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VEVEY SWITZERLAND
021
AMMON IA SAFETY AUDI T GU IDi='
Pmr% 1.
AUDIT REPORT
NESTEC 'RIv/ADi
VERSION 3.0, JAN
921 18 85
921 17 20
92164 88
1989
AMMON IA SAFETY AUD~'T SUMMARY IP~ si. o~: ~b,
FACTORY
COMPANY
AUDIT TEAM
NAME
AUDIT DATE
COUNTRY
TITLE OR POSITION
AMMONIA SAFETY
COORDINATOR
RATING
) I T I O N SAFE~ IND~
'LANT T~ZS AUDIT LAST AUDIT
RUCTION
~PRESSORS
~DENSORS
~SELS
%GE POINTS
PING
FE~ SYST~S
~C~IC~ & INS~~TS
~CELL~EOUS
)~CTI'CES
ZN~CE
(U) rgent - S~IOUS (I)mprove - (N) ormal
DEFICI~CIES MINOR DEFERS
ION OR .OPE~TIONS JUSTI~ ~G~
OVERAll COND
OF' AMMON IA
1. ARRANGEMENT &
2. COMPONENTS: 2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4~
2.5. PIP:
2.6
2.7
2.8
3. DOCUMENTATION
4. OPERATIONS & WORK ]
5. INSPECTION & MAINT!
6. QUALIFICATIONS
7. EMERGENCY RESPONSE
8. TRAINING
(E) mergency - IMMR. DIATE
DANGER TO PLANT SAFETY
DOES THE PLANT CONDITION
REMEDIAL ACTION & RE-SURVEY WITHIN 6 MONTHS
.... DOES THE PLANT COMPLY WITH LOCAL CODES & REGULATIONS?
AMMON ZA SAFETY AUD! T SUMMARY IPage s2 of 4L
FACTORY AUDIT DATE
COMPANY COUNTRY'
SYSTEM LOSSES
(Include only system losses-NOT additions to charge size)
AMMONIA CHARGE
AVERAGE ANNUAL LOSSES
PEAK ANNUAL LOSSES
REASON FOR PEAKLOSSES:
(kg/lbs)
(kg/lbs) (
(kg/lbs) (
% OF CHARGE)
% OF CHARGE)
AMMON iA INC IDEN.TS
CLASS: - 1 - CATASTROPHIC
IN
LAST
DATE CLASS
2 - SERIOUS
CAUSE
YEAR
3 - MINOR
AMMONIA
DISCHARGED
(kg/lbs)
_~TION
ER
ACTION PLAN SUMMARY
ACTION PLANNED
(FOR (U)RGENT AND (E)MERGENCY ITEMS)
ACTI'ON
BY?
DATE TO
COMPLETE
AMMON IA. SAFETY AUDI T
SUMMARY IPage s3 of 4
FACTORY AUDIT DATE
.COMPANY COUNTRY
FACTORY DESCR IPT ION
PRODUCTS
MAIN TYPE IN FACTORY
PRODUCT REQUIRING NH3
REFRIGERATION
FACTORY LOCATION ZONE
(IDENTIFY ZONE FACTORY IS IN)
ZONE No.
ISOLATED/INDUSTRIAL
Clear or industrial only within
1000m of factory boundary
1
PUBLIC - DISTANT
Residential buildings or public
assembly points between 1000m
and 500m of factory boundary
2
PUBLIC - CLOSE
As for zone 2 but less than 500m
from factory boundary
INSTITUTIONAL
Within 1000m of institutional buildings
where free movement is not possible
(eg. prisons, hospitals etc)
4
FACTORY STAFFING
NUMBER OF PERMANENT EMPLOYEES-
NUMBER OF CASUAL/SEASONAL EMPLOYEES- MAX:
NUMBER OF CONTRACTORS- MAX:
MIN:
MIN:
AMMON IA SAFETY AUDIT S.UNtMARY IPage S4 of.4~
FACTORY AUDIT DATE
COMPANY COUNTRY
AMMON IA REFR I 6ERAT I ON P.LANT
Provide overall particulars for refrigeration plant at each
suction temperature or circuit
Units used:- (Deg. C, kW(refr), kW(power) OR Deg. F, TonsR, HP)
(Cross out units not applicable)
SYSTEM TYPE No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 HIGH OTHER OTHER
( for "OTHER" BOOST BOOST BOOST STAGE
specify)
SUCTION TEMP
CONDENSING TEMP
COMPRESSORS
-TYPE
-DISCH TO? (STAGE)
-TOTAL INST
CAPACITY
-TOTAL INST.
MOTOR POWER
CONDENSORS (~Complete for each type of condensor used)
TyPE:(evap, dry ·
shell & tube)
TOTAL INSTALLED
CAPACITY
COOLING WATER
SOURCE
IF HEAT RECOVERY
IS USED-WHAT FOR?
USAGE POINTS (Complete for each .main usage point)
LOCATION
TYPE
(manufacturing
or cold room?)
SUCTION TEMP
REFRIG. DEMAND
AMMONIA SAFETY AUDIT GUIDE
.!
1.0 OVERALL PLANT ARRANGEMENT AND CONSTRUCTION
Summary of Plant Rooms and 3anmonia Hazard Area Inspections (Refer Annex Al)
ilNDEX ROOM NAME OCCUPANCY ~NH3 IN No.. OF' ROOM ROOM ACCESS VENTI- DETECTORS SAFETY ELECT DRAIN SIR
No. RATING ~ROOM PEOPLE VOLUME SEALED IEXITS LATION EQUIP OK? -AGE
IN ROOM OK? OK? NH3 FIRE OK? OK?
/~REA ADJA-
~CENT ikg/lbs m3/ft3 Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N
~,-1.1 -.1.2 -2.1 -2.2 -.3.2 -.3.4 -.3.5 -.3.9 -.4 -.5 -6.1 -6.3 -.7.1 -..8 -.9 -.10
I
NOTES: - Reference numbers under column titles refer to questions in Annex A1
(eg. -1.2 refers to question Al.l.2) ..%
- "*" Refers to questions which, should be answered by factor¥ as part of the preparation
BEFORE the audit. This applies to all questions throughout the audit guide.
(Refer Part 2 Guidance Notes Section C.4 for more details)
~I~0
AMMON IA SAFETY AUDI T GUIDI='
SIR
,,,
2.0 SYSTEM COMPONENTS
2.1 COMPRESSORS
2.1.1 Summary of Compressor Inspections (refer Annex A2)
'INDEX DUTY TYPE MANUFACTURER I MODEL YEAR CAPACITY SIR
No. BUILT kW I Tons
!A2.1.1 A2.1.3 A2.1.6 A2.1.4 A2.1.5 A2.2.4 A2.7
A~4~4ONIA SAFETY AUDIT GUIDE' isiR
2.2 CONDENSORS (Including Condensing Heat Recovery)
2.2.1 Summary of 'Condensor Inspections (refer Annex A4)
INDEX TYPE MANUFACTURER IMODEL iYEAR CAPACITY SIR
No. iBUILT kW/Tons
A4.1.1 A4.1.3 A4.1.6 A4.1.7 A4.2.3 A4.7
* * * * * *
AMMON I A
2.3
2.3.1
VESSELS
SAFETY
AUD IT
GU I
VESSELS OUTSIDE MANUFACTURING AREAS
(Plant Rooms Ceilin¢ Spaces etc)
Summary of Vessel Inspections (refer Annex A3)
INDEX LOCATION FUNCTION iYEAR WORKING NH3 SIR,
No. (BLDG) ,BUILT PRESSURE CAPACITY'
Bar/PSI kg/lbs
A3.1.1 A3.1.3 A3.1.5 A3.1.7 A3.2.1 A3.2.4 A3.7
* * * * * * ~
AMMON IA SAFETY AUDIT GU IDE S/,30 I
2.3 · 2 'VESSELS WITHIN MANUFACTURING AREAS
:Summary of Vessel Inspections (refer Annex A3)
INDEX LOCATION FUNCTION YEAR WORKING NH3 SIR
No. ( BLDG ) i BUILT PRESSURE CAPACI'i~
Bar/~$I kg/lbs
· 2.3.3 Is the system arranged` and the vessels sized so YIN SIR
that the entire charge can be safely isolated to
allow opening of any part of the system for
maintenance? --
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,~MMON I,~ S,~F~"TY ,~,~UID I T GU ID~ Is~ I
I
I
2.4 ~SA~E ~I.~S
2.4.1 lO, SIDE ~A~ING ~LS. ~ CO~ R~MS
(Plant Rooms, Ceiling Spaces etc)
S~ary of. Heat Exchanger Inspections (Ref Annex A4)
I~ .~E LOCATION ~FACT. IMODEL Y~ CAPACI~ SIR
No. BUILT kW I Tons
A4.1.1 A4.1.3 A4.1.4 A4.1.6 A4.1.7' A4.2.3 A4.7
2.4.2 WI~IN ~A~ING ~LS ~ CO~ R~MS (Refer Al.4)
2.4.2.1 S~ary of Heat Exchanger Inspections (Ref Annex A4)
I~ ~PE LOCATION ~FACT. ~MODEL ~ ~C~ACI~ SIR
No. BUILT kW ~ Tons
'A4.1.1 A4.1.3 A4.1.4 A4.1.6 A4.1.7 A4.2.3 A4.7
AMMONIA SA 'ET¥ AUDIT GUID "
· III ·
2.4.2.2 OTHER AMMONIA USAGE POINTS
QTY DEFROST SYSTEM LIQUID LIQUID LIQUID RELIEF SIR
HAMMERSUPPLY QUANTITY VALVES
TYPE FREQ- IF HOT GAS AUTO INDIV !TYPE IN UNIT
EQUIPMENT UENCY IMAN OR FITTED OK?.
TEMP PRESS MULT Y/N Y/N
(1) oClF BarlPSI (2) (3) (4)
(1) ROOM COOLER UN1TS
IN COLD ROOMS
(2) ROOM COOLER UNITS
.OUTSIDE COLD ROOMS
(3) PLATE FREEZERS
(4) AIR BLAST FREEZERS
(5) COOLINGIHARDENING
TUNNELS
(6) PACKAGING MACHINES
(7) OTHER
(8) OTHER
(9) OTHER
(10)OTHER
NOTES: (1) Defrost Types: (W)ater, (H)ot Gas, (E)lectric, (S)team, (A)ir
(2) Liquid Hammer: (O)ften, (S)ometimes, (N)ever
(3) Liquid Supply: (P)umped, (S)ystem Pressure
(4) Refer to Annex A4.4 for guidance in deciding on the adequacy of the relief valves.
I SIR
* 2.4.2.3 Describe the defrost cycle for each defr-ost system
identified in section 2.4.2.2.
2.4.2.4 Assign an SIR for each system described in 2.4.2.3
i
'12.4.2.5 ~What type of liquid ammonia hoses are used on the
I
I .equipment described in 2.4.2.1 and 2.4.2.27
I
EQUIPMENT ITEM TYPE OF INSPECTION REPLACEMENT SIR
HOSE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
I
* 2.4.2.6 Are any emergency systems installed on the equipment
in 2.4.2.1 & 2.4.2.2 (eg water sprays, explosion proof,
.exhaust fans) ?
EQUIPMENT ITEM SYSTEM TYPE AUTO I REMOTE TESTING SIR
OPERATION? FREQUENC
I
AMMONIA SAF'ET¥ AUDIT GUID '
m 2.5 PIPEWORK
2.5.1 Is pipework well supported?
2.5.2 Is pipework free of apparant mechanical damage?
2.5.3 Is pipework adequately protected from mechanical
damage where required?
2.5.4 £s the pipework free of vibration, abnormal
noises, liquid hammer or excessive movement?
2.5.5 Are there few threaded joints under 12mm/0.5"Nom
2.5.6 Are there few threaded joints over 12 mm/0.5"Nom
Maximum size of threaded joints .mm/"
2.5.7 Are threaded joints seal welded?
2.5.8 lis there any sign of corrosion on the pipework?
( ) none ( ) slight ( ) moderate
( ) extensive, could jeopardize safety
* 2.5.9 Describe insulation:
- Pipe preparation (painting etc.)-
- Insulation material(fire retardant?)
- Vapour barrier
- Metal or other cladding
2.5.10 Is insulation free of damage?
2.5.11 Are all insulated boxes around valves 'and fittings
in place and sealed?
2.5.12 What is the condition of the insulation?
( ) good ( ) fair ( ) bad
2.5.13 Is the insulation free of ice formations?
2.5.14 If any of questions 2.5.1-13 indicated defects,
list location and nature of the defects and
indicate on system diagram
2.5.15 Has welding on pipework been carried out only by
suitably qualified welders?
* 2.5.16 Have welds been Xrray tested or similar?
% tested
2.5.17 Is piping adequately labelled and colour coded
with flow direction, pressure, medium?
AMMONIA SAFETY AUDIT 6UI E
Y IN
.6 SAFETY SYSTEMS
2.6,1 RELIEF VALVES (Refer also Annex A5)
2.6.1.1 Are all elements of the refrigeration system
adequately protected against overpressure by
relief valves? (including fire hazard and
liquid lockup) __
2.6.1.2 What type of Relief Valve vent-points are used?
( ) internal to suction ( ) atmosphere-bare pipe
( ) diffuser (). tank
( ) water shroud volume __(m3/ft3)
( ) inside room
2.6.1..3 If internal relief valves to the suction side are
used, are the suction side relief valves adequate
to protect the LP side and.the components vented
to it?
2.6.1.4 Do vent points locations and types adequately
restrict the spread of ammonia vapour into other
buildings (via air inlets, windows, doors, etc.) or
to surrounding areas?
2.6.1.5 Can relief valves be easily and safely serviced
without isolating and purging large sections of
the system?
2.6.1.6 Have all valve cartridges been replaced or over-
hauled in the last 5 years? __
2.6..2 AMMONIA VENT AND DUM~ SYSTEM
* 2.6.2.1 Is a manually activated ammonia vapour vent system
installed? Provide a sketch of the system. __
2.6.2.2 If (2.6.2.1) yes, do vent point locations and type
adequately restrict the spread of ammonia vapour? __
* 2.6.2.3' Is a manually activated ammonia liquid dump system
installed? Provide a description and a sketch of
the system. --
If (2.6.2.3) yes, answer 2.6.2.4-9%
2.6.2.4 Is there installed a system to add large
quantities of water to absorb the liquid ammonia? __
2.6.2.5 Is the dump system isolated from the common
factory waste water system?
2.6.2.6 Can waste water/ammonia be isolated from municipal
sewer/treatment of systems or factory waste water
treatment plant?
2.6.2.7 If (2.6.2.6) no, are sewerage authorities aware oJ
and accept the potential nature of the effluent
resulting from the dumping operation?
2.6.2.8 Can wast~ be diverted to a dedicated containment?
2.6.2.9 Are the manual controls for the vent or dump
systems described above adequately protected from
tampering or misuse?
2.6.2.1OAre the manUal controls readily accessible from
outside in event of a fire etc.?
2.6.3 KING VALVES/MAIN STOP VALVES
2.6.3.1 Are King valves (main liquid stop valves) provided?__
2.6.3.2;~Are they readily accessible or remote operated in
event of an incident? __
2.6.3.3 Are emergency suction shutoff valves provided?
2.6.3.4 Are they readily accessible from out~ide the
engine room?
2.6.3.5 Are emergency hot gas isolation valves provided
2.6.3.6~Are they readily accessible or remote operated in
the event of an incident?
2.6.4' AMMONIA DETECTORS
2.6.4.1 Summary of Ammonia Detector Inspectio~
(Refer Annex A6)
INDEX AREAS MONITORED SHUT DOWN SET POINTS SIR
NO NON EXPL.
PROOF EQUPT.
START FANS? ALARM SHUTDOWN
A6.1.1 A6.1.3 A6.1.9 ~6.1.6 A6.1.7 A6.3
2.6.4.2 Are all plant rooms and hazard areas identified
in Annex A1 adequately protected by ammonia
AMMON IA SAFETY AUDIT GU
2.7.1 ELECTRICAL
2.7.1.1 How is refrigeration system controlled?
( ) Manual ( ) Automatic (using relays)
( ) Automatic (using PLC/Microprocessors)
2.7.1.2 Are all main safety interlocks hard wired?
2.7.1.3 Are all ~electrical panels clean and orderly
without loose, unmarked, unconnected wires etc.?
2.7.1.4 Are covers for all instruments controls and ~other
components in good condition and in place?
2.7.1.5 Is all cabling and wiring in an acceptable
condition?
2.7.2 GAUGES AND SIGHT GLASSES
'2.7.2.1 Sight (.Gauge) glasses:
- Are automatic shut off valves provided?
- Are the glasses protected by suitable guards?
2.7.2.2 Gauges:
- Are 'there sufficient gauges to effectively
monitor the critical operating points of the
system?
Are normal operating points marked on the gauges.
for easy recognition by the operators?
Do gauges appear to be in Working order?
Are all thermowell pockets etc. provided with a
seal to adquately prevent ingress of moisture?
AMMONIA AF' 'TY' AUDIT GUIDE
2 . 8 ~I$CELI~ANEOUS COF~PONENTS
2.8.1 .GAS PURGERS
2.8.1.1 Type of purger installed
( ) auto ( ) manual ( ) none
2.8.1.2 If manual, describe purge operation method. Give
S.I.R.-
2.8.1.3 Location of purge points in system
2.8.1.4 Purger access ( ) good ( ) fair ( ) poor
2.8.1.5 Purger discharge point
( ) good
2.8.2 OIL DRAINAGE
2.8.2.1 Are there adequate oil drain points in the system?
2.8.2.2 Do oil drain points have double valves with one
needing to be held open by the operator?
2.8.2.3 Do any oil drains go to a regenerator or use an
oil drain pot?
2.8.2.4 If (2.8.2.3) yes, how are they heated?
( ) ambient air ( ) hot gas (
2.8.2.5 Oil drain points access
( ) good ( ) fair. ( ) poor
2.8.3 AMMONIA CHARgINg
2.8.3.1 Where is the systems charge point?
( ) high side ( ) low side
2.8.3.2 Is the system charging connection made by
( ) flexible hose ( ) hard piping
2.8.3.3 Is the charging arrangement such that there is no
risk of straining the connections?' (adequate line
'length, securing vessels, etc.)
