDs) to identify potential deviations from the design intent of the plant process parameters at those nodes. A report of the findings.of the HazOp review was prepared in the form of a matrix. For each study node, this table includes the guide words, causes of deviations, consequences of deviations in terms of potential AHM release, and safeguards and/or suggested actions that mitigate the deviations. This HazOp matrix was reviewed by PFI operations personnel and the refrigeration contractor (Tri-Com Refrigeration) for accuracy and completeness. The HazOp matrix for the PFI facility is included in this document as Appendix A. B. HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS The HazOp team was selected based upon knowledge of the design and operation of the facility, expertise in.their respective fields and experience in the type of system and equipment being reviewed. For the PFI facility, the HazOp team consisted .of the following personnel. Team Leader Luff Environmental Consulting Study Recorder Luff Environmental Consulting Ooerations Manager. PFI Refrigeration Engineering Tri-Com Refrigeration, Inc. PFI/HazOp Study/June, 1991 Page-2 Luff Environmental Consulting I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL C. HAZOP REVIEW FOR PFI The HazOp review consisted of a brainstorming Session of approximately four hour duration with follow up telephone calls with the team members. These review sessiOns are described below. In order to direct the review team, a copy of the Process and Instrumentation Diagram (P & ID) for the ammonia system was posted. The system was divided into eleven areas of review, as follows. Item #1: Item #2: Item #3: Item #4: Item #5 Item #6 Item #7 Item #8 Item #9 Item #10 Item #1 1 Tank Filling System Thermosyphon Receiver Liquid Ammonia Distribution Header Shell and Tube Heat Exchanger (Glycol System) Plate Chiller (Baudelot type) Heat Exchanger (Process Water) Controlled Pressure Receiver Ammonia Purger Intercooler Low Suction Accumulator Evaporators Compressors and Evaporative Condensers Each item (study node) was addressed systematically. The guide words (more, less, no, other) were applied at each node. Deviations from normal design intent for each guide word, the possible causes of the deviation, the likelihood of the deviation occurring, and the consequences of occurrence were evaluated. Action items were created for study, nodes with deviations likely to occur or with high consequences of occurrence. This information was recorded during the session in matrix form. After the initial meeting, a summary of the results, comments, and action items was assembled in a matrix form and provided to each team member for review. Follow-up meetings/conference calls were held after the action items were addressed to determine whether any further changes to the HazOp matrix were required. D. RESULTS OF HAZOP FOR PFI FACILITY The ammonia system at the PFI facility has been designed in accordance with all PFI/HazOp Study/June, 1991 Page-3 Luft Environmental Consulting I I I I ! I I I I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL applicable laws, ordinances, regulations and standards which should minimize .the riSk of accidents involving AHMs. However, in order to meet the requirements of the statute, an analysis of the hazards associated with the handling of the anhydrous ammonia due to operating error, equipment failure, and external events was performed. This analysis identified the potential releases that may have an offsite consequence to the surrounding community. In accordance with the guidelines published by the Bakersfield City Fire Department, an offsite consequence analysis of the worst credible release was conducted. The potential hazardous events determined by the HazOp review are described briefly below. As previously stated, these events could be caused by operating error, equipment failure or external events (including earthquakes). The offsite consequence analysis based on the release events generated during the HazOp · Study is provided later in this document. It is very important to note that the following release events take into account the ambient ammonia monitoring system and the emergency ventilation system located in the engine room. The ammonia monitoring system has an ambient ammonia sensor strategically located in the engine room.. This sensor will be set at 200 ppm and will activate an alarm on the ammonia refrigeration control panel. 'In addition to initiating an alarm, the ambient ammonia monitoring system will also start the emergency ventilation system. The emergency ventilation system consists of a fan that will discharge the ammonia laden air .from the engine room into the evaporative condenser where tl~e ammonia will be absorbed into the condenser water. When the emergency ventilation system is activated, the blowdown water from the evaporative condenser is redirected from the sewer discharge to a scrubber tank filled with water located outside of the engine room. A water circulation pump on the scrubber tank will also start when the emergency ventilation system is activated. This pump circulates water from the scrubber tank to the evaporative condenser. 1. Filling The Refrigeration System In addition to the initial fill of the refrigeration system with anhydrous ammonia, the system will periodically require a "recharge" of ammonia due to the operation of the air purger and minute leaks in fittings such as valve packings. During a typical recharge of the refrigeration system, ammonia is added to the system to bring the system capacity up to the initial fill inventory. The method of adding ammonia to the refrigeration system is the PFI/HazOp Study/June, 1991 Pag. e-4 Luff Environmental Consulting I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL same for the initial fill and the system recharges. Ammonia will be transferred as a liquid from the vendor tanker to the controlled pressure receiver Via a liquid ammonia pump. The hoses that are used to transfer the ammonia must comply with the requirements of Cai- OSHA. The Cai-OSHA requirements include pressure testing the hoses and incorporating safety factors in the pressure ratings of the hoses. The vendor's tanker is equipped with excess flow valves that will shut off immediately if the normal filling rate is exceeded. These excess flow valves are designed to automatically operate in the event of a catastrophic hose or pipe fitting failure. Ammonia tankers are also equipped with cable actuated, spring loaded emergency shut down valves. The cable that operates the emergency shut down valves is accessible from both sides of the tanker as well as from the front of the vehicle. The combination of excess flow valves and emergency shut down valves along with the standard valves allows for · quick response by the tanker operator in the event of an emergency. As an added safety Precaution, PFI will also install a back check valve on the fill line to the controlled pressure-receiver during ammonia deliveries. This back check valve will prevent the reverse flow of ammonia in the event of a hose rupture. A release could occur during the tank filling operation if the delivery hose were to rupture. Two types of hose failure were investigated; a complete failure of a hose and a partial failure of a hose. If a complete hose failure occurred, the excess flow valve on the tanker would close immediately and only the contents of the loading hose would be released. The contents of the controlled pressure receiver would not be released since the back check valve installed on the controlled pressure receiver would prevent the reverse flow of the ammonia. A more significant release could occur, under certain circumstances, if there was a partial failure of the hose. If the partial failure of the hose resulted in a release below the set point of the excess flow valve, the excess flow valve would not operate. In this release event, the operator (either the tanker operator or PFI personnel) would need to pull the cable on the emergency shut down valve on the ammonia tanker to control the release. PFI/HazOp Study/June, 1991. Page-5 Luft Environmental Consulting I I I I I I i I I CONFIDENTIAL Assuming that the operator would take up to 10 seconds to respond, the net release would be 25.4 pounds (2.54 pounds per second for 10 seconds) of vapor ammonia and 97.1 pounds (9.71 pounds per second for 10 seconds) of liquid ammonia. The 25.4 pounds of ammonia vapor represents an instantaneous release to the atmosphere while the 97.1 pounds of liquid ammonia must evaporate over a period of time. A failure of this type could occur in the engine room where there is an emergency ventilation system or outside near the delivery truck. In order to help mitigate this type of release, a PFI employee that is familiar with the ammonia delivery truck will be required to oversee any tank filling operation. If this type of release were to take place in the engine room, the emergency ventilation system would start up automatically or could be initiated manually. Additionally, self contained breathing apparatuses (SCBA's) are on site for emergency response purposes. The rate of release for this event is lower than the rate described in event #5 belowl Dispersion modeling was performed for this 10 second release event, along with a release at the'same rate lasting one minute. I 2. Thermosyphon Receiver Tank Line Failure I I I I I The thermosyphon receiver tank supplies various parts of the refrigeration system with liquid ammonia via a 3 inch high pressure liquid line. This line, along with the balance of the ammonia system, has been installed in accordance with the ANSI/ASME B31.5 refrigeration piping code. Although unlikely, a worst case release event for the ammonia system within the engine room would be a complete pipe failure near the thermosyphon receiver tank. Assuming that the thermosyphon receiver would be operating at aPproximately half full prior to the failure, the 3 inch high pressure liquid line would discharge the contents of the receiver (approximately 486 pounds) in less than a second and a half. Approximately 114 pounds of ammonia would vaporize instantly while 372 pounds of liquid ammonia would form a pool and have to evaporate to the atmosphere. I I I PFI/HazOp As a means to help mitigate this type of release, the building is equipped with an emergency ventilation system that is activated by an ambient sensor set at 200 ppm. The emergency ventilation system may also be activated manually. Self contained breathing apparatuses (SCBA's) are on site in strategic locations for emergency response purPoses. Study/June, 1991 Page-6 Luff Environmental Consulting I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL 3. Fitting Leak The available leak flow area for all valves and threaded fittings on the ammonia system would be less than the area of the other failure modes that were reviewed. Although a valve packing is one of the most likely release events, the smaller flow area would result in a release well below the other events described in this section. In the event of a leak from valves or fittings, sulphur sticks or soap bubble solution will be utilized to locate the leak for repair purposes. If a larger leak occurs, the engine room is equipped with the emergency ventilation system to mitigate the release. Additionally, SCBAs are on site to provide emergency responders access to the leak in an ammonia laden environment. 