HomeMy WebLinkAboutMITIGATION
Section 1. Registration Information
1,1 Source Identification:
a. Facility Name:
b, Parent Company #1 Name:
c. Parent Company #2 Name:
1.2 EPA Facility Identifier:
1.3 Other EPA Systems Facility Identifier:
1.4 Dun and Bradstreet Numbers (DUNS):
a. Facility DUNS:
b. Parent Company #1 DUNS:
c. Parent Company #2 DUNS:
1.5 Facility Location Address:
a. Street 1: 6501 Disffict Blvd.
b. Street 2:
c. city: Bakersfield
.,f. County: Kern
;~=~cility La~'_,~ude and Longitude:
.. g. Lat, (d~mmss,s): 35 18 46.0
~ i.' I.at/Long Method: 14
j. La~t/Long Description: PG
1.$' OWner or Operator:
a. Name: Randy D0rrell
b. Phone: (66t) 832-2653
Mailing address:
c. Street 1: 6501 District Blvd.
e. City: Bakersfield
United States Cold Storage, Bakersfield
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
United States Cold Storage of California
157537127
001215136
009108150
d. State: CA e. Zip: 93313
h. Long. (dddmmss.s): -119
Interpolation - Digital map source (TIGER)
Plant Entrance (General)
d. Street 2:
f. State: CA g. Zip:
ORIGINAL
04. 32.0
93313 -
1.7, ,Name and title of person or position responsible for part 68 (RMP) implementation:
a. Name of person: Ron Whisenant
I~; Title of person or position: Chief Engineer
5/20/1999 5:21:08 PM Page 1 of 11
1.8 Emergency contact:
a. Name:
b. Title:
c. Phone:
d. 24-hour phone:
e. Ext. or PIN:
1.9 Other points of contact:
Ron Whisenant
Chief Engineer
(661) 832-2653
(559) 250-4182
a. Facility or Parent Company E-Mail Address:
b. Facility Public Contact Phone:
c. Facility or Parent Company WWW Homepage Address:
1.10 LEPC: Region 5 LEPC Inland South
1.11 Number of full time employees on site: 23
1.12 Covered by:
a. OSHA PSM: Yes
b. EPCRA 302: Yes
c. CAA Title V: No Air Operating Permit ID:
1.13 OSHA Star or Merit Ranking: No
1.14 Last Safety Inspection (by an Extemal Agency) Date:
1.15 Last Safety Inspection Performed by an External Agency:
1.16 Will this RMP involve predictive filing?: No
12/14/1994
Fire Department
Page 2 of 11
5/20/1999 5:21:08 PM
Section 1.1 7 Process(es)
a. Process ID: 20 Program Level 3 Ammonia Refrigeration
b. NAICS Code
49312 Refrigerated Warehousing and Storage Facilities
c. Process Chemicals
c.1 Chemical Name
Ammonia (anhydrous)
c.2 CAS Nr.
7664-41-7
S e ctio n 2. Toxics: Worst Cas e
Toxics: Worst Case ID: 20
2.1 a. Chemical Name: Ammonia (anhydrous)
b. Percent Weight of Chemical (if in a mixture):
2.2 Physical State: Gas Liquified by Pressure
2.3 Model used: EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
2.4 Scenario: Liquid spill & Vaporization
2.5 Quantity released: 13,165 lbs
2.6 Release rate: 724.0 Ibs/min
2.7 Release duration: 10.0 rains
2.8 Wind speed: 1.5 m/sec
2.9 Atmospheric Stability Class: F
2.10 Topography: Urban
2.11 Distance to Endpoint: 1.00 mi
2.12 Estimated residential population within distance to endpoint:
2.13 Public receptors within distance to endpoint:
a. Schools: Yes d. Prisons/Correctionfacilities:
b. Residences: Yes
c. Hospitals: Yes
g. Other (Specify):
2.14 Environmental receptors within distance to endpoint:
a. National or state parks, forests, or monuments:
b. Officially designated wildlife sanctuaries, preserves, or refuges:
c. Federal wilderness areas:
d. Other (Specify):
2.15 Passive mitigation considered:
6,669
e. Recreation areas:
f. Major commercial, office, or industrial areas:
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
c.3 Qty (lbs.)
22,957
5/20/1999 5:21:09 PM Page 3 of 11
a. Dikes: No d. Drains: No
b. Enclosures: Yes e. Sumps: No
c. Berms: No f. Other (Specify):
2.16 Graphic file name:
Release inside building
Section 3. Toxics: Alternative Release
Toxics: Alternative Release ID: 20
3.1 a. Chemical Name: Ammonia (anhydrous)
b. Percent Weight of Chemical (if in a mixture):
Gas Liquified by Pressure
EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
Mechanical seal on liquid ammonia pump
3.2 Physical State:
3.3 Model used:
3,4 Scenario:
3.5 Quantity released:
3.6 Release rate:
3.7 Release duration:
3.8 Wind speed:
3.9 Atmospheric Stability Class:
3.10 Topography: Urban
3.11 Distance to Endpoint:
7,077 lbs
236.0 Ibs/min
30.0 mins
3.0 m/sac
D
0.10 mi
3.12 Estimated residential population within distance to endpoint:
3.13 Public receptors within distance to endpoint:
a. Schools: No
b. Residences: No
c. Hospitals: No
g. Other (Specify):
d. Prisons/Correction facilities:
e. Racreation areas:
f. Major commercial, office, or industrial areas:
3.14 Environmental receptors within distance to endpoint:
a. National or state parks, forests, or monuments:
b. Officially designated wildlife sanctuaries, preserves, or refuges:
c. Federal wiidemess areas:
d. Other (Specify):
3.15 Passive mitigation considered:
a. Dikes: No
b. Enclosures: Yes
c. Berms: No
3.16 Active mitigation considered:
a. Sprinkler systems:
b. Deluge system:
d. Drains: No
e. Sumps: No
f. Other (Specify):
Release inside building
Yes f. Flares:
No g. Scrubbers:
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
512011999 5:21:10 PM Page 4 of 11
c. Water curtain: No
d. Neutralization: Yes
e. Excess flow valve No
3.17 Graphic file name:
h. Emergency shutdown systems:
i. Other (Specify):
Yes
Section 4. Flammables: Worst Case -- No Data To Report
Section 5. Flammables: Alternative Release -- No Data To Report
Section 6. Accident History
6.1 Date of accident: 03/15/1997 6.2 Time accident began (HHMM):
6.3 NAICS Code of process involved: 49312
6.4 Release duration: 000 Hours (HHH) 01 Minutes (MM)
6.5 Chemical(s):
a. Chemicol Nome
Ammonia (anhydrous)
6.6 Release event: 6.7 Release source:
a. Gas release: No a. Storage vessel:
b. Liquid spill/evaporation: Yes b. Piping:
c. Fire: No c. Process vessel:
d. Explosion: No d. Transfer hose:
0645 ~iAM "~ M
CAS Number
7664-41-7
b. Quantity
Released (lbs)
No e. Valve: No
Yes f. Pump: No
No g. Joint: No
No h. Other (Specify):
6.8 Weather conditions at time of event (if known):
a. Wind speed: 3.0 Units: mile/h
b. Temperature: 84
c. Atmoshperic Stability Class:
d. Precipitation present: No
e. Unknown weather conditions: No
Degrees Fahrenheit
D
Direction: NW
6.9 On-site impacts:
Employees or contractors:
a. Deaths 0
b. Injuries o
c. Property damage ($):
6.10 Known Off-site impacts:
a. Deaths:
Public responders:
0
0
d. Evacuated:
Public:
0
0
c.%
Weight
0
Page 5 of 11
5120/1999 5:21:10 PM
b. Hospitalization:
c. Other medical treatments:
g. Environmental damage:
1. Fish or Animal Kills:
2. Tree, laWn, shrub, or crop damage:
3. Water contamination:
4. Soil contamination:
5. Other (specify):
6.11 Initiating event: b
6.12 Contributing factors:
a. Equipment failure: No
Yes
b. Human error:
c. Improper procedures: Yes
d. Overpressurization: NO
e. Upset condition: No
f. By-pass condition: No
Unknown
Human Error
No
No
No
No
e. Sheltered-in-place:
f. property Damage ($):
g. Maintenance activity/inactivity: Yes
No
h. Process design failure:
No
i. Unsuitable equipment: ·
j. Unusual weather condition: No
No
k. Management error:
I. Other (specify}:
6.13 Offsite responders notified:
6.14 Changes introduced as a result of the accident:
a. Improved or upgraded equipment: No
No
b. Revised maintenance:
No
c. Revised training:
No
d. Revised operating procedures:
No
e. New process coatrols:
No
f. New mitigation systems:
Section 7. Prevention program 3
Ammonia Refrigeration
Process Id: 20_
500
0
g. Revised emergency response plan: No
No
h. Changed process:
No
i. Reduced inventory:
No
j. None:
kl Other(Specifi]): Reinforce existing programs
prevention program ID: 20
prevention Program Description: Ammonia Refrigeration, Cold Storage facility
7.1 NAICS Code: 49312
7.2 Chemicals: Chemical Name
Ammonia (anhydrous)
' . ' was last reviewed or revised:
7.3 Date on which the safety reformation
7.4 Process Hazard Analysis {PHA):
05/2011999
5/20/1999 5:21:11 PM
Page 6 of 11
a. The date of last PHA or PHA update:
b. The technique used:
What If: Yes
Checklist: No
What If/Checklist: No
HAZOP: No
05120/1999
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis: No
Fault Tree Analysis: No
Other (Specify):
c. Expected or actual date of completion of all changes from last PHA or PHA update:
Major hazards identified:
Toxic release:
Fire:
Explosion:
Runaway reaction:
Polymerization:
Overpressurization:
Corrosion:
Overfilling:
e. Process controls in use:
Vents:
Relief valves:
Check valves:
Scrubbers:
Flares:
Manual shutoffs:
Automatic shutoffs:
Interlocks:
Alarms and procedures:
Keyed bypass:
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Contamination:
Equipment failure:
Loss of cooling, heating, electricity, instrument air:
Earthquake:
Floods (flood plain):
Tomado:
Hurricanes:
Other (Specify):
Emergency air supply: No
Emergency powdr: No
Backup pump: Yes
Grounding equipment: Yes
Inhibitor addition: No
Rupture disks: No
Excess flow device: No
Quench system: No
Purge system: Yes
None: No
Other (Specify):
05/20/1999
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
f. Mitigation systems in use:
Sprinkler system: Yes
Dikes: No
Fire walls: Yes
Blast Walls: No
Deluge system: Yes
g. Monitoring/detection systems in use:
Water curtain: No
Enclosure: No
Neutralization: Yes
None: No
Other (Specify):
Page 7 of 1 I
5/20/1999 5:21:11 PM
Process area detectors: Yes None:
Perimeter monitors: No Other (Specify):
h. Changes since last PHA or PHA update:
Reduction in chemical inventory: No
Increase in chemical inventory: No
Change process parameters: No
Installation of process controls: No
Installation of process detection systems: No
7.5 The date of most recent review or revision of operating procedures:
7.6 Training:
a. The date of the most recent review or revision of training programs:
b. The type of training provided:
Classroom: Yes On the job: No Other (Specify):
No
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems:
Installation of mitigation systems:
None recommended:
None:
Other (Specify):
Industry schools
No
No
No
Yes
05/18/1999
09/01/19§3
7.7
c. The type of competency testing used:
Written test: Yes Observation:
Oral test: No Other (Specify):
Demonstration: Yes
Maintenance:
Yes
a. The date of the most recent review or revision of maintenance procedures:
b. The date of the most recent equipment inspection or test:
c. Equipment most recently inspected or tested: Purger
7.8 Management of change:
a. The date of the most recent change that triggered management of
change procedures:
b. The date of the most recent review or revision of management of
change procedures:
7.9 The date of the most recent pre-startup review:
7.10 Compliance audits:
a. The date of the most recent compliance audit:
b. Expected or actual date of completion of all changes resulting from the compliance audit:
7.11 Incident investigation:
a. The date of the most recent incident investigation (if any):
b. The expected or actual date of completion of all changes resulting from the investigation:
7.12 The date of the most recent review or revision of employee participation plans:
05/19/1999
05/14/1999
09/29/1994
04/04/1997
05/24/1996
03/17/1997
03/17/1997
08/09/1994
512011999 5:21:12 PM Page 8 of 11
7.13 The date of the most recent review or revision of hot work permit procedures:
7.14 The date of the most recent review or revision of contractor safety procedures:
7.16 The' date of the most recent evaluation of contractor safety performance:
Section I). Prevention Program 2 -- No Data To Report
Section 9. Emergency Response
9.1 Written Emergency Response (ER) Plan:
a. Is facility included in written community emergency response plan? Yes
b. Does facility have its own written emergency response plan? Yes
9.2 Does facility's ER plan include specirm actions to be taken in response
to accidental releases of regulated substance(s)? Yes
9.3 Does facility's ER plan include procedures for informing the public and
local agencies responding to accidental releases? Yes
9.4 Does facility's ER plan include information on emergency heath care? Yes
9.5 Date of most recent review or uPdate of facility's ER plan: 08/14/1998
9.6 Date of most recent ER training for facility's employees: 02/20/1999
9.7 Local agency with which facility's ER plan or response activities are coordinated:
a. Name of agency: Bakersfield Fire Department
b. Telephone number: (661) 861-3636
9.8 Subject to:
a. OSHA Regulations at 29 CFR 1910.38: Yes
b. OSHA Regulations at 29 CFR 1910.120: Yes
c. Clean Water Act Regulations at 40 CFR 112: No
d. RCRA Regulations at 40 CFR 264, 265, and 279.52: No
e. OPA-90 Regulations at 40 CFR 112, 33 CFR 154, 49 CFR 194, or 30 CFR 254: No
f. State EPCRA Rules or Laws: Yes
g. Other (Specify):
Executive Summary
09/01/1993
10/01/1994
05/20/1999
United States Cold Storage, Inc. is committed to the safe operation of all our facilities to protect our workers, the
public and the environment. This is accomplished to a great extent by a well developed, up-to-date and
implemented Risk Management Program. All USCS facilities shall operate in a prudent and safe manner. It shall be
the responsibility of the plant manager to ensure that all procedures are followed as set forth in our Risk
Manaoement and Proce.~,s Safety Mana(3ement oroorams. In the unlikelv event of an accidental release it is USCS
5/20/1999 5:21:12 PM Page 9 of 11
poliCy to immediately call the National Response Center, Local Emergency Response Committee, the local Fire
Department and other agency(les) that maybe required. All USCS facilities will have an emergency response team
to assist these agency(les).
United States Cold Storage, Bakersfield, is a public refrigerated warehouse that uses anhydrous ammonia as a
refrigerant in a closed loop system. Anhydrous ammonia, most commonly known as ammonia, is an excellent
refrigerant and is commonly used in most of the wodd's induslfial refrigeration systems. Ammonia has an excellent
warning property, its odor. Ammonia's odor is familiar to most people due to the fact that it is commonly used in
household cleaning solutions. Ammonia can be detected as Iow as 5 parts per million (PPM) and has an average
life span of 7 days in the environment before it breaks down to its common elements nitrogen and hydrogen.
Typical items stored within USCS facilities are raw or processed food items that can be found in your supermarket
or local restaurant. Temperatures range between -30 degrees to +45 degrees F. The refrigeration equipment and
piping are located throughout the facility. The condensers, and related piping are on the machine room roof with
the piping to and from the freezers, coolers, truck and rail docks located on the warehouse and dock roofs. The
machine room contains most of the large refrigeration machinery and vessels. In an unlikely event of a refrigerant
leak in a refrigerated space, the ammonia vapor would be contained inside the space, due to the vapor fight
construction of the facility. It then may be treated and/or vented under controlled conditions. The facility is equipped
with ammonia detectors throughout to help lessen any leaks that might occur and to provide an early alert.