2.8.3.4 If reserve ammonia containers are held'on site,
there adequate provision for security and protec-
tion (shelter, mechanical damage, tampering)?
II
AMI ON IA SAFi TY AU[DIT GUIDI '
* ~.~.~.l Describe valving used in plant.
Stem Seals ( ) Packing ( ) Bellows
2.8.4.2 Are valves "back seated" so that valve stem seals
ican be replaced while the system is under
!pressure?
2.8.4.3 Are all parts of the system provided with suitable
isolation valve arrangements to permit adequate
!maintenance?
2.8.4.4 Are all valves'fitted with a tag showing a unique
number?
2.8.4.5 Are these tag numbers consistent with
identification numbers in the plant documentation
~nd emergency plan?
* 2.8.5 PUMP SYSTEMS
* 2.8.5.1 Are pumps used to transfer liquid ammonia within
the plant?
( ) on MP side ( ) on LP side
*1 2.8.5.2 Type of pump
i ( ) Positive Displacement ( ) ,Centrifugal
,i
~2.8.5.3 Type of shaft seal:
( ) Packed Gland ( ) Mechanical
( ) Hermetic ( ) Sealless (magnetic coupling)
2.8.5.4 Is a relief valve or bypass fitted to prevent
overpressure at the pump discharge or if
isolation valves are closed?
2.8.5.5 Are there any sections of the pump system where
liquid can be trapped which is not protected by a
relief valve?
AMMONIA S^FETY AUOIT GUID
2.8.5.6 Is the pump protected against cavitation by low
level or differential pressure cutout switches?
2.8.5.7 Are check valves fitted to pump disCharges?
2.8.5.8 Is there a .small bleed valve to permit removal of
liquid in the pump before it i-s opened for
maintenance?
2.8.5.9 Is access to pump and isolation valves?
( )'good ( ) fair ( ) poor
2.8.6 STRAINERS
* 2.8.6.1 Are liquid strainers used anywhere in the plant?
2.8.6.2 Are these protected against excess pressure due to
liquid lockups?
2.8.6.3 !Is there a small bleed valve to permit removal of
liquid in the strainer body before it is opened?
2.8.6.4 Is access to the strainers and isolation valves
( ) good ( ) fair ( ) poor
2.8.7 MATERIALS
2.8.7.1 Are all materials used in the system compatible
with ammOnia?
2.8.7.2 Are all materials used on the low temperature side
suitable for the operating temperatures?
II
AM.MO'NIA SA,~-:ETY AUDIT GUID~'
3.0 ~YSTEM'DOCUMENTATION
3.1 Are all drawings and documents
up to date?
If not, give time to up date
- electrical (manhours)
- system flowsheets (manhours)
- pipe & valve layouts (manhours)
3.2 Is there an established, formal, documented
procedure for authorizing and reCording changes
to system documentation?'
3.3 Is this procedure strictly followed?
~ r
AMMONIA. SAF "TY AUDIT GUID '
3.4 'Check off where the following documents are
available in your plant
- ~ m o ~ ~ ~ SIR
DOCUMENTS
3.4.1 $¥$T~¢ D~$C~IPTION
3.4.1.~ Orig design/constr'n specs
3.4.1.2,Current as built d~awings:-
-Piping & valve positions
-~lectrical
-System flowsheets
3.4.1.3'~c~ipment details for:
-~c~t specifications
-Technical manuals
-Purchase orders
-Appr drgs/Ul certificates
3.4.1.41Closeout/commiss'ng records
-Material test certificates
-Pressure test certificates
-X-ray test records
-Welders certificates
-Insurers/authority approva
3.4.1.51As (3.4.1.4) for system
modifications/major repairs
3.4.1.6 NH3 & refrig'n codes etc
3.4.2 OPERATIONS
3.4.2.1 Operating manuals
3.4.2.2 Charging records
3.4.2.3 Operating checklists
(eg. procedures for isolat-
ing vessels)
3.4..2.4 Hazardous material
information sheets
3.4.3 MAINTENANCE
3.4.3.1 Maintenance manuals
3.4.3.2 Checklists & instructions
3.4.3.3 Mtnce schedules
AMMON 5AF'ETY AUO
3.4 Continued
DOCUMENTS
3.4.3 MAINTENANCE (continued)
3.4.3.4 Safety device test records
3.4.3.5 COMPREHENSIVE Maintenance
History records giving
COMPLETE information on
extent of repairs
a-nd alt.erations
3.4.4 iSAFETY & 'I2~INING
3.4.4.1 Emergency plan
3.4.4.2 Training plan
3.4.4.3 Training records
3.4.4.4 Detailed job descriptions
3 4.4 5 Operator licences
(if required by law)
AMMONIA SAF'ET¥ AUDIT GUIDE
, ,
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6. P C XCES
4.1 GENERAL
4.1.1 Are there consistent minimum safety standards
available and enforced for the control of all work
associated with ammonia equipment by both employ-
ees and contractors (e.g. rules for contractor~ on
site, personal safety, qualification requirements)
4.1.2 Is every operator (of both refrigeration plant and
usage points) provided with a simple ammonia
booklet of" do's and dont's"?
4.1.3 Is smoking by employees prohibited (and enforced?)
except in designated areas which are isolated from
hazard aresa (Ref. Annex 1)?
4.1.4 For all operations or maintenance where an ammonia
discharge may occur (charging, oil drainage,
opening systems)
- Are only suitably qualified people used for
these operations?
- Is suitable safety equipment used? (masks,
gloves, explosion proof lamps, etc.)
- Is the "buddy system" adhered to?
- Is it under constant supervision?
- Persons working nearby warned?
4.1.5 Are there regular house keeping inspections.by
plant management?
4.1.6 Is there an effective safety management system
operating in the factory (e.g. safety committees,
audits etc.)
4.2 PLANT OPERATIONS
4.2.1 SYSTEM SUPERVISION (Plant and uSage points)
4.2.1.1 Are log books kept to note.all pertinent
operational temperatures, pressures, repairs,
adjustments and ch~anges during each shift?
4.2.1.2 Are the logs/recordings analyzed daily by the
supervisor to determine the cause, effect and any
needed corrections to system operation defects?
4.2.1.3'Are preprinted checksheets used to direct
Operators to monitor temperatures, pressures,
levels, on or off operation of equipment, etc.
h4h4ONI, UDIT GUID
4.2.2 CHARGING
* 4.2.2.1 How is NH3 recieved at the plant?
( ) Road tanker ( ) Rail tanker ( ) Bottle
* 4.2.2.2 Capacity of NH3 containers (~g/~b)
* 4.2.2.3 Quantity of'NH3 held in reserve at
plant? (kg/lb)
4.2.2.4 Are containers weighed before and after charging?
4.2.2.5 Is the quantity of NH3 added, recorded?
4.2.2..6 Are NH3 containers handled in a safe manner?
(Securely restrained, safety equipment checked)
4.2.3 OIL DRAINAGE
4.2.3.1 Is there a regular scheduled procedure for drained
oil from vessels?
4.2.3.2 Is a log kept and checked of quantity of oil
drained vs filled?
4.2~4 DEFECT REPORTING
4.2.4.1 Is there a formal, documented procedure for
reporting and follow-up on plant defects?
Describe system
4.2.4.2 Is this system effective to ensure that
appropriate corrective action is taken in the
appropriate time frame?
4.3 MAINTENANCE ANDMODIFICATIONS
4.3.1 CONTROL OF WORK
4.3.1.1 Is all maintenace and modification work controlled
by written instructions issued on work orders/PM
cards?
4.3.1.2 Do these orders also indicate
- minimum safety standards required?
- minimum standards for workmanship (e.g. welding
procedures, test requirements)
4.3.1.3 Is there an established formal, documented
procedure for authorizing and recording changes t¢
the system (controls, flow arrangement, equipment,
etc.?
Describe the procedure:
Is this procedure strictly followed?
4.3.1.4 If components (piping, valves, vessels materials
etc.) are repaired/replaced, are they actually
checked and documented to ensure that they meet
the appropriate specification for the intended
service?
4.3.1.5 Are welders tested and certified prior to carrying
out welding operations on the system?
4.3.1.6 Is there a documented procedure for pump down,
purging and testing/inspection which is strictly
followed?
- prior to commencing work on the system
- After completion of work and prior to
re-charging with ammonia
4.3.1.7 Does this procedure include provision for X-ray
testing, welds pressure testing, leak testing?
4.3.1.8 Is a hot work permit system with provision for
after' inspection established and strictly followed
for welding, grinding and open flame work
(especially in plant rooms and hazard areas
ref. Al)?
4.3.1.9 Are electrical and mechanical lockout procedures
strictly followed when it is required to carry outi
maintenance or modification to the system?
4.3.2 USE OF CONTRACTORS
4.3.2.1 Are contractors used for work on the ammonia
system?
( ) rarely ( ) often ( ) all work (.) operational
( ) system modification only
4.3.2.2 Are contractors carefully checked for competence
and experience prior to hiring? (references,
certifications, etc.)
4.3.2.3 Is there a single company representative on site
who has control of all liaison with the
contractors?
AlvilviON A SAFi='TT AUDIT GU'[DEE
I
15. !INSPECTION AND ~AINTENANCE
5.1 Does your formally scheduled mtnce
include the following? Y/N FREQ. WRITTEN
State frequency or "NS" if not RECORDS?
performed on a regular basis Y/N
~5.1.1 Pressure relief vlves
'Inspected
-Replaced or overhauled
'5.1.2 Test/Calibration of safety controls:
-High pressure cutouts
-Low pr.essure cutouts
· -Oil pressure failure
· -High discharge temperature
-Liquid level switches
i -Ammonia detectors
5.1.3 Compressor & drive inspection
5.1.4 Periodic oil analysis
5.1.5 Filters/strainers (inspect/replace)
~5.1.~ ~$hutoff valves (inspect/exercise)
5.1.7 'Ammonia liquid pumps & drives
5.1.8 Press/temp gauges calibration
5.1.9 Inspect fixed & portable safety
equipment (eg. air packs, suits etc)
5.1.10 Purger operation & maintenance
i5.1.11 Check defrost operation & control
5.1.12 Inspect pipe & equipment for
visible corrosion
5.1.13 Inspect insulation
^Mh40. UOIT
6PERSONAL~
6.1 QUALIFICATIONS
6.1.1 Complete the following for all staff classifica-
tions associated with the operation, maintenance
and management of the ammonia plant
CLASSIFICATION ~OTAL REFRIGERATION AMMONIA YEARS
DEFINE NO QUALIFICIATION TRAINING NH3
EXPCE
Operators
Mechanics
Supervisor
(Refrigeration)
Engineer
(Plant serv.)
Supervisor
(Maintenance')
Factory eng.
Assistant eng
Others . _
6.1.2 Is operator licensing]certification a requirement
under your local codes/statutes?
6.1.3 If (6.1.2) yes, are all your operators licensed or
in a scheduled program to obtain a license?
6.1.4 Do you have a detailed job description describing
the operator's duties?
MWONI S P 'TY UOIT
6.1.5 Do all people referred to in Section 6.1.1 have a
thorough understanding of the following areas?
- Basic refrigeration fundamentals
- Compressor function and limitations
- Operation; set point, purpose of each safety
control
- Operation, setpoint, purpose of control valves
- Location, operation, normal position of isolat-
ing valves
- Relief valve location, purpose, setting and
operator response if activated
- Normal system temperatures/pressures and causes/
effects of changes in system temperatures/
pressures
- Correct procedures for pump outs, intra-system
NH3 transfers, system charging and oil drainage/
charging
- Recognition of and correct response to. abnormal
conditions
- Purpose, sequence of .operations, potential prob-
lems for defrost cycles
6.1.6 Do all personnel know where king valves and all
other main isolating valves (eg. hot gas, suction)
are located and their purpose?
^MMON IA SAF 'TY' AU[DIT GUI-D ' '
7.1 EMERGENCY PLANNING
7.1.1 Is there a written emergency plan?~
7.1.2 If (7.1.1) yes, does it include at least the
following:
a~ Site Plan - evacuation routes, assembly points,
command post, prevailing wind noted __ __
b. Site Plan - fire protection, electrical, gas,
fuel storage other utilities and
shut off points noted
c. Ammonia (and other hazardous materials) inven-
tory and storage plan
d. System flow sheet and accompanying valve list
with valve location and numbering consistent
with valve tagging __ __
e. Hazard Room (refer 1.0) diagrams with key
valves, switches, locations and access ways
noted? __
f. Response plan for fire, earthquakes, natural
disasters __ __
g. Notification plan and telephone number list __
h. Medical plan
i. Systematic shutdown instructions __ __
j. Evacuation plan __ __
k. Ammonia containment/neutralisation/disposal
plan
1. Procedure for authorizing the dumping of the
charge (if a dump station is installed) __
m. Means of rapidly estimating possible extent of
affected surronding areas __
~n. Procedure for notification of down wind
occupants in case of major releases __
o. Provision for communication among management,
employees, emergency team, emergency services __
p~ Follow up action:
- All clear re-entry procedur.e
- Cleanup and disposal procedure
- Formal incident investigation procedur~es
- Minimisation of business interruption
7.1.3 Is the emergency plan up to .date?
7.1.4 How frequently is the plan reviewed
7.1.5 Is the emergency plan package readily available
for reference at all times?
7.1.6 Where is it kept?
7.1.7 Are safety evacuation routes posted throughout the
~actor¥?
7.~.8 Is there a supply source for large quantities of
CO2 for neutralisation prearranged?
7.2 ORGANISATION (EMERGENCY TEAM)
7.2.1 Is there a formal plant emergency organization
with emergency response teams trained to handle
fire fighting, ammonia releases, etc?
7.2.2 Who is' the person designated to take charge during
an incident?
7.3 ROLE OF OUTSIDERS
7.311 What role does the emergency services take during
an incident?
( ) leading ( ) supporting
i( ) never discussed with them
7.3.2 Do emergency services have a copy of the emergency
~lan?
7.3.3 ~re they adequately traine~ to perform their
~greed role dealing with an ammonia incident?
7.3.4 ~re contractors expected to be involved in dealing
~ith an emergency?
7.'4 IPROTECTIVE EQUIP~
iComplete the following information on personal
iprotective and safety equipment. Indicate the
~anount of equipment at each location.
EQUIPMENT i Engine
LOCATION Room
'17.4.1.1 Cannister-masks t
* 7.4.1.2 SCBA air packs "
* 7.4.1.3 Encapsul'd suits
* 7.4.1.4 ,Disposable suits
* 7.4.1.5 Rubber boots
* 7.4.1.6 Rubber gloves
* 7.4.1.7 Face shields
* 7.4.1.8 Life lines
* .7.4.1.9 First aid eqpt
* 7.4.1.10 Hand held
analysers
* 7.4.1.11 Spare cannisters'
(ref 7.4.1.1)
* 7.4.1.12 Spare air
bottles
(ref 7.4.1.2)
Complete the following information on personal
protective and safety equipment. Indicate the
ammount of equipment at each location.
EQUIPMENT Engine SIR
LOCATION Room
Cannister masks
SCBA air packs
Encapsul'd suits
Disposable suits
Rubber boots
Rubber gloves
Face shields
Life lines
First aid eqpt
Hand held
analysers
Spare cannisters'
(ref 7.4.1.1)
Spare air
bottles
(ref 7.4.1.2)
I
YIN SIR
7.4.2 Can SCBA air bottles be refilled on the plant
site? __
If no, is a 24 hr available refill source
arranged? -
7.4.3 Have plant .employees previously used the following
in strong NH3 concentration?
1. Cannister masks (Y/N);Effective? (G/F(P)
2. $CBA Packs __(Y/N);Effective? (G/F/P)
3. Chemical suits ~(Y/N);Effective? (G/F/P)
7.4.4 Is location of first aid, protective and rescue
equipment clearly placarded within and external to
areas of risk? __ __
7.4.5 If emplOyees may be required to wear respirators,
have they been deemed physically fit by a
physician? __ __
7.4.6 Are cannistsers disposed of:
1) Immediately after use
2) After mfrs - expiration date if unused
(auditors to spot check) ~ __
7.4.7 Is fire fighting equipment appropriate to ammonia
provided and labeled in areas of risk? ~ ~
7.4.8 Are portable explosion proof lamps available? __
7.4.9 Are stationary or portable explosion proof fans of
sufficient capacity provided for emergency
ventilation? (1.0 - 1.5 air chg./hr.)
I ,, ~ YIN 'SIR
8. TRAINING
8.1 Do you have a formal documented program for
training per.sonnel? __ __
8.1.1 For Emergency teams?
8.1.2 For system o~erators and maintainers?
8.1.3 For all factory staff?
8.1.4 For new employees? (induction training)
8.2 If (8.1) yes, does the training plan 'include the
following?
8.2.1 Formal regular review of overall program
8.2.2 Regular formal review/testing of personnel
competence and/or knowledge?. __
8.2.3 Regular review of training gOals and require-
ments for each operator/maintainer or emergency
team member
8.2.4 Minimum acceptable training frequency for each
~type of instruction? __ __
8.2.5 Records of who attended training sessions? __ __
8.2.6 List of suitably qualifed instructors with their
qualifications and personal training records.
8.3 Are the local emergency authorities involved in the
training program? Describe extent of ihvolvement
AMMONIA SAFETY AUDIT GUIDE
I I
8.4 Does the training program cover at least the following areas?
(If yes, indicate frequency of training)
EMERGENCY OPERATORS! ALL. FACTORY NEW SIR
TEAMS MAINTAINERS STAFF EMPLOYEES
8.4.1 Basic refrigeration fundamentals
8.4.2 Operation & maintenance of plant
and equipment (refer 6.1.5)
8.4.3 Hazards of ammonia and other stored
chemicals
8.4.4 Safety precautions when working with
ammonia equipment
8.4.5 Use and limits of safety equipment:
(1) Cannister Masks
(2) SCBA Packs
(3) Encapsulated Suits
8.4.6 First Aid Procedures
8.4.7 Emergency Shutdown Procedures
8.4.8 Fire Safety & Response Procedures
8.4.9 Emergency Notification .Procedures
8.4.10 Evacuation Procedures
8.4.11 EarthquakelNatural Disaster Response
8.4.12 Spill Containment & Neutralisation '~
h4ONI UOiT GUtD
Annex PLANT ROOMS & AMMONIA HAZARD AREAS
A1 (e.g. plant rooms, manufacturing rooms,
preparation rooms,' cold rooms, ceiling spaces,
auxiliary rooms, rooms w£th exposed pipe runs)
(Complete one form for each room or area)
Al.1 IDENTIFICATION
* Ai.i.1 Room index number (refer 1.0)
* Al.l.2 Room name
* Al.l.3 Identification Number
Al.2 OCCUPANCY RATING
Identify occupancy rating
(1) Limited Attendance
(2) Occupied by permanent employees
(3) Occupied by Seasonal/Casual/Temporary
employees
(4) Public
* Al.2.1 Occupancy rating for room or area
* A1.2.2 Occupancy rating for adjacent rooms or areas
connected by doorways, openings or ductwork
Al.3 ROOM AND CONTENTS DESCRIPTION
* Al.3.1 Function of room
* A1.3.2 Est. quantity of Ammoniain~Room (lb/kg)
A1~3.3 Is it essential for this quantity of ammonia to b
located in this area for operational purposes?