4. Pressure Relief Valve Release Each vessel in the ammonia refrigeration system is equipped with a pressure relief valve. The pressure relief valves vent into a four inch diameter pressure relief header pipe that discharges into a scrubber tank. This pressure relief header pipe extends down into the scrubber tank which is filled with water. The relief header pipe has perforations below the water level which allow the ammonia vapors to bubble out into the water. The ammonia will be absorbed into the water in the scrubber tank. Although there are very few combustible materials in the engine reom, a fire in the engine room could theoretically cause the system pressure to rise far enough to open the pressure relief valves. In this unlikely event, the maximum release rate of ammonia vapors from the refrigeration system vessels would be approximately 1.6 pounds per second. 5. Controlled Pressure Receiver Tank Line Release The controlled pressure receiver, which operates at 30 psig, supplies liquid ammonia to the blast freezer and the holding freezer evaporators via a 3 inch pipeline. This pipeline, built to ANSI/ASME B31.5 piping code, extends from the controlled pressure receiver to the blast freezer located north of the production area in a separate building. Although very unlikely, a worst case release event for the ammonia refrigeration system would be a complete PFI/HazOp Study/June, 1991 Page-7 Luff Environmental Consulting I I I ! I I I I I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL failure of this pipeline (due to an external event, such as an earthquake). A break .in this 3 inch line could release liquid ammonia into the engine room, the blast freezer building, or outside of the building depending on the location' of the pipeline failure. If this line catastrophically fails, all of the liquid ammonia in the controlled pressure receiver would be discharged within' about 30 seconds. Approximately 36! pounds of ammonia would flash into the air during this discharge. The balance of the liquid ammonia, approximately 4100 pounds, would form a liquid pool that would evaporate over time. Since the engine room is equipped with an ambient'ammonia sensor and emergency ventilation system that discharges into a scrubbing system, a release in the engine room would not be the worst credible release. If the pipeline were to fail in the blast freezer building, there would not be an immediate release to the atmosphere. The ammonia, in both the liquid and vapor phases, would be contained in the blast freezer building. Over time, the ammonia would diffuse through the conveyor belt openings into the main production area of the complex. Ammonia vapors Would also diffuse through the blast freezer building and into the atmosphere. A direct release to the atmosphere could develop if the pipeline failure occurred outside of the engine room and outside of the blast freezer building. In this unlikely event, approximately 361 pounds of ammonia would flash into the atmosphere. The remaining 4100 pounds of ammonia would form an evaporation pool between the blast freezer building and the engine room. Air dispersion modeling was pedormed on this wOrst credible release event. A 1 inch liquid ammonia line serves the ammonia evaporators in the holding freezer. If this 1 inch line were to fail, the release event would be very similar to the blast freezer release, except that the release rate would be approximately 11 percent of the blast freezer release rate. Since the flow rate for this 1 inch line is much less than the flow rate for the 3 inch line described above, no dispersion modeling was pedormed. PFI/HazOp Study/June, 1991 Page-8 Luft Environmental Consulting I ! i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Se Oil Pot CONFIDENTIAL Oil drain pots were incorporated into the~design of the refrigeration system to remove compressor oil that will accumulate in the Iow suction, accumulator during normal operation. In order to remove the oil from the system, the mixture of oil and liquid ammonia is drained from the Iow suction accumulator to the oil pot through a closed piping system. Maintenance personnel will then activate an electric heater to vaporize the liquid ammonia that is in the oil/ammonia mixture. The vaporized ammonia flows out of the oil pot and into the refrigeration suction line. After the ammonia has been boiled out of the oil pot, the refrigeration suction line is closed. The oil pot is then pressurized with the hot discharge gas off of the compressors. Once the oil pot is pressurized, the operator can open the oil drain valve and bleed the compressor oil into a container. If the service person were to become incapacitated while draining the oil, ammonia gas could be released into the engine room at a rate of 2.57 pounds per second. The ambient ammonia sensor in the engine room would start the emergency ventilation system if the ambient concentration of ammonia reached 200 ppm. Since this release would be in the engine room where the emergency ventilation system is installed, and the actual release rate to the environment would be less than event #5 above, this release event was not modelled. However, the release rate for the oil pot release event (2.57 pounds per seCond) is very close to the vapor release rate in the hose rupture event (2.54 pounds per second). Therefore, the vapor; release portion of the hose rupture event (the one minute duration case) provides a qualitative representation of the worst case release without the benefit of the emergency ventilation system. PFI/HazOp Study/June, 1991 Page-9 Luff Environmental Consulting I I I I I I I I ! I I I I I I I I I I APPENDIX A HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY MATRIX Item # NH3 Equip. Guide Word Deviation I Fill No No Flow Connections More Less Reverse More Flow Less Flow Reverse Flow PESTRITTO FOODS, INC.-HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY Possible Cause Consequence Fill valve closed or blocked Will relieve thru truck Safety valve fails Hose failure, truck pulls away without disconnecting Maximum flow through PSV Release contents of hose. Back check valve prevents ammonia leak from receiver Operator opens open-ended valve Max release thru orifice Partially plugged or blocked line Slow product transfer. Worst case, delivery system relieves back to truck. Delivery pump fails Flow could be back to delivery truck Comments Typical vendor truck recirculation system settings are below 250 psig. Dead head pressure on typical vendor pump is 225 psig. PSV on NH3 receiver is set @ 300 psig. Delivery hoses are tested once per year at twice the receiver pressure or at least 500 psig. SG**-Relief system on vendors truck SG-Operator training **SG=Safeguard Very rare incident-PSV vent thru scrubber tank Back check valve will be screwed into isolation valve on controlled pressure receiver during filling operation. SG-Truck is equipped with excess flow valve. SG-Back check valve installed on fill hose SG-SCBA on site for emergency response SG-Ambient ammonia monitor and engine room scrubber system. SG-Pestritto Foods personnel witness loading SG-Operator Training SG-AII open ended valves are plugged or capped SG-Ambient ammonia monitor and engine room scrubber system. SG-Operator Training No public consequence SG-Operator Training SG-Delivery truck relief system No public consequence SG-Back check valve on vendor's hose Page 1 m m m m m m Item # 1 NH3 Equip. Guide Word Fill More Connections (Cont.) Less Other Deviation More Pressure Less pressure m m m m m mm m PESTRITFO FOODS, INC.-HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY m m m m m m Possible Cause Consequence Comments Vendor tanker overfills receiver Additional compressors start up. If continued, compressors shut down on high discharge pressure or temperature There is sufficient gas volume in system to avoid hydraulicing vessels, if vessels are not valved out (isolated) Worst case, PSV may lift. Normal vendor pressure to fill tank · is 120 to150 psig~ Dead head press. is 225 psig. SG-Pestritto Maint. staff always witnesses loading. SG-Sight glass to observe level of NH3 SG-PSV relieve through scrubber tank SG-Operator Training Vendor truck pump failure - insufficient pressure No product transfer No public consequence Truck hits valves (Not possible since valves are on bottom of receiver - receiver is isolated in building) Thermosyphon No Receiver More No Flow More Flow System idle, power outage Relief valve fails-lifts Opening emergency dump valve Opening of unplugged valves Sightglassfailure Gauge failure System equalizes pressure Maximum flow through PSV Release to scrubber tank Max release through orifice Discharge until system can be isolated Discharge until system can be isolated No public consequence Very rare incident SG-Relief system vents to scrubber tank Emergency dump valve is located in a locked emergency refrigerant control box SG-Operator Training SG-AII open ended valves are plugged, SG-Ambient sensor and engine room scrubber SG-Operator Training SG-Bullseye type sight glass is resistant to impact. SG-SCBA on site for emergency response SG-Operator Training SG-Ambient sensor and engine room scrubber SG-Gauges have isolation valves SG-Ambient sensor and engine room scrubber SG-SCBA on site for emergency response SG-Operator Training Page 2 ~ Item # NH3 Equip. Guide Word Deviation Thermosyphon Less Less flow Receiver (Cont.) Possible Cause High pressure liquid line Hugged or blocked More More Pressure Overfilling Less More PESTRITTO FOODS, INC.-HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY Consequence Less cooling of the refrigerated rooms Compressors shut down on high discharge pressure/temperature Additional compressors start up'. If continued, compressors shut down on high discharge pressure or temperature There is sufficient gas volume in system to avoid hydraulicing vessels, if vessels are not valved out (isolated) Worst case, PSV may lift. Liquid ammonia trapped in oil cooler (valves closed on NH3 line). Less Pressure Compressor failures/shutdown More Temperature Evaporative condenser motor fails Failure can be fan motor or water recirculation pump failure Fire in building Overpressure liquid ammonia pipe System equalizes pressures Compressor discharge does not condense. Thermostats still call for cooling. Compressors eventually shut down on high discharge head or high discharge temperature Ammonia refrigeration control panel can balance system pressures. Worst case, PSV relieves Less Less Temperature Compressors malfunction Less temperature means less pressure and less cooling duty. Comments Room temperatures are monitored closely. Refrigeration problem would be detected rapidly. SG-High temperature/pressure shutdowns on compressors. Normal vendor pressure to fill tank is 120 to150 psig. Dead head press. is 225 psig. SG-Pestritto Maint. staff always witnesses loading. SG-Sight glass to observe level of NH3 SG-PSV relieve through scrubber tank SG-Operator Training SG-Thermal relief valves installed on NH3 line. SG-Operator Training No public consequence SG-High head shut down common to all compressors. SG-Two sets of fans on the evaporative condenser SC~-High discharge temperature shutdown SG-Operator Training SG-Ammonia system emergency control panel SG-Operator Training SG-PSV vents through scrubber tank SG-Most of the building materials are nonflammable SG-Compressor control panel alarms SG-Operator Training Room temperatures are monitored closely. Refrigeration problem would be detected rapidly. Page 3 Item # .2 3 NH3 Equip. Guide Word Thermosyphon More Receiver (Cont.) More Less Other Liq. Ammonia No line More PESTRITTO FOODS, INC.~HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY Deviation Possible Cause Consequence Comments Ammonia in oil system. Compressors may shut down on Iow oil pressure or high oil temperatu re. More Composition Leak in compressor oil cooler More Level Level pilot sensor failure/high pressure liquid line blocked or plugged Evaporative condenser failure Compressor discharge not condensing Receiver fills with liquid, may lose some of the refrigeration capacity where the liquid ammonia would have been in service. May shut down compressor on high discharge pressure/t e mperatu re Without condensation, pressure builds. Compressors shut down on high discharge temperature or pressure. Level controller fails liquid ammonia to controlled pressure receiver. Receiver has plenty of capacity Less Level Maintenance Draining oil line blocked, or isolated Oil will be drained through the oil pot (vs. draining oil through a valve on the vessel) If liquid NH3 line, pressure would increase in line due to liquid expansion No Flow Power failure Leak in pipelines, valves Compressor seai leak System equalizes to 80 - 100 psig' Discharge until leak isolated Low volume leaks, odor easily detected More Flow SG-Ambient sensor in engine room and automated scrubber system · SG-SCBA on sight for emergency response SG-Operator Training SG-Operator Training SG-High discharge temperature shutdown Room temperatures are monitored closely. Refrigeration problem would be detected rapidly. SG-High discharge temperature shutdown SG-Operator Training SG-High head shut down common to all compressors. SG-Controlled pressure receiver capacity. SG-Operator Training SG-Level Eyes SG-Operator Training SG-Oil drain pot designed to drain oil. SG-Operator Training SG-Pipelinss installed per ANSI/ASME 31.5 SG-Ambient sensor in engine room and automated scrubber system SG-SCBA on site for emergency response Would require several valves to be closed simultaneously in order to isolate this line. No public consequence SG-Ambient sensor in engine room and automated scrubber system SG-SCBA on site for emergency response SG-Operator Training Page 4 Item # NH3 Equip. Guide Word Deviation . 3 IJq. Ammonia More More Flow line (Cont.) Less More Shell and No tube heat exchanger (Glycol chiller) PESTRI'I-rO FOODS, INC.-HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY Possible Cause Pipe failu re Consequence Ammonia release corresponding to size of opening Worst credible case, liquid phase release Less Flow Line blocked or closed Less cooling capacity for freezers More Pressure Liquid line is isolated (blocked on both ends) with line full of liquid ammonia Could rupture line. into engine room Release contents of line No Flow Heat exchanger isolated Failure of solenoid valve for NH3 supply Power failure "Flooded" type heat exchanger could trap liquid ammonia. Normal gas volume will accomodate liquid ammonia expansion. Gas volume controlled by level control boot Compressor suction would empty NH3 from heat exchanger. Loss of refrigeration capacity. System equalizes to 80 - 100 psig Comments SG-Pipelines installed per'ANSI/ASME 31.5 SG-Ambient sensor in engine room and automated SCrubber system SG-SCBA on site for emergency respOnse SG-Operator Training Room temperatures are monitored closely. Refrigeration problem would be detected rapidly. SG-Pipelines installed per ANSI/ASME 31.5 SG-Ambient sensor in engine room and automated scrubber system SG-SCBA on site for emergency respOnse SG-Operator Training Would require several valves to be closed simultaneously in order to isolate this line. SG-PSV relieve through scrubber tank SG-Operator Training No public consequence No public consequence More More Flow Solenoid failure Level switch failure Tube failure in heat exchanger Higher heat exchange rate, glycol system pressure may increase if glycol freezes. Any excess NH3 entrained in gas stream would be removed by intercooler. Ammonia and glycol would be mixed and pumped through the system Could result in Iow release rate in glycol expansion tank. No public concern SG-Operator Training SG-High level alarm SG-Ambient sensor in engine room and automated scrubber system SG-SCBA on site for emergency respOnse SG-Operator Training Page 5 PESTRI'I-I'O FOODS, INC.-HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY Item # '4 NH3 Equip. Shell and tube heat exchanger (Glycol chiller) (Cont) Guide Word Less More Less Deviation Less Flow More Level Less Level Possible Cause Solenoid failure Level switch failure Solenoid failure Level switch failure Solenoid failure Level switch failure Consequence Glycol system warms up, less refrigeration duty. Higher heat exchange rate, glycol system pressure may increase if glycol freezes. Any excess NH3 entrained in gas stream would be removed by intercooler. Glycol system warms up, less refrigeration duty. Comments Room temperatures are monitored closely. Refrigeration problem would be detected rapidly. No public concern SG-Operator Training SGoHigh level alarm Room temperatures are monitored closely. Refrigeration problem would be detected rapidly. Plate heat exchanger (Dough mixe~ More More Flow Float switch failure, solenoid switch failure Hole in heat exchanger Liquid ammonia would overflow into the intercooler. Ammonia will enter process water and ruin dough batch. No public consequence Would be discovered immediately in production area. Ammonia would be absorbed in the process water, resulting in a slow release. SG-Operator Training SG-SCBA on site for emergency response Less Less Flow Float switch failure, solenoid valve Less refrigeration duty available failure No public consequence More Lsss More Level Less Level Solenoid failure Level switch failure Solenoid failure Level switch failure Higher heat exchange rate, glycol system pressure may increase if glycol freezes. Any excess NH3 entrained in gas stream would be removed by intercooler. Glycol system warms up, less refrigeration duty. No public concern SG-Operator Training SG-High level alarm Room temperatures are monitored closely. Refrigeration problem would be detected rapidly. Controlled Pressure Receiver More Less More Flow Less Flow Float valve failure, pilot sensor failure Float valve failure, pilot sensor failure Higher liquid level in receiver. Receiver is sized to accomodate ail liquid NH3. Less cooling of the refrigerated rooms Compressors shut down on high discharge pressure/temperature No public consequence No publicconsequence Page 6 m m m m m m Item # 7 NH3 Equip. Guide Word Controlled More Pressure Receiver (Cont.) More Less Ammonia More Purger Less More Less 8 Intercooler No More Deviation More Pressure More Level Less Level More Flow Less Row More Level Less Level' No Flow More Flow m m m m m m PESTRITTO FOODS, INC.-HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY Possible Cause Consequence Comments Failure of pressure reducing valve Increased pressure in receiver. PSVs set higher than normal system operating pressure, therefore, release not likely. SG-Ambient sensor in engine rOom and automated scrubber system SG-SCBA on site for emergency response SG-Operator Training SG-PSV release to scrubber tank Float valve failure, pilot sensor failure Higher liquid level in receiver. Receiver is No public consequence sized to accomodate all liquid NH3. Float valve failure, pilot sensor failure Less cooling of the refrigerated rooms Compressors shut down on high discharge pressu re/temperature No public consequence Liquid NH3 solenoid valve fails open Excessive NH3 flow through purger or float switch fails No public consequence Air purge solenoid valve falls open or float switch fails Water solenoid valve fails closed Excess NH3 flows through water bubbler Ammonia flows into sewer line Low rate release into sewer SG-Flow is restricted with orifice SG-Operator training Low rate release into sewer SG-Flow is restricted with orifice SG-Operator training Float switch failUre Ammonia relief check valve sends ammonia No public consequence to compressor suction Float switch/solenoid failure Pipe blocked Power failure Suction regulator failure Excessive purge cycle. Aqua ammonia to sewer. System equalizes pressure No public consequence No public consequence NH3 inlet solenoid valve falls open Liquid level in intercooler rises. Activates No public consequence liquid dump cycle. Dumps to Iow suction SG-High level switch emergency shut down accumulator (LSA), LSA dumps to controllec SG-Operator Training pressure receiver, ff dump cycle was not sufficient, emergency shut down on high liquid level in intercooler. Page 7 .. Item # NH3 Equip. Guide Word Deviation PESTRITTO FOODS, INC.-HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY Possible Cause Consequence Comments Intercooler Less Less Flow (Cont.) More MOre Pressure Less Less Pressure More More Level Less Less Level Low Suction No No Flow Accumulator More More Flow NH3 inlet solenoid valve fails dosed. Booster compressor discharge does not Inlet line partially blocked, condense. Hot gas to high stage Control boot isolated compressor, compressor shut down on high discharge temperature or pressure SG-Compressor shut down controls SG-Operator Training NH3 inlet solenoid valve fails open Liquid level in intercooler rises. Activates No public consequence liquid dump cycle. Dumps to Iow suction SG-High level switch emergency shut down accumulator (LSA), LSA dumps to controllec SG-Operator Training pressure receiver. If dump cycle was not sufficient, emergency shut down on high liquid level in intercooler. Malfunctioning compressor Less refrigeration capacity No public consequence NH3 inlet solenoid valve fails open Liquid level in intercooler rises. Activates No public consequence liquid dump cycle. Dumps to Iow suction SG-High level switch emergency shut down accumulator (LSA), LSA dumps to controllec SG-Operator Training pressure receiver. If dump cycle was not sufficient, emergency shut down on high liquid level in intercooler. Control column isolated and Iow level float switch is activated Intercooler can hold entire thermal syphon No public consequence receiver charge. SG-Operator Training NH3 inlet solenoid valve fails closed. Booster compressor discharge does'not Inlet line partially blocked, condense. Hot gas to high stage Control boot isolated compressor, compressor shut down on high discharge temperature or pressure SG-Compressor shut down controls SG-Operator Training Line blocked, system isolated See more level-lntercooler SG-Operator Training Power outage System pressure equalizes No public consequence Solenoid valve from intercooler fails in open position Liquid ammonia flows into dump traps. If SG-High level emergency shut down dump traps do not operate fast enough, high SG-Dump traps liquid level switch will operate emergency SG-Operator Training shut down. Page 8 m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m Item # 9 NH3 Equip. Low Suction Accumulator (Cont.) Guide Word Less Reverse More Less More Less Deviation Less flow Reverse Flow More Pressure Less Pressure More Level Less Level PESTRn-ro FOODS, INC.-HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY Possible Cause Consequence Comments Hand expansion valve improperly set, plugged line See more level-lntercooler Cold storage temp will rise SG-Operator Training Would be discovered quickly Check valve on Phillips dump fails Second Phillips dump works more often. Worst case, ESD on high liquid level. No public consequence SG-High level emergency shut down SG-Operator Training Inlet to compressor closed Pressure increase in refrigerant return lines. SG-Operator Training Refrigeration system performance decrease; SG-PSV release to scrubber tank Worst case, PSV lifts Normal operation Check valve on Phillips dump fails Second Phillips dump works more often. Worst case, ESD on high liquid level. No public consequence SG-High evel emergency shut down SG-Operator Training Normal operation 10 Evaporators No More More Less No Flow More Flow More pressure Less Flow Line blocked or isolated Operator error Power failure Evaporator leak Line blocked, system isolated Operator error Malfunctioning solenoid valve Hand expansion valve improperly set Pressure increase in refrigerant return lines. SG-Operator Training Refrigeration system performance decreases System equalizes to 80 - 100 psig No public consequence Release to holding freezer SG-SCBAs on site for emergency response SG-Evacuation plan SG-Opsrator training Less refrigeration capacity. Worst case, SG-Operator Training ammopia expansion bursts evaporator and SG-SCBA on site for emergency response releases contents of evaporator to holding freezer. Cold storage temperature will rise Would be discovered quickly Page 9 Item # 11 NH3 Equip. Guide Word Deviation Compressors No No Flow More More Flow Less Less Flow More More Pressure Less More PESTRI'I-ro FOODS, INC.-HAZOP REVIEW SUMMARY Possible Cause Power failure Discharge line failure Consequence System equalizes pressure Release to engine room. Maximum release is compressor throughput. Suction regulator closes Discharge not condensing Loss of refrigeration capacity Compressor discharge does not condense. Compressors eventually shut down on high discharge head or high discharge temperature Discharge valve closed or blocked System shuts down on high pressure Less Pressure Compressor failure More Temperature Oil cooler malfunction Loss of refrigeration capacity Compressor shut down on high oil temperatu re Comments No public consequence SG-Pipelines installed per ANSI/ASME 31.5 SG-Ambient sensor in engine room and automated scrubber system SG-SCBA on site for emergency response SG-Operator training No public consequence SG-High head shut down common to all compressors. SG-Two sets of fans on the evaporative condenser SG-High discharge temperature shutdown SG-Operator Training No public consequence SG-Operator Training SG-High pressure shut down switch No public consequence No public consequence SG-Operator Training SG-High oil temperature shut down switch SG-High discharge temperature shutdown Page 10 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL PESTRITTO FOODS, INC. BAKERSFIELD FACILITY Bakersfield, California ' OFFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS for Anhydrous Ammonia June1991 I I I I I I I I I I I I I i I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL OFFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Section 25534 (d)(2), Division 20, California Health and Safety Code states that "[t]he RMPP shall consider... [f]or the hazards identified in the hazard and operability studies, an.°ffsite consequence analysis which, for the most likely hazards, assumes pessimistic air dispersion and other adverse environmental cOnditions..' Additionally, as added to the statute, effective January 1, 1990, Section 25534.1 requires that "[e]very RMPP... shall give consideration to the proximity of the facility to schools, residential areas, general acute care hospitals, long-term health cam facilities, and child day care facilities." This document addresses these requirements. For the release cases identified in the HazOp studY,. an air dispersion model was performed for the HazOp release events utilizing adverse (pessimistic) and average meteorological conditions. Both sets of meteorological data were used to provide a baSis for evaluating the offsite consequences of the release events. The air dispersion model and its results are discussed in this document. A. GENERAL MODEL INFORMATION The pollutant dispersion results were generated by the CAMEO~3.0-ALOHA 5.0 model developed by the Hazardous Materials Response Branch of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). CAMEOTM is the Computer- Aided Management of Emergency Operations program which was designed to help emergency planners and first responders both plan for, and safely handle, chemical accidents. ALOHA stands for Areal Locations Of Hazardous Atmospheres and serves as a tool for estimating the movement and dispersion of an atmospheric pollutant. NOA^ recently updated ALOHA to include both a Gaussian dispersion model and a heavy gas model. The Gaussian dispersion model plots the distribution of a pollutant gas from a series of Gaussian equations as described by Turner in the "Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates"1. The Gaussian equation describes a bell- shaped or normal curve. Concentration distribution at ground level is calculated and the bell-shape spreads out and gets wider and flatter as the pollutant drifts downwind. 1Turner, D. Bruce, 1974. Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates. National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia. PFI/Offsite Consequence/June, 1991 Page I Luff Environmental Consulting I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL The heavy gas dispersion model uses calculations found in the widely accepted DEGADIS2 model. The model has'been simplified to provide quicker results during emergency use, but is still accurate to within ten percent of the original DEGADIS model. In both models, the pollutant concentration to be calculated is set to a particular numerical value such as parts per million (ppm), or can be the value of a toxicological parameter such as' those set in the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines issued by the American Industrial Hygiene Association3. The models will give results using either an instanta~ne0us source release or a continuous source release. When the release of t.h~ pollutant occurs during one short time period, it is modeled as an instantaheous release. An instantaneous release is handled as a series of puffs.