USCS believes that prevention is foremost. Ail of USCS facil~es are maintained by a staff of trained maintenance
personnel. Most of these people are members of the Refrigerating Engineers and Technicians Association (RETA)
and all Chief Engineers are members of the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (ILAR) and hold a
RETA Certification Level A. USCS has on staff at the corporate level an OSHA and EPA coordinator/trainer who is
a certified OSHA Instructor. All facilities comply with OSHA's Process Safety Management without regard to the
ammonia threshold quantity. All the vessels and piping have been installed according to ASME vessel and piping
codes and applicable local Building, Fire and Mechanical Codes. The Bakersfield facility was engineered and built
to a Seismic 4 Earthquake Code.
The facility's emergency response program is based on the OSHA requirements for 29 CFR 1910.38-Emergency
Action Plan, OSHA's 1910.119, Process Safety Management and 1910.120 HAZWOPER standards. We have
trained employess for emergency response and maintain a written emergency response plan.
FIVE-YEAR ACCIDENT HISTORY:
The USCS Bakersfield facility has been operating at this location for the past 5 years. Within that history the facility
has seen one refrigerant releases.
OFFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS:
Worst-case release scenado analysis: As required by law under Title 19, Public Safety, Chapter 4.5 Califomia
Accidental Release Prevention Program, Section 2750.3, and 40 CFR Part 68.25, Worst-case release scenado
analysis, an analysis was prepared for the Bakersfield facility. The United States Environmental Protection
Agency's Risk Management Comp computer program for Ammonia was used for this analysis. This worst-case
release scenario is estimated to create the greatest distance in any direction to an endpoint of 200 ppm from the
accidental release of anhydrous ammonia used as a refrigerant in a closed-loop refrigeration system. The quanta/
release was based on a 'I/Vorst-case" release scenario for a toxic gas liquified under pressure that is normally a
gas at ambient temperature. The release was generated from the facility's High Pressure Receiver. Releasing 724
pounds per minute for a 10 minute period with passive mitigation system in place, inside a facility. The Bakersfield
facility has offsite consequence.
The dispersion analysiS used a wind speed of 1.5 meters per second and an "F" atmospheric stability class. With
an ambient temperature of 77 degrees F (25C) and a relative humidity of 50%. Using a release height at ground
level and a surface roughness class of Urban. Dense gas was used for gas density.
Alternative Release Scenario Analysis: As required by law under 40 CFR Part 68.28, Alternative release scenario
analysis was prepared for the facility. The United States Environmental Protection Agency's Risk Management
Comp computer program was used for this analysis. This alternative release scenario is estimated to create a
distance to reach off-site in any direction to an endpoint of 200 ppm from an accidental release of ammonia used
as a refrigerant in a closed-loop refrigeration system. The Bakersfield facility has offsite consequence'.
The alternative release scenado was a mechanical seal failure on an ammonia pump for the Iow temperature pump
receiver. The mechanical seal failure was identified through the review of our process hazard analysis (PHA) for
the Bakersfield facility's What-If Study. The failure scenario was identified under Subsystem(s) #17, Low
Temperature Pump Receiver, question ~L3. Passive mitigation system was in place, the release took place inside
the facility. The follOwing administrative controls are in place: Engine room log is maintained wi~ visual checks of
all of the equipment including the amonia pumps. Oil that is added to the refrigeration equipment is noted on the
Daily Engine Room Log. Annual preventive maintenance of the refrigeration equipment includes the ammonia
5/20/1999 5:21:12 PM Page 10 of 11
pumps. Housekeeping of the engine room area includes wiping up and investigating oil leaks and moping the floors
on a daily to weekly bases.
The second PHA recently performed for this facility produced no recommendations to improve safety. However the
first PHA produced 7 recommendatons to improve safety at the Bakersfield facility. Such recommendation
included training, installation of new mitigation equipment.
RMP Validation Errors --- No Data To Report
Page 11 of 11
5/20/1999 5:21:12 PM
Appendix D
Risk Management Plan
I.J~ted States Cold Storage, I1~.
Risk Management Data Elements
Page 1 Bakersfield, CA.
i~ction 2745.7 RMP Program 3 Prevention Program Component:
(q) The owner or operator shall submit the following external events analysis information.
(1) The types of natural and human caused external events considered in PHA Section 2760.2
[~Earthquake [~Fire ~"]^irplane crash [--1Train Derailment
[~lSevere weather
[--]Electrical storm [~]High winds ~]Flooding
[--~Hail r"'lTornadoes
~"]Sabotage [~]Vandalism
(2) The magnitude or S, cope of external events which were considered.
~-lEarthquake Zone 4 intensity. 1991 Edition of the Uniform Building Code '
Damage to the facility and refrigeration system.
Other:
(3)
For each external event with a potential to create a release of a regulated substance that
will reach an endpoint offsite, apply Section (e)(l) through (e)(6); and
External event: Earthquake
(e) The date of completion of the most recent PHA or update and the technique used.
May 20, 1999
(1) The Expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the PHA.
May 20, 1999
(2) Major hazard identified;
~ 1. Toxic release E] 9. Contamination
F-~ 2. Fire E~ 10. Equipment failure
r-] 3. Explosion [~] 11. Loss of cooling, heating, electricity,
~] 4. Runaway reaction instrument air
r-1 5. Polymerization [~ 12. Earthquake
r-1 6. Overpressurization ~ 13. Floods (flood plain)
J~] 7. Corrosion ["'1 14. High winds
r'~ 8. Overfilling [~] 15. Tornado
RMP Data Element q location Revised 04/08/1999
Page 2
Bakersfield, CA.
(3) Process controls in use (check all that apply):
F-~I. vents r-111.
E~]2. Relief valves F-~12.
[~3. Check valves ~-]13.
r'~14.Scrubbers r"114.
BI5. Flares r~15.
[~6. Manual shutoffs [~16.
[~17. Automatic shutoffs r'~17.
r-18. Interlocks [~18.
[~9. Alarms and procedures [~19.
~ 10. Keyed bypass [~20.
Emergency air supply
Emergency power
Backup pump
Grounding equipment
Inhibitor addition
Rupture disks
Excess flow device
Quench system
Purge system
Other Seismic shut down switch.
(4) Mitigation systems in use (check all that-apply):
[~1. Sprinkler system r~6.
r'"]2. Dikes E~7.
~"~3. Fire walls [~8.
r-j4. Blast walls [~9.
~--]5.Deluge system
Water curtain
Enclosure
Neutralization
Other Seismic shut down switch.
(5) Monitoring/detection systems in use (check all that apply):
[~1. Process area detectors [~3. Other Seismic shut down switch.
E~2. Perimeter monitors
(6)
I--I1.
1'-12.
1--13.
1--14.
I--15.
1--17.
Changes since last PHA update (check all that apply):
Reduction in chemical inventory
Increase in chemical inventory
Change in process parameters
Installation of process controls
r-j8. other
[~9. None required/recommended
Installation of perimeter detection systems
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems
Installation of mitigation systems
(4) The date of the most recent field verification that equipment is installed and maintained
as designed.
April 1999
RMP Data Element q LOCATION Revised 04/08/1999
I.j~ted States Cold Storage, ii~.
Risk Management Data Elements
Bakersfield, CA.
Page 3
ion 2745.7 RMP Program 3 Prevention Program Component:
(q) The owner or operator shall submit the following external events analysis information.
(1) The types of natural and human caused external events considered in PHA Section 2760.2
[~Airplane crash r--]Train Derailment
E-]High winds
r--]Tornadoes
r']Flooding
[~Earthquake [~]Fire
[~Severe weather
r'-~Electri~l storm
I-']Hail
[~Sabotage ~-lVandalism
(2) The magnitude or scope of external events which were considered.
[~Fire 1991 Edition of the Uniform Fire Code
Other:
(3)
For each external event with a potential to create.a release of a regulated substance that
will reach an endpoint offsite, apply Section (e)(1) through (e)(6); and
External event: Fire
(e) The date of completion of the most recent PHA or update and the technique used.
May 20,1999
(1) The Expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the PHA.
May 20, 1999
(2) Major hazard identified;
~ 1. Toxic release D 9. Contamination
r'"] 2. Fire D 10. Equipment failure
~ 3. Explosion r-~ tl. Loss of cooling, heating, electricity,
D 4. Runaway reaction instrument air
D 5. Polymerization ~ 12. Earthquake
~ 6. Overpressurization D 13. Floods (flood plain)
D 7. Corrosion ~ 14. Highwinds
E] 8. Overfilling D 15. Tornado
RMP Data Element q LOCATION Revised 0410811999
Page 4
Bakersfield, CA.
(3) Process controls in use (check all that apply):
Ell. Vents E~11'
[~]2. Relief valves r-]12.
[~3. Check valves r-]13.
[-]4. Scrubbers ~14.
[""]5. Flares [-]15.
~6. Manual shutoffs r-]16,
~7. Automatic shutoffs F"]17.
['"]8. Interlocks E]18.
[~9, Alarms and procedures ~]19.
~10. Keyed bypass El20'
The What-If Study tean (4)
Mitigation systems in use (check all that apply):
~'-]1. Sprinkler system El6.
El2. Dikes E~7.
~]3. Fire walls El8.
El4. Blast walls [~9.
['-]5. Deluge system
Emergency air supply
Emergency power
Backup pUmp
Grounding equipment
Inhibitor addition
Rupture disks
Excess flow device
Quench system
Purge system
Other
Water curtain
Enclosure
Neutralization
Other USCS Fire Prevention
Program/policy.
(5) Monitoring/detection systems in use (check all that apply):
~1. Process area detectors J~"]3. Other Heat and Smoke
E~]2. Perimeter monitors detectors
(6) Changes since last PHA update (check all that apply):
r-'~l. Reduction in chemical inventory [~-]8. Other
Increase in chemical inventory
Change in process parameters El9.
Installation of process controls
Installation of perimeter detection systems
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems
Installation of mitigation systems
Annualinspection
J ]3.
r'-J4.
E 5.
1"-16.
j 7.
of sprinkler systems.
None required/recommended
(4) The date ofthe most recentfield verification thatequipmentisinstalled and maintained
as designed.
._May 14, 1999
RMP ~ Element q L~ATION
Revised 04/08/1999
U~ed States Cold Storage, IJ~.
Risk Management Data Elements
Page 5 Bakersfield, CA.
~ction 2745.7 RMP Program 3 Prevention Program Component:
(q) The owner or operator shall submit the following external events analysis information.
(1) The types of natural and human caused external events considered in PHA Section 2760.2
~"~Earthquake [~Fire [~]Airplane crash [--1Train Derailment
[~Severe weather
r-'lElectrical storm r-lHigh winds r-lFIooding
DHail DTornadoes
[~Sabotage [~]Vandalism
(2) The magnitude or scope of external events which were considered.
[~Airplane crash
Severe building damage, due to fire after plane crashes into facility.
Other:
(3)
For each external event with a potential to create a .release of a regulated substance that
will reach an endpoint offsite, apply Section (e)(1) through (e)(6); and
External event: Airplane crash into facility
(e) The date of completion of the most recent PHA or update and the technique used.
May 20, 1999
(1) The Expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the PHA.
May 20, 1999
(2) Major hazard identified;
[~ 1. Toxic release [~ 9. Contamination
~ 2. Fire r-~ 10. Equipment failure
~ 3. Explosion r'"] 11. Loss of cooling, heating, electricity,
~ 4. Runaway reaction instrument air
[~ 5. Polymerization [~ 12. Earthquake
E~ 6. Overpressurization [~ 13. Floods (flood plain)
['-] 7. Corrosion E~ 14. High winds
D 8. Overfilling D 15. Tomado
RMP Data Element q LOCATION Revised 04/08/1999
Page 6
Bakersfield, CA.
(3) Process controls in use (check all that apply):
~1. Vents Dll. Emergency air supply
[~2. Relief valves r-~12. Emergency power
E~3. Check valves D13. Backup pump
r"~4. Scrubbers _D14. Grounding equipment
D5. Flares D15. Inhibitor addition
[~6. Manual shutoffs D16. Rupture disks
[~7. Automatic shutoffs D17. Excess flow device
D8. Interlocks D18. Quench system
D9. Alarms and procedures D19. Purge system
Dl°- Keyed bypass D20. Other
(4) Mitigation systems in use (check all that apply):
[~1. Sprinkler system [~6. Water curtain
r-'j2. Dikes r--~7. Enclosure
[~3. Fire walls r'-'~8. Neutralization
r-'j4.Blast walls r"-]9. Other
r-"]5.Deluge system
(5)
[~]1. Process area detectors [~3. Other
[~2. Perimeter monitors
(6) Changes since last PHA update (check all that apply):
2.
1-13.
1-14.
1'-15.
I'-Is.
Monitoring/detection systems in use (check all that apply):
Facility Alarm system
r'"']8. Other
Reduction in chemical inventory
Increase in chemical inventory
Change in process parameters
Installation of process controls
Installation of perimeter detection systems
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems
Installation of mitigation systems
None required/recommended
(4)
The date of the most recent field verification that equipment is installed and maintained
as designed.
NA
RMP Data Element q LOCATION Revised 04/08/1999
Page 7
U ed States Cold Storage,'
Risk Management Data Elements
Bakersfield, CA.
2745.7 RMP Program 3 Prevention Program Component:
(q) The owner or operator shall submit the following'external events analysis information. ~
(1) The types of natural and human caused external events considered in PHA Section 2760.2
~"~Airplane crash r"'~Train Derailment
[~High winds
[--']Tornadoes
r'~Flooding
[~"]Earthquake [~Fire
[~Severe weather
[--'~Electrical storm
r']Hail
[~Sabotage [~Vandalism
(2) The magnitude or scope of external events which were considered.
[~]Severe weather
Damage to the refrigeration system, piping failure located on the facility roof.
Other:
(3)
For each external event with a potential to create a release of a regulated substance that
will reach an endpoint offsite, apply Section (e)(1) through (e)(6); and
External event: Severe weather
(e) The date of completion of the most recent PHA or update and the technique used.
May 20, 1999
(1) The Expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the PHA.
May 20' 1999
(2) Major hazard identified;
~ 1. Toxic release r~ 9. Contamination
r'-] 2. Fire [~] 10. Equipment failure
~ 3. Explosion [~ 11. Loss of cooling, heating, electricity,
r-~ 4. Runaway reaction instrument air
[~] 5. Polymerization E~ 12. Earthquake
['-'] 6. Overpressurization F"] 13. Floods (flood plain)
['"] 7. Corrosion [~] 14. · High winds
~'~ 8. Overfilling r-'] 15. Tornado
RMP Da~a Element q LOCATION Revised 04/08/1999
Page 8
Bakersfield, CA.
(3) Process controls in use (check all that apply):
Ell. vents r'-~11.
r~2. Relief valves E]12.
[~-~3. Check valves r-]13.
[~4. Scrubbers r-]14.
[--~5. Flares r--]15.
[~6. Manual shutoffs [~16.
[~7. Automatic shutoffs ~17.
r'"'~8. Interlocks F-']18.
[~9. Alarms and procedures ~19.
~ 10. Keyed bypass E~]20.