* A1.3.4 IHow many people are normally in the room?
* A1.3.5 Approximate room volume (m3/ft3)
* A1.3.'6 Room Temperatures (cold & chilled rooms)
*'iA1.3.7 Number of room coolers in room (refer 2.4.2.2)?
(Details given in section 2.4.2.)
A1.3.8 Is there a sign prominently displayed at the main
entrance stating that the refrigerant is ammonia
and the charge capacity (or quantity in room)?
q.
MMONI UDIT
I ~YIN SIR
A1.3.9 Is room completely separate from other rooms or
buildings (i.e. no common walls)? __
!
A1.3.101If not separate, is the room completely sealed
from adjacent rooms or can all openings'be sealed
off (e.g. air locks, air-tight doors etc.)? __ __
Al.3.11 Non combustible construction?
A1.3.12 Is the room (or adjacent rooms that cannot be
sealed off ref. A 1.3.10) free of other installed
equipment not related to the refrigeration plant?
(e.g. air compressOrs, boilers, fans etc.) __ __
A1.3.13 If (A1.3.12) no, do all air intakes for this
lequipment draw air from outside the room at a
location remote from exhaust ventilation points
and r.v. discharges etc.? (refer A1.5.5) __
Al.3.14 Is the room clear of any unnecessary storage of
any kind?
A1.3.15 Is the room clear of stored combustibles?
Al.4 ACCESS/EGRESS AND ISOLATION
Al.4.1 Is unauthorised access restricted and enforced? __ __
A1.4.2 Are exit ways free and clear? __ __
A1.4.3 Are a minimum of 2 unlocked outward swinging doors
with clear access provided no more than 25 m
(75 ft) walking distance from any point in the
room?,~ --
A1.4.4 Are exit points clearly marked and illuminated? __ __
A1.4.5 Is operational and maintenance access to all
valves, protection devices, gauges etc. adequate?
(especially to evaporators in cold rooms) __
A1.4.6 iAre valves to isolate ammonia liquid supply to
Iroom external to room and easily accessible and
clearly identified?
A1.4.7 Are all access ways and catwalks adquate and
clearly marked? __
AMMONIA SA "ET¥ AUDIT GUI'O -
YiN ssa
Al.5 VENTILATION
Al.5.1 'Is adequate natural ventilation provided?
A1.5.2 Is adequate positive ventilation provided? -
A1.5.3 Is this ventilation.by means of extraction fan~
(i.e. negative pressure in room)? __
A1.5.4 If (A1.5.2) yes, can these fans be started from
outside the room?
A1.5.5 Are all room ventilation outlet points well clear
of air inlets for equipment or other rooms? __ __
A1.5.6 Are adequate explosion relief panels provided to
Code of Practice? __
A1.6 DETECTION AND SPRINKLER SYSTEMS
Al.6.1 Is the room protected by ammonia detectors?
(refer Annex A6 for details)
A1.6.2 Do these detectors automatically shUt down
non-explosion proof plant equipment within the
room? __ __
A1.6.3 Is the room protected by automatic fire detectors? __ __
A1.6.4 Is a sprinkler system installed in the room? __
A1.6.5 '~If (A1'.6.4) yes, can these sprinklers be activated
manually to absorb ammonia in event of a major
leak?
A1.6.6 If (A1.6.5) yes, are the control valves protected
from accidental Operation or tampering? __
A1.6.7 Are there fire hydrants or hose reels in the room
or adjacent which can be used to absorb ammonia?
Al.7 SAFETY EQUIPMENT
Al.7.1 Are there adequate safety showers/eyewash stations
located in the room? __
A1.7.2 As above, readily accessible in adjacent rooms? __
A1.7.3 Is there adequate personal protective equipment
located in the vicinity of the room (refer 7.4 for
details)
AN N4ONIA S^FETY'^UDIT GUIDE
A1.7.4 'Is.there a means oS con~lnua±±y monItoring une
number .of people in t-he room? (mainly for cold
rooms) ? __ __
A1.7.5 Is there a means of activating emergency alarm
~from w~thln the room (mainly for cold rooms)?
Al. 8 ZLECTRI.C~L/LIGHTING
· A1.8.1 Is adequate emergency lighting provided in the
room and .over exit doors? __
A1.8.2 Are motor contactors (starters) located outside
the room? __ __
A1.8.3 Are all installed electrical emergency equipment
and associated components explosion proof?
(emergency lighting, ventilation fans, detectors
etc.) __
A1.8..4 Is there an emergency isolation switch located
outside the room to shut power off all
~on-explosion proof equipment? __ __
A1.8.5 If (A1.8.4) yes, is the switch protected from
accidental operation or tampering? __
A1.8.6 If (A1.8.4) yes, do~s this switch also activate
alarm which is adequate to notify all concerned
people? __
Al.9 DRAINAGE
Al.9.1 Are there floor drains in the room? (If yes,
answer the following) __
A1.9.2 Are room floor drains isolated from common factory
wastewater system? __ __
A1.9.3 Can waste water from room/floor drains be isolated
from municipal sewer/treatment system or factory
WWTP? __ __
A1.9.4 If (A1.9.3) no, are the sewerage authorities aware
of and accept the potential nature of.the effluent
resulting if a spill occurs?
A1.9.5 If (A1.9.3) yes, is this automatically controlled? __.
Is there an alarm signal given? __
Describe overall system on an attached sheet.
A1.9.6 If (A1.'9.3) yes, can floor dr. ainage be diverted to
dedicated containment vessel in case of spills?
A.MMO-N.IA SAF'I~T¥ AUDIT GU~D~'
YINSIR
Al.10 OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Give an overall S.I.R. for the room, considering
general saf, ety, consequences of a spill, layout,
surrounding rooms and occupancy rating of the room
and adjacent rooms. __
Complete summary section 1.0.
AMMO'NIA SAFE;TY AUOIT GUIE) '
Annex AMMONIA COMPRESSOR INSPECTION DATA
A2 (Complete one form for each compressor).
A2.1 MACHINE DESCRIPTION
* A2.1.1 Index number (refer 2.1)
* A2.1.2 Location
* A2.1.3 Duty:High/single stage ( ) Booster ( ) SWing ( )
* A2.1.4 Manufacturer Model
* A2.1.5 Year Built Last overhaul
* A2.1.6' ~Type: v~rtical Reciprocating ( ) V/VW Recip. ( )
Rotary Vane ( ) Rotary Scr'ew ( )
* A2.1.7 Manuf. max. recommended disch press __(Bar/Psi)
* A2.1.8 Compressor Nameplate RPM (RPM)
* A2.1.9 Drive: Motor ( ) Steam Turbine ( )
Diesel/Gas Engine ( )
* A2.1.10 Transmission: Direct ( ) Belt ( ) Gearbox ( )
* A2.1.11 Motor rating (kW/HP) at RPM
* A2.1.12 Type of oil cooling
( ) Refrigerant direct injection
( ) Refrigerant via Heat Exchanger
( ) Water (source )
A2.1.13 Is there any means of ensuring that oil coolers
have priority in supply of refrigerant or .coolant?
A2.2. OPERATING COND. SUCTION DISCHARGE
* A2.2.1 Pressure (Bar/Psi)
'*A2.2.2 Temperature (.C/OF)
* A2.2.3 Superheat (cC/OF)
* A2.2.4 !Capacity at above (kW/Tons R)
* A2.2.5 Absorbed Power (kW/Tons R)
* A2.2.6 ~Compressor RPM
* A2 2 8 Drive RPM
iA2.2.9 Do operating conditions comply with the machine
limitations given in A2.17
A.MNONIA SAFETY AUDIT GUIDE
' YI'NSIR
A2.3 SAFETY CUTOUTS
* A2.3.1 What safety cutouts are fitted?
Y/N SETTING FAIL/ - OPERATE
SAFE TO
iDES. ACT. ALARM
COND. SIR
Y/N
Low Press. (bar/psi) I
High Press' (bar/psi'I I I
"Disch Temp. ( 'C/'F, [ I
Oil Press. (bar/psi) I
:Oil Temp. (°C/°F) I ·
A2.3.2 Do the actual ~e~tings and operations adequately
protect the compressor? __
* A2.3.3 Are the following safety cutouts hardwired?
- High discharge pressure
- High liquid level on connected equipment
- Overspeed cutout if the drive is capable of
overspeeding (e.g. steam turbines)
A2.4 RELIEF VALVES
A2.4.1 Is a relief valve installed on the compressor dis-
charge?
* A2.4.2 Relief valve setting (bar/psi)
rating (kg/min);(lb/air-min.) :
A2.4.3 Does setting and rating comply with machine
limitations given in A2.17
* A2.4.4 'Relief valve year of manufacture
* A2.4.'5 When was valve last overhauled/replaced?
AMMONIA SA'F'.E T¥ AUDIT GUIDI
A2.4.6 Does the relief valve look (Give S.I.R.)
lexcellent ( ) good ( ) fair ( ) bad ( )
IA2..5 OTHER COMPONENT DETAILS
A2.5.1 Is the compressor protected by an adequately
sized liquid separator or knockout pot?
A2.5.2 Is there a check valve at compressor discharge?
A2.5.3 Are all moving components (couplings, belts etc.)?
adequately guarded? .
A2.5.4 Are all electrical components and wiring
adequately guarded and Protected? '
A2.5.5 Is there a safe lockable Electrical?
means of isolation which-
is easily accessible? Mechanical?
A2.5.6 Does compressor start automatically?
A2.5'.7 If (A2.5.6) yes, is there an "Auto Start,' hotice
posted?
A2.6 GENERAL CONDITION/MAINTENANCE
A2.6.1 Any abnormal vibrations or noises present?
A2 6 2 Any visible leaks?
A2.6.3 Is the compressor properly secured to adequate
foundations?
A2.6.4 Have any compressor components ever been repaired
by welding or other means which may affect its
safe operation?
A2.6.5 Is compressor free of other noticeable defects?
(If no, describe defects and assign SIR)
A2.7 OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF COMPRESSOR
(Give S.I.R)
Complete summary section 2.0.
^-WWONI^ S^FETY ^UOIT GUIDE
~nnex ~ONI~EBEL INEPECTION D~T~
A3 (Complete one form for each vessel including those
which may not require certification to local
codes)
A3.1 ~SSEL DESCRIPTION
* A3.1.1 Index n~er (refer 2.3)
* A3.1.2 Vessel n~e
* A3.1.3 Location (Building)
* A3.1.4 Location of vessel in building
* A3.1.5 'Description of vessels use
* A3.1.6 Manufacturer:
* A3.1.7 Year built
* A3.1.8 Is vessel AS~ (or equivalent) st~ped? __ __
* A3.1.9 Registration n~er
*~ A3.1.10 Do you have any up to date AS~ certified prints
or U-1 certificate (or local e~ivalent) at the
factory site?
* A3.1.11 Vessel' length (m/ft)
* A3.1.12 Vessel di~eter (m/ft)
* A3.1.13 Gross internal vol~e (m3/ft3)
* A3.1.14 Approved or Design working pressure (bar/psi)
* A3.1.15 Was the welding on the unit stress relieved on
completion?
* A3.1.16 Is the vessel directly connected to the suction
side of a compressor?
I
^MIqONIA SAFETY AUDIT GUIDE
YINSIR
A3.2 OPERATION/S~IUTDOWN CONDITIONS
OPERATION SHUTDOWN
* A3.2.1 Pressure (bar/~si)
* A3.2.2 Temperature (°C/°F)
* A3.2.3 Range in liq.level to to (%)
* A3.2.4 Estimate the normal liquid quantity in vessel
A3.2.5 Do all function conditions comply with the vessel
limitations given in A3.17 __
A3.3 CONTROLS AND CUTOUTS
~ A3.3.1 What level controls and safety cutouts are fitted?
iY/N SETTING FAIL/SAFE OPERATES SIR
% LEVEL TO ALARM
CONDITION
Y/N Y/N
High level cutout
High level alarm
Level control
Low level cutout
A3.3.2 Do level controls adequately protect the system
from the following hazards?
- Liquid slugging in connected compressors __
- Completely flooding vessel with liquid so that
there is a risk of liquid locks
- Liquid-starvation and consequent cavitation of
connected pumps
A3.3.3 Are the level cutouts hardwired?
A3.3.4 Assign an SIR based on your assessment of the
~ontrol column design and layout
YIN SIR
A3.4 IRELIEF VJ~VES
I
I
* IA3.4.1 lis the vessel protected by a relief valve? __ __
* 'A3~ .4.2 Relief valve setting__ (bar(psi) -
rating (kg/min, lb/min-air)
!A3.4.3 Does setting and rating comply with vessel
Ilimitations and code requirements (ref. A3.1 & 2) __
. A3'.4.4 Is the valve single, or a dual system?
~iA3.4.5 If single, can the valve cartridge be easily and
i Isafely replaced without the need to isolate and
'purge large sections of the refrigeration system?
A3.4.6 If dual, is it impossible for both valves to be
isolated from the vessel at the same time? __ __
~A3.4.7 Is the valve above maximum liquid level?'
*~A3.4.8 Diameter of RV outlet (mm/inches)
.outlet pipe (mm/inches)
*:A3.4.9 'Relief valve piped to ( ) s~ction ('·) atmosphere
A3.4.10 If the relief valve is piped to the Suction side,
is there a means of ensuring that the discharge
Ipiping is not blocked unless it is safe to do so? __
A3.4.11 If'the relief valve is piped to atmosphere
- does it discharge well clear of windows or
ventilation inlets? __
- Identify the type of discharge point?
( ) Bare pipe ( ) Diffuser
( ) Water shower ( ) Water tank
- Is the discharge point safe? __
A3.4.12 Is the relfef valve correctly piped?
A3.4.13 Relief valve year of manufacture
A3.4.14 When was the valve last overhauled/replaced?
A3.4.15 Does relief valve look
i( )excellent ( )good ( ) fair ( ) bad
AMMONIA SAFETY ^UOIT GUIO '
A3.5 i_OTHER COMPONENT DETAILS
* A3.5.1 Does the vessel have an oil pot?
* A3.5.2 Does oil pot have relief valve?
A3.5.3 Is oil pot relief valve correctly and safely piped?
A3.5.4 Are all .electrical components adequately guarded
and protected?
A3.5.5 Is there a safe means of isolation which is easily
accessible?
A3.6 GENERAL CONDITION/MAINTENANCE
A3.6.1 Has' this vessel always been free of cracking?
A3.6.2 To your knowledge has this vessel ever been
altered, modified or repaired by welding?
A3.6.3 If (A3.·6.2) yes,
- was the work carried out under the supervision
of the original certifying authority or an
equivalent?
- was the vessel retested and recertified?
A3.6.4 Has the vessel had a documented inspection by an
l outside authority within the last 5 years?
When?
When
A3.6.5 was the vessel last examined by
NDE methods?
A3.6.6 Is the vessel properly secured to adequate
foundations?
A3.6.7 iWhat is the condition of the insulation?
!( ) good .( ) fair ( ) bad ( ) not insulated
A3.6.8 'Is the vessel free of ice formation?
A3.6.9 Is there any sign of rust/corrosion on the vessel
!and associated piping?
!( ) none ( ) slight ( ) moderate
:( ) extensive, could jeopardize safety
( ) c~nnot tell due to insulation
AMMONIA SAF'I~T¥ AUDIT GU~DI~
YIN' SIR
A3.6.10 Is. the vessel and associated pipework free of
:unusual noises or vibrations?
A3.6.11 Is the vessel free of other noticeable defects?
(If no, specify defects and assign SIR). __ __
A3.7 OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF VESSEL
(Give S.I.R.)
· Complete summary - section 2.3.
AM, 4ONIA 5^ FETY AUDIT GUIDE
ANNEX4 AMMONIA HEAT EXCHANGER INSPECTION DATA
(Complete one form for each heat exchanger
including those which may not require certifica-
.!ti°n to code)
A4.1 IDESCRIPTION -
*l A4.1.1. Index number (refer 2.2, 2.4.)
I
*1A4.1.2 Unit name
,. A4.1.3 Type of Heat Exchanger
]
I i- Evaporators:
i( ) shell & tube ( ) plate (') scraped surface
!( ) jacket
'( ) Immersed c6il or plate ( ) other type
Product or substance being cooled
- Condensors:
( ) Shell & Tube ( ) Dry Condensor ( ) Evaporative
( ) Closed cooling circuit ( ) Open circuit
'( ) Heat recovery - what for?
* A4.1.4 {Location (Blg.)
(. ) Inside manufacturing area ( ) outside manufac-
! turing area
* A4.1.5 Location in Bldg.
* A4.1.6 'Manufacturer Model
*.A4.1.7 Year built
*IA4.1 8 Is unit (ASME) or equivalent stamped?
I
Reg. No.
* A4.1.9 Do you have any up to date ASME certified prints
or Ul-certificate (or local equivalent) at the
factory site?
* A4.1.10 Dimensions
Length Shell dia (mm/inch)
No tubes Tube dia (mm/inch)
No passes :
' Tube side Shell side
AMMON IA SAFETY A,U[DIT GUID -
* H4.1.11 Heat exchange surface area {m2/ft2)
* A4.1.12 Gross internal volume on
refrigerant side (m2/ft3)
* A4.1.13 Approved/Design working pressure (bar,psi
* A4.1.14 Was the Welding stress relieved during
construction?
A4.1.15 Is the water (or other) treatment and bleed syste~
adequate to prevent scaling and corrosion on the
heat exchanger?