-As~the wind carries the puff away, the puff spreads out in all directions (see Figure 1). The puff of vapor becomes larger and less dense as it drifts, but the core which exceeds the concentration value given will eventually get smaller. The plume ends when the spreading has reduced the central concentration of the puff to below the value being calculated. Vapor puff Part of the puff that exceeds '~x thresh°~ntr~ Pollutant _.~L~f~Y ~ ~ \ sou~o~× ,~ ~1~ ~ ~ "' FIGURE I - Top View of a Footprint from an Instantaneous Spill I I I 2Spicer, Tom and Jerry Havens, 1989. UsersGuide for the DEGADIS 2.1 Dense Gas Dispersion Model, EPA-450/4-89-019. U.S. EPA, Cincinnati, Ohio. 3American Industrial Hygiene Association, October, 1988: Emergency Response Planning Guidelines. AIHA ERPG Committee, 475 Wolf Ledges Parkway, Akron, OH 44311. PFI/Offsite Consequence/June, 1991 Page 2 Luft Environmental Consulting '1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ! CONFIDENTIAL A continuous release occurs when a pollutant is being released over a longer period of time.. A continuous release results in a concentration curve termed a footprint (see Figure 2). The area inside the curve is the region that is predicted to have ground level concentrations above the limit set by the modeler. Pollutant Source X. -~-----~- ~ _ --~ FIGURE 2 - Footprint from a Continuous Source Spill The ALOHA model incorporates several assumptions regarding chemical source, meteorological data and terrain. In the heavy gas model, the chemical spill is assumed to have occurred at ground level. The Gaussian model has the option of using elevated sources. For both models, all concentrations are calculated at ground level. Meteorological data includes atmospheric stability, wind speed and wind direction. Atmospheric stability classes are measured from A to F with class A being the most unstable and class F the most stable. Unstable conditions result in a large amount of mixing of the atmosphere, causing the pollutant chemical to produce a shorter threat distance but a wider plume. HoWever, this condition alSo includes more variable wind directions, resulting in a threat zone that may tend to meander. Stable conditions give opposite results. The stability can be influenced by both heating and mechanical stirring of the atmosphere. Heating of the sudace layer of the atmosphere leads to unstable conditions and ground cooling results in more stable conditions. Mechanical stirring is caused by the winds, with strong winds tending to cause neutral stability (classes C and D). Wind speed and wind direction are input directly by the modeler; although the air model checks that wind speeds are consistent with the stability class chosen. If the wind speed and stability class are inconsistent, no plume dispersion is calculated. PFI/Offsite Consequence/June, 1991 Page 3 Luff Environmental Consulting I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I .I CONFIDENTIAL The turbulence caused as the wind flows over and around obstacles is included in the model and termed ground roughness. The model adjusts for mixing consistent with stability class by allowing for either rural ground roughness, a terrain with few obstacles, or an urban ground roughness, characterized by many obstacles. The effects of terrain on the speed and direction of the plume are not · included in the model. The model assumes that the winds are uniform throughout the plume. B. LIMITATIONS OF ALOHA DISPERSION MODEL Even with all the above mentioned factors included in the plume concentration calculations, as with all dispersion models, the ALOHA model does have several limitations. It is important to remember that the model has a nominal accuracy of a factor'of 2, so a predicted concentration of 50 ppm may actually be in the range of 25 to 100 ppm. This degree' of accuracy is consistent with other dispersion models. The model also does not accurately represent several conditiOns which are discussed below. As mentioned earlier, the ALOHA model does not include terrain steering effects caused by topography or wind shifts and the model assumes that all winds are constant throughout the plume. Wind variation can reduce the accuracy of the -results when the plume travels more than a mile from the source. The model will only calculate plume dispersion results at distances less than 6.4 miles (10 km). Also, dispersion models are not accurate at Iow wind speeds (less than 1 mile per hour) or at very stable atmospheric conditions, which produce these Iow wind speeds. ALOHA does not allow a wind speed of less than one meter per second (2.237 miles per hour). Another situation not handled well by ALOHA (or air models in general) is concentration, patchiness in the area 50 to 100 yards from the source. In this vicinity, the pollutant may meander and' be more patchy than the model can predict. After about 100 yards, a plume will experienced enough mixing eddies to reduce the irregular concentrations within the plume. At this point, the model will predict the pollutant concentrations within the accuracy of the model. PFI/Offsite Consequence/June, 1991 Page 4 Luft Environmental Consulting I I I I I I I i I I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL C. MODEL ~PARAMETERS FOR PESTRITTO FOODS, INC. For the release cases identified in the HazOp study, an air disperSion.model was used to evaluate the offsite consequences of the release events. The air dispersion modeling was performed utilizing both adverse and average meteorological conditions. By applying both sets of data to the release events, the modeling results provide qualitative information to help evaluate the offsite consequence associated with the worSt credible release events. Anhydrous ammonia is a gas composed of three parts hydrogen and one part nitrogen (NH3). It has a molecular weight of 17.03 and is lighter than air. When stored under sufficient pressure at ambient temperature, ammonia is liquefied. Ammonia exists in both liquid and vapor.phases in the refrigeration system, depending on system pressure and temperature. Anhydrous ammonia is shipped as a nonflammable gas and is an irritant to the eyes, skin' and mucous membranes. Ammonia has a perceptible odor as Iow as 5 ppm and is readily detectable at 10 ppm. A release of anhydrous ammonia vapors under pressure may result in the formation of an aerosol mist which behaves as a heavy gas (heavier than air). However, the ammonia behaves in a normal Gaussian distribution once the concentrations in air drop to about 10,000 ppm. For a small release, this will occur within the firSt 50 yards from the source. Because of this dual behavior, both the heavy gas and Gaussian models were used to predict plume dispersion. If anhydrous ammonia is released as'a liquid, a portion of the liquid will flash to the vapor phase immediately. The amount of liquid ammonia that will flash to the vapor phase is dependent on the storage pressure prior to the release. For each release of liquid ammonia, the percentage of ammonia flashing to the vapor phase was calculated. The balance of the release would form a liquid pool that would evaporate over a period of time depending on ambient conditions. The air dispersion model calculates the evaporation release rate based on the input meteorological parameters. Therefore, a release of liquid anhydrous ammonia would generate two vapor disperSion models; one for the initial flash of the release and the second for the evaporation of the liquid pool. Results were modeled for concentrations set at 50 ppm and 500 ppm as specified in the "Outline of RMPP Requirements", prepared by the Bakersfield City Fire Department Hazardous Materials Division. The 50 ppm value is the EPA Lever of PFl/Offsite Consequence/June, 1991 Page 5 Luff Environmental Consulting I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i I CONFIDENTIAL Concern (LOC) concentration at which there should be no discomfort or impairment of health for a prolonged exposure of more than 30 minutes. An ambient concentration of ammonia of 500 ppm is considered as Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH). At 500 ppm, there is severe irritation of the eyes, nose and throat, but there are no lasting effects for a short exposure of less than 30 minutes. Since ammonia has a perceptible odor as Iow as 5 ppm, it is unlikely that. a person would become unknowingly overexposed.4 The meteorological conditions used to determine maximum impact distances and times were based on data collected by the U.S. Weather Service at Meadow Fields Airport in Bakersfield, California. The data in Table 1 summarizes the meteorological data for both average and adverse conditions. On an annual basis, the predominant meteorological conditions are with a wind direction from the north-northwest at 6.4 miles per hour. A chemical release during these average atmospheric conditions represents the most likely offsite consequence resulting from the release. For modeling purposes, however, winds from the south-southeast at 5.0 miles per hour were also considered because they represent the worst case or "pessimistic" atmospheric conditions. Modeling releases with these adverse weather conditions would present an offsite consequence that would potentially have the greatest affect on sensitive populations. The PFI facility is located on McDivitt Drive in a commercial/light industrial area. Pursuant to Section 25534, California Health and Safety Code, "[e]very RMPP... shall give consideration to the proximity of the facility to schools, residential