Emergency air supply
Emergency power
Backup pump
Grounding equipment
Inhibitor addition
Rupture disks
Excess flow device
Quench system
· Purge system
Other
(4) Mitigation systems in use (check all that apply):
Ell. Sprinkler system, r'-~6. Water curtain
D2. Dikes r-j7. Enclosure
[-"]3. Fire walls E~8. Neutralization
[~4. Blast walls El9. Other
"El5. Deluge system
(5) Monitoring/detection systems in use (check all that apply):
~"~1. [~3. Other
1'-12.
Process area detectors
Perimeter monitors
Alarm system
(6)
I--I1.
I-'12.
El3.
1--14.
!-'15.
I-]6.
I-'17.
Changes since last PHA update (check all that apply):
Reduction in chemical inventory
Increase in chemical inventory
Change in process parameters
Installation of process controls
~']8. Other
Installation of perimeter detection systems
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems
Installation of mitigation systems
None required/recommended
(4) The date of the most recent field verification that equipment is installed and maintained
as designed.
NA
RMP Data Element q LOCATION Revised 04/08/1999
Page 9
'~.~!ction
I..~ted States Cold Storage, i~.
Risk Management Data Elements
2745.7 RMP Program 3 Prevention Program Component:
Bakersfield, CA.
(q) The owner or operator shall submit the following external events analysis information.
(1) The types of natural and human 'caused external events considered in PHA Section 2760.2
~"~Earthquake [~Fire
[~]Severe weather
E]Electrical storm
~]Hail
~"~Sabotage
~"~Airplane craSh
E]High winds
F]Tornadoes
[~]Vandalism
r--]Train Derailment
DFIooding
(2) The magnitude or scope of external events which were considered.
[~]SabotageNandalism
Damage to the refrigeration system. Opening of a valve or snapping off gauge, etc.
Other:
(3)
For each external event with a pot.ential to create a. re/ease of a regulated substance that
will reach an endpoint offsite, apply Section (e)(1) through (e)(6); and
External event: SabotageNandalism
(e) The date of completion of the most recent PHA or update and the technique used.
May 20, 1999
(1) The Expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the PHA.
May 20,1999
(2) Major hazard identified;
~ 1. Toxic release
~'~ 2. Fire
[~] 3. Explosion
[-'1 4. Runaway reaction
~1 5. Polymerization
r-1 6. Overpressurization
[--1 7. Corrosion
[~] 8. Overfilling
E] 9. Contamination
r-] 10. Equipment failure
D 11. Loss of cooling, heating, electricity,
instrument air
D 12. Earthquake
E~] 13. Floods (flood plain)
r-] 14. High winds
r-] 15. Tornado
RMP Data Element q LOCATION Revised 04/08/1999
Page 10
Bakersfield, CA.
(3) Process controls in use (check all that apply):
r'~l. Vents r'-~11.
r'-~2. Relief valves r-'112.
[-]3. Check valves r-113.
[~4. Scrubbers r-~14.
r'-]5. Flares [--'~ 15.
[~"16. Manual shutoffs r--]16.
~--]7. Automatic shutoffs r~17.
r'-~8. Interlocks E~]18.
[~9. Alarms and procedures ['"=~19.
r'-]lO. Keyed bypass ~--']20.
Emergency air supply
Emergency power
Backup pump
Grounding equipment
Inhibitor addition
Rupture disks
Excess flow device
Quench system
Purge system
Other
(4) Mitigation systems in use (check all that
[~1. Sprinkler system r-j6.
F-~2. Dikes [~7.
[~-13. Fire walls r"'18.'
r-14. Blast walls 9.
~]5. Deluge system
apply):
Water curtain
Enclosure
Neutralization
Other Alarm system and a
fenced-in area the property
(5) Monitoring/detection systems in use (check all that apply):
[~1. Process area detectors ~'-]3. Other Video monitors
~"]2. Perimeter monitors
(6)
D1.
1-12.
i-13.
D5.
r'-16.
1-17.
Changes since last PHA update (check all that apply):
Reduction in chemical inventory ~18.
Increase in chemical inventory
Change in process parameters ~"19.
Installation of process controls
Installation of perimeter detection systems
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems
Installation of mitigation systems
Other
None required/recommended
(4) The date of the most recent field verification that equipment is installed and maintained
as designed.
NA
RMP Data Element q LOCATION Revised 04/08/1999
Section 1. Registration Information
1.1 Source Identification:
a. Facility Name:
b. Parent Company #1 Name:
c. Parent Company #2 Name:
1.2 EPA Facility Identifier:
1.3 Other EPA Systems Facility Identifier:
1.4 Dun and Bradstreet Numbers (DUNS):
a. Facility DUNS:
b. Parent Company #1 DUNS:
c. Parent Company #2 DUNS:
1.6 Facility Location Address:
a. Street 1: 6501 District Blvd.
b. Street 2:
c. City: Bakersfield
f. County.- Kern
Facility Latitude and Longitude:
g. Lat. (ddmmss.s): 35 18 46.0
i. I.at/Long Method: 14
j. Lat/Long Description: PG
1.6 Owner or Operator:
a. Name: Randy Dorrell
b. Phone: (661) 832-2653
Mailing address:
c. Street 1: 6501 District Blvd.
e. City: Bakersfield
United States Cold Storage, Bakersfield
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
United States Cold Storage of California
157537127
001215136
009108150
d. State: CA
e. Zip:
h. Long. (dddmmss.s): -119
Interpolation - Digital map source (TIGER)
Plant Entrance (General)
d. Street 2:
f. State: CA g. Zip:
93313
04
93313 -
1.7 Name and title of person or position responsible for part 68 (RMP) implementation:
a. Name of person: Ron Whisenant
b. Title of person or position: Chief Engineer
32.0
5/20/1999 5:25:34 PM
Page 1 of 11
1.8 Emergency contact:
a. Name: Ron Whisenant
b. Title: Chief Engineer
c. Phone: (661) 832-2653
d. 24-hour phone: (559) 250-4182
e. Ext. or PIN:
1.9 Other points of contact:
a. Facility or Parent Company E-Mail Address:
b. Facility Public Contact Phone:
c. Facility or Parent Company WWW Homepage Address:
1.10 LEPC: Region 5 LEPC Inland South
1.11 Number of full time employees on site: 23
1.12 Covered by:
a. OSHA PSM: Yes
b. EPCRA 302: Yes
c. CAA Title V: No
Air Operating Permit ID:
1.13 OSHA Star or Merit Ranking: No
1.14 Last Safety Inspection (by an Extenml Agency) Date:
1.15 Last Safety Inspection Performed by an External Agency:
1.16 Will this RMP involve predictive filing?: No
12/14/1994
Fire Department
5120/1999 5:25:34 PM Page 2 of 11
Section 1.1 ? Process(es)
a. Process ID: 20 Program Level 3 Ammonia Refrigeration
b. NAICS Code
49312 Refrigerated Warehousing and Storage Facilities
c, Process Chemicals
c.1 Chemical Name
Ammonia (anhydrous)
c.2 CAS Nr.
7664-41-7
Section 2. Toxics: Worst Case
Toxics: Worst Case ID: 20
2.1 a. Chemical Name: Ammonia (anhydrous)
b. Percent Weight of Chemical (if in a mixture):
2.2 Physical State: Gas Liquified by Pressure
2.3 Model used: EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
2.4 Scenario: Liquid spill & VaporizaUon
2.5 Quantity released: 13,165 lbs
2.6 Release rate: 724.0 Ibslmin
2.7 Release duration: 10.0 rains
2.8 Wind speed: 1.5 m/sec
2.9 Atmospheric Stability Class: F
2.10 Topography: Urban
2.11 Distanceto Endpoint: 1.00 mi
2.12 Estimated residential population within distance to endpuint: 6,669
2.13 Public receptors within distance to endpoint:
a. Schools: Yes d. Prisons/Correction facilities:
b. Residences: Yes
c. Hospitals: Yes
g. Olfler (Specify):
2.14 Environmental receptors within distance to endpoint:
a. National or state parks, forests, or monuments: No
b. Officially designated wildlife sanctuaries, preserves, or refuges: No
c. Federal wildemess areas: No
d. Other (Specify):
2.15 Passive mitigation considered:
e. Recreation areas:
f. Major commercial, office, or industrial areas:
No
Yes
Yes
c.3 Qty (lbs.)
22,957
5/20/1999 5:25:34 PM Page 3 of 11
a. Dikes: No d. Drains: No
b. Enclosures: Yes e. Sumps: No
c. Berms: No f. Other (Specify):
2.16 Graphic file name:
Release inside building
Section 3. Toxics: Alternative Release
Toxics: Altemative Re~a_-e ID' 2...~0
3.1 a. Chemical Name: Ammonia (anhydrous)
b. Percent Weight of Chemical (if in a mixture):
3.2 Physical State:
3.3 Model used:
3.4 Scenario:
3.5 Quantity released:
3.6 Release rate:
3.7 Release duration:
3.8 Wind speed:
3.9 Atmospheric Stability Class:
3.10 Topography: Urban
3.11 Distance to Endpoint:
Gas Liquified by Pressure
EPA's RMP*Comp(TM)
Mechanical seal on liquid ammonia pump
7,077 lbs
236.0 Ibslmin
30.0 mins
3,0 m/sec
D
0.10 mi
3.12 Estimated residential population within distance to endpoint:
3.13 Public receptors within distance to endpoint:
a. Schools: No
b. Residences: No
c. Hospitals: No
g. Other (Specify):
d. Prisons/Correction facilities:
e. Recreation areas:
f. Major commercial, office, or industrial areas:
3.14 Environmental receptors wifltin distance to endpoint:
a. National or state parks, forests, or monuments:
b. Officially designated wildlife sanctuaries, preserves, or refuges:
c. Federal wildemess areas:
d. Drains: No
e. Sumps: No
f. Other (Specify):
Yes f. Flares:
No g. Scrubbers:
Release inside building
d. Other (Specify):
3.15 Passive mitigation considered:
a. Dikes: No
b. Enclosures: Yes
c. Berms: No
3.16 Active mitigation considered:
a. Sprinkler systems:
b. Deluge system:
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
5/20/1999 5:25:35 PM
Page 4 of 11
c. Water curtain: No
d. Neutralization: Yes
e. Excess flow valve No
3.17 Graphic file name:
h. Emergency shutdown systems:
i. Other (Specify):
Yes
Section 4. Flammables: Worst Case- No Data To Report
Section 5. Flammables: Alternative Release- No Data To Report
Section 6. Accident History
AccidentHistorvID: 11)
6.1 Date of accident: 03/15/1997
6.3 NAICS Code of process involved:
6.4 Release duration: 000 Hours (HHH)
6.6 Chemical(s):
a. Chemical Name
Ammonia (anhydrous)
6.6 Release event:
a. Gas release: No
b. Liquid spill/evaporation: Yes
c. Fire: No
d. Explosion: No
6.8 Weather conditions at time of event (if known):
a. Wind speed: 3.0
b. Temperature: 84
c. Atmoshperic Stability Class:
d. Precipitation present: No
e. Unknown weather conditions: No
6.9 On-site impacts:
Employees or contractors:
a. Deaths 0
b. Injuries 0
c. Property damage ($):
6.10 Known Off-site impacts:
a. Deaths:
6.2 Time accident began (HHMM):
49312
01 Minutes (MM)
Public responders:
0
0
0
6.7 Release source:
a. Storage vessel:
b. Piping:
c. Process vessel:
d. Transfer hose:
Units: mile/h
Degrees Fahrenheit
D
0 d. Evacuated:
0645 ~AM ~!iPM
CAS Number
7664-41-7
b. Ouantity
Released (lbs]
No e. Valve: No
Yes f. Pump: No
No g. Joint: No
No h. Other (Specify):
Direction: NW
Public:
0
0
c.%
Weight
5/20/1999 5:25:35 PM Page 5 of 11
b. Hospitalization: 0
c. Other medical treatments: 0
g. Environmental damage:
1. Fish or Animal Kills:
2. Tree, lawn, shrub, or crop damage:
3. Water contamination:
4. Soil contamination:
5. Other (specify):
6.11 Initiating event: b Human Error
6.12 Contributing factors:
a. Equipment failure: No
b. Human error: Yes
c. Improper procedures: Yes
d. Overpressurization: No
e. Upset condition: No
f. By-pass condition: No
6.13 Offsite responders notified: Unknown
6.14 Changes introduced as a result of the accident:
a. Improved or upgraded equipment: No
b. Revised maintenance: No
c. Revised training: No
d. Revised operating procedures: No
e. New process controls: No
f. New mitigation systems: No
No
No
No
No
e. Sheltered-in-place:
f. Property Damage ($):
g. Maintenance activity/inactivity: Yes
h. Process design failure: No
i. Unsuitable equipment: No
j. Unusual wea~er condition: No
k. Management error.- No
I. Other (Specify):
g. Revised emergency response plan: No
h. Changed process: No
i. Reduced inventory: No
j. None: No
k. Other(Specify): Reinforce existing programs
Section 7. Prevention Program 3
.P, rocess Id: 2_.~ Ammonia Refrigeration
Prevention Program ID: 20
Prevention Program Description:
7.1 NAICS Code: 49312
7.2 Chemicals: Chemical Name
Ammonia (anhydrous)
7.3 Date on which the safety information was last reviewed or revised:
7A Process Hazard Analysis (PHA):
Ammonia Refrigeration, Cold Storage facility
05/20/1999
5OO
0
5120/1999 5:25:36 PM
Page 6 of 11
a. The date of last PHA or PHA update:
b. The technique used:
What If: Yes
Checklist: No
What If/Checklist: No
HAZOP: No
05/20/1999
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis: No
Fault Tree Analysis: No
Other (Specify):
c. Expected or actual date of completion of all changes from last PHA or PHA update:
d. Major hazards identified:
Toxic release:
Fire:
Explosion:
Runaway reaction:
Polymerization:
Overpressurization:
Corrosion:
. Overfilling:
e. Process controls in use:
Vents:
Relief valves:
Check valves:
Scrubbers:
Flares:
Manual shutoffs:
Automatic shutoffs:
Interlocks:
Alarms and procedures:
Keyed bypass:
Yes Contamination:
Yes Equipment failure:
Yes Loss of cooling, heating, electricity, instrument air:
No Earlflquake:
No Floods (flood plain):
Yes Tomado:
No Hurricanes:
Yes Other (Specify):
No Emergency air supply: No
Yes Emergency power: No
Yes Backup pump: Yes
Yes Grounding equipment: Yes
No Inhibitor addition: No
Yes Rupture disks: No
Yes Excess flow device: No
No Quench system: No
Yes Purge system: Yes
No None: No
Other (Specify):
f. Mitigation systems in use:
Sprinkler system: Yes
Dikes: No
Fire walls: Yes
Blast walls: No
Deluge system: Yes
g. Monitoring~detection systems in use:
Water curtain: No
Enclosure: No
Neutralization: Yes
None: No
Other (Specify):
05/20/1999
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
5/2011999 5:25:36 PM Page 7 of 11
Process area detectors: Yes
Perimeter monitors: No
h. Changes since last PHA or PHA update:
Reduction in chemical inventory: No
Increase in chemical inventory: No
Change process parameters: No
Installation of process controls: No
Installation of process detection systems: No
None:
Other (Specify):
No
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems:
Installation of mitigation systems:
None recommended:
None:
Other (Specify):
7.$ The date of most recent review or revision of operating procedures:
7.6 Training:
a. The date of the most recent review or revision of training programs:
b. The type of training provided:
Classroom: Yes On the job: No Other (Specify):
Industry schools
7.7
7.8
c. The type of competency testing used:
Written test: Yes Observation:
Oral test: No Other (Specify):
Demonstration: Yes
Maintenance:
Yes
a. The date of the most recent review or revision of maintenance procedures:
b..Thb date of the most recent equipment inspection or test:
'c.'Equipment most recently inspected or tested: Purger
Management of change:
a. The date of the most recent change that triggered management of
change procedures:
b. The date of the most recent review or revision of management of
change procedures:
No
No
No
Yes
05/18/1999
7.9 The date of the most recent pre-startup review:
7.10 Compliance audits:
a. The date of the most recent compliance audit:
b. Expected or actual date of completion of all changes resulting from the compliance audit:
7.11 Incident investigation:
a. The date of the most recent incident investigation (if any):
b. The expected or actual date of completion of all changes resulting from the investigation:
7.12 The date of the most recent review or revision of employee participation plans:
09/01/1993
05/19/1999
05/14/1999
04/04/1997
05/2411996
03/17/1997
03/17/1997
08/09/1994
5/20/1999 5:25:37 PM
Page 8 of 11
7.13 The date of the most recent review or revision of hot work permit procedures:
7.14 The date of the most recent review or revision of contractor safety procedures:
7.15 The date of the most recent evaluation of contractor safety performance:
Section 8. Prevention Program 2- No Data To Report
09/0111993
10/01/1994
05/20/1999
Section Emergency Response
9.1 Written Emergency Response (ER) Plan:
a. Is facility included in written community emergency response plan? Yes
b. Does facility have its own written emergency response plan? Yes
9.2 Does facility's ER plan include specific actions to be taken in response
to accidental releases of regulated substance(s)? Yes
9~1 Does facility's ER plan include procedures for informing the public and
local agencies responding to accidental releases? Yes
9.4 Does facility's ER plan include information on emergency heath care? Yes
9.5 Date of most recent review or update of facility's ER plan: 08/14/1998
9.6 Date of most recent ER training for facility's employees: 02/20/1999
9.7 Local agency with which facility's ER plan or response activities are coordinated:
a. Name of agency: Bakersfield Fire Department
b. Telephone number: (661) 861-3636
9.8 Subject to:
a. OSHA Regulations at 29 CFR 1910.38: Yes
b. OSHA Regulations at 29 CFR 1910.120: Yes
c. Clean Water ACt Regulations at 40 CFR 112: No
d. RCRA Regulations at 40 CFR 264, 265, and 279.52: No
e. OPA.90 Regulations at 40 CFR 112, 33 CFR 154, 49 CFR 194, °r 30 CFR 254: No
f. State EPCRA Rules or Laws: Yes
g. Other (Specify):
Executive Summary
United States Cold Storage, Inc. is committed to the safe operation of all our facilities to protect our workers, the
public and the environment. This is accomplished to a great extent by a well developed, up-to-date and
implemented Risk Management Program. All USCS facilities shall operate in a prudent and safe manner. It shall be
the responsibility of the plant manager to ensure that all procedures are followed as set forth in our Risk
Mana(]ement and Process Safety Mana(]ement oromams. In the unlikely event of an accidental release it is USCS
512011999 5:25:37 PM Page 9 of 11
policy to immediately call the National Response Center, Local Emergency Response Committee, the local Fire
Department and other agency(les) that may be required. All USCS facilities will have an emergency response team
to assist these agency(les).