A4.1.16 If the fluid (e.g. chilled water, condensor water
on the other side of the heat exchanger is in a
closed circuit, is there some adequate means of
monitoring to detect ammonia leakage to the other
side of the heat exchanger? (e.g. ph alarm?)'
A4.1.17 Is the heat exchanger used as part of a heat
recovery system for heating potable water?
A4.1.18 If (A4.1.17) yes, is there a "break circuit"
installed to ensure that ammonia will not enter
the potable water system in event of 'a leak?
ANSWER QUESTIONS A4.1.19 - 23 FOR EVAPORATOR
* A4.1.19 Pype of refrigerant feed
( ) direct expansion ( ) flooded ( ) pumped
* A4.1.20 ~s the unit connected directly to the suction side
of a compressor?
A4.1.21 If (A4.1.20) yes, is an adequate liquid separator
or knockout pot installed in the line?
Index No (Refer A.3.1.1)
* A4.1.22 Indicate type of defrost used?
( ) water ( ) hot gas ( ) electric
( ) air ( ) steam
i( ) auto ( ) manual (~)no defrost
A4.1.23 ~ive a description of the ~efrost sequence. Assigr
n SIR to the method.
AMMON IA E AF't='T¥ AUDIT GU IOl:'
A4.2 OPERATION/SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS
Hot gas
Defrost Operat. Shutdown SIR
* A4.2.1 Ammonia Press. (bar/psi) '
*iA4.~.2 Ammonia Temp. (°C/°F)
*i A4.2.3 Capacity (kW/Tons R) xxxxx xxxxxx
* A4.2.4 Range in liq. level (%)
* A4.2.5 Estimate the normal liquid quantity
in the unit (kg/lb
A4.2.6 Do all operations and shutdown conditions comply
with the limitations given in A4.17 __
A4.3 CONTROLSw CUTOUTS AND ALARMS
* A4.3.1 What controls and safety cutouts are fitted?
CONTROL Y/N SETTING FAIL/SAFE OPER~TE~
TO ALARM Y/N
CONDITION
High lev.cutout%
High Iev.alarm % I I
Level control %
Low lev. cutout%
Freeze up
cutout % °F
Other
(Specify)
A4.4 RELIEF VALVES
* A4.4.1 Is the unit protected by a relief valve?
* A4.4.2 Relief valve setting (bar/psi),
rating (mg air/min.)
(lb air/min)
., t
A4.4.3 IDoes setting and rating comply with unit
Ilimitation and code requirements? (ref. A4.1 &2)
* A4.4.4 ~iIs the valve single, or a dual system?'
A4.4.5 If single, can the valve cartridge be easily and
isafely replaced without the need to isolate and
ipurge large sections of the refrigeration sys£em? __
I
A4.4.6 iIf dual, is is impossible for both valves to be
:isolated from the unit at the same time?
A4.4.7 Is the relief valve above maximum liquid level? __ __
*! A4.4.8 Diameter of RV outlet (mm/")
outlet pipe (mm/")
* A4.4~9 Relief valve piped to ( ) sUction
( ) atmosphere
A4.4.10 If the relief valve is piped to the suction is
there a means of ensuring that the discharge
piping is not blocked unless it is safe to do so?
A4.4.11 If the relief valve is piped to atmosphere
- does it discharge well'clear of windows or
ventilation inlets?
- Identify the type of discharge to point?
( ) Bare pipe ( ) Diffuser
( ) Water shower ( ) Water tank
- Is the discharge point safe? __ __
A4.4.12 Is the relief valve correctly piped?'
A4.4.13 Relief valve year of manufacture
A4.4.14 When was the valve last overhauled/replaced?
A4.4.15 Does relief valve look
( ) excellent ( ) good ( ) fair ( ) bad __
A4.5 OT~W.R COMPONENT DETAILS
A4.5.1 Does the unit have an oil pot or small auxiliary
vessels?
A4.5.2 Do they have relief valves?
A4.5.3 Are oil relief valves correctly and safely
piped?
AMMONIA SAFETY AUDIT GUIDE
A4.5.4 Are all electrical components adequately guarded
and protected?
A4.5.5 Is there a safe means of isolation which is easily
accessible?
A4.6 GENERAL-CONDITION/MAINTENANCE
A4.6.1 Has this unit always been free of cracking?
A4.6.2 To your knowledge has this unit ever been altered,
modified or repaired by welding7
A4.6.3. If (A4.6.2) yes
- Was the work carried out under the supervision
of the orginal certifying authority or an
equivalent?
- Was the vessel retested and recertified?
A4.6.4 Has the unit had a documented inspection by an
outside authority within the last 5 years?
- when?
A4~6.5 Is the unit properly secured to adquate
foundations?
A4.6.6 What is the condition of the insulation?
( ) good ( ) fair ( ) bad ( ) not insulated
A4.6.7 Is there any ice formation?
A4.6.8 Is there any sign of rust/corrosion on the unit
and associated piping?
( ) none ( ) slight ( ) moderate
( ) extensive, could jeopardize safety
( ) cannot tell due to insulation
A4.6.9 Is the vessel unit and associated pipework free of
noises, vibrations or liquid hammer?
A4.6.10 Is the unit free of other noticeable defects?
(If no, specify defects and assign SIR)
A4.7 OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF HEAT EXCHANGER {Give SIR)
Complete summary section 2.2., 2.4
AMMON IA SA' 'ETY AUDIT GU
ANNEX A5 RELIEF VALVES
* INDEX No.
* EQUIPMENT PROTECTED
* LOCATION
* MANUFACTURER?
*!YEAR MANUFACTURED?
* yEAR LAST OVERHAUL?
* SETTING (Bar/PSI)
* RATING:
(kg/min,lb/min)
* (S)INGLE/(D)UAL
* VALVE. DIA (mm/in)
* OUTLET PIPE
DIAMETER (mm/in)
~ ABOVE LIQUID LEVEL?
EASILY SERVICED?
, VENT POINT: -
* (1) Type
* (2)Location
(3)Near windows?
or air inlets?
* (4)If vent to tank:
Volume? (m3/ft3)
(5)Moisture traps?
(6)Stop valve
in vent line?
(7)Vent line
condition? (2)
R.V CONDITION? (2)
VALVE SEAL INTACT?
OVERALL SIR
NOTES:(1) Vent Point Type: (S)uction, (B)are Pipe,
Water (T)ank, Water (S)hroud
(3) Valve & Pipe Condition: (E)xcellent, (G)ood,
AMMONIA AUOIT GUIDE
!Annex
A6 AMMONIA GAS DEiCeRS
(Complete one form for ~ach gas detector)
A6.1 ~IT DESCRIPTION
* A6.1.1 'lUnit Index n~mber (refer 2.6.4)
* A6.1.2 Unit location
* A6.1.3 Hazard areas monitored by unit (Refer Annex Al)
(Assign SIR based on adequacy of monitoring)
INDEX NO DESCRIPTION
i(refer Al.l.1)i
* A6.1.4 Manufacturer Model
* A6.1.5 Location of sensing points
Point Location Point Location
No No
* A6.1.6 Alarm Setpoint ppn
* A6.1.7 Shutdown setpoint ppn __
* A6.1.8 Does the alarm give adequate warning to all
~oncerned personnel? __ __
Nestec Ltd. ~
VEVEY SWITZERLAND
021
921 18 85
921 17 20
921 64 88
AMMON IA SAFETY AUDI T
I III II
GU
:2. AUDI T
GUIDELINES
II
NESTEC RIv/ADi
VERSION 3.0, JAN 1989
B1.1/59
A. PURPOSE OF AMMONIA PLANT AUDITS
The underlying aim of the ammonia safety audit is to
ensure that all ammonia refrigeration plants within Nestle are
built, operated and maintained in a manner that ensures the
minimum possible risk to personnel, the general public,
environment and product safety.
To achieve this aim, the procedure must also achieve the
following goals:
1. Pinpoint actual and potential safety hazards due to
design, location, operation and maintenance of ammonia
refrigeration plants.
2. Provide a means to assess objectively and document the
continuing safety of our p~ants.
3. Provide a means of objectively defining needs, for
upgrading and modification to plant and operations.
Also to assist in documenting justification for
expenditure if required.
4. Provide feedback on plant safety issues so that
information may be disseminated to other interested
groups within the organisation.
4. Provide a guide for the assessment of safety of new
installations.
The audit 'is NOT intended to be used as a means of
comparing safety standards between factories or as a measure of
safety management competence. Any attempts to use the audits in
such a manner will lead to a reduction in effectiveness of the
entire audit program.
B1.2/59
B. WHEN TO AUDIT
B. 1 EXISTING PLANTS
Full audits
- Every 4 years
Intermediate audits - Yearly
B. 2 NEW PLANTS
Pre-contract stage
- Use document for a "desktop" audit
to ensure completeness of offers.
(by project engineer only)
During .Construction - Audit plant under construction,
particularly to assist in the
preparation of documentation and
safety standards.
(by project engineer only)
First Full Audit
- Within 6 months of full
commissioning of the plant.
C. ORGANISATION OF AUDIT
To ensure that the audit has maximum effectiveness with
minimum disruption to the company operations, the following action
should be taken.
C. 1 MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
The auditing process will occupy significant manpower,
both at the factory and corporate level. It would also be
expected to result in increased capital and maintenance
expenditure to.rectify defects and may also result in the need
for fundamental decisions on the continued operation of the
refrigeration plant.
Therefore, if the audits are t° be objective and achieve
the aim of upgrading safety, they must have the total support of
company management - especially technical management.
C. 2 COORDINATOR
A coordinator at corporate level should be nominated to
act as a focus for the organisation of the audits. The main
duties would be:
1. Schedule audits in consultation and agreement with the
factory and corporate management.
2. Follow up preparation of audit documentation by
factory prior to the audit and ensure distribution of
preliminary document to audit team members.
3. Ensure distribution of the completed audit documents.
B1.3/59
4. Follow up to ensure that the recommended corrective
action is taken in the agreed time frame. Follow up
reports should be circulated to audit team members.
5. Act as liason between factory, corporate level and
Nestec.
C.3 AUDIT TEAM COMPOSITION
Based on the experience of test audits, the following
recommendations are made for full audits:
1. Total number on the audit team should be 5-7.
2. Factory involvement should include Factory Engineer,
Refrigeration Engineer and Safety Officer. These
people should also carry out the annual audit. Note
that their allocation must be 100% for the duration of
the audit.
3. An engineer from corporate engineering should
participate for the full audits.
4. A refrigeration engineer from a sister factory should
participate for the full audits.
5. Consultants should be used with caution and only if
necessary (eg. due to lack of expertise). They should
not be leader and must have clearly defined roles.
6. It is desirable to have one member with system design
experience for the-full audit. However, their role
must be clearly defined and must not be as leader to
avoid'undue influence on the audit team. The "expert"
selection must be supported by company management
based on advice from a competent authority (eg.
corporate engineering, Nestec etc)
7. If possible, the inclusion on the team of a visitor
from another Nestle company for:
-Replacement of consultants if required
-Training of the team members and/or the visitor
-Greater "cross fertilisation" of experience.
C.4 PREPARATION FOR AUDIT
As the only aim of the audit is to improve plant safety,
it is not .necessary for the audits to be unannounced. In this
case such a practice is highly undesireable and will lead to
reduced effectiveness of the audit.
B1.4/59
The key to performing an effective audit is thorough and
timely preparation. To achieve this, the following action should
be taken:
1. The audit document should be sent to the factory by
the coordinator for preparation of information 1-3
months before the audit. To assist this preparation,
each question which requires answer before the audit
has been marked with an asterisk. The technical
details of the plant in the management summary should
also be completed by the factory. Note that the SIR's
should not be filled Out by the factory.
Failure to make this preparation will result in
extensive delays in completion of the audit and waste
the time of both the audit team and factor~ staff.
2. The partially complete audit document should be sent
to each audit team member for familiarisation at least
2 weeks prior to the start of the audit. This will
also be confirmation that the preparation is complete.
3. At the same time, the factory must ensure that
documentaion required is available and gathered in
one location to simplify reference. (For guidance on
the scope of documentation, refer section 3.0 of the
audit guide.)
4. The factory must allocate their representatives fog
the audit team and advise°the coordinator, and ensure
that sufficient technical and clerical support will be
available. (Note that typing the forms should not
normally be necessary.)~
C.5 ~UDIT EXECUTION
Assuming that the on site preparation is adequate, a
proposed sequence for the audit is as follows:
1. Review of audit preparation and identify areas
requiring clarification
2. Brief inspection to gain an overview of the plant.
3. Perform detailed audit of plant and equipment (sect
1.0 & 2.0). If the plant is very extensive, it may be
desirable to split the audit team into 2 groups.
4. Perform detailed audit of organisational aspects of
the plant (sections 3.0-8.0) after the detailed
inspection to allow the audit team to first become
more familiar with the hardware.
5. Consolidate and review audit results, and assign SIR's
for each question.
6. Review each section and assign an overall SIR in the
Management Summary for each section
B1.5/59
7. Make a recommendation on whether the plant condition
or operation justifies the need to re-audit the plant
in 6 months (eg. if there are defects which warrant
serious concern for the safety of the plant)
8. Prepare an action plan in consultation with factory
management for the rectification of defedts with a "E"
or "U" rating. Prepare action plan summary in the
Management Summary.
9. Before leaving the factory site the. audit team must
discuss the audit results with the factory manager.
1'0. Distribute the audit report as appropriate. A complete
copy of the audit report must be left at the site.
D. TIME FOR AUDIT
Provided that the preparation is adequate, the audit on
site should require no more than 3-5 days depending on the size
and complexity of the plant. However, there must be no time limit
set for the completion of the site audit.
E. DISTRIBUTION OF AUDIT DOCUMENT
E.1 FULL AUDITS
The following distribution is the recommended minimum.
Factory, Corporate Engineering:
-Full audit document with all supporting documents.
Corporate Management: (responsible for factory)
-Management summary and incider~ reports
Nestec:
-Management summary and incident reports
-Supporting documents as required to clarify
specific details.
-Full audit report only if in the opinion of the
audit team, the plant has equipment or operation
defects which will seriously jeopardise safety.
E.2 ANNUAL AUDITS
As required by Corporate Management.
B1.6/59
F. GENERAL FORMAT OF AUDIT DOCUMENT
F. 1 DOCUMENT ARRANGEMEKT
The audit document is divided into four main parts:
-NESTEC & MANAGEMENT SUMMARY which is intended for
reporting to corporate management and to be used to
provide a data base for ammonia' safety on a company wide
basis. The summary includes;
-Names of audit team and company coordinator for
ammonia safety
-Statements-of overall condition of the
refrigeration plant, and its operation, maintenance
and safety.
-Recommendation on whether the condition of the
plant justifies re-survey within 6 months.
-Statement of compliance with local codes and
regulations.
-Details of ammonia losses from system.
-Summary of action plan to rectify defects
identified as (U)rgent or (E)mergency.
-General description of the factory and
refrigeration plant.
-AUDIT DETAILS, comprising;
Section 1. Overall Plant Arrangement & Construction
2. System Components.
This section also includes summary sheets
to consolidate main information from the
annexes.
3. Documentation
4. Operations & Work Practices
5. Inspection & maintenance
6. Qualifications
7. Emergency Response
8. Training
-DETAIL ANNEXES, dealing with specific component details
-INCIDENT REPORTS for previous 12 month~
B1.7/59
F . 2 AUDIT RESPONSES
The questions have been organised to assist in the
determination of plant safety. Many have been included to
record plant information for reference by the audit team and in
the future for factory staff.
Most of the questions directly related to plant safety
require only a yes/no answer. The sense of the questions is
generally such that a "no" answer may indicate some degree of
deficiency.
The audit team' must judge the degree of the deficiency
and assign a Safety Item Rating (SIR) which reflects the
severity of the defect and potential impact on plant safety.
The definitions of the SIR's are as follows.
"E" (Emergency)
The defect is so severe that there is
immediate danger to the plant (eg. bad
corrosion relief valves missing etc) or if
there are organisational defects that will
lead to rapid deterioration of the plant or
the inability to safely deal with an incident
(eg lack of competent staff, no emergency
plan, inadequate safety equipment etc).
Action.
The audit team should ensure that action is
committed to rectify the defect before leaving
the site.
"O" (Urgent)
The defect presents a serious hazard, but
which may not necessarily be immediately
dangerous to life or property.
Action.
A firm deadline should be set to correct the
deficiency.
"I" (Improvement) Improvement is required, but can be achieved
through regular channels of maintenance,
capital improvements or assigned to the
functional staff.
"N" (Normal)
No action considered necessary. Where
appropriate, the audit team should include
'notes explaining why no action is considered
necessary.
"NA"
Not Applicable to this plant situation.
F. 3 UNITS USED
In all cases, the guide identifies a choice between an
Imperial or metric unit.. When entering the technical data', the
appropriate unit should be highlighted.
B1.8/59
G. DETAIT.F~ COMMENTS ON QUESTIONS
1.0
OVERALL PLANT ARRANGEMRNT SUMMARY
Summaries of main points from annex A1 to provide a means
of.rapidly assessing key areas of the plant arrangement
Intended to assist the audit team in defining overall
SIR's for the summary to management, and to provide a
rapid means of overall assessment. Refer comments Annex
A1 for details.
2.0
2.1
2.1.1
SYSTEM COMPONENTS
COMPRESSORS
COMPRESSOR INSPECTION SUMMARY
Summary of compressors from Annex A2. Refer comments in
section 1.0
2.2
2.2.1
CONDENSORS
CONDENSOR INSPECTION SUMMARY
Summary of condensors from annex A4. Refer comments in
section 1.0
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
VES S'R.T..~
VESSEL INSPECTION SUMMARY OUTSIDE MANUFACTURING AREAS
Summary Of vessels from Annex A3. Refer comments in
section 1.0
VESSEL INSPECTION SUMMARY INSIDE MANUFACTURING AREAS
Summary of vessels from Annex A3. Refer comments in
section 1.0
SYSTEM VOLUME CAPACITY & ARRANGEMENT
Intended to draw attention to the overall arrangement of
the system and the ability to isolate and purge sections
for maintenance.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Inability to isolate sections of the system will cause
inconvenience when performing maintenance or repairs to
the extent that essential Work may not be done (eg.
periodic replacement of single relief valves).