areas, general acute care hospitals, long-term health care facilities, and child day care facilities." Sensitive population sites considered in this offsite consequence analysis included residences, schools, emergency and health care facilities. Figure 3 shows an overview of the sensitive population sites near the PFI plant. The distances between the PFI facility and the sensitive populations are summarized in Table 2. The nearest resident is approximately a quarter of a mile north of the PFI facility. There is a hospital to the northeast of the PFI facility, over a mile away. The nearest school is roughly 1.24 miles to the west of the plant. A Bakersfield City Fire Department station is located 1.31 miles northwest of the PFI 4American Industrial Hygiene Association, October, 1988: Emergency Response Planning Guidelines. AIHA ERPG Committee, 475 Wolf LedgeS Parkway, Akron, OH 44311. PFI/Offsite Consequence/June, 1991 Page 6 Luft Environmental Consulting I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I TABLE 1 MEADOWS FIELD METEOROLOGICAL DATA Bakersfield, CA MONTH WIND SPEED WIND DIRECTION (MPH) (FROM) JAN 5.20 NW FEB 5.80 ENE MAR 6.50 NW APR 7.10 NW MAY 7.90 NW JUN 7.90 NW JUL 7.20 NW AUG 6.80 NW SEP 6.20 WNW OCT 5.50 NW NOV 5.10 ENE 'DEC 5.00 ENE AVG. 6.40 NW I I I I I I I I I I PESTRITTO FOODS INC. ['~ STOCKDALE HWY CSUB n-' -r z ~ n- O uj ' MING AVE · [FIlitl PESTRI'I' rO ~rh FOOD', ~ 'l~',I' ~ WHITE LN' ,", ~ x ~......... ~p!S,T,~? ,~, ~,q ......................... ,,,,,,, ........... J.JJ .............................. I >. ~ PAOHEOO RD O iz~uJ ~ PANAMA LN IFIllE HOSKING AVE LEGEND ~ ' School I~ - Nearest Residence [~] - Fire Stal~on - Proposed School - Hospital. ....,,, - Railroad 1 Milo -- 1 ~nch I I I I I i I I I FIGURE 3 -- Map showing location of sensitive population sites near the Pestritto Foods facility. Luff Environmental Consulting / June 1991 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I TABLE 2 PESTRITTO FOODS INC. SENSITIVE POPULATION SITES SITE Nearest Residence DISTANCE FROM PLANT (Miles) 0.24 Nearest Hospital Nearest School 1.10 1.24 Nearest 'Fire Station 1.31 CRITICAL WIND DIRECTION (Wind From) South Southwest East Southeast I I I I I i I I I I I I I i I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL facility. Most of the ALOHA limitations discussed previously have minimal effects on the model results. The ALOHA limitation regarding terrain steering effects and wind shifts caused by topography is not a problem in the area being modeled because the terrain is generally flat and unobstructed by large hills or valleys. The ground roughness of the area is determined to be rural terrain. The effects of concentration patchiness within the first 50 to 100 yards from the source will be minimal because there are no resident populations within this pre-Gaussian area. D. RESULTS OF THE ALOHA DISPERSION MODELING The HazOp study generated release events for the ammonia system based on the design of the facility, potential operator error and external events, such as an earthquake. These release events were reviewed to determine whether there was a high likelihood of occurrence or a significant offsite consequence if the release were to occur. The releases associated with a high likelihood of occurrence were very Iow release rates and originated within the engine room which is equipped with the emergency ventilation system. There would be little or no offsite.consequences associated with these release events. Five release events were identified in the HazOp study as having offsite consequences that warranted air dispersion modeling. These releases were identified as follows: 1. Failure of the ammonia delivery hose during a delivery. --2. Thermosyphon receiver tank line failure. 3. Pressure relief valve release. -'4. Controlled pressure receiver tank line failure. 5. A release from the oil drain pot. Air dispersion modeling was pedormed for the delivery hose failUre (for two different release durations), the thermosyphon receiver line failure, and the controlled pressure receiver failure. Modeling was not performed for the drain pot release for two reasons. First, a release from the oil pot would be in the engine room where the emergency ventilation system would mitigate the offsite consequence from the release. The second reason for not modeling the oil pot release is that any unmitigated release from the oil pot would be almost identical PFI/Offsite Consequence/June, 1991 Page 7 Luff Environmental Consulting ! I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL to the vapor release rate from the hose failure. Of these events, only the delivery hose failure and the oil drain pot release were considered credible by the HazOp team. The pipeline failures were not considered as likely events since the lines were designed and installed per' · ASME codes.. However, air dispersio'n modeling was performed for these release events to provide emergency responders with a representation of a worst case, unlikely event. The pressure relief valve release event was not considered likely to occur since there is little or no combustible material in the engine room, and the engine room has a fire suppression Sprinkler system. Additionally, the pressure relief header discharges into a-passive scrubbing system. For this reason, air dispersion modeling was not pedormed on this release event. The releases associated with the delivery hose failure and the oil drain pot have the potential to occur on an infrequent basis. Ammonia will be delivered to the plant periodically, to recharge the ammonia system. Only during ammonia delivery could the delivery hose failure release event develop. In order to generate a worst case release event, the hose failure was assumed to occur outside of the engine room. Similarly, compressor oil is drained from the system through the oil pot periodically. This release event, if it occurred, would take place within the engine room. Since the engine room is equipped with the emergency ventilation system, the offsite consequences associated with this release would be substantially mitigated. Additionally, since the vapor release rate from the oil pot discharge is neady identical to the vapor release rate from the delivery hose, the release from the oil pot was not modeled. As mentioned earlier, a release of liquid~ anhydrous ammonia would result in a 'portion of the liquid flashing to the vapor phase immediately, depending on the storage pressure prior to the release. For the liquid ammonia release cases that were modeled, the percentage of ammonia flashing to the vapor phase was calculated and modeled as a vapor release. The balance of the release would form a liquid pool that would evaporate over a period of time depending on ambient conditions and the size of the pool. The air dispersion model calculates the evaporation release rate based on the input meteorological parameters and PFI/Offsite Consequence/June, 1991 P~e8 Luft Environmental Consulting I I I I I I I I I '1 I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL the surface area of the pool. In general, the larger the surface area of the spill the greater the evaporative release rate. This situation would generate a larger plume in the offsite consequence analysis, but the duration of exposure would be significantly shorter. Conversely, the smaller the surface area of the spill, the smaller the dispersion plume and the longer the duration of exposure. For the hose rupture, releaSe event, the assumed ammonia pool surface area was 100 square feet due to the duration of the event.' This sudace area was used for both the 10 second and the 1 minute hose failure release events, and the thermosyphon receiver line failure. For the release event associated with the controlled pressure receiver pipeline failure, the assumed sudace area of the pool was 1000 square feet. The results of the ALOHA plume dispersion modeling are summarized in Tables 3 through 6 and shown in Figures 4 through 19. Tables 3 through 6 give the total plume distance travelled for both the Gaussian and heavy gas models using. average and adverse meteorological conditions. Additionally, the duration of the evaporation release from the liquid pools is given for both sets of meteorological conditions. The figures show the direction the plume would most likely travel when using the actual meteorological data from Table 1. For the hose rupture release event shown in Table 3 and Figures 4 through 7, the 500 ppm plume travels only a few hundred yards under adverse weather conditions. The majority of the offsite consequence is associated with the flashing vapor release, instead of the evaporation of the pool. The duration of the sensitive population exposure is very short, lasting only 8 minute under adverse meteorological conditions. The hose rupture case with a release duration of one minute is shown in Table 4 and Figures 8 through 11. The 50 ppm model run shows that the plume would travel up to .61 miles from the plant. There are no residenceS within the 500 ppm plume dispersiOn. Sensitive population exposure from the vapor release would only be for a few minutes. Local businesses within a few hundred yards of the facility could be exposed, to the lower.concentration plume (50 ppm) for up to 47 minutes. Table 5 and Figures 12 through 15 show the results of the dispersion modeling PFI/Offsite Consequence/June, 1991 Page 9 Luff Environmental Consulting I I I I I i I I I I I I I I I I CONFIDENTIAL for the unlikely thermosyphon receiver line failure in the engine room.