United States Cold Storage, Bakerstield, is a public refrigerated warehouse that uses anhydrous ammonia as a
refrigerant in a closed loop system. Anhydrous ammonia, most commonly known as ammonia, is an excellent
refrigerant and is commonly used in most of the world's industrial refrigeration systems. Ammonia has an excellent
warning property, its odor. Ammonia's odor is familiar to most people due to the fact that it is commonly used in
household cleaning solutions. Ammonia can be detected as Iow as 5 parts per million (PPM) and has an average
life span of 7 days in the environment before it breaks down to its common elements nitrogen and hydrogen.
Typical items stored within USCS facilities are raw or processed food items that can be found in your supermarket
or local restaurant. Temperatures range between -30 degr, ees to +45 degrees F. The refrigeration equipment and
piping are located throughout the facility. The condensers and related piping are on the machine room roof with
the piping to and from the freezers, coolers, truck and rail docks located on the warehouse and dock roofs. The
machine room contains most of the large refrigeration machinery and vessels. In an unlikely event of a refrigerant
leak in a refrigerated space, the ammonia vapor would be contained inside the space, due to the vapor tight
construction of the facility. It then may be treated and/or vented under controlled conditions. The facility is equipped
with ammonia detectors throughout to help lessen any leaks that might occur and to provide an early alert.
USCS believes that prevention is foremost. All of USCS facilities are maintained by a staff of trained maintenance
personnel. Most of these people are members of the Refrigerating Engineers and Technicians Association (RETA)
and all Chief Engineers are members of the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (ILAR) and hold a
RETA CerlJficaflon Level A. USCS has on staff at the corporate level an OSHA and EPA coordinator/trainer who is
a certified OSHA Instructor. Ail facilities comply ~ OSHA's Process Safety Management without regard to the
ammonia threshold quantity. Ail the vessels and piping have been installed according to ASME vessel and piping
codes andapplicable local Building, Fire and Mechanical Codes. The Bakersfield facility was engineered and built
to a Seismic 4 Earthquake Code.
The facility's emergency response program is based on the OSHA requirements for 29 CFR 1910.38-Emergency
Action Plan, OSHA's 1910.119, Process Safety Management and 1910.120 HAZWOPER standards. We have
trained employess for emergency response and maintain a written emergency response plan.
FIVE-YEAR ACCIDENT HISTORY:
The USCS Bakersfield facility has been operating at this location for the past 5 years. Within that history the facility
has seen one refrigerant releases.
OFFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS:
Worst-case release scenario analysis: As required by law under Title 19, Public Safety, Chapter 4.5 California
Accidental Release Prevention Program, Section 2750.3, and 40 CFR Part 68.25, Worst-case release scenado
analysis, an analysis was prepared for the Bakersfield facility. The United States Environmental Protection
Agency's Risk Management Comp computer program for Ammonia was used for this analysis. This worst-case
release scenado is estimated to create the greatest distance in any direction to an endpoint of 200 ppm from the
accidental release of anhydrous ammonia used as a refrigerant in a closed-loop refligeration system. The quantity
release was based on a 'Worst-case" release scenario for a toxic gas liquified under pressure that is normally a
gas at ambient temperature. The release was generated from the facility's High Pressure Receiver. Releasing 724
pounds per minute for a 10 minute period with passive mitigation system in place, inside a facility. The Bakersfield
facility has offslte consequence.
The dispersion analysis used a wind speed of 1.5 meters per second and an "F" atmospheric stability class. With
an ambient temperature of 77 degrees F (25C) and a relative humidity of 50%. Using a release height at ground
level and a surface roughness class of Urban. Dense gas was used for gas density.
Alternative Release Scenado Analysis: As required by law under 40 CFR Part 68.28, Aitema~ve release scenario
analysis was prepared for the facility. The United States Environmental Protection Agency's Risk Management
Comp computer program was used for this analysis. This alternative release scenado is estimated to create a
distance to reach off-site in any direction to an endpoint of 200 ppm from an accidental release of ammonia used
as a refrigerant in a closed-loop refrigeration system. The Bakersfield facility has offslte consequence.
The alternative release scenario was a mechanical seal failure on an ammonia pump for the Iow temperature pump
receiver. The mechanical seal failure was identified through the review of our process hazard analysis (PHA) for
the Bakersfield facility's What-If Study. The failure scenario was identified under Subsystem(s) #17, Low
Temperature Pump Receiver, question #3. Passive mitigation system was in place, the release took place inside
the facility. The following administrative controls are in place: Engine room log is maintained with visual checks of
all of the equipment including the amonia pumps. Oil that is added to the refrigeration equipment is noted on the
Daily Engine Room Log. Annual preventive maintenance of the refrigeration equipment includes the ammonia
5/20/1999 5:25:37 PM Page 10 of 1'1
pumps. Housekeeping of the engine room area includes wiping up and investigating oil leaks and moping the floors
on a daily to weekly bases.
The second PHA recently performed for this facility produced no recommendations to improve safety. However the
first PHA produced 7 recommendations to improve safety at the Bakersfield facility. Such recommendation
included training, installation of new mitigation equipment.
RMP Validation Errors --- No Data To Report
Pagellof 11
5/20/1999 5:25:38 PM
I ted States Cold Storage,
Risk Management Data Elements
Page 1 Bakersfield, CA.
Section 2745.7 RMP Program 3 Prevention Program Component:
(q) The owner or operator shall submit the following external events analysis information.
(1) The types of natural and human caused external events considered in PH^ Section 2760.2
[~Earthquake ~"]Fire [~]Airplane crash ['-']Train Derailment
r~Severe weather
["]Electrical storm ["~]High winds r-]Flooding
r-lHail ['-]Tornadoes
[~Sabotage ~'~Vandalism
(2) The magnitude or scope of external events which were considered.
[~-lEarthquake Zone 4 intensity. 1991 Edition of the Uniform Building Code
Damage to the facility and refrigeration system.
Other:
(3)
For each external event with a potential to create a release of a regulated substance that
will reach an endpoint offsite, apply Section (e)(1) through (e)(6); and
External event: Earthquake
(e) The date of completion of the most recent PHA or update and the technique used.
. May 20, 1999
(1) The Expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the PHA.
May 20, 1999
(2) Major hazard identified;
~ 1. Toxic release r"] 9. Contamination
~ 2. Fire E] 10. Equipment failure
r'-] 3. Explosion ~ 11. Loss of cooling, heating, electricity,
['-1 4. Runaway reaction instrument air
r'-] 5. Polymerization E~ 12. Earthquake
J-'l 6. Overpressurization r'"] 13. Floods (flood plain)
r-'l 7. Corrosion r'-] 14. High winds
E~ 8. Overfilling r"l 15. Tornado
RMP Data Element q location
Revised 04/08/1999
Page 2
Bakersfield, CA.
(3)
r-'Il. Vents
'r-~2. Relief valves
[~3. Check valves
[~]4. Scrubbers
El5. Flares
[~6. Manual shutoffs
~-]7. Automatic shutoffs
r-"]8. Interlocks
[~']9. Alarms and procedures
Ell°. Keyed bypass
Process controls in use (check all that apply):
E]11.
r~12.
[~-'~13.
[-"]14.
E]15.
r-]16.
E]17.
[~18.
[~-~19.
[~20.
Emergency air supply
Emergency power
Backup pump
Grounding equipment
Inhibitor addition
Rupture disks
Excess flow device
Quench system
Purge system
Other Seismic shut down switch.
(4) Mitigation systems in use (Check all that
apply):
[~]1. Sprinkler system ['-]6.
E~2. Dikes E]7.
[~]3. Fire walls [~8.
r--~4.Blast walls ~9.
r'-]5.Deluge system
Water curtain
Enclosure
Neutralization
Other Seismic shut down switch.
(5)
[~1. Process area detectors [~3. 'Other
El2. Perimeter monitors
(6) Changes since last PHA update (check all that apply):
O1.
r~2.
1--13.
r-J4.
1-15.
1'-16.
r'-~7.
Monitoring/detection systems in use (check all that apply):
Seismic shut down switch.
r'"]8, other
Reduction in chemical inventory
Increase in chemical inventory
Change in proceSs parameters
Installation of process controls
Installation of perimeter detection systems
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems
Installation of mitigation systems
None required/recommended
(4) The date of the most recent field verification that equipment is installed and maintained
as designed.
April 1999
Revised 04/08/1999
RMP Data Element q LOCATION
U ed States Cold Storage,
Risk Management Data Elements
Page 3
Bakersfield, CA.
Section 2745.7 RMP Program 3 Prevention Program Component:
(q) The owner or operator shall submit the following external events analysis information.
(1) The types of natural and human caused external events considered in PHA Section 2760.2
[~"~Earthquake [~Fire [~"JAirplane crash E]Train Derailment
~'~Severe weather
r-~Electrical storm ["-~High winds J-"~Flooding
[~Hail r"'JTornadoes
[~Sab°tage J~-JVandalism
(2) The magnitude or scope of external events which were considered.
J~--~Fire 1991 Edition of the Uniform Fire Code
Other:
(3)
For each external event with a potential to create a relea$~ of a regulated substance that
will reach an endpoint offsite, apply Section (e)(1) through (e)(6); and
External event: Fire
(e) The date of completion of the most recent PHA or update and the technique used.
May 20, 1999
(1) The Expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the PHA.
May 20, 1999
RMP Data Element q LOCATION
(2) Major hazard identified;
J~ 1. Toxic release ~ 9. Contamination
~ 2. Fire E] 10. Equipment failure
[~ 3. Explosion r-] 11. Loss of cooling, heating, electricity,
~ 4. Runaway reaction instrument air
~ 5. Polymerization ["'] 12. Earthquake
[~ 6. Overpressurization ['-'J 13. Floods (flood plain)
E] 7. corrosion ['-] 14. High winds
~ 8. Overfilling E] 15. Tornado
Revised 04/08/I 999
· Page 4
Bakersfield, CA.
(3) Process controls in use (check all that apply):
r'-]l. Vents r'"]l 1.
~-~2. Relief valves ~112.
[~"]3. Check valves r-]13.
C~4. Scrubbers ~'114.
[-'15. Flares r-'~15.
[~'16. Manual shutoffs D16.
[~7. Automatic shutoffs D17.
D8. Interlocks D18.
[~9. Alarms and procedures ~119.
D 10. Keyed bypass D20.
Emergency air supply
Emergency power
Backup pump
Grounding equipment
Inhibitor addition
Rupture disks
Excess flow device
Quench system
Purge system
Other-
Mitigation systems in use (check all that apply):
The What-If Study tean (4)
[~1. Sprinkler system r--j6.
r-12. Dikes [-17.
[~]3. Fire walls [~8.
r'-]4. Blast walls [~9.
[--]5. Deluge system
Water curtain
Enclosure
Neutralization
Other USCS Fire Prevention
Program/policy. ,
(5) Monitoring/detection systems in use (check all that apply):
~=]1. Process area detectors ~-~3. Other Heat and Smoke
r'-~2. Perimeter monitors detectors
(6)
I--!1.
1--12.
1'-]3.
r-14.
r-is.
i-]6.
r--]7.
Changes since-last PHA update (check all that apply):
Reduction in chemical inventory ~']8.
Increase in chemical inventory
Change in process parameters E~]9.
Installation of process controls
Installation of perimeter detection systems
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems
Installation of mitigation systems
Other Annual inspection
of Sprinkler systems.
None required/recommended
(4) The date of the most recent field verification that equipment is installed and maintained
as designed.
May 14, 1999
RMP Data Element q LOCATION Revised 04/08/1999
t.j~ted States Cold Storage,
Risk Management Data Elements
Bakersfield, CA.
Page 5
Section 2745.7 RMP Program 3 Prevention Program Component:
(q) The owner or operator shall submit the following external events analysis information.
(,1) The types of natural and human caused external events considered in PHA Section 2760.2
[~Earthquake [~"lJFire [~Airplane crash E]Train Derailment
E]High winds
E]Tornadoes
E]Flooding
[~Severe weather
r-]Electrical storm
E~Hail
[~Sabotage F~Vandalism
(2) The magnitude or scope of external events which were considered.
[~Airplane crash
Severe buildin dam~due to fire after i_plane crashes into facility.
Other:
(3)
For each external event with a potential to create a releas~ of a regulated substance that
will reach an endpoint offsite, apply Section (e)(1) through (e)(6); and
External event: Airplane crash into facility _
(,e) The date of completion of the most recent PHA or update and the technique used.
May 20, 1999
(1) The Expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the PHA.