B1.9/59
2.4
2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.2.t
2.4.2.2
2.4.2.3
2.4.2.4
USAGE POINTS
OUTSIDE MANUFACTURING ]~T.T.S & COLD ROOMS
Summary of heat exchangers from annex A4' for units
outside manufacturing halls & cold rooms. Refer comments
in section 1.0.
WITHIN MANUFACTURING ~T.T.S &-COLD ROOMS
HEAT EXCHANGER SUMMARY
Summary of heat exchangers from annex A4 for units in
manufacturing halls & cold rooms. Refer comments in
section 1.0.
OT~RR AMMONIA USAGE POINTS
Addresses ammonia usage points not covered .elsewhere.
When looking at this section refer to the notes for Annex
A4. Particular points to note are:
-Control of defrost cycle (Refer comments 2.4.2.3)
-For liquid hammer it should, be noted that ANY
unusual noise must be investigated and the cause
identified.
-Liquid quantity should be known by plant staff in
order to know the potential quantity of ammonia
that could leak in the event of a failure
DEFROST CYCLES
Particular points to be aware of are:
-Sequencing of valves to ensure that there is no
short circuiting of hot gas to suction side
-Smooth changeover, especially during liquid
purging to ensure no liquid hammer.
-Risks associated with thermal shocks caused by
temperature changes during the defrost cycle.
DEFROST CYCLE SIR'S
'B1.10/59
2.4..2.5
2.4.2.6
'LIQUID HOSES
Liquid hoses (particularly rubber) have been found to be
prone to failure due to various causes. Many have been
due to damage caused by failure of other components (lift
mechanisms), .or improper work practices (stacking product
inside the cabinet, improper use of tools during
maintenance). Hose ends are particularly vulnerable.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Failure to thoroughly and regularly inspect hoses can
result in significant defects being un-detected. Failure
of a hose can release large quantities of liquid.
I~[ERGENCY SYSTEMS
The audit team should inspect the installed systems to
decide effectiveness and the ability to limit damage to
equipment (eg. water sprays on plate freezers flooding
electrical control equipment.)
2.5
2.5.1
2.5.2
2.5.3
2.5.4
2.5.5-6
PIPING
PIPE SUPPORT-
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Inadequately supported piping will result in excessive
strain on connections and other pipe supports. Failure of
piping and fittings can result, particularly if there is
corrosion or liquid hammer.
.MECHANICAL DAMAGE
PROTECTION
Particular areas include weather protection for outside
pipe runs and protection for piping in warehouses,
passageways or piping which may be damaged during
maintenance work etc.
VIBRATION, ABNORMAL NOISES, LIQUID HAMMER, MOVEMENT
Any areas shOuld be fully investigated and documented.
THREADED JOINTS
Threaded joints are difficult to make tight and are prone
to failure by leakage or breaking at the pipe threads.
Their use should be discouraged except on smal-1 sizes for
gauge points etc, or where no alternative is available.
Note that compression fittings must be considered as
threaded joints for the purpose of these questions.
B1.11/59
2.5.7
2.5.8
2.5.9
2.5.10
to 14
2.5.15
2.5.16
SEAL WELDING
Note that good quality welding is very difficult to
achieve due to contamination from thread lubricants or
sealants. Far better to completely avoid unnecessary
threaded joints in favour of welded or flanged joints.
CORROSION
List locations & extent of damage. Refer also comments
2.5.10-14.
INSULATION DESCRIPTION
Assign a SIR based on durability, effectiveness,
suitability of each component of the insulation.
Particular points to note are:
-Adequate preperation of pipe prior to insulation
(eg de-scaling, painting)
-Adequate and fully sealedovapour barrier
-Adequate mechanical protection
INSULATION CONDITION
List locations & extent of damage. Refer comments A3.6.7.
WELDER QUALIFICATION
Welding of ammonia piping, particularly for low
temperature applications, should-only be done by suitably
qualified welders. Testing and pre-qualification of
welders should be carried out before work is done. The
test results should also be documented (ref 3.0).
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Use of unqualified welders will lead to uncertain weld
quality and the possibility of weld failure. (There have
been incidents where bad welding practices have been a
major cause of catastrophic failure of equipment).
X-RAY TESTING
Testing of welds is often a code requirement, and is
adviseable especially on low temperature applications,
where material ductility is reduced. (Normal extent is
10% tested with additional testing of each side of every
failed'weld.)
2.5.17
B1.12/59
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Non compliance with codes and uncertain weld quality.
PIPE MARKING
Refer also comments 2.8.4.4.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Risk of improper actions being taken during operation or
maintenance due to ignorance of what is in the piping.
· Loss of valuable time and added danger to emergency teams
due to uncertainty.
2.6
2.6.1
2.6.1.1
2.6.1.2
'SAFETY SYSTEMS
I~RT.IEF VALVES
ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF EQUIPMENT
List locations not protected.
List locations-of deficient vent points.
Internal:.
Not a problem provided that the low side relief
valve capacity is adequate AND the system is
arranged to allow servicing the valves with'
safety.
Atmosphere - Bare Pipe:
Is acceptable but must be used with caution to
ensure that the ammonia cloud will not enter
buildings or cause problems with neighbours
(refer Factory Location Zoning in Management
Summary).
For factories in location zones 3 and 4 this
type of discharge is inadviseable due to the
risk to neighbours.
Atmosphere - Diffuser:
Same comments as above
Water Tank:
Is adviseable for factories in location zones 3
and 4 due to the control/elimination of the
ammonia cloud. (Code requirement in some cases.)
2.6.1.3
2.6.1.4
2.6.1.5
2.6.1.6
B1.13/59
Water Shroud:
Can be used as an alternative to water tanks
provided codes permit. However, caution is
required to ensure that the design will permit
the shroud to absorb the ammonia.
If used in location zones 3 & 4, automatic
operation of the water valve is recommended.
Treatment and disposal problems of the ammonia
laden water must be addressed.
Inside Room:
RELIEF VALVES MUST NEVERBEVENTED INSIDE
E/~CLOSED SPACES!!!!~!
INTERNAL ~RT.TEFS
Refer comments 2.6.1.2.
CONTROL OF AMMONIA DISCHARGE
Refer comments 2.6.1.2
SERVICING VALVES
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Inability to safely and conveniently service valves will
lead to the work not being done and consequent
probability of valve failure.
REPLACEMENT OF VALVE CARTRIDGES
As refrigeration relief valves cannot be tested (due to
uncertainty of fully reseating after lifting), the
cartridges must be replaced at regular intervals
(normally up to 5 years). Replaced cartridges should not
be reused unless they have been returned to the
manufacturer for overhaul.
Where the complete valve assembly may be removed, the
complete valve should be replaced.
Note: "Valve Cartridges" include all valve components
except the valve body which will often be welded in place
These cartridges are usually supplied preset.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Failure to replace relief valve cartridges at regular
intervals is against recommended practice and is illegal
under some codes.
B1.14/59
2.6.2
2.6.2.1
2.6.2'2
2.6.2.3
2.6.2.4
AMMONIA VENT AND DUMP SYSTEMS
If vapour vent or liquid dump systems are installed, the
audit team must look closely at the emergency plan to
ensure that there are adequate organisational safeguards
so that any operation of the equipment is adequately
controlled.
AMMONIA VAPOUR VENT SYSTEMS
Some codes require a manual valve which bypasses relief
valves on vessels to allow direct venting of vapour.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Unless a code requirement, lack of a manual vent should
not be.a problem as the relief valves are normally sized
to limit vessel pressure even under fire conditions.
CONTROL OF AMMONIA DISCHARGE
Refer 2.6.1.2
AMMONIA LIQUID DUM~ SYSTEMS
Some codes and fire authorities require a 'Fireman's.Dump
Station' where the liquid ammonia charge can be dumped
from the system in the event of a fire.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Unless demanded by the authorities, the lack of such a
system should present no significant problems, due to the
sizing of the relief valves.
There is some controversy over whether such systems
should be installed due to the inherent significant
dangers of dumping large quantities of ammonia in a
manner which cannot be readily controlled by personnel
who may not be fully aware of the risks. Misuse and
'tampering is also a potential problem. Refer also
comments 7.
WATER ADDITION
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Dumping liquid without adding large quantities of water
to absorb it at the discharge point will result in
immediate gassing off and the formation of highly toxic
concentrations of ammonia which are also likely to be at
explosive concentrations.
B1.15/59
2.6.2.5
to 8
DISPOSAL OF DUMPED AMMONIA
If dump systems are installed, the consequences of
dumping ammonia laden water into sewerage systems .must be
addressed due to the potential risks involved. The major
risks involved are:
-Upsetting and possibly totally disabling a bio waste
water plant due to the high pH of the resulting
effluent.
-Injury to personnel working in sewers or at the
treatment plant due to gassing off of the ammonia.
-Serious Pollution of waterways into which the effluent
flows.
2.6.2.9 DUMP STATION SECURITY
2.6.2.10 ACCESS IN EVENT OF A FIRE
When assessing accessibility, it must be remembered that
normally acceptable access is INSUFFICIENT in the event
of an emergency, due to wearing of protective equipment
(especially SCBA and ammonia suits) and reduced vision.
2.6.3
'2.6.3.1
2.6.3.2
KING VALVES/MAIN STOP VALVES
KING VALVES
The effectiveness of 'king valves' in isolating a system
is highly dependant on specific, plant details.
Generally, a minimum requirement would be the ability to
shut off liquid supply to each room or hazard area, with
a (the ideal) minimum of liquid downstream of the valve.
This will not always significantly improve safety due to
system arrangements, especially on pumped or flooded
systems where large quantities of liquid are in the
equipment.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Audit team should assess the effectiveness of the
installed valving and decide if improvement is necessary
or feasible.
ACCESS
When assessing accessibility, it must be remembered that
normally acceptable access is INSUFFICIENT in the event
of an emergency, due to wearing of protective equipment
(especially SCBA and ammonia suits) and reduced
visibility.
If remote operation is necessary, the explosion risks of
operating electrical equipment in an ammonia laden
atmosphere must be considered when looking at the
actuators.
B1.16/59
2.6.3.3
2.6.3.4
2.6.3.5
2.6.3.6
SUCTION SHUTOFF VALVES
ACCESS
Refer comments 2.6.3.2
HOT GAS ISOLATION VALVES
AccESs
REFER COMMENTS 2.6.3.2
2.6.4
2.6.4.1
2.6.4.2
AMMONIA DETECTORS
AMMONIA DETECTOR SUMMARY
Summary of ammonia detector inspections from annex A6.
Refer comments 1. & A6.
ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF PLANT ROOMS & HAZARD AREAS
Adequate protection must include alarms which are
monitored at all times (eg. at gate house, telephone link
etc). Refer also comments for Annex Al.6.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Failure to adequately monitor plant rooms and hazard
areas will result in a greater risk of a discharge
becoming serious before it is detected. At particular
risk are areas which are not manned on a 24 hour/7 day'
basis.
2.7
2.7.1
2.7.1.1
2.7.1.2
ELECTRICAL & INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS
TYPE OF CONTROL SYSTEM
HARD WIRING INTE~I~CKS & CUTOUTS
No matter what control system is used, the main safety
cutouts MUST be 'hard wired' without any reliance on
software control through PLC~s, microprocessors etc (eg.
by means of wiring at the starter panel or similar)
This is necessary to limit the risks associated with
operations in a manual mode or failure of the control
system.
Cutouts which must normally be hard wired are:
-HIGH COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE PRESSURE
2.7.1.3
to 5
B1.17/59
-HIGH LIQUID LEVEL in flooded vessels & equipment
to prevent liquid carryover to compressors or
liquid locks in the equipment.
-LOW LIQUID LEVEL in flooded vessels to prevent
liquid starvation and cavitation in connected
pumps.
-OVERSPEED CUTOUTS if required by the compressor
drive (eg. steam turbine)
HOUSEF~DING/GENERAL CONDITION
List locations.
2.7.2
2.7.2.1
2.7.2.2
GAUGES & SIGHT GLASSES
SIGHT/GAUGE GLASSES
GAUGES
ADEQUACY
OPERATION POINTS
Marking normal operation ranges on gauges can provide the
a rapid check of the system without the need to trust to
memory.
CONDITION
WELLPOCKETS
These must be fitted with a gland or arranged to keep
water out.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Water entering the pocket will freeze and split the
pocket, releasing ammonia.
2.8
2.8.1
2.8.1.1
MISCELLANEOUS coMPONENTS
GAS PURGERS
TYPE OF PURGER INST~T.T.~
Audit team should decide if the type of purging is
adequate for the system.
B1.18/59
2.8.1.2
2.8.1.3
2.8.1.4
2.8.1.5
MANUAL PURGING OPERATION
If used, safety of the method and safety precautions for
manual purging should be decided, bearing in mind that
the purging operation is opening the system and carries
with it a risk of causing an ammonia escape.
LOCATION OF PURGE POINTS
The audit team should decide whether the location and
number of purge points will ensure adequate air purging.
ACCESS
Access to purge points must be adequate even when
wearing emergency equipment (refer comments 2.6.3.2).
PURGER DISCHARGE POINT
Should be outside the building and into a water bath to
absorb any released ammonia.
2.8.2
2.8.2.1
2.8.2.2
2.8.2.3
2.8.2.4
2.8.2.'5
OIL DRAINAGE
.ADEQUACY
Double valving is required to ensure that the operator
does not leave the drain point during oil drainage. One
valve should be quick, auto-closing type to allow rapid
shutoff in the event of a discharge of liquid ammonia.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Potentially serious incidents have occurred due to the
operator being distracted away from the drainage 'point
and liquid ammonia discharging.
DRAINS TO REGENERATOR OR OIL POT
m~-ATING OF OIL POTS ETC
Use of electric heating should be treated with caution
due to the~potential to overheat (and overpressure) the
oil pot.
Refer also comments on pockets in the system (2.7.2.2~.
ACCESS
Refer comments 2.8.1.4
B1.19/59
2.8.3
2.8.3.1
2.8.3.2
2.8.3.3
2.8.3.4
CHARGING
CHARGING POINT
Charging to the high pressure side of the system should
be treated with caution. Refer comments' 4.2.2.4.
TYPE OF CONNECTION
ARRANG~
SECURITY OF RESERVE CONTAINERS
2.8.4
2.8.4.1
& 2
2.8.4.3
VALVING
DESCRIPTION OF VALVING
Generally, valves for ammonia service should be:
-Cast Steel.
Fabricated valves have been known to fail due to poor
quality and failure of the welds.
-Backseated (stop valves).
To allow complete replacement of the gland packing
without the need the purge the system. Also to ensure
that the system pressure is not on the gland when fully
open or closed. This will minimise leakage of the gland.
-Bellows sealed (modulating valves)
To improve security of the seal on valves which operate
over a range of positions.
Note that care must be taken with bellows seals to
prevent moisture collecting on the outside of the
bellows. If this freezes, it will split the bellows
seal. Refer.also comments on pockets in the system
(2..7.2.2).
ARRANGEMENT OF ISOLATION VALVES
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Insufficient isolation points will make it difficult to
perform essential maintenance which will then risk being
deferred. During an emergenCy there will also be
difficulties with minimising an ammonia release.
However, care should be exercised with location and
number to ensure that other problems are not caused by
isolation points (eg. liquid lockups).
B1.20/59
2.8.4.4
& 5
VALVE IDENTIFICATION
This is mandatory to minimise the risk of operation of
valves incorrectly and to allow rapid identification of
valve function in an emergency.
While no single type of identification is.specifically
recommended, the audit team must examine the system in
use and determine whether it is effective in preventing
unsafe actions or other problems described below
CONSEQUENCES .OF 'NO' ANSWER
Risk of causing dangerous interconnections or isolations
in the system by improper operation of valving (eg.
connecting HP side to LP side by improper operation of
valving on swing compressors).
Loss of valuable time and added danger to emergency team
when dealing with an ammonia release.
2.8.5
2.8.5.1
2.8.5.2
2.8.5.3
PUMP LOCATION/DUTY
The audit team should look at the duty of the pumps
particularly those which are on.standby. Startup o~
pump which has been shutdown for extended periods
lead to failure of the seal and consequent liquid
discharge.
TYPE OF-PUMP
Greater care must be taken with positive displacem,
pumps due to their potential to develop very high
discharge pressures if operated against a closed
TYPE OF SEAL
Note that there have been many incidents which are
result of seal failure. As a result of this, the
following recommendations are made:
Packed gland:
Not recommended
Mechanical Seal:
Acceptable but must be used with caution due to
of seal failure.
Hermetic:
Recommended but care required with cavitation as
pumps usually are centrifugal only.
,f
a
an
nt
stem.
the
risks
these
2.8.5.4
2.8.5.5
2.8.5.6
2.8.5.7
B1.21/59
Sealless (Magnetic Coupling):
Pump type recently available, with drive by means of
magnetic coupling through a hermetic barrier. Has same
safety as hermetic pump but allows the use of standard
motors.
RELIEF VALVE/BYPASS
Particular points to note are:
-Piping of bypass directly into the pump suction can lead
to overheating if it continually lifts. To avoid this,
the bypass should be piped back to the supply vessel.
Piping in this manner should also avoid liquid lockups
if the pump isolation valves are closed.
-Rating of relief bypass must be for full discharge
capacity of a positive displacement pump and at least
sufficient to prevent any pump from overpressurising the
system beyond its design operating pressure.
-Liquid lockups (refer 2.8.5.5)
LIQUID LOCK%~S
Pump systems are particularly vulnerable to liquid
lockups due to the number of isolation valves fitted in
the systems for servicing.
The audit team should closely examine the system to
determine whether liquid lockups could occur. (Refer also
2.8.5.4).
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Any small temperature rise in a liquid locked component
will result in a VERY RAPID rise in pressure and it's
consequent rupture.
CAVITATION PROTECTION
Cavitation can quite rapidly destroy a pump.
Check whether there is an unrelieved liquid pocket
between the check valve and the stop valve. (Refer
comments.2.8.5.5).
B1.22/59
2.8.5.8
2.8.5.9
2.8.6
2.8.6.1
2.8.6.2
2.8.6.3
2.8.6.4
LIQUID BLEED
The fitting of a small bleed valve or plug in the pump
system will allow the controlled removal of liquid
ammonia before the system is opened.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Opening a component charged with liquid which may be
under pressure (due to temperature rise) is DANGEROUS and
must be avoided under all circumstances.