~ The air dispersion modeling' for this release event does not take into account the emergency ventilation system in the engine rodm. As such, the results of the modeling for this release event are extremely conservative. The modeling results for the Iow probability controlled pressure receiver line failure are show in Table 6 and Figures 16 through 19. This release event was assumed to take place outside the building, although only a few feet of liquid ammonia piping is exposed to the atmosphere. Under this extreme worst case release event, the 50 ppm plume could travel up to a mile away from the facility. The 500 ppm plume would travel several hundred yards. In all of the release events modeled above, the majority of the offsite consequence is assoCiated with the flashing vapor release, instead of the evaporation of the pool. This means that the sensitive population exposures would be of minimal duration. The evaporative pool releases, although longer in duration, result in a lower release .rate than the vapor release. As such, evaporative pool releases disperse much quicker and do not travel as far as the .vapor releases. PFI/Offsite Consequence/June, 1991 Page 10 · Luft Environmental Consulting TABLE 3 pESTRrI'rO FOODS INC. PLUME DISPERSION RESULTS FOR AMMONIA DELIVERY HOSE RUPTURE VAPOR RELEASE OF 2.54 LBS/SEC OF AMMONIA-FOR 10 SECONDS LIQUID RELEASE OF 9.71 LBS/SEC OF AMMONIA-FOR 10 SECONDS EVAPORATION POOL SURFACE AREA -- 100 SQUARE FEET ATMOSPHERIC MODELING CONDITIONS ATMOSPHERIC MODELING RESULTS CONDITION AVERAGE ADVERSE PLUME DISTANCE OF PLUME TRAVEL CONCENTRATION VAPOR RELEASE LIQU ID RELEASE (PPM) GAUSSIAN HEAVY GAS GAUSSIAN TEMPERATURE 95°F 40°F MODEL MODEL MODEL AVERAGE HUMIDITY 25% 5(7¥° CONDITIONS 7 minute evaporation release CLOUD COVER 10% 70% 50 137 yards 281 yards 106 yards WIND SPEED 6.4 MPH 5.0 MPH 500 44 yards 55 yards 34 yards WIND DIRECTION NW ENE ADVERSE RELEASE DATE Summer Winter CONDITIONS 8 minute evaporation release RELEASE TIME 4:00 P.M. 8:00 A.M. 50 201 yards 401 yards 141 yards STABILITY CLASS B-Unstable C-Unstab/Neut 500 63 yards 90 yards 44 yards Luff Environmental Consulting June 91 I I I DISPERSION PESTRITTO FOODS INC. OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM DELIVERY HOSE 2.54 lbs/sec VAPOR-9.71 lbs/sec LIQUID 10 SECOND RELEASE AVERAGE WEATHER CONDITIONS 50 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION FAILURE I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I o ~ o < ~ FiR[I ~ .1~' PESTRITTO ~ WHITE LANE FOODS I ! I ! I I ! ! I ! ! ! ! ! ! I PANAMA LANE LEGEND j~ School ~ - Residential Area ~] - Fire Station N Proposed School ~ - Hospital ~ ~ ~ ~ - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 4 - Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. VaDor Source: 2.54 lbs/sec Ammonia-10 sec Liauid Source: 9.71 lbs/sec Ammonia-10 sec Total Dis0ersion Distance for 50 DDm Plume: V _a~or Release: 0.16 miles Liquid Release: 106 yards (bold border) Average Weather Conditions Modelled Stability_ Class: B Wind S_Deed: 6.4 mph Wind Direction: From the Northwest TemPerature: 95°F LEC/June-91 I I I PESTRITTO FOODS INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM DELIVERY HOSE 2.54 lbs/sec VAPOR-9.71 lbs/sec LIQUID 10 SECOND RELEASE ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS 50 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION FAILURE ! I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Q Q Z ~~ ~ PESTRITTO ~ WHITE LANE Q FOODS cc 1~ DISIRICT ~I_¥D I~, I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~,,,,,,,,,,,~,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,~ PANAMA LANE LEGEND ~ ~rh - School ~ - Residential Area ~1 - Fire Station N Iz~ - Proposed School [] - Hospital = = [ = - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 5 - Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. VaDor Source: 2.54 lbs/sec Ammonia-10 sec Liauid Source: 9.71 lbs/sec Ammonia-10 sec Total DisoerSion Distance for 50 odin Plume: .Y~ClQ~e~P.~,~t: 401 yards , Liauid Release: 141 yards (bold border) Adverse Weather Conditions Modelled Stability_ Class: C Wind SDeed: 5.0 mph ~JQQ.D_~: From the East-Northeast Tem_~eratum: 40°F LEC/June-91 I ! I DISPERSION pESTRITTO FOODS INC. OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM DELIVERY 2.54 lbs/sec VAPOR-9.71 lbs/sec .LIQUID 10 SECOND' RELEASE AVERAGE .WEATHER CONDITIONS 500 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION HOSE' FAILURE I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I- ,,,,.,4 MING AVE Plumes for vapor and liquid rel~ ases are too small to plot on map. ~ PESTRITTO ~, WHITE LANE FOODS ~] DISIRIGI BLYD I I I I I I i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I [ I I [ I I I I I I PANAMA LANE LEGEND ~ ~rh - School ~' - Residential Area ~'~ - Fire Station N I~ - Proposed School r~ - Hospital ', ',: ', - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 6 -Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. Vapor So~trce: 2.54 lbs/sec Ammonia-10 sec .J,Jg[iJlZ.~;~EI;~: 9.71 lbs/sec Ammonia-10 sec Total Disoersion Distance for 500 DDm Plume: Va~or Relea.~: 55 yards (Too small to plot) Liauid Release: 34 yards (Too small to plot) Average Weather Conditions Modelled · Stability_ Clas~: B Wind Soeed: 6,4 mph Wind Direction: From the Northwest Temperature: 95°F LEC/June-91 PESTRITTO FOODS INC. I I I I I I I I I I I I ! I I I I I DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM DELIVERY HOSE FAILURE 2.54 lbs/sec VAPOR-9.71 lbs/sec LIQUID 10 SECOND RELEASE ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS 500~ PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION ~ o < '~~rh~ both plumes are too small to plot on the map. ~-~ ~ PESTRITTO ~ WHITE LANE FOODS [] ~ r~STR~CT ~tVD I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I PANAMA LANE · LEGEND School ~ - Residential Area '~ - Fire Station ~ [~ N Proposed School - Hospital I I | I - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 7 - Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. ~: 2.54 lbs/sec Ammonia-10 sec ~: 9.71 lbs/sec Ammonia-10 sec Total DisPersion Distance for 500 DDT Plume: .~aJZ~..~t~,~: 90 yards (Too small to plot) J,J~i~~: 44 yards (Too small to plot) Adverse weather Conditions Modelled ~: C ~: 5.0 mph ~3~LD.~: From the East-Northeast Temoerature: 40OF LEC/June-91 TABLE 4 PESTRII'ro FOODS INC. PLUME DISPERSION RESULTS FOR AMMONIA DEMVERY HOSE RUPTURE VAPOR RELEASE OF 2.54 LBS/SEC OF AMMONIA-FOR 1 MINUTE UQUlD RELEASE OF 9.71 LBS/SEC OF AMMONIA-FOR 1 MINUTE EVAPORATION POOL SURFACE AREA = 100 SQUARE FEET ATMOSPHERIC MODELING CONDITIONS ATMOSPHERIC MODELING RESULTS CONDITION AVERAGE ADVERSE PLUME DISTANCE OF PLUME TRAVEL CONCENTRATION VAPOR RELEASE LIQUID RELEASE (PPM) GAUSSIAN I HEAVY GAS GAUSSlAN TEMPERATURE 95°F 40OF MODELJ MODEL MODEL AVERAGE HUMIDITY 25% 50% CONDITIONS 40 minute evaporation release CLOUD COVER 10% 70% 50 0.18 miles 0.45 miles 104 yards WIND SPEED 6.4 MPH 5.0 MPH ' 500 106 yards 241 yards 33 yards WIND DIRECTION NW ENE ADVERSE RELEASE DATE Summer Winter CONDITIONS 47 minute evaporation release RELEASE TIME 4:00 P.M. 8:00 A.M. 50 0.27 miles 0.61 miles 140 yards STABILITY CLASS B-Unstable C-Unstab/Neut 500 155 yards 227 yards 43 yards Luft Environmental Consulting June 91 I I I I I I I I I I I I ! I I I ! I · PESTRITTO FOODS INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM DELIVERy HOSE 2.54 lbs/sec VAPOR-9.71 lbs/sec LIQUID I MINUTE RELEASE AVERAGE WEATHER CONDITIONS 50 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION FAILURE Z PESTRI~O ~ WHITE ~NE FOODS' DISTRICT BLVD LEGEND ~ ~rh - School ~ - Residential Area [~1 - Fire Station N I~1 - Proposed School [] - Hospital :::: - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 8_ Map shows the impact on the sensitive pOpulations sites from subject ammonia release case. Va~_ or Source: 2.54 lbs/sec Ammonia-1 min .J.J~t~[.~Z~[J~: 9.71 lbs/sec Ammonia-1 min Total Disoersion Distance for 50 o_Dm Plume: Va[x)r Release: 797 yards J,igu~3_B~: 104 yards (bo~d border) Averaae Weather Conditions Modelled Stability_ Class: B Wind Speed: 6.4 mph Wind Direction: From the Northwest Tem_oerature: 95°F LEC/June-91 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I PESTRITTO FOODS INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM DELIVERY 2.54 lbs/sec VAPOR-9.71 lbs/sec LIQUID I MINUTE RELEASE ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS 50 .PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION HOSE FAILURE Q LU ~_ Flail ~ ~ pESTRITTO 1~ WHITE ~NE FOODS ~ DISTRICT BLVD PANAMA ~NE LEGEND j~ ~ - School ~ - Residential Area r~l - Fire station N I~ - Proposed School ~-~ - Hospital :::: - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 9 -Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. Vapor Source: 2.54 lbs/sec Ammonia-1 min Liauid Source: 9.71 lbs/sec Ammonia-1 min Total Dis0ersion Distance for 50 oDrrl Plurrle: vapor Release: 0,61 miles Liauid Release: 140 yards (bold border) Adverse Weather Conditions Modelled Stabili_ty Class: C Wind SDeed: 5.0 mph Wind Direction: From the East-Northeast TemPerature: 40°F LEC/June-91 I I I I ! I I I I I I I I I I I I I I PESTRITTO FOODS INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM DELIVERY HOSE 2.54 lbs/sec VAPOR-9.71 lbs/sec LIQUID I MINUTE RELEASE AVERAGE WEATHER CONDITIONS 500 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION FAILURE Plume for liquid release i: too small to plot on map. ~ PESTRITTO ~ WHITE LANE FOODS ~ DISTRICT BLVD I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '~n', PANAMA LANE LEGEND ~ ~ - School ~ - Residential Area [~1 - Fire Station N I~ - Proposed School [] - Hospital ::: ,' - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 10 - Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. VaDor Source: 2.54 lbs/sec Ammonia-1 min .