May 20, 1999
(2) Major hazard identified;
[~ 1. Toxic release E] 9. Contamination
[~] 2. Fire E~] 10. Equipment failure
[~ 3. Explosion E] 11. Loss of cooling, heating, electricity,
E] 4. Runaway reaction instrument air
r-'] 5. Polymerization E] 12. Earthquake
E] 6. Overpressurization r'-] 13. Floods (flood plain)
E] 7. Corrosion r--Ii 14. Highwinds
["'] 8. Overfilling E] 15. Tornado
Revised 04/08/1999
RMP Data Element q I~OCATION -
Page 6
Bakersfield, CA.
(3)
I-'!1.
[k"12.
1--13.
1-14.
1--15.
1~-16.
~7.
1--18.
r~9.
Process controls in use (check all that apply):
Vents ~ 11.
Relief valves C~ 12.
Check valves [-"] 13.
Scrubbers r'-] 14.
Flares r'~ 15.
Manual shutoffs r--~16.
Automatic shutoffs C~] 17.
Interlocks [~ 18.
Alarms and procedures ~ 19.
Keyed bypass [~20.
Emergency air supply
Emergency power
Backup pump
Grounding equipment
Inhibitor addition
Rupture disks
Excess flow device
Quench system
Purge system
Other
(4)
[--]2.
I--13.
r"']4.
r"]5.
Mitigation systems in use (check all that
Sprinkler system 1--16.
Dikes [-"]7.
Fire walls D8.
Blast walls D9.
Deluge system
apply):
Water curtain
Enclosure
Neutralization
Other
(5)
[~]1. Process area detectors ~"'~3. Other
r-'j2. Perimeter monitors
(6) Changes since last PHA update (check all that apply):
Monitoring/detection systems in use (check all that apply):
Facility Alarm system
~--'~8. Other
Reduction in chemical inventory
Increase in chemical inventory
Change in process parameters
Installation of process controls
Installation of perimeter detection systems
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems
Installation of mitigation systems
None required/recommended
r~2.
~]3.
1-14.
r-15.
r-j6.
F'"]7.
(4) The date of the most recent field verification that equipment is installed and maintained
as designed.
NA
RMP Data Element q LOCATION Revised 04/08/1999
I~ted States Cold Storage,
Risk Management Data Elements
Page 7 Bakersfield, CA.
Section 2745.7 RMP Program 3 Prevention Program Component:
(q) The owner or operator shall submit the following external events analysis information.
(1) The types of natural and human caused external events considered in PHA Section 2760.2
[~"lJEarthquake [~Fire
[~l~Severe weather
r'"~Electrical storm
I-']Hail
[~]Airplane crash ~--~Train Derailment
[~High winds
~-"~Tornadoes
r']Flooding
[~ Sabotage [~Vandalism
(2) The magnitude or scope of external events which were considered.
[~Severe weather
Damage to the refrigeration system, piping failure located on the facility roof.
Other:
(3)
RMP Data Element q LOCATION
For each external event with a potential to create a release, of a regulated substance that
will reach an endpoint offsite, apply Section (e)(1). through (e)(6); and
External event: Severe weather
(e) The date of completion of the most recent PHA or update and the technique used.
May 20, 1999
(1) The Expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the PH^.
May 20' 1999
(2) Major hazard identified;
[~ 1. Toxic release r'~ 9. Contamination
~ 2. Fire [~ 10. Equipment failure
F-'] 3. Explosion r-'] 11. Loss of cooling, heating, electricity,
[-'] 4. Runaway reaction instrument air
r~ 5. Polymerization F-~ 12. Earthquake
r~ 6. Overpressurization [-'] 13. Floods (flood plain)
[-"] 7. Corrosion [~ 14. High winds
F-'] 8. Overfilling r-'J 15. Tornado
Revised 04/08/1999
Page 8
Bakersfield, CA.
(3) Process controls in use (check all that apply):
r~l. Vents r'-~l 1.
[~=-~z Relief valves ['-]12.
[;~]3. Check valves E~13.
El4. Scrubbers E]14.
El5. Flares r"115,
[~6. Manual shutoffs r'-]16.
[~]7. Automatic Shutoffs E]17.
['-!8. Interlocks E]18.
[~9. Alarms and procedures E]19.
~10. Keyed bypass r--j20.
Emergency air supply
Emergency power
Backup pump
Grounding equipment
Inhibitor addition
Rupture disks
Excess flow device
Quench system
Purge system
Other
(4) Mitigation systems in use (check all that apply):
['-]1. Sprinkler system r-J6. Water curtain
r-'~2.Dikes r'~7. Enclosure
r-]3. Fire walls r'-~8. Neutralization
F-J4. Blast walls r-]9. Other
~--~5.Deluge system
(5) Monitoring/detection systems in use (check all that apply):
[~1. Process area detectors ~-~3. Other
El2. Perimeter monitors
Alarm system
(6)
I--!1.
r"]2.
1'-13.
1'-14.
I-'15.
1-17.
Changes since last PHA update (check all that apply):
Reduction in chemical inventory
Increase in chemical inventory
Change in process parameters
Installation of process controls
El8. Other
[~]9. None required/recommended
Installation of perimeter detection systems
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems
Installation of mitigation systems
(4) The date of the most recent field verification that equipment is installed and maintained
.as designed.
NA
RMP Data Element q LOCATION Revised 04/08/1999
I.~ted States Cold Storage, I~.
Risk Management Data Elements
Page 9 Bakersfield, CA.
Section 2745.7 RMP Program 3 Prevention Program Component:
(q) The owner or operator shall submit the following external events analysis information.
(1) The types of natural and human caused external events considered in PH^ Section 2760.2
[~Earthquake [~']Fire
[~Severe weather
r--]Electrical storm
E]Hail
[~-]Sabotage [~Vandalism
[~Airplane crash DTrain Derailment
E]High winds
DTornadoes
DFIooding
(2) The magnitude or scope of external events which were considered.
[~SabotageNandalism
Damage to the refrigeration system. Opening of a valve or snapping off gauge, etc.
Other:
(3)
For each external event with a potential to create a release of a regulated substance that
will reach an endpoint offsite, apply Section (e)(1) through (e)(6); and
External event: SabotageNandalism
(e) The date of completion of the most recent PHA or update and the technique used.
May 20, 1999
(1) The Expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the PHA.
May 20, 1999
(2) Major hazard identified;
~ 1. Toxic release D 9. Contamination
~ 2. Fire D 10. Equipment failure
E] 3. Explosion E] 11. Loss of cooling, heating, electricity,
~ 4. Runaway reaction instrument air
["'] 5. Polymerization E] 12. Earthquake
E] 6. Overpressurization E] 13. Floods (flood plain)
['"'] 7. Corrosion E] 14. High winds
~ 8. Overfilling ~ 15. Tornado
RMP Data Element q LOCATION
Revised 04/0811999
Page 10
(3) Process controls in use (check all that apply):
[~1. Vents E]11.
[~2. Relief valves [~12.
[~3. Check valves [~13.
[-']4. Scrubbers [~14.
[~]5. Flares E:]151
[~6. Manual shutoffs [~16.
[~7. Automatic shutoffs [~]17.
El8. Interlocks [~18.
[~9. Alarms and procedures [~19.
E~ 10. Keyed bypass [~20.
(4)
El2.
El4.
Mitigation systems in use (check all that apply):
Sprinkler system
Dikes
Fire walls
Blast walls
Deluge system
Bakersfield, CA.
Emergency air supply
Emergency power
Backup pump
Grounding equipment
Inhibitor addition
Rupture disks
Excess flow device
Quench system
Purge system
Other
[~6. Water curtain
E~]7. Enclosure
E]8. Neutralization
9. Other _Alarm system and a
fenced-in area the property
(5) Monitoring/detection systems in use (check all that apply):
~-Jl. Process area detectors [~3. Other Video monitors
J~2. Perimeter monitors
(6) Changes since last PHA update (check all that apply):
E~]i. Reduction in chemical inventory [~8. Other
Increase in chemical inventory
Change in Process parameters [~9.
Installation of Process controls
Installation of Perimeter detection systems
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems
Installation of mitigation systems
J 3.
J ]4.
E ]6.
J 7.
None required/recommended
(4) The date of the most recent field verification that equipment is installed and maintained
as designed.
NA
RMP Data Element q LOCATION
Revised 04/08/1999
RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN DATA ELEMENTS
1. REGISTRATION:
1.1 Source identification:
a. United States Cold Storage of California
b. 6501 District Blvd.
c. Bakersfield d. Kern e. California
g.. Latitude 35° 18.76' North h. Longitude 119° 4.50' West
1.2 Dun and Bradstreet number:
NA ,,
1.3
Corporate parent
a. United States Cold Storage, Inc., Cherry Hill, N.J.
c. Dun and Bradstreet number: NA
1.4 Operator:
a. Carl Willis b. 805/832-2653
c. 6501 District Blvd. Bakersfield, CA. 93313
1.5 Person responsible for Part 68 ifnplementation
Carl Willis, Manager
1.6 Emergency contact:
a. Ron Whisenant b. ChiefEngineer
c. 805/832-2653 d. 805/393-4463
1.7 Covered process: Refrigeration
a. 1. Anhydrous ammonia 2. CAS 7664-41-7
3.20,000 lbs
1.8 EPA Identifier
NA
1.9 Number of full-time employees:
25 employees
1.10 Cover by
a. OSHA PSM I. ,/Yes
b. EPCRA section 302 1. ,/Yes
¢. CAA Title V operating permit 1. Yes
2. No
2. No
2.~ No
1.11 Last safety inspection:
a. · December 14, ! 994
b. OSHA c. Cai-OSHA
d. EPA
eo
State EPA
f. 93313
4. SIC 4222
5. Level 3
f. d' Fire department
2. TOXICS WORST CASE
2.1 Anhydrous Ammonia ~
2.2 Physical
a. Gas b. e' liquid
2.3 Results based on:
a. ,/Reference table
Model used:
2.4
2.5
2.7
2.8
2.10
2.11
2.12
Modeling
Scenario:
Explosion b. Fire
Quantity released 9,700 lbs.
Release duration (if modeled)
Wind speed 1.5 m/sec.
Topography a. d' Urban
Distance to endpoint: 1.8 miles
c. vr Toxic gas release
2.6 Release rate
I 0 min.
2.9 Stability class F:
b. Rural
d. d' Liquid spill/vaporization
970 lbs/min.
Residential population within distance (number)
51,000 people
2.13 Public receptors (check all that apply)
a. d' Schools d. Prisons
b. d' Residences e. d' Public recreational areas or arenas
c. d' Hospitals f. vr Major commercial, office, or industrial areas
2.14 Enviromnental receptors within distance (check all that apply)
a. · National or state parks, forests, or monuments
b. Officially.designated wildlife sanctuaries, preserves, or rufuges
c. Federal wilderness areas
Passive mitigation considered (check all that apply)
Dikes d. Drains g. Not applicable
Enclosures e. d' Sumps
Berms. f. Other (specify)
2.15
a.
b.e~
C.
RMP Data Elements ~ USCS, Bakersfield -page 2-
3. TOXICS ALTERNATIVE RELEASES (complete for each toxic)
3.1 Anhydrous Ammonia
3.2 Physical
a. d' Gas b. liquid
3.3 Results based on:
a. Reference table b../ Modeling
Model used: ALOHA
3.4 Scenario:
a. Transfer hose failure d. Overfilling
b. Pipe leak e. Rupture disk/relief valve
c. Vessel leak f. Excess flow valve failure
g. ~' Other (specify)
g. Mechanical seal on ammonia pump.
3.5 Quantity released 78.6 lbs.
3.6 Release rate 1.31 lbs/min.
3.7 Release duration (if modeled) 60 min.
3.8 Wind speed 2 m/sec.
3.10 Topography a. vr Urban
3.9 Stability class F
b. Rural
3.11 Distance to endpoint: 0.04 mile
3.12 Residential population within distance (number)
0 population
3.13
a.
b.
C.
Public receptors (check all that apply)
Schools d. Prisons
Residences e. Public recreational areas or arenas
Hospitals f. Major commercial, office, Or industrial areas
3.14
a.
b.
Environmental receptors within distance (check all that apply)
National or state parks, forests, or monuments
Officially designated wildlife sanctuaries, preserves, or rufuges
Federal wilderness areas
3.15 Passive mitigation considered (check all that apply)
a. Dikes d. Drains g. Other (specify)
b. vr Enclosures e. ~ Sumps h. Not applicable
c. Berms f. Other (specify)
3.16
a.
b.
C.
d.
Active mitigation considered (check all that apply)
Sprinkler systems e. Excess flow valve
Deluge system f. Flares
Water curtain' g. d' Scrubbers
Neutralization h. d' Emergency shutdown systems
I. Other (specify)
RMP Data Elements - USCS, Bakersfield .: -page 3-
FIVE-YEAR ACCIDENT IIISTORY (complete the following for each release)
Date March 15, 1997 6.2 Time 6:45 pm
6.0
6.1
6.3 Release duration 1 to 2 minutes
6.4 Chemical(s) Anhydrous ammonia
6.5 Quantity release (lbs) 28 pounds
CAS 7664-41-7
6.7 Release source
6.6 Release event a. Storage vessel
a. et Gas release . 'b. et Piping
b. et Liquid spill/evaporat~°n c. Process vessel
c. Fire d. Transfer hose
d.. ExploSion e. Valve
f. Pump
6.8 Weather conditions at time of event (if known)
a. Wind speed/direction 8mph NW
b. Temperature 70°F(s)
c. Stability 61ass B-C
d. Precipitation present No
e. Unknown
6.9 On-site impacts
a. Deaths 0
b. Injuries 0
c. Property damage
$0.00.
6.10 Known offsite impacts
a. Death 0
b. Hospitalizations 0
c. Other medical treatment 0
d. Evacuated 0
e. Sheltered in place Yes
f. Property damage $0.00
g. Environmental damage None
6.11 Initiating event
a. Equipment failure
b. et Human error
c. Weather condition
6.12 Contributing factors (check ali that apply)
a. Equipment failure f. By-pass condition
b. et Human error
c. et Improper pro. ced?res
'. d. Overpressunzat~on
e. Upset condition
g. Maintenance activity/inactivity
h. Process design
i. Unsuitable equipment
j. Unusual weather condition
k. et Management error
6.13
6.14
a.
b.
C.
d.
f.
RMP Data Elements - USCS, Bakersfield
Offsite responders notified a. et Yes b. No
Changes introduced as a result of the accident
Improved/upgrade equipment g. Revised emergency response plan
Revised maintenance h. Changed process
Revised training i. Reduce inventory
New process controls J' et Other Reconfirm authority
New mitigation system k. None
-page 4-
7. PREVENTION PROGRAM
7. i SIC code for process: 4222
PROGRAM 3 (For Each Program 3 Process)
7.2 Name of substance(s) covered:
a. Anhydrous ammonia b.
Co
7.3 Date on which the safety information was last reviewed or revised:'
March 3-6, 1997
7.4 PHA:
a. Date of completion of the last reviewed/revised:
March 3-6, 1997
b. The technique used: ~'
1. vt What If 5.
2. Checklist 6.
3. What If/Checklist 7.
4. HAZOP
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis
Other
c. The expected date of completion of any changes resulting from PHA:
April I, 1997
d. Major hazards identified (check all that apply):
1. vt Toxic release
2. vt
3.
4.
5.
6. vt
7.
8.
9.
lO. vt
11.
12. vt
13.
14.
15.
16~
Fire
Explosion
Runaway reaction
Polymerization
Overpressurization
Corrosion
Overfilling
Contamination
Equipment failure
Loss of cooling, heating, electricity, instrument air
Earthquake
Floods (flood plain)
Tornado
Hurricanes
Other
2. vt Relief valves 13.