ACCESS
When deciding accessibility, it must be remembered that
normally acceptable access is INSUFFICIENT in the event
of an.emergency, due to wearing of protective equipment
(especially SCBA and ammonia suits) and reduced
visibility.
Pump systems are often the worst areas for access in a
refrigeration plant due their usual location under pump
seperators with low headroom.
At the same time, these are often the MOST CRITICAL areas
requiring rapid access in an emergency as they are often
the location of the problem or are where main stop valves
are located.'
STRAINERS
USE OF STRAINERS
LIQUID LOCKUPS
Strainer systems often carry the same risks of liquid
locks as pump systems; refer 2.8.5.5.
BT~nVALVE
Refer comments 2.8.5.8
ACCESS
2.8.7
2.8.7.1
MATERIALS
MATERIAL TYPE
Ail materials used in the system should be suitable for
ammonia service. In particular, alloys of copper, zinc,
cadmium and mercury must be avoided in contact with
ammonia. Rubber must also be treated with caution to
ensure that only compatible types are used.
B1.23/59
2.8-.7.2
LOW TEMPERATURE MATERIALS
Normal low carbon steels are usually suitable at
temperatures down to approx. -40 deg. C. Below this,
special low temperature steels must be used.
CONSEQUENCES ~OF 'NO' ANSWER
Normal steels become brittle at low temperatures are
liable to fracture without warning, even under quite easy
conditions.
3.0
3.1
3.2-3
SYSTEM~ATION
Complete and up to date documentation is essential both
for the safe operation of a plant and to allow a complete
investigation of incidents.
It should be noted that, in the event of a catastrophic
incident, the documentation and records may be the only
means of performing and adequate investigation. These
documents may also be used by the authorities or other
outsiders in any 'consequent legal action.
Therefore, the audit team MUST spot check documentation
......... to..ensure that it is complete, relevant AND up to date.
In particular, the team should look closely at records
associated with system expansions and major repairs to
ensure that the work done is fully documented. These
areas have been found in the past to be deficient in some
cases (.especially major repairs)
UP TO DATE?
When estimating the time required to bring documentation
up to date, the team should consider who will undertake
the update and make firm recommendations on the need to
engage outside assistance.
CONTROL OF UPDATES
The audit team must satisfy itself that the procedure for
controlling documentation changes will ensure that all
system changes are adequately documented.
3.4
3.4.1
3.4.1.1
AVAILABT.R DOCUMENTATION
SYSTEM. DESCRIPTION
ORIGINAL DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS
B1.24/59
3.4.1.2
3.4.1.3
3.4.1.4
3.4.1.5
3.4.1.'6
CURRENT AS BUILT DRAWINGS
EQUIPMENT DETAILS
CLOSEOUT (COMMISSIONING) RECORDS (NEW CONSTRUCTION)
CLOSEOUT RECORDS (MODIFICATIONS & ]~F-~AIRS)
CODES & STANDARDS
3.4.2
3.4.2~1
3.4.2.2
3.4.2.3
3.4.2.4
OPERATIONS
OPERATING MANUALS
CHARGING RECORDS'
OPERATING CK~.CKLI STS
These should include detailed checklist instructions for
· all manual operations on the plant; including, where
possible, emergency shutdown procedures. As a working
document, they must be readily available to all concerned
personnel - possibly'mounted near the relevant equipment.
(Code requirement in some cases.)
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL INFORMATION
This is a legal requirement in some cases.
3.4.3
3.4.3.1
3.4.3.2
3.4.3.3
3.4.3.4
3.4.3.5
MAINTENANCE.
MAINTENANCE MANUALS
CHECKLISTS & INSTRUCTIONS
At least for .all routine maintenance operations
MAINTENANCE SCHEDUT~
SAFETY DEVICETESTRECORDS
Should include test date, method, results, corrective
action taken, retest results for relief valves,
interlocks, cutouts etc.
PM HISTORYRECORDS
3.4.4
3.4.4.1
SAFETY & TRAINING
Refer comments 7.
B1.25/59
3.4.4.2
3.4.4.3
3.4.4.4
3.4.4.5
TRAININS PLAN
Refer comments 8.
TRAINING RECORDS
JOB DESCRIi~fIONS
Refer comments 6.1.4.
OPERATOR LICENCES
4.1
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4
4.1.5
4.1.6
OPERATIONS & woRK PRACTICES
GENERAL
MINIMUM SITE SAFETY STANDARDS
PROVISION OF A GUIDE BOO~T.RT
These guide books are often available from chemical
manufacturers and suppliers. (eg ICI).
SMOKING
SAFETY PRECAUTIONS
HOUSE~F. RDING INSPECTIONS
E~w.u'~'~E SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
4.2
4.2.1
4.2.1.1
4.2.1.2
4.2.1.3
4.2.2
4.2.2.1
4.2.2.2
PLANT OPERATIONS
SYSTEM SUPERVISION
REGULAR ANALYSIS OF DAILY LOGS & RECORDS
CHECKSW~.~-TS
Refer comments 3.4.2.3
CHARGING
METHOD OF AMMONIA RECEIVAL
AMMONIA CONTAINERS
B1.26/59
4.2.2.3
4.2.2.4
4.2.2.5
4.2.2.6
4.2.3
4.2.3.1
4.2.3.2
4.2.4
4.2.4.1
AMMONIA STO~ IN RESERVE
This should be the minimum feasible, consistant with
delivery considerations. Note, some codes limit the
allowable quantity of reserve ammonia on site.
WEIGHING CONTAINERS
In addition to the normal accounting requirements for
incoming goods, it is essential to know at any time, the
amount of ammonia charged into the system. This is
necessary so that unusual or large charge additions may
be investigated and to ensure that the system is not
overcharged.
Note that it is possible, when charging-on the high side,
for ammonia to discharge INTO the container due to the
container pressure being lower than the system. This can
lead to overcharging the container and a resultant liquid
lockup.
DOCUMENTATION
All additions to the charge must be documented and
checked by the engineer responsible for the plant to
ensure that charging did occur (refer 4.2.2.4) and to
monitor the refrigerant losses from the system.
SAFE HANDLING OF CONTAINERS
Note that ammonia containers must never be left connected
to the system.
OIL DRAINAGE
REGULAR PROCEDURE
DOCUMENTATION
DEFECT~RDORTING
PROCEDURE
4.2.4.2
EFFECTIVENESS
The audit team should also check with refrigeration users
to determine whether the procedure is effective.
4.3
4.3.1
MAINTENANCE & MODIFICATIONS
CONTROL OF WORK
4.3.1.1
4.3.1.2
4.3.1.3
4.3.1.4
4.3.1.5
4.3.1.6
4.3.1.7
4.3.1.8
B1.27/59
WORK ORDERS
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Failure to adequately control work can result in
unauthorised and undocumented repairs and alterations
(refer comments-3.0).
SCOPE OF WORK ORDERS
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
-Uncertain quality of repair work
-Violation of required safety standards.
AUTHORISING CHANGES TO SYSTEM
Refer comments 3.2-3 & 4.3.1.1
CONTROL OF MATERIALS
All materials must be checked and documented before
installation. There should also be a procedure to
"quarantine" materials to avoid-inadvertent mixing with
unsuitable components.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Failur~ to control materials can lead to the use of
inappropriate materials in-the system (refer comments
2.8.7)
w~r.~ER CERTIFICATION
Refer comments 2.5.15.
PUM~DOWN & PURGING PROCEDURES
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Increased risk of opening the system when it is unsafe to
do so.
Failure to adequately evacuate and purge the system prior
to charging will lead to contamination and improper
operation.
TESTING
HOT. WORK PERMITS
These are essential to ensure that all necessary
precautions are taken before hot work is carried out and
to .ensure that the area is re-inspected for a period
after to ensure that there are no fires.
B1.28/59
4.3.1.9
.ELECTRICAL & MECHANICAL LOCKOUTS
Audit team should pay particular attention to MECHANICAL
lockouts as these are often overlooked.
4.3.2
4.3.2.1
4.3.2.2
4.3.2.3
USE OF CONTRACTORS
EXTENT OF USE
Normally, the use of contractors should be controlled to
the minimum possible to ensure that factory staff do not
lose contact, with all aspects of the refrigeration plant.
The audit team should decide if'the use of contractors is
excessive and limiting the experience of the engineering
staff responsible for the' plant.
CONTRACTOR COMPETENCE
Where contractors are used, the audit team must be
satisfied that they are working only within the limits of
their competence.
Note that all installation and modification work must be
under the responsibility of a professional with legally
accepted qualifications. If such professionals are not
available on the contractors staff, then they must not be
used witohout outside legally qualified supervision.
LIASONWITH CONTRACTORS
All communication with contractors should normally be
through one company representative only to minimise the
risk of conflicting information and instructions, and to
ensure that the contractor is strictly controlled.
B1.29/59
5.1
5.1.1
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.1.4
5.1.5
INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE
SCOPE OF SC~m~ULEDMAINTENANcE
]~RT.IEF Vi~LVES
At least:
Inspection-
-Periodic examination for corrosion etc, especially of
the inside of the valve discharge and the vent pipe.
-Check "blow off" type removeable rain caps are not
seized on.'
-Check oil traps in vent lines are full.
Replacement of' valve cartridges at 5 yearly intervals or
more frequently if required by code or recommended by
valve manufacturer.
TEST & CALIBRATION
All safety controls should be subject to a documented
test at least annually or after any work has been done on
them or the associated equipment. This should be a.full
functional test of the complete .control circuit.
Note that ammonia detectors can be highly susceptible to
drift in their setting. The frequency of test and
recalibration will d~pend on the known performance of the
installed equipment.
Note als0 that detectors in cold stores can be very
difficult to maintain in a stable condition.
In all cases, the audit team must be satisfied that the
test and calibration procedure, and timing is adequate to
ensure reliability of the particular installation.
COMPRESSOR & DRIVE INSPECTION
PERIODIC OIL ANALYSIS
This is recommended, particularly on larger .compressors
and systems. However, care must be taken that the
analysis and interpretation is done by competent people.
INSPECTION OF FILTERS & STRAINERS
The frequency of inspection will depend on particular
plant conditions', but should be much more often after
startup or when the system has been opened. All foreign
material removed from the filters should be checked.
B1.30/59
5.1.6
'5.1.7
5.1.8
5.1.9
5.1.10
5.1.ll
5.1.12
5.1.13
INSPECT & FDc~RCISE SHUTOFF VALVE$
Ail valves must be at least exercised at intervals no
longer than 1 year to ensure that they close tight and
are not seized.
LIQUID PUMPS & DRIVES
Particular areas which must be inspected carefully are
pump seals and components affecting seal life (bearings,
couplings, alignment etc). Standby pumps which do not
operate frequently should also be checked more closely.
Refer also comments 2.8.5
'PRESSURE & TEMPERATURE GAUGE CALIBRATION
SAFETY EQUIPMENT INSPECTION
PURGER INSPECTION
DEFROST,OPERATIONAL CHECKS
CORROSION INSPECTION
INSULATION INSPECTION
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.3
PERSONAL 9UALIFICATIONS
QUALIFICATIONS & EXPERIENCE
When looking at qualifications, the audit team should
decide whether there are sufficient personnel with
adequate qualifications to ensure that the plant can be
operated safely and that incidents may be dealt with
competently.
Note that it is not always necessary for all engineering
staff to be fully competent to operate and maintain the
refrigeration plant.
OPERATOR LICENCING REQUIREMENTS
OPERATOR LICENCES
Note that if there is a legal requirement for licencing
of operators, care should be exercised in the use of
unlicenced operators under training to ensure that legal
requirements are complied with. This may mean that
operators in training may be additional to staff numbers.
B1.31/59
6.1.4
6.1.5
6.1.6
JOB DESCRII~fIONS
These should be available to ensure that there is no
misunderstanding about the MINIMUM duties required.
However, it should not limit the scope of work so that
unexpected events will not be responded to.
PERSONNEL COMPETENCE
The list of points under this question should be regarded
as the minimum required for those personnel actively
involved in the operation, maintenance or supervision, of
the plant.
KING & ISOLATING VALVE LOCATIONS
All factory staff who work around the refrigeration
equipment (including manufacturing people) should be
familiar with the location and purpose of main liquid
stop valves and all other valves intended.for the
emergency isolation of the plant(eg suction and hot gas
valves)·
7.1
7.1.1
7.1.2
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
As-part'of the audit of emergency response, it is
suggested that a drill be carried out.
EMERGENCY PLANNING
Ail factories must have a written emergency plan to
ensure that the response to an emergency condition is
adequate to ensure safety of all personnel, general
public, environment and product.
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Lack of a plan WILL result in confusion and the inability
to adequately deal with an emergency. In many cases this
inability will result in minor incidents escalating to
catastophes.
~T.FME~TS OF PLAN
While the extent of planning will vary depending on
specific local conditions, the list in this question
should be regarded as a recommended minimum.
Note particularly comments 2.6.2 on dump and vent
systems.
B1.32/59
7.1.3
7.1.4
7.1.5 -6
7.1.7
7.1.8
UP TO DATE?
AVAILABILITY
The plan package must be readily available at all times
in a location such as the gatehouse or emergency
equipment store. Multiple copies should be kept in other
locations for reference.
POSTING EVACUATION ROUTES
The audit team should "walk over" the evacuation routes
to assess their safety and practicality. The assembly
points should also be checked.
CO2 SUPPLY
Carbon Dioxide can be useful in dealing with an spill as
it will react with ammonia vapour to form a powder.
However, as the reaction also requires water vapour, it
will be of limited benefit at low temperatures without
the addition of water. This is due to the limit in water
vapour which air will carry, at low temperatures.
Therefore, it should be considered as an assistance in
absorbing ammonia, with the primary means being large
quantities of water and ventilation.
7.2
7.2.1
7.2.1
ORGANISATION (EMERGENCY TEAM)
FORMAL TEAM
Is this Person able to do the required job. (Physically,
training, experience, mentally etc).
7.3
7.3.1
ROLE OF OUTSIDERS
ROLE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES
The role of the emergency services (fire department,
police, ambulance etc) must be clearly defined and agreed
upon by all concerned.
This is essential as outsiders cannot be expected to be
totally familiar with the operation of any particular
refrigeration plant. Often, the services do not have any
experience and are not properly equipped for dealing
with ammonia.
In some cases, the best course of action may be to ensure
that the services called to the site take a supporting
role only.
7.3.2
7.3.3
7.3.4
B1.33/59
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
If the roles are not predefined,-confusion will result,
leading the a high risk of escalation of an incident.
There have been cases where minor incidents have caused
serious injuries to personnel and/or extensive damage by
the actions of outside emergency service personnel who
were not familiar with the plant or hazards of ammonia.
EMERGENCY SERVICES HAVE COPY OF EMERGENCY PLAN?
ADEQUATE TRAINING OF EMERGENCY SERVICES
The audit team should try to assess the capability of the
outside services and decide if their agreed role is
appropriate to their competence.
CONTRACTOR INVOLVEMENT
Normally contractors should not be relied upon to take
any role in an emergency. If they are expected to be
involved, the team should look carefully at their
effectiveness and the response time.
7.4
7.4.1
7.4.1.1
PROTECTIVE EQUIPMRNT
AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT
When determining the adequacy of safety equipment, the
audit team should consider possible incidents and whether
the resulting ammonia cloud will result in the safety
equipment being inaccessible. (eg. all equipment located
within the engine rooms). Generally, the main safety
equipment store should be convenient to, but secure from
the main hazard areas.
It should also be remembered that' under no circumstances
should anyone enter an ammonia filled area alone.
Therefore, it follows that a MINIMUM of 2 (preferably 3)
sets of equipment must be available.
In all industrial systems, there will be sufficient
ammonia to cause toxic concentrations which cannot be
entered wearing cannister masks only or even air packs
alone. Therefore, the audit team should beware of any
plant where SCBA and encapsulated suits are not
available. The normal limitations .of equipment are given
below.
Generally only effective in low concentrations of
ammonia - Absolute maximum of 3000ppm. This is equivalent
to about 0.4kg ammonia in 200cu.m (0.9lbs in 7000cu.ft)
B1.34/59
7.4.1.2
SCBA AIR PACKS
Can only be used alone (withOut encapsulated suits) in
concentrations up to 5000ppm, equivalent to 0.7kg in 200
cu.m (1.5lbs in 7000cu.ft).
7.4.1.3
7.4.1.4
7.4.1.5
7.4.1.6
7.4.1.7
7.4.1.8
7.4.1.9
ENCAPSULATED SUITS
Essential in concentrations greater than 5000ppm
DISPOSEABLE SUITS
RUBBER BOOTS
RUBBER GLOVES
FACE
LIFE LINES
FIRST AID EQUIPMENT
7.4.2
7.4.3
7.4.4
7.4.5
7.4.1.10 HAND ~.?.~ ANALYSERS
7.4.1.11 SPARE CANNISTERS
7.4.1.12 SPARE AIR BOTTLES
REFILLING' AIR BOTTLES
E~PERIENCE WITH SAFETY EQUIPMENT
The audit team should question the training program for
any plant which reports good effectiveness of cannister
masks in strong ammonia concentrations.
LOCATION & IDENTIFICATION OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT
Refer comments 7.4.1.
M~nICAL EXAMINATION
7.4.6
7.4.7
DISPOSAL OF CANNISTERS
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Failure to dispose of out of date or partially used
cannisters may lead to re-use in an emergency condition.
APPROPRIATE FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT
7.4 ..8
7.4.9
B1.35/59
PORTABLE EXP~SION PROOF LAMPS
Should always be used in an ammonia spill as it is never
known whether there are local explosive concentrations of
ammonia vapour.
EXPLOSION PROOF FANS
Ventilation is often'the most effective means of dealing
with an ammonia spill. The fans.used should be explosion
proof. (refer also comments 7.4.8)
e
8.1
8.1.1
8.1.2
8.1.3
8.1.4
TRAINING
PROGRAM
FOR EMERGENCYTEAMS
FOR SYSTEM OPERATORS & MAINTAINERS
FOR ~T.T. FACTORY STAFF
FOR NEWEMPLOYRR~
8.2
8.2.1
8.2.2
8.2.3
8.2.4
8.2.5
8.2.6
SCOPE OF TRAINING PLAN
FORMAL REVIEW OF PROGRAM
REVIEW OF PERSONNEL COMPETENCE
REVIEW OF INDMDUAL TRAINING NR.~S
MINIMUM TRAINING FREQUENCY
TRAINING ATTENDANCE RECORDS
LIST OF INSTRUCTORS
8.3
INVOLVEMENT OF EMERGENCY SERVICES
Refer comments 7.3
8.4
8.4.1
8.4.2
SCOPE OF TRAINING PLAN
FUNDAMENT~?.m
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE
8.4.3
8.4.4
8.4.5
8.4.6
8.4.7
8.4.8.