~: 9.71 lbs/sec Ammonia-1 min Total Disoersion Distance for 500 DDm Plume: V .apor Release: 241 yards I_iauid Release: 33 yards (Too small to plot) Average Weather Conditions Modelled ~: B Wind Speed: 6.4 mph Wind Direction: From the Northwest Temperature: 95°F LEC/June-91 I I I PESTRITTO FOODS INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM DELIVERY HOSE 2.54 lbs/sec VAPOR-9.71 lbs/sec LIQUID I MINUTE RELEASE ADVERSE. WEATHER CONDITIONS 500 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION FAILURE I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ o < Plume from liquid release too small to plot on map. ~ PESTRITTO ~ WHITE LANE Q FOODS ~_J n" ~ DISTRICT BLVD I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I PANAMA LANE LEGEND ~ ~rh - School ~ - Residential Area ~ - Fire Stal~on N ~1 -Proposod School [~ - Hospital ....,,,, - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 11 - Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. Va0or Source: 2.54 lbs/sec Ammonia-1 min Liauid Source: 9.71 lbs/sec Ammonia-1 min Total Disoersion Distance for 500 DOm Plume: Vapor Release: 227 yards Liauid Release: 43 yards (Too small to plot) Adverse Weather Conditions Modelled Stability_ Class: C Wind Soeed: 5.0 mph Wind Direction: From the East-Northeast Tem0erature: 40°F LEC/June-91 TABLE 5 PESTRITTO FOODS PLUME DISPERSION RESULTS FOR THERMOSYPHON RECEIVER LINE FAILURE VAPOR RELEASE OF 113.7 LBS OF AMMONIA MQUID RELEASE OF 372.2 LBS OF AMMONIA EVAPORATION POOL SURFACE AREA = 100 SQUARE FEET ATMOSPHERIC MODELING CONDITIONS ATMOSPHERIC MODELING RESULTS CONDITION AVERAGE ADVERSE PLUME DISTANCE OF PLUME TRAVEL CONCENTRATION VAPOR RELEASE LIQUID RELEASE (PPM) GAUSSIAN I HEAVYGAS GAUSSIAN TEMPERATURE 95°F 40°F MODELI MODEL MODEL AVERAGE HUMIDITY 25*/, 50*/, CONDITIONS 25 minute evaporation release CLOUD COVER 10% 70°/, 50 283 yards 682 yards 105 yards WIND SPEED 6.4 MPH 5.0 MPH 500 92 yards 206 yards 33 yards WIND DIRECTION NW ENE ADVERSE RELEASE DATE Summer Winter CONDITIONS 30 minute evaporation release RELEASE TIME 4:00 P.M. 8:00 A.M. 50 .24 miles .51 miles 141 yards STABILITY CLASS B-Unstable C-Unstab/Neut 500 134 yards 183 yards 44 yards Luff Environmental Consulting June 91 I I i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I PESTRITTO FOODS INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM THERMOSYPHON RECEIVER LINE FAILURE 113.7 LBS VAPOR-372.2 LBS LIQUID AVERAGE WEATHER CONDITIONS 50 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION ~ 1~ PESTRITTO 1~ WHITE LANE C3 FOODS ~_J cc ~! DISTRICT BLVD LLI' I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I [ I I I I I I I I I I I ~ . PANAMA LANE LEGEND ~ ~rh - School 1~ - Residential Area r~ - Fire station N Iz~ - Proposed School [] - Hospital :::: - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 12 - Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. VaDor Source: 113.7 pounds Ammonia ~: 372.2 pounds Ammonia Total Disoersion Distance for 50 00m Plume: Vaoor Release: 0.39 Miles [,iauid Releasei 105 Yards (bold border) ~verage Weather Conditions Modelled ~tability_ Class: B Wind S~eed: 6.4 mph Wind Direction: From the Northwest TemPerature: 95°F LEC/June-91 I I I PESTRITTO FOODS INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM THERMOSYPHON RECEIVER LINE FAILURE 113.7 LBS VAPOR-372.2 LBS LIQUID ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS 50 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ °~ FlllEi ~ ~' PESTRITTO ~ WHITE LANE C~ FOODS n- ~ DISTRICT BLVD U.l' ~ , , , , I , , , , ,~, , I , , , , , , , , , , , PANAMA LANE LEGEND j~ ~ - School 1~ - Residential Area r~l - Fire station N I~ - Proposed School [] - Hospital , ....,,, - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 13 -Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. VaDor Source: 113,7 lbs Ammonia .J,j~~: 372;2 lbs Ammonia Total Dis.oersion Distance for'50 00m Plume: Va~3or Release: 0.51 miles Liauid Release: 141 yards (bold border) Adverse Weather Conditions Modelled Stability_ Class: C Wind Speed: 5.0 mph Wind Direction: From the East-Northeast TemDerature: 40°F LEC/June-91 I I I PESTRITTO FOODS INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM THERMOSYPHON RECEIVER LINE FAILURE 113.7 LBS VAPOR-372.2 LBS LIQUID AVERAGE WEATHER CONDITIONS 500 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION I I I I I I I I I I I I .I I I I --"~~h Plume from liquid release . is too small to plot on map. ~ ~ PESTRITTO ~ WHITE LANE Q FOODS ~-] cc ~ DISTRICT BLVD I1~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I PANAMA LANE LEGEND ~ ~rh - School ~ - Residential Area r~ - Fire station N I~ - Proposed School ~] - Hospital [ ~ [ [ - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 14 - Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. Vaoor Source:' 113.7 pounds Ammonia .J~: 372.2 pounds Ammonia Total Dis_Dersion Distance for 500 0Dm Plume: V{~r Release: 206 yards Liauid Release: 33 yards (Too small to plot) Average Weather Conditions Modelled Stability_ Class: B Wind S-Deed: 6.4 mph Wind Direction: From the Northwest Tem.Derature: 95°F LEe/June-91 I I I I I I I I I I ! I I I I I I. I I PESTRITTO FOODS INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM THERMOSYPHON RECEIVER ,LINE FAILURE 113.7 LBS VAPOR-372.2 LBS LIQUID ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS 500 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION ~ ~ FiREI '--"~~rh Plume from liquid release is too small to plot on map. ~,~ ~ PESTRITTC ~, WHITE LANE ~ FOODS > ~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I' ~ I I I I I I I I I ~l I I Il I i I I I I I I I I I I I I~ PANAMA ~NE LEGEND ~ drh . School ~ - Residential Area r~ - Fire station N IZ~ - Proposed School ~ - Hospital ~ ~ ', ~ - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 15 - Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. VaDor Source: 113.7 lbs Ammonia ~: 372.2 lbs Ammonia Tgtal Disoersion Distance for 500 00m Plume: V _apor Release: 183 yards J.jQUJd..B~tA~: 44 yards (too small to plot) Adverse Weather Conditions Modelled Stability_ Class: C Wind S_oeed: 5.0 mph Wind Direction: From the East-Northeast Temoerature: 40OF LEC/June-91 TABLE 6 PESTRITTO FOODS PLUME DISPERSION RESULTS FOR CONTROLLED PRESSURE RECEIVER LINE FAILURE VAPOR RELEASE OF 361 LBS OF AMMONIA LIQUID RELEASE OF 4001 LBS OF AMMONIA EVAPORATION POOL SURFACE AREA = 1000 SQUARE FEET ATMOSPHERIC MODELING CONDITIONS ATMOSPHERIC MODELING RESULTS CONDITION AVERAGE ADVERSE PLUME DISTANCE OF PLUME TRAVEL CONCENTRATION VAPOR RELEASE LIQUID RELEASE ,~ (PPM) 'GAUSSIAN I HEAVYGAS GAUSSIAN TEMPERATURE 95°F 40°F ./ MODELI MODEL MODEL AVERAGE HUMIDITY 25% 50% CONDITIONS 27 minute evaporation release CLOUD COVER 10% .70% 50 0.28 miles 0.71 miles 0.18 miles WIND SPEED 6.4 MP~I 5.0 MPH 500 163 yards 357 yards 103 yards WIND DIRECTION NW ENE ADVERSE RELEASE DATE Summer Winter CONDITIONS 32 minute evaporation release RELEASE TIME 4:00 P.M. 8:00 A.M. 50 0.39 miles 0.99 miles 0.25 miles ~ STABILITY CLASS B-Unstable C-Unstab/Neut 500 239 yards 446 yards 137 yards Luff Environmental Consulting June 91 I I I PESTRITTO FOODS INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM CONTROLLED PRESSURE RECEIVER LINE FAILURE 361 LBS VAPOR-4001 LBS LIQUID AVERAGE WEATHER CONDITIONS 50 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION I I I I I ! ! I I I I I I I I o ,,, ~ z ~ °~ FlaEi ~ ~ ~' PESTRITTO ~ WHITE LANE C3 FOODS [] n- ~ DISTRICT BLVD I~. I I I I I i i I I I I I I I I i ~ I I I I I I I I I ~,,,,,, ,,, ,~, , , ,,, , ,,:,~,,,,,,,, LEGEND j~ ~ - School ~ - Residential Area ~ - Fire Station 1~1 - Proposed School [] - Hospital N ', ', ~ = - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 16 - Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. Vaoor Source: 361 pounds Ammonia Liauid Source: 4001 pounds Ammonia Total DisDersion Distance for 50 _Dom Plume: V _{~3or Release: 0.71 miles Li(]uid Release: 0.18 miles (Bold border) Averaqe Weather Conditions Modelled Stability_ Class: B Wind SDeed: 6.4 mph Wind Direction: From the Northwest Temoerature: 95°F LEC/June-91 I I I PESTRITTO FOODS-INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM CONTROLLED PRESSURE RECEIVER LINE FAILURE 361 LBS VAPOR-4001 LBS~ LIQUID ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS 50 PPM PLUME'CONCENTRATION I I I I I I I I I I I I I '1 I. ~ Fllt[i ~ 1~ PESTRITTO ~ WHITE LANE C3 FOODS ~-~ ~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i i I LEGEND ~ School ~ - Residential Area ~ - Fire Station I~1 N Proposed School - Hospital , ....,,, - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 17 - Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. .V.~: 361 lbs Ammonia .~: 4001 lbs Ammonia Total Dis_oersion Distance for 50 00m Plume: Va~_ or Rele~,se: 0.99 miles J,J[IJJJ~.J~P,~: 02.5 miles (bold border) Adverse Weather Conditions Modelled Stability_ Class: C Wind Speed: 5.0 mph Wind Direction: From the East-Northeast Temperature: 40°F LEC/June-91 I I I PESTRITTO FOODS INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM CONTROLLED PRESSURE RECEIVER LINE FAILURE 361 LBS VAPOR-4001 LBS LIQUID AVERAGE WEATHER CONDITIONS 500 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ o < ~ ~ PESTRITTO 1~ WHITE LANE Q FOODS [] >LUaC: ~ l~ r~ DISTRICT BLVD ~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I ~ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I.I I I I I I I I I i I I I I J PANAMA LANE LEGEND ~ ~r~ - School ~ - Residential Area ~] - Fire Station ~ I~1 N -Proposed School -Hospital ~ ',~: - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 18 - Va.Dor Soume: 361 pounds Ammonia Liauid Source: 4001 pounds Ammonia Total DisDersion Distance for 500 Dom Plume: V .a~or Release: 0.20 miles Liauid Release: 103 yards (bold border) Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. Average Weather Conditions Modelled Stabili_ty Class: B Wind S.oeed: 6.4 mph Wind Direction: From the Northwest TemDerature: 95°F LEC/June-91 I I I PESTRITTO FOODS INC. DISPERSION OF AMMONIA RELEASE FROM CONTROLLED PRESSURE RECEIVER. LINE FAILURE 361 LBS VAPOR-4001 LBS LIQUID ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS 500 PPM PLUME CONCENTRATION I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I PESTRITTO ~ WHITE LANE FOODS ~_J D~STR~CT et_va ,,,,,,,~,,,,,,,,,,,,,I LEGEND ~ ~h - School ~ - Residential Area ~ - Fire Station ~ m N - Proposed School - Hospital ', ', ', I - Railroad 0.5 Mile = 1 Inch FIGURE 19 - ~: 361 lbs Ammonia Liouid Source: 4001 lbs Ammonia Total Dis_Dersion Distance for 500 _Dom Plume: .V.~~: 446 yards LiQuid Release: 137 yards (bold border) Map shows the impact on the sensitive populations sites from subject ammonia release case. Adverse Weather Conditions Modelled ~: C Wind Soeed: 5.0 mph Wind Direction: From the East-Northeast Temperature: 40°F LEC/June-91