3. vt Check valves 14.
4. vt Scrubbers 15.
5. Flares 16.
6. ~r Manualshutoffs 17.
7. vt Automatic shutoffs 18.
8. vt Interlocks 19.
9. vt Alarms and procedures 20. vt
10. Keyed bypass
11. Emergency air supply
Process controls in use (check all that apply):
Vents 12. Emergency power
Backup pump.
Grounding equipment
Inhibitor addition
Rupture disks
Excess flow device
Quench system
Purge system
Other
Seismic shut down switch.
RMP Data Elements - USCS, Bakersfield -page 5-
7.4 PHA: continued
f. Mitigation systems in use (check all that apply):
1. ff Sprinkler system
2. Dikes
3. ff Fire walls'
4. Blast walls
5. Deluge system
6. Water curtain
7. ff' Enclosure
8. ff Neutralization
9. Other
g. Monitoring/detection syStems in use (check all that apply):
1. ff Process area detectors.
2. Perimeter monitors
3. Other
h. Changes since last PHA update (checkall that apply):
1. Reduction in chemical inventory
2. Increase in chemical inventory
3. Change in process parameters
4. Installation of process controls
.5. Installation of perimeter detection systems
6. Installation of perimeter monitoring systems
7. Installation of mitigation systems
8. Other '
9. ff None required/recommended
7.5 Date of the most recent review or revision of operating procedures:
March 3-7, 1997
7.6 Training:
a. Date of the most recent review or revision of the training program:
June 19, 1996
b. The type Of training provided:
1. Class room 2. ff Classroom plus on the job
RETA monthly and annual meetings
lIAR annual meeting
USCS Chief Engineers training programs
RETA Certification
3. On thejob 4.
c. Type of cOmpetency testing used:
1. ff Written tests 2. Oral tests
5. Other
3. ff Demonstration
4. ff Observation
7.7 Maintenance:
a. The date of the most recent review or revision of maintenance procedures
June 25, 1997
b. The date of the most recent equipment inspection or test
June 25, 1997
Other
RMP Data Elements - USCS, Bakersfield
-page 6-
7.7 Maintenance: continued
c. The equipment inspected or tested
Screw compressors, pumps, vessels,
7. 8 Managemen~ of Change:
a. The date of the most recent change that triggered management of Change procedures:
December 17, 1996
b. The date of the most recent review or revision of management of change procedures:
July 22, 1996
7.9 Date of the last pre-startup review:
April 4, 1997
7.10 Compliance audits:
a. Date of the most recent compliance audit:
May 3, 1996
b. Expected date ofcmnpletion of. any change resulting frmn the compliance audit:
June 19, 1996
7:11 Incident investigation:
a. Date of the most recent incident investigation:
March 17, 1997
b. Expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the investigation:
April 17, 1997
7.12 Date of the'most recent review or revision of employee participation plans:
May 3, 1996
7.13 Date of the most recent review or revision of hot work permit:.
July. 22, 1996
7. ! 4 Date of the most recent review or revision of contractor safety procedures:
April 17, 1997
7.15 Date of the most recent evaluation of contractor safety performance:
April 17, 1997
RMP Data Elements. USCS, Bakersfield
-page 7-
9. EMERGENCY RESPONSE
9.1 Do you have a written emergency response plan? a. vt Yes b. No
9.2 Does the plan include specific action t° be taken in response to an accidental release ora
regulated substance? a. vt Yes b. No
9.3
responding to an accidental release of a regulated substance? a. vt Yes b. No
9.4 Does the plan include information on emergency, health care? a. vt Yes b.
9.5 The date of the most recent review or.update of the emergency resPonse plan:
June 25, 1997'
Does the plan include procedures tbr informing the public and local agencies responsible for
No
9.6 The date of the most recent emergency response training for employees:
March 27, 1997
9.7 The name and telephone number of the local agency with which the plan is coordinated:
a. Bakersfield City Fire Dept. b. 911 (805/324-4542)
9.8 Subject to (check all that apply)
a. vt OSHA 1910.38 Emergency Action Plan
b. vt OSHA 1910.120 HAZWOPER
c. Clean Water Act/SPCC
d. RCRA
e. OPA-90
f. vt State EPCRA Rules/Law
g. Other (specify)'
RMP Data Elements - USCS, Bakersfield
-page 8-
Executive Summary
United States Cold Storage, Bakersfield, CA.
.A_c.cidental Release Prevention/Emeroenc,, Response Policies: '
United States Cold Storage is committed to the safe operation of all our facilities to
protect our workers, the public and the environment. This is accomplished to a great
extent by a well developed,, up-to-date and implemented Risk Management Program. All
USCS facilities shall operate in a prudent and safe manner. It shall be the responsibility
of the Plant Manager to ensure that all procedures are followed as set forth in our risk
lnanagement and process safety manage~nent programs. In the unlikely event of an
accidental release it is USCS' policy to immediately call the local fire department and
emergency response team and t° assist these agencies.
It is also USCS' belief and policy to work openlY with all state and federal agencies for
the betterment of the community and the industry.
Stationary Source and Regulated Substances:
United States Cold Storage,-Bakcrsficld is a public refrigerated warehouse located at
6501 District Boulevard that uses anhydrous ammonia as a refrigerant in a closed loop
refrigerating system. Thc refrigerant charge is 20,000 pounds. Typical items stored
within USCS facilities are raw or processed food items. Temperatures range
between -30°F to + 45°F.
Release Scenarios:
For this document, two (2) separate ammonia release scenarios were used: the "Worsi
Case" as required by law and the "Alternative release" (most likely). The Worst Case
release scenario was based on the high pressure receiver completely filled, discharging
970 pounds per minute for a period of 10 minutes. Distance to the end point of 200 ppm
is 1.8 mi/es.
The Alternative Rele&se scenario was identified through the What-If Study performed on
April 8, 1997. The team was asked to identify what they thought would be the most
!ikely cause of an ammonia release. The teton determined that an ammonia Pump
mechanical seal leak located in the cmnpressor roo~n was the most likely case.
All the refrigeration vessels and piping have been installed according to ASME vessel
and piping codes and applicable California Building, Fire, and Mechanical Codes. The
building was engineered and built to Seismic #4 Earthquake Codes.
In an unlikely event ora refrigerant leak in any refrigerated space, the ammonia vapor
would be contained inside that space, due to the vapor tight construction of the facility.
It could then be vented and treated under controlled conditions. The compressor room
contains most of the large refrigerating machinery and vessels. The facility is equipped
with ammonia detectors throughout to help lessen any leak or spill that might occur and
to provide an early warning to the operating personnel.
Risk Management Program Executive Summary page 1
General Accident Release Prevention Pro~,ram:
The following programs and procedures hav~ been in place since the facility was opened
in the fall of'1993'
California Risk Management program;
Cai-OSHA Process Safety Management Program;
USCS's Respiratory protection Program;
USCS's Lockout/Tagout Program;
Local facility's Emergency Response Plan.
Chief Engineer will assume the responsibility for refrigeration modification and
equipment pump downs and tie-in.
Five-year Accident History:
The USCS Bakersfield facility was opened in the fall of 1993. In the fall of 1996 it was
determined that additional freezer space was required. During the spring of 1997, while
the contractor was making a scheduled refrigeration tie-in for the'new freezer, there was
an estimated 26 pounds of ammonia accidentally released to the atmosphere. This release
was due to a vertical leg in the liquid line not being properly pumped out. There was no
offsite injuriesor evacuation of the surrounding co~nmunity.
Emergency Response Program:
Although the facility has an emergency response program and the local fire department
and hazardous material team have toured the facility, scheduling for a joint training and
exercise program has yet to be done.
Planned Safety_ Changes:
During the What-If study the following ite~ns were identified to increase the safe
operation of the facility. ·
Revising compressor maintenance procedures to include the proper torque for the
oil separator access cover bolts after the installation ora new gasket.
Revising compressor maintenance procedures to include testing of all electrical
safety cutouts through pressure activation.
Verify the manufacturer of the pressure safety relief valves for all the oil cooler on
the screw compressors.
Risk Management Progrmn Executive Summary
page 2.
Tagging out the manual cross-over interconnection valve between the high side
and low side suction valve.
Installing a pipe plug at the inlet of the charging connection.
Install warning signs for "Hydraulic Lockup" at the charging system valve station
and proper maintenance procedures for the exterior piping.
Install guard post to protect the emergency ammonia diffusion station located
outside of the engine area.
Risk Management Program Executive Summary page 3
United States Cold Storage
6501 District Boulevard
Bakersfield, CA. 93313
Certification Statement Program 3
I, Cari L. Willis, Manager of United States Cold Storage, Bakersfield hereby certify that I
have reviewed the existing Risk Management Program with Ron Whisenant, Chief
Engineer and after reasonable inquiry, the information submitted is true, accurate and
complete as per 40 CFR §68.185(b).
Manager
Date
UNITEO ST/II'Es ~-010 si'OR/lEE
OF £ALIFOIP~/iA
6501 District BOulevard
Bakersfield, California 9331
(805 8 - 3
Cari L. Willis
Manager . .
-THE STELI2~R GROUP
Charles R.' TaYlor, PE
_ Vice P;resident
' 7828 South Maple · Fresno, CA 93725' ~' ~ _
(?.09) 834-594~7 o' Fax (209) 834-220~7 '.: ~-_ - ~ ...
./
TO: Ralph Huey
FROM: Barbara Brenner
MEMORANDUM
"WE CARE"
January 25, 1993
.'SUBJECT: U.S. Cold Storage
Following is a list of the Article 80 code sections which do not appear to be
addressed by the Stellar Group in the plans submitted for the U.S. Cold Storage
warehouse located in Tracy.
80.401 (c)3A - Piping and tubing utilized for the transmission of toxic gases shall have
welded or brazed connections throughout. ( This is probably ok, but I did not see the
specification on the plans.)
80.401 (c)3C - Excess flow control shall be provided where piping originates form within
a hazardous material storage room or area. The excess flow control shall be located
within the storage room or area.
80.401(c)3D Readily accessible manual 'or automatic remotely activated fail-safe
emergency shutoff valves shall be installed on suPply piping at the bulk source. (I
cannot determine the 'accessibility of the king valve from the mechanical drawings. They
do have shut off valves on the high pressure receiver.)
80.40! (I) - Mechanical ventilation, treatment systems, alarms etc. required by Article 80,
Division 4 must be connected to a source of standby power.
80.402(a) - The amount of corrosive/toxic compressed gas'in the system 'exceeds the
exempt quantity. Therefore, at least the engine room should be built in accOrdance with
the UBC requirements for a H7 Occupancy.
80.402(b)G - Tanks utilized in use of a toxic compressed gas 'shall be within a ventilated
separate gas storage room or placa~ within an exhausted enclosure. They show a
emergency vent to atmosphere adjacent to the ammonia water diffusion station which'
would also need to be scrubbed if left ,in the plans.
I have given page R-13 to 'Larry Toler for.his review of the ammonia diffusion
system per. Article 63. He knows that we need his comments by Thursday morning at
the latest. David Lyman called to find out if We have received the plans. He indicated
that U.S. Cold Storage would like our response faxed to Chuck Togood at (609) 354-
8199. 7'he letter should be copied to John Umps. '
CITY of BAKERSFIELD
"WE CARE"
FIRE DEPARTMENT
SD. JOHNSON
FIRE CHIEF
3.
4.
5.
2101H STREET
BAKERSFIELD, 93301
326-3911
· SITE PLAN REVIEW/PLAN CHECK
'Re: Ammonia Diffusion System
U.S. Cold Storage/Dis rlct B1. & Ashe Rd.
show calculations by a mechahica'l'engineer confirming system
has a' capacity of two gallonls of water per pound
of
ammonia.
Submit specifications on mix
After construction of syste~
be 6onducted with Fire. Deparl
The Fire Department shall be
has activated.
Plans shall be submitted to
Department Mechanical Specia
·requirements.
Date Typed: January 26, 1993
Typed By: dlf
~cc: Er~c Poore/City BuildingDe],artment
Barbara Brenner/City Fire D~partment
WDPRFPLANSCHECK:USCOLDST
ing Valve.
has been completed, a test must
bment personnel present..
notified any'time the system
City of Bakersfield Building
list for any additional
M E M ORA N D UM
January 25, 1993
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Chief Toler, Fire Safety Control Division
Barbara Brenner, Hazardous Materials Division
U.S. Cold Storage
Economic Development has asked us to comment on the UFC compliance status
of a set of plans used to build a refrigerated warehouse in Tracy, CA. U.S.~Cold Storage
intends to-model their Bakersfield facility after the Tracy plant where possible. I have
attached the page dealing with Article 63 for your review. The notes in pencil are
residual from my review.
We have to fax a response out. on Thursday, so we will need your comments by
noon on Thursday. Thanks!
Tracy. Cslifarni, 12/01/92 Thro,~h 12/02/92 HAZOPSHEETTEAM MEMBERS: Vi d..Yun
, - Marrena, Lany Jones, Bruce Chandler, Ron Nosier ,*- , -*- ,:
NODE - EQUIPMENT GUIDE WOI~OS'- DEVIATION CAUSE OF DEVIATION - HOV~ COULD DEVIATION CONSEQUENCE OF DEVIATIQN PROTECTION OR PROYEU~VE DEVICE8 'RISK RANKING... RECOMMENDED ACTION, .,O'TE8 ?R...QUE~.S~.ION$
FROM OPERATING ARISE
CONDITIONS ,
THE NODE WI.L BE ONE VESSEL SU GG EgTED:. IDENTIFY ALL CAUSES OF DEVIATIOI~" IDEN'nFY ALL ¢ON~EQUEN CES OF DEVtAT~N, , LJST ALL E~-T1NG PROTEC.rION THAT C. OULD PREVENT OR $
OR f:~ECE OF EQUIPMENT, THE HIGH FLOW, LOWFLDW, NO MI'nGATE(LE~SEN)THECON~EQUENCE. R-RECOMMENDEDACTI(~ ':* · ·
STUDY OF THAT NODE W/U. TA.K~ FLOW. R~eNERSE FLOW, HiGH EXAMFr~.. EXAMPLES: I - * *
lqT'O ACCOUNT ANY PRF.~SURE, LOW PR~S61JRE, LOSS OF COOt.~G, LEAK IN VAL.VE, HUMAN ERROR, FIRE, RELEASE OF TO~C MATERIALS INTO ATMOSPHERE, PI.ANT EXAMPt. E~: N = NOTES
IN STRu MENT, VALVE. pPING OR HIGH TEMI:~-RATURE, LOW EQUIPMENT FNLURE. CoN'rRoL FAILU RE, AN D EXIERNAL ~HUTDOWN. EQUIPMENT DAMAGE , AND NO CONSEQUENCE. ALARMS. INTERLOCK A~ID SHI,.IT~OWN ~TEMS, PRESSURE
EQUIPMENT '/~.tAT AFFEC'~ TH E TEMPERATURE. HIGH LEVE~ EVENT ( EARTHQUAKE, FLOOD. TORNADO, PLAN E CRASH. , REUEF ( SAFETY ) VAt.VE$, FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPldENT, Q - QUESTIONS
OPERATION OF'THAT NODE LOW lEVEL. CONTAMiNATiON ETC. ). I LEAK DETECTORS, PROCEDURES ( EMERGENCY. .
MAINTENANCE, OPERA'riONAL, ETC,),TRAJNING AND
WITH AR, CONTAMINATION WITH OPERATIONAL MONITORING,
WATER, CONTAMNATION wn'H ; SEV~:~'Y U~F..LY. RI~K
OIL, bO~S OF POWER. AND LOSS HOOD
OF CONTAINMENT.