8.4.9
8.4.10
8.4.11
8.4.12
B1.36/59
HAZARDS OF AMMONIA & STO~ C~RMICALS
SAFETY PRECAUTIONS
USE & LIMITS OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT
Particular nOte should be taken of practical training
with equipment and limitations.
FIRST AID
EMERGENCY SHUTDO~ PROCEDURES
Especially for equipment in manufacturing areas.
FIRE & SAFETY RESpONSE PROCEDURES
· EM~-RGENCY NOTIFICATION PROCEDURF.-~
EVACUATION PROCEDURES
NATURAL DISASTERS
SPILL CONTAINMENT & NEUTRALISATION
B1.37/59
ANNEX A1 PLANT ROOMS & AMMONIA HAZARD AREAS
Hazard areas are defined as any area where a hazard may
exist due to the presence of ammonia. They may include
such areas as manufacturing halls, preparation rooms,
auxiliary equipment rooms, some areas with exposed pipe
runs.
The audit team should decide which areas should be
regarded.as hazardous.
Complete one form for each plant room or hazard area.
Al. 1
IDENTIFICATION
A1.1.1 ROOM INDEX NUMBER
A sequential number should be assigned to each room
audited to permit cross referencing with section 1. and
other parts of the audit report.
Information also entered in 1.0
A1.1.2 ROOM NAME
Information also entered in 1.0
A1.1.3 IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
Plant register identification number if any.
Al. 2
OCCUPANCY RATING
This rating is intended to draw the attention of the
audit team to the likely competence and ability of the
room occupants to safely deal with and/or escape from an
ammonia release.
The audit team should keep this rating in mind when
assessing the operations, layout, and overall safety of
the room in question.
Ratings:
1. Limited attendance
Normally unoccupied or occupied only by a limited
number of personnel (say maximum 3). Access
normally restricted only to' personnel who should be
totally familiar with the refrigeration plant,
ammonia hazards, and emergency procedures. (eg.
plant rooms, ceiling spaces)
Under normal circumstances there would be no
limitation to the installation of ammonia equipment
in these areas.
B1.38/59
Al.2.1
A1.2.2
2. Occupied by permanent employees only
Normally occupied only by permanent employees who
should be totally familiar with ammonia hazards and
emergency procedures but will not necessarily be
familiar with the refrigeration plant. (eg.
manufacturing areas)
Similar to rating 1, but more care is required to
protect equipment from unauthorised operation. It
would also be advisable to limit the quantity of
ammonia in the room.
3. Occupied by seasonal/casual/temporary employees
Occupied by factory staff who may not necessarily
be fully familiar with ammonia hazards or emergency
procedures. (eg. manufacturing areas where
temporary workers are used)
As for rating 1, but every effort should be made to
limit the. quantity of ammonia present (vessels,
flooded heat exchangers, pumper drums, etc) in the
room and allow moreextensive emergency exits etc
to compensate for lack of competence.
4. Public
May be occupied by members of the general public
who will not be aware of ammonia hazards or
emergency procedures and may not be physically fit.
(eg. offices, areas open to public inspection)
AMMONIA MUST NOT BE USED IN ANY AREA OPEN TO THE
PUBLIC OR IN ADJACENT AREAS CONNECTED BY DOORWAYS.
(Note that it is illegal to use ammonia in such
areas under some codes.)
ROOM RATING
Information also entered in 1.0
ADJACENT ROOM RATING
Information also entered in 1.0
Al.3
Al.3.1
A1.3.2
ROOM AND CONTENTS DESCRIPTION
FUNCTION OF ROOM
QUANTITY OF AMMONIA IN ROOM
The audit team should consider the amount of ammonia in
the room when deciding on the adequacy of the' room design
and operation. Information also entered in 1.0
B1.39/59
A1.3.3
A1.3.4
A1.3.5
A1.3.6
A1.3.7
A1.3.8
A1.3.9
to 10
Al.3.11
A1.3.12
Al. 3.13
A1.3.14
A1.3.15
IS THE QUANTITY ESSENTIAL?
When answering this, the audit team should address only
the technical need for the amount of ammonia in the room.
Generally, the quantity should be kept to a minimum for
rooms with occupancy ratings higher than 1. Particular
equipment to check are brine coolers, pumper drums, surge
vessels etc.
NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE R.OOM
Should be considered when looking at the adequacy of
access and .emergency exits. Information also entered in
1.0
ROOM VOLUME
Information also entered in 1.0
NUMBER OF ROOM COOLERS IN ROOM
WARNING SIGNS AT ENTRANCE
ISOLATION FROM OTHER ROOMS
Intend~d..~o draw attention to the possible spread of an
ammonia cloud in the event of an incident.
Information also .entered in 1.0
NON-COMBUSTABLE CONSTRUCTION-
OTRRR EQUIPMENT IN ROOM
When looking at other equipment in the room the team
should consider whether that equipment will cause an
escalation of an ammonia incident (eg. boilers operation
in an explosive concentration of ammonia. Refer also
comments A1.3.13.).
CONSEQUENCES OF ' NO' ANSWER
Ammonia laden air can be drawn into equipment and
distributed throughout the factory, significantly
escalating an incident or damaging equipment (eg
pneumatic instrumentation).'
CLRAR OF UNNECESSARY STORAGE
CT.R~ OF STO~ iCOMBUSTABT.~.S
Al. 4
Al.4.1
Al. 4 .j2
A1.4.3
A1.4.4
A1.4.5
AI.4.6
Al. 4.7
B1.40/59
ACCESS/EGRESS AND ISOLATION
When deciding accessibility, it must be remembered ~'hat
normally acceptable access is INSUFFICIENT in the event
of an emergency, due to wearing of protective equipment
(especially SCBA and ammonia suits) and reduced
visibility. Refer also comments 7.1.7.
Information also entered in 1.0
RESTRICTION OF UNAUTHORISED ACCESS
EXITWAYS FRR~ & CT~AR
NUMBER OF EXITS
The figures quoted a~e the minimum required by some
codes. The audit team must,decide if more should be
provided due to the particular layout.
IDENTIFICATION OF EXIT POINTS
ACCESS
MAIN ISOLATION VALVES
Refer comments A1.4.5.
ACCESSWAYS & CATWALKS
Particular attention should be paid to service gantries
and catwalks in areas such as ceiling spaces. Refer also
comments A1.4.5.
Al. 5
Al.5.1
Hazard areas must have adequate ventilation, whether by
natural means or by extraction fans. Ideally, both
should be available. Information also entered in 1.0
(Following ventilation formulas taken from British
Standard B.S. 4434, 1969)
ADEQUATE NATURAL VENTILATION
Typical requirement would be:
Free Open Area = 0.144(G) sq.m
= 1.01J(G) sq.ft
G = Mass of refrigerant charge (kg or lbs) in the largest
plant, any part of which is located in the machinery room
A1.5.2
A1.5.3
A1.5.4
A1.5.5
A1.5.6
B1.41/59
ADEQUATE POSITIVEVENTILATION
Typical requirement would be:
Air Flow = 50(~$(.G=))-cu.m/hr
= 17.37(~$(G~)) cu.'ft/min
G = as above
VENTILATION BY EXTRACTION FANS
The use of extraction ventilation is to be preferred as
it will assist to limit the spread of ammonia vapour.
EXTERNAL STARTING
EXHA~STFROMVE~TILATION
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Exhausting the ventilation system near air inlets or
windows etc will lead to ammonia being drawn back into
the plant.
EXPLOSION ~R~.IEF PANELS
In some cases, this is a code requirement.
Al. 6
DETECTION & SPRINFT.~R SYSTEMS
The main points which must be considered when deciding on
the adequacy of the detection systems are:
-Occupancy.
Areas which are unattended or with limited
attendance require more extensive automatic
detection and alarm systems.
Al.6.1
-Equipment.
Areas where equipment types are more prone to leaks
(plant rooms, pump systems, plate freezers, defrost
valve stations etc) will require more extensive
systems.
-Risk to adjacent areas.
This includes both within the factory and
neighbours. Both the occupancy ratings (Al.2) and
the Factory Location Zone must be considered.
AMMONIA DETECTOR PROTECTION
Information also entered in 1.0
A1.6.2
A1.6.3
A1.6.4
A1.6.5
A1.6.6
Al. 6.7
B1.42/59
AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN OF NON-E~PLOSION PROOF EQUIPMENT
The automatic shutdown of non-explosion proof equipment,
shutoff of liquid supply and hot gas, and start of
extraction fans in the room when there is an ammonia leak
is recommended, particularly in unattended or limited
attendance areas.
AUTOMATIC FIRE DETECTORS
Information also entered in 1.0
SPRINF?.~-R SYSTEM
MANUAL ACTIVATION-OF SPRINF?.RRS
The automatic sprinkler systems if fitted with manual
operation valves can be useful to assist in neutralising
an ammonia discharge. However, care should be taken that
the resultant water deluge does not result in more
widespread damage.
PROTECTION OF MANUAL SPRINKLER VALVES
PROXIMITY OFF IRE HOSE ~RT.~ &HYDRANTS
In addition to normal fire requirements, fire hose points
and/or hydrants should be close to hazard areas with
sufficient hose length to ensure that all ammonia
equipment can be deluged with water to neutralise
ammonia.
A1.7
A1.7.1
to 2
Al.7.3
Al.7.4'
A1.7.5
Information also entered in 1.0
SAFETY'SHOWERS/EYEWASH STATIONS
These should be located close to the ammonia equipment
and also outside the hazard area. (Refer comments 7.4)
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
Refer comments 7.4
MONITORING pERSONNRT. IN ROOMS
Strongly recommended for cold rooms.
ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY ALARMS
Al. 8
Al.8.1
· Al. 8.2
A1.8.3
A1.8.4
A1.8.5
A1.8.6
ELECTRICAL/LIGHTING
Information also entered in 1.0
EMERGENCY LIGHTING
MOTOR STARTER LOCATION
EXPLOSION PROOF EMERGENCY ~-?.~.CTRICAL EQUIPMENT
EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL ISOLATION SWITCH
PROTECTION FROM TAMPERING
ADEQUACY OF ALARMS
B1.43/59
Al. 9
Al.9.1
A1.9.2
A1.9.3
A1.9.4
A1.9.5
A1.9.6
DRAINAGE
The consequences of dumping ammonia laden water into
the sewer must be addressed due to the risks involved:
-Upsetting and possibly totally disabling a bio waste
water plant due to the high pH of the effluent.
-Injury to personnel working in sewers or at the
treatment plant.due to gassing off of the ammonia.
-Pollution of waterways into which the effluent flows.
Information also entered in 1.0
FLOOR DRAINS
ISOLATION FROM COMMON DRAINS
ISOLATION FROM SEWER.
AUTHORITIES AWARE OF EFFLUENT
AUTOMATIC CONTROL
DIVERSION OF FLOOR WASTE
Diversion of the effluent either to a containment vessel
or to land application can be viable possibilities for
disposal if there are problems with discharging through
normal means. Note that ammonia is frequently used as a
fertiliser at concentrations of max. 2% in water.
Al.10
OVER~T.T.
Information also entered in 1.0
B1.44/59
A2.1
A2.1.1
ANNEX A2 AMMONIA COMPRESSOR INSPECTION' DATA
Complete one form for each compressor.
MACHINE DESCRIPTION
A sequential number should be assigned to each compressor
audited to permit cross referencing with section 2. and
other parts of the audit report.
A2.1.2
A2.1.3
A2.1.4'
A2.1.5
A2.1.6
A2.1.7
A2.1.8
A2.1.9
A2.1.10
A2.1.11
A2.1.12
A2.1.13
Information also entered in 2.1.1
LOCATI ON
DUTY
Information also entered in 2.1.1
MANUFACTURER/MODEL
Information also entered in 2.1.1
YEAR BUILT/LAST OVERHAUL
Information also entered in 2..1.1
TYPE
Information also entered in 2.1.1
MAXIMUM DISCHARGE P~F.~SURE
MAXIMUM RPM
DRIVE TYPE
TRANSMISSION
MOTOR RATING
OIL COOLING
OIL COOLER PRIORITY
A2.2
A2.2.1
A2.2.2
A2.2.3
OPERATING CONDITIONS
SUCTION & DISCHARGE PRESSURE
SUCTION & DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE
SUPERHEAT
A2.2.4
A2.2.5
A2.2.6
A2.2.7
A2.2.8
A2.2.9
A2.3
A2.3.1
A2.3.2
A2.3.3
B1.45/59
CAPACITY
Information also entered in 2.1.1
ABSORBED POWER
COMPRESSOR RPM
OPERATING CONDITIONS OK?
Operating Conditions should be checked against machine
limits in Al.
SAFETY CUTOUTS
DESCRIPTION OF SAFETY CUTOUTS
The audit team must be satisfied that the safety cutouts
function correctly. In plants with adequate documentation
and test procedures, an inspection of the records with
some spot testing may be sufficient.
The extent of testing required must be at the discretion
of the audit team at the time of the audit.
ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF COMP~R~SOR
Safety cutout settings & operation should be checked
against actual operation conditions and machine limits.
HARDWIRING CUTOUTS
Refer comments 2.7.1.2
A2.4
A2.4.1
A2.4.2
A2.4.3
A2.4.4
A2.4.5
RRLIEFVALVES
Refer also comments 2.6.1 & A3.4.
FITTED?
SETTING & RATING
ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF COMPRESSOR
Settings & operation should be checked against actual
operation conditions and machine limitations.
YEAR OFMANUFACTURE
LASTOVERHAUL/REPLACEMENT
B1.46/59
A2.4.6
RELIEF VALVE CONDITION
Excellent.
Clean with no visible rust or corrosion
Good..
Looks OK but some corrosion visible-less than 25%,
surface only.
Fair.
Considerable surface corrosion but none visible
internally.
Bad.
Extensive surface and internal-corrosion visible.
A2.5
A2.5.1
A2.5.2
A2.5.3
A2.5.4
A2.5.5
A2.5.6
A2.5.7
OT~RR COMPONENT DETAILS
LIQUID SEPERATOR/KNOCKOUT POT
C~tECK VALVE ON DISCHARGE
MOVING PARTS GUARDED
ELECTRICAL PARTS GUARDED
ELECTRICAL & MECHANICAL ISOLATION
AUTOMATIC START
AUTO START WARNING
A2.6
A2.6.1
A2.6.2
A2.6.3
A2.6.4
A2.6.5
GENERAL 'CONDITION & MAINTENANCE
ABNORMAL VIBRATION
FOUNDATIONS
COMPRESSOR REPAIRS
OTK~R DEFECTS
A2.7
OVER~T.V. ASSESSMENT OF COFiPRESSOR
Information also entered in 2.1.1
B1.47/59
ANNFD( A3 AMMONIA VESSEL INSPECTION DATA
A3.1
A3.1.1
A3.1.2
A3.1.3
A3.1.4
A3.1.5
A3.1.6
A3.1.7
A3.1.$
A3.1.9
A3.1.10
A3.1.11
to 13
A3.1.14
VESSEL DESCRIPTION
A sequential number should be assigned to each vessel
audited to permit cross referencing with section 2. and
other parts of the audit report.'
Information also entered in
2.3.1 Vessels outside manufacturing areas
2.3.2 Vessels within manufacturing areas
VESS~'-T. NAME
VESSEL LOCATION
Information also entered in
2.3.1 Vessels outside manufacturing areas
2.3.2 Vessels within manufacturing areas
LOCATION IN BUILDING
FUNCTION
Information also entered in
2.3.1 Vessels outside manufacturing areas
2.3,~ ..... ~essels within manufacturing areas
MANUFACTURER
YEAR BUILT
Information also entered in
2.3.1 Vessels outside manufacturing areas
2.3.2 Vessels within manufacturing, areas
ASME OR EQUIV~T.~T STAMPED
Audit team should physically check and confirm whether
the vessel is certified and approved for it's current
use. Note that the vessel approval should be for the
worst condition, which may not necessarily be during
operation.
REGISTRATION NUMBER
CERTIFIED DRAWINGS
Refer comments 3.0
VESSRT. DIMENSIONS
APPROVED/DESIGN PRESSURE
A3.1.15
A3.1.16
B1.48/59
STRESS I~.T.TEVING W~.T.~ING
There is evidence that stress cOrrosion cracking (SCC)
can occur in ammonia refrigerating systems. Particular
causes are associated with.
-Presence of oxygen (air purger efficiency)
-Absence of moisture ( > 0.2% moisture inhibits SCC.)
-Temperatures above -5 deg.c (ie components on the high
pressure side of the system.)
-Use of higher strength steels ( > 350 MPa yield)
Stress relieving of the vessel is believed to
significantly reduce the risks.
(Reference. UK Institute of refrigeration, Code of
Practice for Ammonia Refrigerating Systems, 1982).
While it is not necessarily recommended to take action,
the question is intended to draw attention to a potential
problem.
CONNECTION TO COMPRESSOR SUCTION
A3.2 OPERATION & SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS
Shutdown (not operating) conditions included as these can
be more severe than operation conditions in some .cases.
A3.2.1 PRESSURE
' Information also entered in
2.3.1 Vessels outside manufacturing areas
2.3.2 Vessels within manufacturing areas
A3.2.2 TEMPERATURE
A3.2.3 LIQUID T.RVELRANGE
Must allow sufficient volume above the liquid to ensure
that liquid lockups cannot occur and also prevent liquid
carryover to compressors.
A3.2.4 LIQUID QUANTITY IN VESSRT.
Information also entered in
2.3.1 Vessels outside manufacturing areas
2.3.2 Vessels within manufacturing areas
A3.2.5 CONDITIONS OK?
B1.49/59
A3.3
A3.3.1
A3.3.2
A3.3.3
A3.3.4
CONTROLS & CUTOUTS
DESCRIFi~/ON
Refer to comments for section A2.3.1.