~ 10pem~om~l T~
[-[ ?. ?-~,.~=r (TOtal ~ 71ow ! ~uma~ erro; Toxic ~ ;clcasc:
H. ?. ?ipLn~ STstem) a /=proper c~ Froced=res ! [memai - ~n thc b~di~ ~ 2 ~umsa Observatio~
b Improper oil ~nin~ procedt==s 2 F_.xtema] - otm~d¢ , ;3 Buikti~ dcs~gacd acco;dh~ to
~ · :2 ~t=ma] eveat 3 Dow~ thc draim in thc e~.c zoomseismic zone 4 ~ - [~t i= place operatiomd oil dr~in;n~
a Earthquake - severed H. P. liquid I 4 Ammonia leak detectors connected procedures
· - linc to central alarm station R - Install central oil drain vessel and nm
~ b Sabotage - chal'gi~'ng valves or i 5 Emergency response procedures & piping to it from oil drains on H P recc'ivcr
difteuser valves arc accessible ~ training and screw compressor shell and tube heat
from outside and could be opened , exchangers
~ R- Run engine room drains to a sump with
, romp that could be intcrruptcd by a signal
t from the engine room ammonia sensor.
Altemati~ - plug or lay a mat over floor
~ drains - removable only when cleaning the
floors
R- Put a lock and alarm on ammonia
diffuser valve box outside - put a lock out
cover on charging valve
R - Put emergency response and training in
~ pls¢¢
Low Flow Over condensing caused by controlNo consequence,
No Flow Equipment failure - ¢leclri¢ king Plant shutdown I 1 Low pressure alarms 4 2 $ Sufficient protection exists
solenoid valve or rccirculator intcrcoolcr 2 Low pressure compressor cutout
liquid feed solenoid valve fails closed : - i 3 Ammonia pump low level alarm &
~ cut out
" '* Rev'c-nc Flow S~=red condenser liquid return Linc Toxic material release: ·', I1 ~fional Training _. 2 3 3 R- Enforce disciplinary Action Safety Policy
1 External event- eauthquakc 1 Internal- in thc building 2 Human Observation #SB198
2 Extcumal - outside ~ 3 Building designed according to IR - Put emergency r=sponse and training in
3 Down the drains in thc engine room seismic zone 4 place
.. -, -. ' 4 ,~mmollia leak detectors connected R- Plug or lay a mat over floor drains -
·; { to central alarm station removable only when cleaning thc floor
· RISK RANKING ( $ ) SEVERITY ( L ) UKEt. IHOOD ' ( R ) ~ OF CONSEQUENCE
1 · CATASTROPHIC 1 · HIGHLY I.J~=LY 1 · VERY ~NIFICAN~, ACTION REQUIRED; IM=t,.EMENTATION BEG~ IM~IEDIATELY
· 2 · E)(T-=NSNE 2 - I.J~LY i 2 ~' ~QN~'ICANT; ACTION REQUI~EDi IMPLEMENTA'i'tON BEGINS IN THREE MONTHS
$ · MODERATE $" UNUKELY ~ · NOTVERY 6~3NFICAN~. Ac'rIONA~ REQUIRED; ~PI. EMENTA'I1ON BEGIH$ WrTHIN
4 -OPERATION~. (REFERTOC..HARTA) 4-EXTREMELYUNI. I~J.Y (REFERTO ,Ct~'B) 4 -NOT~IONIFICANT: AG"TION ATDt~GRE'rlON OF HAZOPTEA/~ BIPI.EMENTATION EVN.UATED BY MANAGEMENT
· I $ - NO ~ BUT OPERAllONAL PROBI.E~ ACT1ON AT DISCRE'1~ON OF HAZOP TEAM: II~I.EMENTA'T1ON EVALUATED BY DESIGN TEN, I ( REFER TO CHART C )
FACILITY: Uzdtcd States Cold Storage DATES OF STUDY: *I TEAM MEMBERG: Victor ,6a-ne~ Chuck Toogood, Jim PAGE 2 OF 11
c fo, a HAZOP STUDY SHEET
NODE-EQUIPMENT : GUIDE WORDS - DEVIATION CAUSE OF DEVIATION - HOW'~OULD DEVIATION CONSEQUENCE OF DEVIATION PROTECTION OR PROTECTIVE DEVICES 'RISK RANKING RECOM UENDED ACTION, NOTES OR QUESTIONS
FROM OPERATING ARISE
CONDITIONS
THE NODE WLL BE ONE VESSEL SUGGES'rED: IDENTIFY ALL CAUSES OF DEVIATION IDENlIFY ALL CON ~EQUEN CE$ OF DEVIAllON. [ uST ALL E)~STIN G PROTECTION 'tHAT COULD PREVENT OR $ g R
OR PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. THE HIGH FLOW, LOW FLOW, NO MI'rlGATE ( LESSEN ) THE CONSEQUENCE. R · RECOMMENDED ACTION
· rUDY OF THAT N ODE W1LL TAKE FLOW. REVER~E FLOW, HIGH EXAMPLES: EXAMPLE~:
NTO ACCOUNT ANY PRESSURE. LOW PRES~LIRE. LOSS OF COOLING. LEAK iN VALVE, HUMAN ERROR, FIRE. R~ OF TO)~C MATERIALS INTO ATMOSPHERE. PLANT EXAMPLES: N · NOTE$
I~ISTRU MENT, VALVE, pPIN G OR HIGH TEMPERATURE, LOVV EQUIPh~NT FNUJ RE. CONTROL FAIUJ RE. AN D EXTERNAL SHUTDOWN, EQUIPMENT DAMAGE, AND NO CONSEQUENCE. AI.ARM~, INTERLOCK AND 8H UTDOWN ~"TEMS, ~=RE$$URE
REUEF ( SAFETY ) VAt.VE$. F1RE FROTECTION EQUIPMENT. Q "' QUESTIONS
EQUIPMENT THAT AFFECTS THE 'TEI~ERATURE. HIGH LEVEL, EVENT ( EARTHQUAKE, FLOOD. TORNADO. PLANE CRASH,
OPERATION OF THAT NODE LOW IL=VEL, CONTAHINAI'ION ETC, ), I LEAK DETECTOR~. PROCEDURES ( EMERGENCY.
WTTH A~, CONTAMINATION WrTH ~ MAINTENANCE. OPERATIONAL. ETC. ),TRAINING AND
WATER, CONTAMNAT~ON WITH OPERATIONAL MONITORING.
OIL. gOSS OF POWER. AND LOSS I SEVERITY 1,5~J.Y. RISK
HOOD
OF C ONTN,~ ~,~.%~'. ,
FL ?. l~ccivcr (Total ~gh ~cssm-c goss of coolie;: l~lcasc of toxic material imo * t' ! Ma~ ~ ?, a]an~ o~ discha,~= set at 3 :2 3 R - Update operating pmccdm'cs
H. ?. PiFL~ System) 1 Co~dcascr wat~ p,m? faflm-c atmosphere t 190 ?S! to AD/' - Va]lc'y A]a-m R- Co~duct a prc-sU,,'tup check !
:2 Co~dc~sc; f~ £aflu~e~ :2 Compmsso; ~ ?. slam a~d tmload £acitity
3 Loss of condo-mcr water suppty I at 200 ?$!
4 ,~on-c(mdcmibtc gas ~ co~dcmcrI 3 Screw compressor ~. ?. cutout set
5 Control failure } ~t 215 PSI
!4 SPRV's set ~t 250 PSI on
Hum~ error - New ficility, startup } siphon vessel, receiver, and shell
1 Installation of SPRV valve wilh
w~ong pressure setting~, and tube glycol he~t exchangers
2 Improper s~fety control set points [ SPRV's set at 300 PSIG on screw
compressor off scp~ators and screw
Fire (dealt with under high tcrapcraturc) compressor oil coolers
I 5 line, valve, and pressure gauge to
~1 70p,msfionai Procedures
I 8 Training and monitoring
9 Pr~cnlativc Maintcmmc¢
Low Pressure Over condensing caused by control Rcduced-dci~ost capacity [ 1 Compressor discharge low pressure 4 3 $ Sufficient protection cxisl~
failure I alarm
t 2 Computer condenser control
I onitoring
High Temperature Fire - caused by: Release of toxic material into~ 'i 1 Fire protection equipment (sprinldcr 2 3 3 R - Implement proper inspections of sprinkler
a Electrical atmosphere due to high press ~ur~ due to system, fire alarms, and fire system (NFPA)
b Hot work high temperature (fire) ~ exlinguishers) iR. - Implement no smoking policy
¢ Smoking
d Electrical handling equipment } 2 Sprinldcr system inspection IR - Implement hot work permitting
3 SPRV's set at 250 PSI procedures
I 4 Infrared inspection of electrical R- Install smoke detectors in office axeas
t equipment every two years R- Include electrical handling equipment in
1 5 Install smoke detectors in office and he fire suppression policy (clcanin~
; other tmcillm3t are. as disconnecting b~'y, pl~cmcnt ~md type of
I fir cxtinguish , etc.)
· RiSK RANmNG ( 8 ) ~EV~RITY ( L ) UKEUHOOD ( R ) ~ OF CC~ISEGUENCE
1 - CATASTROPHIC 1 - HIGHLYU~Y 1 -V~ BIGNIFIC~: ~ R~R~D;, IMPUTATION BEGIN~ ~MMEDIA'T~Y '
2 "E~O~NSNE 2 "" I.~Y 2 "~IONIF1CANT:, AC"~ION REQUIREg3: IMPLEMENTATION BEQINS IN THREE MONTH8
~ -MODERATE $ - UNI.~Y I $ ,. NOT~iER'Y ~GN~, ACTION A~ REQUIRED:, MPt.~ATION BEGIN~ WITHIN A YEAR
4 "OPERATtON~ ( REFER 1'0 CHART A ) 4 - EX~Y UNUKELY ( REFER TO ~ B ) 4 "NOT EIGNIFICANT: ACTION Al' D~ORE'~ OF HAZOP TEAM; IMPI.~NTATION EVAUJATED BY MANAGEt~
[:, ' 5 · NO ~ BUT O~ERA'~ONAL PROBLEM: ACTION AT DI~ETION OF HAZOP TEAM: IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATE~ BY DE~R3N TEAM ( RE~'ER TO CHART C )
r~
FACILITY.' Uttited Stat~ Cold Stot'a~¢ DATES OF STUDY: i TEAM MEMBERS: VictoT
C o=i,, HAZOP STUDY SHEET 3o. es, B,=e
NODE - EQUIPMENT GUIDE WORD8 - DEVIATION CAUSE OF DEVIATION - HOW COULD DEVIATION CONSEQUENCE OF DEVIATION PROTECTION OR PROTECTIVE DEVICES 'RISK RANKING RECOMMENDED ACTION, NOTES OR QUESTION8
FROM OPERATING ARISE
CONDITION8
'THE NODE WLL BE ONE VESS~. SUGGESTED: IDENTIFY ALL CALISE$ OF DEVIATION IDEN'~ ALL CON~=QU ENCEE OF DEVIATION. I LIST ALL E)c~llNG PROTECTION '11.lAT COULD PREVENT OR $ L R
~ UITIGATE ( LESSEN ) THE CONSEQUENCE. R - RECOMMENDED ACTION
OR PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. THE HIGH FLOW, LOW FLOW, NO
STUDY OF THAT NODE WILL TN~ FLOW. REVERSE FLOVV. HIGH ' EXAMPLES: EXAMPLES:
· ITO ACCOUNT ANY laRE~SURE, LOW PRESSURE, LOSS OF COOLING. LEAK IN VALVE. HUMAN ERROR. FIRE, RELEASE OF TOXIC MA~ INTO ATMOSPHERE. PLANT EXANIPLE~: N ~ NOTES
INSTRUMENT, VALVE, PPING OR HIGH TEMPERA~RE, LOW EQUIPMENT FAILURE, CON'rROL FAILURE, AND EXTERNAL SHUTDOWN, EQU~tENT DAMAGE, AND NO CONSEQUENCE. ALARI~, ~OCKAND SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS, PRESSURE
EQUIPMENT THAT AFFECTS THE TEMaERATURE. HIGH LEVEL. EVENT { ~QUAK~. FLOOD. TORNADO. PLANE CRASH, } RELIEF ( SAFETY ) VALVES. F1R~= pROTECTION EQUIPMENT, O a QUEa'TION$
OPERATIOf~I OF THAT NODE LOW LEVEL. CONTAMINATION ETC. ). i LEAK DETECTORS, PROCEDURES ( EMERGENCY,
WITH A~, CONTAM~ATION WIT'H , - i MAJN*T'EI~CE. OPERATIONAL, ETC. ).TRAiNiNG AND
WATER. CONTAMNATION WITH ~ OPERATiONAL MONITORING.
OIL. LOSS OF pOW".=~. AND LOSS : SEVERITY I..~ELY-
OF CONTAINMENT. I HOOD
FI. P. Receiver (Total Low Temperature No consequence
[-L P. Piping System)
High Level Electric king valve fails closed Loss of refrigeration t Same as high pressure 3 3 4 R.- Include Ckalging procedures in
I, operational procedures and training
Human error - overcharged system High pressure - possible releas~ of toxic 3 2
Low level Loss of refrigerant through routine Loss of refrigeration i 1 Low level alarm & intercoolcr 4 ' 2 $ S-fficicnt protection exists
maintenance, purging, valve packing, I recirculator liquid ammonia feed
and sha~ seal leakage, defective relief Hot gas by-passes liquid seal in valve shutoff 4 3
valv~ - (fugitive ~nissions) rex~iver - valv~ seat damage 2 LOw level float
3 Sight level column
4 Ammonia Detection System
Contamination with 1 Rec~e contaminated refrigerant Reduced refrigeration capacity,I 4 3 ~ R.- Implement bulletin #108 NAR on water
water 12 Condensed moisture from airI contamination of smmonia into engineers
through op~ system for ' training
maintenance ', R - Implement testing for water in ammOnia
Contamination with oil 1 Carry over from compressor 1 Reduced refrigeration capacity Operational monitoring and 4 2 $ R. - Continue with proper operator and
discharge 2 Valve system malfunction maintenance maintenance training
a Oil separator - collester fails iR. - Write oil drsining procedures
b Secondary oil return fails
2 Human error- failure to routinely
drain oil
Comaminafion with 1 Operating in a vacuum with system High pressure ' "
- possible release of toxic 1 Same as high pressure protection 3 3 4 R - Check into ammonia ejector nozzle to use
air leaks material t 2 Purg~ failure alarm to monitor and 'in evacuating system after maintenance
2 Air purger failureI central station R. - Include how to check for
3 Human Error -putling equipment I uon. condensables in Standard Operafi~
back on line that was open to air Procedures (SOP) & training
after maintenance without proper~ l/,. - Install temperature sensor for liquid raurn
evacuation I R- Install humidity, wet bulb, and ambient
t t~peram~ sensors.