ADEQUATE PROTECTION
Safety cutout settings & operation should be checked
against actual operation conditions and machine
limitations.
HARDWIRING OF CUTOUTS
Refer comments 2.7.1.2
CONTROL COLUMN DESIGN
Audit team should consider access, mechanical protection,
use of screwed joints, isolation, general condition.
A3.4
A3.4.1
A3.4.2
A3.4.3
A3.4.4
A3.4.5
~.~EFVALVES
Refer comments 2.6.1
PROTECTION
In particular, compressor oil seperators, oil pots,
pumper drums, Hoyer tunnels must be checked as these have
been found to lack relief valves in some cases.
SETTING & RATING
ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF VESSEL
Settings & operation should be checked against actual
operation conditions and vessel limitations.
SINGLE OR DUAL
The use of single or dual relief valve sets will depend
largely on the ability to easily purge the vessel to
allow service of the valve.
If this cannot be done, or if the vessel is not small
(normally greater than 0.28 cu.m-10cu.ft), then dual
valves should be fitted.
Note that some codes .only allow the use of single valves
under restrictive circumstances.
SERVICING SINGLE VALVES
Refer comments A3.4.4.
B1.50/59
A3.4'.6
A3.4.7
A3.4.8
A3.4.9
A3.4.10
A3.4.11
A3.4.12
A3.4.13
A3.4.14
A3.4.15
ISOLATION OF DOUBLE RELIEF VALVES
VALVE ABOVE LIQUID LEVEL
VALVE OUTr. RT DIAMETER
VALVE DISCHARGE POINT
If valve discharges to the low pressure side, the audit
team should consider whether the valve can be removed for
service.
BLOCKING. OF INTERNAL R~.IEF VALVE DISCHARGE
With internal reliefs, it is not uncommon for there to be
a stop valve on the discharge side to permit the removal
of the relief valVe. If this is done then there must be a
means of ensuring that this valve is not closed unless it
is safe to do so.
~F3.IEF VALVE DISCHARGE TO ATMOSPHERE
Refer comments 2.6.1.2'.
CORRECT PIPING OF VALVE
Audit team should look at the piping arrangement.
Particular points are protection from entry of water
(rain hoods', oil seals etc), adequate sizing'
(particularly when multiple, relief valves vent through
one pipe), support, termination point, identification of
vent etc~
YEAR OF MANUFACTURE
LAST OVERHAUL/REPLACEMENT
VALVE CONDITION
Refer comments A2.4.6.
A3.5
A3.5.1
A3.5.2
A3.5.3
A3.5.4
OTM~R COMPONENT DETAILS
OIL POT FITTED
RELIEF VALVE ON OIL POT
CORRECT & SAFE PIPING OF R~.IEFVALVE
GUARDING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
A3.5.5
B1.51/59
SAFE, ACCESSIBLE ISOLATION
When assessing accessibility, it must be remembered that
normally acceptable access is INSUFFICIENT in the event
of an emergency, due to wearing of protective equipment
(especially SCBA and ammonia suits) and reduced
visibility.
A3.6
A3.6.1
A3.6.2
A3.$.3
A3.6.4
A3.6.5
A3.6.6
A3.6.7
GENERAL CONDITION & MAINTENANCE
CRACKING
Refer comments A3.1.t5.
If cracking has occurred on this vessel, the audit team
should consider and make a recommendation on whether the
vessel should be condemned and replaced. The method of
repair used, and points raised below, and in 3.1.15, must
also be considered .
MODIFICATIONS & MAJOR ~RDAIRS
SUPERVISION AND RETESTING OF ~AIRS OR MODIFICATIONS
All modifications and repairs must be subject to the same
criteria as for a new.installation (supervision, testing,
welder qualification etc). If the audit team has any
doubt that this has been complied with, or if the
documentation is insufficient, then serious consideration
should be given to condemning the vessel.
VESSEL INSPECTION
It is normally a legal requirement for regular
inspections by an outside authority.
Even if it is not, this should be done.
NDE EXAMINATION
Unless a code requirement, NDE (Non destructive
examination such as X-ray, ultrasonic, magnetic particle
testing) should not normally be necessary, except where
there is doubt about vessel integrity.
ADEQUATE FOUNDATIONS
INSULATION CONDITION
Good.
Fair.
Slight signs of vapour barrier leaks..
B1.52/59
Bad.
Extensive breakdown of vapour barrier.
Where there are vapour barrier leaks, the audit team
should consider the need to remove sections of insulation
to check for corrosion damage.
A3.6.8
A3.6.9
A3.6.10
A3.6.11
ICE FORMATIONS
Generally, any ice formations should be considered as
abnormal.
CORROSION
None.
Slight.
Moderate.
Appears to be on surface only
Extensive.
Could jeopardise safety. In this case the audit
team must make recommendations on the action, to be
taken.
UNUSUAL NOISES OR VIBRATION
Any noise or vibration should be treated as not normal
and fully investigated to determine the source and the
safety of the system.
A3.7
OVER~TJ. ASSESSFiENTOFVESSEL
Information also entered in
2.3.1 Vessels outside manufacturing areas
2.3.2 Vessels within manufacturing areas
B1.53/59
ANNEX A4 AMMONIA ItEAT EXCHANGER INSPECTION DATA
A4.1
A4.1.1
A4.1.2
A4.1.3
A4.1.4
A4.115
A4.1.6
A4.1.7
A4.1.8
A4.1.9
A4.1.10
to 12
A4.1.13
DESCRIPTION
INDEX NUMBER
A sequential number should be assigned to each heat
exchanger audited to' permit cross referencing with
section 2. and other parts of the audit report.
Information also entered in 2.2 Heat Exchangers used as condensors
2.4 Heat Exchangers at usage points
TYPE OF ~R. AT EXCHANGER
Information also entered in 2.2 Heat Exchangers used as condensors
2.4 Heat Exchangers at usage points
Information also entered in
2.4 Heat Exchangers at usage points
LOCATION IN BUILDING
MANUFACTURER/MODEL
InfOrmation also.entered in 2.2 Heat Exchangers used as condensors
2.4 Heat Exchangers at usage points
YEAR BUILT
Information also entered in 2.2 Heat Exchangers used as condensors
2.4 Heat Exchangers at usage points
ASMEOR EQUIVAT.RNT STAMPED
Refer comments A 3.1.8
CERTIFIED DRAWINGS
Refer comments 3.0
HEAT EXCHANGER DIMENSIONS
APPROVED/DESIGN P~R~SURE
A4.1.14
A4.1.15
A4.1.16
A4.1.17
A4.1.18
A4.1.19
A4.1.20
A4.1.21
A4.1.22
A4.1.23
Bi.54/59
STRESS ~RT.IEVINGWELDING
Refer comments A3.1.15
LEAKAGE DETECTOR
Leak detection should be provided on the water side of a
heat exchanger (eg. condensors, water chillers, .ice
tanks) to detect ammonia leaks into the water before
significant damage occurs to water side equipment such as
copper alloy air conditioning coils.
RECOVERY
BREAK CIRCUIT
If the heat exchanger is used for heat recovery to
potable water, it must be provided with an intermediate
"break" circuit to ensure that any ammonia leakage will
not enter'the potable water supplies.
REFRIGERANT F~.~
CONNECTION TO COMPRESSOR SUCTION
LIQUID SEPERATOR OR KNOCKOUT POT
The liquid separator may be integral with the heat
exchanger. Where DX type feed is. used, the need for a
separator is reduced provided that the system is designed
to minimise the risk of liquid carryover to the
compressor.
TYPE OF DEFROST
DESCRIPTION OF DEFROST
Refer comments 2.4.2.3.
A4.2
A4.2.1
A4.2.2
A4.2.3
OPERATION & SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS
Refer comments A3.2
PRESSURE
PRESSURE
CAPACITY
Information also entered in 2.2 Heat Exchangers used as condensors
2.4 Heat Exchangers at usage points
A4.2.4
A4.2.5
A4.2.6
LIQUID LEVEL RANGE
Refer comments A3.2.3.
LIQUID QUANTITY IN R~.ATEXCHANGER
CONDITIONS OK?
B1.55/59
A4.3
A4.3.t
CONTROLSw CUTOUTS
Refer comments A3.3,
DESCRIPTION
A4.4
A4.4.1
A4.4.2
A4.4.3
A4.4.4
A4.4.5
A4.4.6
A4.4.7
A4.4.8
A4.4.9
A4.4.10
~RT.IEFVALVES
Refer comments 2.6.1, A3.4
PROTECTION
Refer comments A3.4.1
SETTING & RATING
ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF ~-AT EXCHANGER
Settings & operation should be checked against actual
operation conditions and heat exchanger limitations.
$ING?~ OR DUAL
Refer comments A3.4.4
SERVICING SINGLE VALVES
Refer comments A3.4.4.
ISOLATION OF DOUBLE ~LIEF VALVES
VALVE ABOVE LIQUID LEVRL
VALVE OD~I~.~T DIAMETER
VALVE DISCHARGE POINT
Refer comments A3.4.9
BLOCKING OF INTERNAL~RLIEFVALVEDI$CHARGE
Refer comments A3.4.10
A4.4.11
A4.4.12
A4.4 ..13
A4.4.14
A4.4.15
~RT.~EF VALVE DISCHARGE TO ATMOSPHERE
Refer comments 2.6.1.2.
CORRECT PIPING OF VALVE
Refer comments A3.4.12
YEAR OF MANUFACTURE
LAST OVERHA~/~C~
VALVE CONDITION
Refer comments A2.4.6.
B1.56/59
A4.5
A4.5.1
A4.5.2
A4.5.3
A4.5.4
A4.5.5
OTW~R COMPONENT DETAILS
OIL POT FITTED
~.T.IEF VALVE ON OIL POT
CORRECT & SAFE PIPING OF ~.T.WEP YALVE
GUARDING ~.?.~-CTRICAL COMi~S
SAFE, ACCESSIBLE ISOLATION
Refer comments A3.5.5
A4.6
A4.6.1
A4.6.2
A4.6.3
A4.6~4
A4.6.5
A4.6.6
GENERAL CONDITION & MAINTENANCE
CRACKING
Refer comments A3.6.1
MODIFICATIONS & MAJOR REPAIRS
SUPERVISION AND RETESTTNG OF ~-DAIRS OR MODIFICATIONS
Refer comments A3.6.3
VESSEL INSPECTION.
Refer comments A3.6.4
ADEQUATE FOUNDATIONS
INSULATION CONDITION
Refer comments A3.6.7
B1.57/59
A4.6.7
A4.6.8
A4.6.9
A4.6.10
ICE FORMATIONS
Refer comments A3.6.8
CORROSION
Refer comments A3.6.9
UNUSUAL NOISES OR.VIBRATION
Refer comments A3.6.10
OTHER DEFECTS
A4.7
O~T.T. ASSESSMENT OFVESSEL
Information also entered in 2.2 Heat Exchangers used as condensors
2.4 Heat Exchangers at usage points
ANNEX A5 I~F.T.IEF VALVES
Refer comments 2.6.I & A3.4
ANNEX A6 AMMONIA GAS DETECTORS
The main points which must be considered when deciding on
the adequacy of the detection systems are:
-Occupancy Rating of Room.
Areas which are unattended or with limited
attendance require more extensive automatic
systems to ensure early detection.
-Equipment.
Areas where equipment types are more prone to leaks
(plant rooms, pump systems, plate freezers, defrost
valve stations etc) will require more extensive
systems.
-Risk to adjacent areas.
This includes both within the factory and
neighbours. Both the occupancy ratings (Al.2) and
the Factory Location Zone must be considered.
B1.58/59
A6.1
A6.1.1
A6.1.2
A6.1.3
A6.1.4
A6.1.5
A6.1.6
A6.1.7
A6.1.8
DESCRIPTION
UNIT INDEX NIE~BER
A sequential number should be assigned to each ammonia
detector system audited to permit cross referencing with
section 2~ and other parts of the audit report.
Information also entered in 2.6.4.1
LOCATI ON
AREAS MONITOR~
Refer comments 2.6.4
Information also entered in 2.6.4.1
MANUFACTURER/MODEL
SENSING POINT LOCATION
Audit team should check sensor location to determine
effectiveness
Setpoints will vary depending on the location and
function of the room protected.
Normally an alarm setpoint should be of the order of
100ppm. Note that some codes specify much higher
(10000ppm). However, these limits are intended to warn
about the risk of explosion only and will not give
sufficient early warning of a leak.
Information also entered in 2.6.4.1
SHUTDO~ SETPOINT
Refer comments A6.1.6.
Shutdown setpoints should be set as low as possible but
high enough to prevent nuisance tripping. This could
normally be in the range of 100-300ppm.
Information also entered in 2.6.4.1
ADEQUATE WARNING
A6.1.9
A6.1.10
A6.1.11
A6.1.12
B1.59/59
AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN
The automatic shutdown of non-explosion proof equipment,
shutoff of liquid and hot gas supply, and start of
extraction fans in the room when there is an ammonia leak
is recommended, particularly in unattended or limited
attendance areas.
The audit team must also consider the risk of damage due
to underpressure when extraction fans start, particularly
in cold rooms and freezers.
Information also entered in 2.6.4.1
BATTERY BACKUP
DETECTOR SUPERVISION
Adequate protection must include alarms which are
monitored at all times (eg. at gate house, telephone link
etc).
CONSEQUENCES OF 'NO' ANSWER
Failure to adequately monitor plant rooms and hazard
areas will result in a greater risk of a discharge
becoming serious before it is detected. At particular
risk are areas which are not manned on a 24 hour/7 day
basis.
FAIL SAFE
A6.2
A6.2.1
A6.2.2
A6.2.3
A6.2.4
TESTING
Refer comments 5.1.2.
REGULAR TESTING
TESTING FREQUENCY
RECORDS
Refer comments 3.0.
TEST METHOD
A6.3
OV]ZRALT. ASSESS~
Information also entered in 2.6.4.1
Page 1
AMMON IA I NC IDENT REPORT of
2 Pages
FACTORY
DATE OF INCIDENT
COUNTRY
TIME OF' INCIDENT
1. CLASS OF INCIDENT
( ) CLASS 1
CATASTROPHIC
( ) CLASS 2
SERIOUS
( ) CLASS 3
-Caused evacuation of the plant or
neighbours or serious injury; and
SCBA (breathing apparatua)to contain.
-Caused injury and/or damage to property
or the environment and required SCBA to
contain.
-Required breathing equipment but caused
no injury or damage.
2. LOCATION IN FACTORY
3. SOURCE OF DISCHARGE
3.1 SUBSYSTEM
( ) COMPRESSOR ( ) CONDENSOR (
( ) AIR PURGER (,) CHARGING SYST. (
(__) HOT GAS PIPING (__) SUCTION PIPING (
(. ) SCRAPED SURFACE HX (__) PLATE FREEZER (
( ) OTHER (specify)
) VESSEL
) OIL DRAINS
) LIQUID PIPING
) A.H.U.
3.2 COMPONENT OR ITEM
( ) SEAL (TYPE
(, ) CONTROL VALVE
(,,) HOSE (TYPE
(__).FLANGE
(__) GASKET
(__) OTHER (specify)
) (__) RELIEF VALVE
(__) JOINT
) (__) GAUGE POCKET
( ) WELD
( ) GLAND PACKING
( ) I SOL. VALVE
(__) SIGHT GLASS
(__) STRAINER
(__) THREAD
(__) .GLASS
3.3 MAIN CAUSE OF DISCHARGE
WORK PRACTICES.
( ) AIR PURGING
( ) MANUFACTURING
DEL~'BERATEDISCHARGE
(__) LIQUID DUMP
COMPONENT DEFECT
(__) FRACTURE (CRACKS) (__) CORROSION
(__) CONTROL SYSTEM (
(__) OIL DRAINAGE (
(__) MODIFICATIONS (
(__) VAPOUR VENT
) CHARGING
) MAINTENANCE
( ) MANUF. DEFECT
) RESULT OF OTHER FAILURE (specify)
OTHER CAUSES (specify)
3.4 OTHER RELATED FACTORS
AMMON I
Page 2
I NC IDENT 'REPORT of 2 Pages
FACTORY
DATE OF INCIDENT
4.ACTIVITY AT TIME OF DISCHARGE
ACTIVITY AT THE TIME OF THE DISCHARGE:
( ) ROUTINE MAINTENANCE (__) ALTERATIONS OR EXTENSIONS
( ) NORMAL OPERATIONS ( ) PLANT WAS SHUT DOWN
ATTENDANCE AT THE TIME OF TMR DISCHARGE:
( )UNATTENDED ( ) ATTENDED BY ( ) OPERATORS
NORMAL PLANT ATTENDANCE:
( ) UNATTENDED ( ) FULLY ATTENDED (__) PARTIALLY ATTENDED
5. EMERGENCY RESPONSE
RATE THE DEGREE OF CONTROL OF THE INCIDENT ACHIEVED
(__) LOW (__) MODERATE ( ) SUBSTANTIAL (__) COMPLETE
RATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN
(__) GOOD (__) FAIR ( ) INEFFECTIVE (__) NO PLAN EXISTED
WHAT DEFICIENCIES WERE FOUND IN THE EMERGENCY PLAN?
6.CONSEQUENCES~OF DISCHARGE
INJURIES
NO. OF PEOPLE INJURED (EMPLOYEES
NUMBER REQUIRED HOSPITALISATION
EVACUATION
EVACUATION OF AREA AROUND DISCHARGE
EVACUATION OF ENTIRE FACTORY
EVACUATION OF NEIGHBOURS
DAMAGE
QUANTITY OF AMMONIA DISCHARGED
NORMAL AMMONIA CHARGE
DESCRIBE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE:
) (OTHERS )
(Y/N)
(Y/N)
(Y/N)
(kg/lbs)
(kg/lbs)
ESTIMATED COST OF INCIDEB~f
(eg:from lost product,down time,damage,cleanup,fines,legal)
7. PROBABLE RECURRANCE OF INCIDENT
( ) HIGH ( ) ~MODERATE (__) LOW (
) NEGLIGIBLE
8. DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT (Note especially the following points)
·-Describe relevent events leading up to the incident.
-What acts, failures to act and/or conditions contributed
directly to the incident. What are the basic, fundamental
reasons for the existance of these acts or conditions.
-What action was taken to bring the incident under control
-What remedial action has been taken to prevent recurrance
(eg:equipment,work practices,training,emergency response).