· RISK RANKIng [ S ) SEVERITY ( L ) UKELIHOOD i ( R ) RISK OF CC~SEQUENCE
1 - CATASTROPHIC 1 · HIGHLY I.I~ELY I I "VERY E~N~qC. ANT:, ~ REQUIRED:. B4=I.EMENTATION BEGINS 11~I4EDIATEL.Y
2" EXTENSIVE 2 · ~Y 2 "~GNIF1CANT; ACTION REQUIRED; IMPLEMENTATION BC"GINS IN THREE MONTHS
a - MOD~-=RATE $ · UNI,.~<~LY / $ · NOT VERY SlGNFICANT:, AG'TION
4 · OPERATIONAL ( REFER TO CHART A ) 4 · EXTREMELY UNUK:ELY ( REFER TO CHART B ) 4 - NOT ~IGNIFICANT: ACTION AT Dt~CRET)ON OF HAZOP TEAM: ~NTATION EVALUATED BY MANAGEldENT
I 5 - NO R~K, BUT OPERATIONAL PROBI..EM~ ACTION AT D~ORETION OF HAZ, OP TEAM: I~ENTKrK:3N EVALUATED BY DESIGN TEAM ( RE~=ER TO CHART C )
'-. F~;Lrr~: UnitedStatc~ ColdStorage~s OF STUDY: TEAM MEMBERS: Victor fill'llot~ ChuckToogood,)"un PAGE 4 OF 11
Tracy, California 12/01/92 Through. 12/03/92 HAZOP STUDY SHEET .Tones, Bruce Chandler, RonNeslcr
NODE - EQUIPMENT GUIDE WORDS - DEVIATION CAUSE OF DEVIATION - HOW COULD DEVIATION C(~8EQUENCE OF DEVIATION PROTECTION OR PROTECTIVE DEVICES 'RI~K RANKING RECOMMENDED ACTION, NOTES OR ~UESTIONS
FROM OPERATING ARISE
CONDITIONS
THE NODE WLL BE ONE VESSEL SUGG~ IDENTIFY ALL C~$E5 OF DEVIATION IDEN~FY ALL CON $EQUENCE$ OF DEMATION. ; UST ALL EXIS'I~G PRO?ECTION THAT COULD PREV~ OR S L R
OR I=iECE OF EQUIPMENT. THE HIGH FLOW, I. DW FLOW, NO t MITIGAI~ ( I.E$SEN ) THE CONSEQUEN CE. R · RECOMMENDED ,~"TiON
STUDY OF THAT NODE WILL TAP~ FLOW, REVERSE FLOW, HIGH EXAMPLES: EXAMPLES:
INTO ACCOUNT ANY PRESSURE, LOW PRESSURE, [.DSS OF COOLING, LEAK IN VALVE. HUMAN ERROR, FIRE, RELEASE OF TO~C MATERIALS INTO ATMOSPHERE, PLANT EXAMPLE~ N · NOTES
INSTRUMENT, VALVE, PI~ING OR HIGH TEMPERATURE, LOW EQUIPMENT FNLURE, CONTROL FNI. URE. AND EXTERNAL SHUTDOWN, EQUIPMENTDAMAGE .AND NO CONSEQUENCE. ALARMS, INTERLOCK AND SHu'roovtiN ~'b'TEMS, PRESSURE
EQUIPMENT THAT AFFECT~ TH E TEMPERATURe. HIGH I. EV~.. EVENT ( EARTHQUAKE, FLOOD. ?ORNADO, PLANE CRASH, RELJEF ( SAFETY ) VALVES. FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT, Q a QUES'FIONS
OPERATION OF THAT NODE LOW LEVEL. CONTAMINATION ETC. ). LEAK I~FECTOR$, PROCEDURES ( EM~:~GEN CY,
WITH AIR, CONTAMINATION WITH ~CE, OPERATIONAL. ETC. ),TRAJNING AND
WATER, CONTAMNATION WITH OPERATIONAL MONITORING.
OiL. LOSS OF POWER. AND LC~-S t SEVEriTy LJ~ELY.
OF CONTNNMENT. ~ HOOD
[-I. p.~..Rgc~ver (Total Loss o£powcr 1 Supply fsilurc from power company No consequence (temporary p ,l~nt
FI. ?. Piping System) 2 C-l'ound fault interruption trips main shutdown)
:3 Eqnipmcnt £Edurc trips main
Loss of containmentSevered high pressure tiq~d or hot gas Toxic material release:~ ! Ammonia dctccfioa system 2 3 :3 1~ - Sectional containment or shutdown of thc
ammonia line: a Intct~d - inside building / 2 Same as High Flow unmonia systc~n triggered by an ammonia
a Human error - linc damaged by b External - on roo£~ :3 F.,mergcncy response procedures & sensor in that parlic~_dar a_rca
£orkli/t c Down floor drain .I training 1 Shut off thc liquid and hot gas £ccd valves
b F_,xternal event - earthquake I1 4 Emergency response procedures & to evaporators (also glycol system heat
I training exchanger) in room or dock where
l~upturcd sight glass bulls cyc t ammonia signal was
t 2 Shut off suction valves and fans, in that
t area or room, after a pump down period of
tin/c.
i,
I
I
· RISK RANKING { S } SEVERITY ( L ) UKEUHOOD [ ' ( R ) RiSK OF CC~I~EQUENCE
1 =CATASTROPHIC 1 · HIGHLYL~ELY I I = VERY SIGN~qC~JT;. ACTION REQUIRED;, II~PLEMENTATION BEGINS IMMEDIATELY
2 · I~SIV~ 2 · L.i~Y I 2 m ~NI~C~N~, AC~ON REQUI~, IMPLEMENTATION BEGINS IN THREE MONTHS
~ · MODEt~ATE 3 · UNUKELY ' ~ · NOTVERY 8~NFICAN~, ACTION A~ REQUIRe; IdPL~MENTATION SEGING WTTHIN AY=AR
4~- ~TIONAL (;REFER-'rOGHART~A~): 4=.:E~y-~JNi~E~y - -{~i~.TO, CH~j?_B~) .... 4="N~T~3N~q~ANT;;ACT~N;AT~8CRET1~N~F~HAZOF~TEA~t~MF~JEM~AT~NEVA~UATEDBYMANA~EMENT-
,~ 5 · NO ~ SLIT O~ERATIONAL PROgLE~ ACTION AT DI6C'RETION OF HAZOP TEAM; IMPLEV~'NTATION EVALUATED BY DESIGN ~ ( REFER TO CHART C )
FAmLrrY: U~dted States Cold Storage DATES OF ~TUDY: i TEAM MEMBERS: Victor,~'~ C~uck Toogoo~ ~m PAGE 5 OF ql
mo.e H OP STU DY SHEET
NODE - EQUIPMENT GUIDE WORDS - D~IA~ON CAUSE OF D~ON - HOW COULD D~ATION CONSEGU~CE OF D~A~ON PROLCON OR PRoT~E D~CES *RI$K ~KING RECOMM~DED ~1~, NO~S OR ~UE~IO~
FROM OPE~TING ~ISE
CONDITIONS ~ ,,,
~E NODE~BE ~E~ ~UGG~ ~EN~ ~SE~ ~ ~ON IO~ CONfErENCES OF D~N, ~, ~ ~G ~O~ ~T ~ ~E~ OR ~ L R
~ P~E OF ~ENT. ~E HIGH F~, ~. NO
~DY ~ ~T NODE ~T~ ~, R~ FLOW, HIGH ~S: ~P~: ~ ~GA~ ( ~ )~E ~N~QU~. R - REGO~D~
~TO ~COU~ ~y PR~URE, ~W P~RE, ~SG ~ ~O~G, ~ IN V~, HU~ ER~R, FIRE. REdE OF TO~C ~ ~TO A~OSPHEEE. P~ ~ N m
~U~, V~. PPING OR HIGH ~M~RE, ~ EQU~ F~RE, COBOL F~RE, ~D ~ SHUBOX, EQUIPM~ ~GE. ~D NO ~NS~UENCE. ~, ~~D SH~O~ ~,PRESSURE
~ON OF ~AT NODE ~W ~ ~INA~ON ~C. ). ~ ~' ~~ ( E~OEN~,
WA~, CO~A~ON ~ OP~ M~NG.
O[.~ OF PO~,~D L~S ~ ~Y. R~K
HOOD
OF CONT~.
~ T~p~e ~ flow ~S~d ~ol~ s~fion ~e (30 PSIG m~ ~le~e of m~c mt~i ~ I For~ & ophir ~ 2 3 3 R- N~ m ~i~ ~
~c~~l~ 35 PSD or ~p ~d f~d ~e (60 ~ 2 ~~ semo~ ~o~a pi~ ~ for~ ~
~o~ ~~ate iPSIG to 65 PS~ 3 ~~ve ~~ R- ~ ~~fion ~ ~ doc~ able
pip~ s~t~) a H~ ~or - for~ 4 B~ desi~ ~or~ to &e ~f ~
b Mec~c~ f~e - ~offia s~c reno 4 R - ~ ~d~o~ ~col heat
prop s~ ~e, or ~e ~e ~ 5 ~ess~e ~ ' out of ~~ oqffi~t ffsffic
~ R - Secfi~ c~~t or sh~dom of
E~
~t
e~q~
~, i~o~a ~ ~d ~ ~ ~o~a
Ga~e ~ ~ ~c f~e i N - ~ss sch~ ~o~a p~p
~o~ ~id~)
:~w ~ow / No ~ow Mcc~c~ f~e ~ss of r~g~ 1 ~ l~el fl~t ~ & p~ s~ 4 1 5 S~ci~ ~fion ~
a ~q~d f~ solmoid ~ cl~cd off
b ~ ~q~d solm~d ~ clos~ 2 Amm~ p~P f~e & ~
c ~q~d fc~ p~p f~c ~ 3 D~ op~o~ mo~to~
4 ~u~ ~t~c
.
~c ~ow Mcc~c~ f~c ~q~d smmo~a m boos~ come. sot 1 B~s~ ~sc~gc c~ck ~ 4 2 5 R - ~ a ch~k ~c do~ s~ of
a Boost~ s~ew core. sot 2 p~p c~k ~es ~~ ~s~ Uq~d ~o~a f~
~sc~e check ~c f~e ~ss of rc~g~a~ 3 ~ 1~cl ~ & sh~o~ ~ to low ~~ ~c~tor ~ssel
b .~o~a p~p ch~k ~ 4 ~k ~d door ~ on &c
f~e ~c v~scl Uq~d l~cl ~io~a ~ ~c ~m
H~ ~or / Sabo~c
a ~ pr~s~ Uq~d ~o~a
f~d (s~p)~s m low
~m~a~ rec~or opcn~
~ess~e Uq~d ~o~a f~
~ to &e s~ low ~mp~c
~c~c~or v~scl
b S~p s~gon cross~ o~ N- S~p Mw s~on ~st~ to M~ suc~on
c ~ M~ to low cross ~ ~ crms~ ~c not on ~
* R~K ~G [ S ) 8~ ( C ) ~OOD , ( R ) ~ ~
t = ~T~OPHIC 1 = H~H~Y ~Y I ~ E~N~ ~ ~ ~A~ON BEQ~S ~Y
4~-~~-- (=~=~,~A=)= 4~-~Y=U~Y-- --(=~O_~=B.)~ __4~N~~_~NAT_D~C~ OF_~_~;:~~~_~T '--'--N'--"' ,
; S -NO ~ B~ ~E~O~OB~ A~ ATD~C~ OF ~ ~~ ~A~ ~ i~ '(~~)
FACILrrr: United States Cold Storage DATES OF STUDY:
T=cy, 01/92 HAZOP STUDY S. .EET Jo= , S=e
NODE - EQUIPMENT GUIDE WORDS - DEVIATION CAUSE OF DEVIATION - HOW COULD D~/IATION CONSEQUENCE OF DEVIATION PROTECTION OR PROTECTIVE DEVICES 'RISK RANKING RECOMMENDED ACTION, NOTES O'R QUe:~iONS
FROM OPERATING ARISE
CONDITIONS
THE NODE WLL BE ONE VESSEL SUGGESTEi~, IDENTIFy ALL CAUSES OF DEVlA~ON' IDENTIFY ALL CONSEQUENCES OF DE~ATION, i UST ALL E)~S'T1N G PROTECTION THAT COULD PREVENT OR $ L R
OR PIECE OF EQUPMENT. THE HIGH FLOW, LOW FLOW, NO MITIGATE ( LESSEN ) THE CONSEQUENCE. R u RECOMMENDED ACTION
$TIJDY OF THAT N ODE W1LL TAKE FLOW, REVERSE FLOW. HIGH EXAMPLES: EXAMPLES:
~ITOACCOUNTANy PRESSURE, LOWPRESSURE, LO$S OF COOLING. LEAK IN VALVE, HUMAN ERROR. FIRE. RELEASE OFTOX]C MATERIALS INTO ATMOSPHERE. PLANT EXAMPLE~ N -NOTES
~ISTRUMENT, VALVe, PIPING OR HIGH TEMPERATURE, LOW EQUlPK~NT FAILURE, CON'i~OL FAILURE, AND EXq~RNAL SHUTDOWN, EQUIPMENTDAMAGE .AND NO CONSEQUENCE, ALARM~, IN'r~LOCK AND ~-ILITDOWN SYSTEMS, PRESSLIRE
EQUIPMENT THAT AFFECTS TH E TEb~ERATURE. HIGH L.EVEL, EVENT ( EAern.iQUAKE, FLOOD, TORNADO. PLANE CRASH. } REUEF ( SAFETY ) VALVES, FIR~ PROTECTION EQUIPMENT. Q - QUESTIONS
OPERATION OF THAT NODE LOW LEVEL, CONTAMINATION ETC, ). I LEAK DETECTORS, PROCEOURE~ ( EMERGENCY,
WiTH AiR, CONTAMINATION WFI'H MAINTENANCE, OPERATIONAL. ETC. ).TRAINING AND
WAq~R. CONTAJ~NATION WITH t OPERATIONAL MONiTORING.
OLL, LOSS OF POWER, AND LOSS S~ L~ELY- RISK
OF CONTAINMENT. I HOOD
High Temperature High Pressure Mechanical failure Loss of refrigeration - possible ~elease I Fire protection equipment 3 4 $ EC- Include electrical handling equipment in
Recirc/lntercooler a Second stage compressors fail off of toxic ~al I 2 Sprinkler system inspection the fire suppression policy (cleaning
3 Infrared Inspection of electrical disconnecting battery, placement and type of
(Total intermediate boosters continue to run I equipment fire extinguisher, etc.)
~iping system) Fire - caused by
a Electrical Release of toxic material - high'.pressure4 Booster high pressure alarm, 2 3 3
b Hot work due to exIemal heat (fire) / interlock and cutout
c Smoking~ 5 Intermediate suction system high
pressure alarm
d Electrical handling equipment I 6 SPRV on recirc/'mter set at 250
PSIG and on oil pot set at 300
PSIG
7 Ammonia dirt-user system
, 8 No smoking policy
9 Smoke detectors installed in office
and ancillary areas
~ 10 Hot work permitfin~ procedures
11 Emergency response procedures and
Low Pressure Mechanical failure No bs~*rdous consequence I 1 Low pressure alarm & cutoms on 4 2 5 Sufficient protection exists
a Compressor suction control/, screw compressors and alarm on
failure system suciion
Human error 2 Operational monitoring
a Machine lef~ on manual operation
I'
RISK RANKING ( S ) SEVERITY (L) ~OOD I ( R )
CONSEQUENCE
t · CATASTROPHIC 1 · HIGHLY UK~=LY I
2 · EXTENSIVE 2 ~ LI~ELY I 2 "~IGNIFICANT: ACTION REQUIRED:, IMPLEMENTATION BEGINS IN THREE MONTHS
.............. 3"MODERATE S"_UN~Y L ___3_~NOT~_SIGN~ ACTtONA~REQUIRED; blPLEMENTATION BEGINswrI~IINAYEAR
4 · ~TIONAL ( REFER TO CHART A ) 4 · EXTREMELY UNUI~.LY ( R~FER TO CHART B ) 4 = N OT'~IQHiFICANT;'-ACTIO N-AT DISDI~='llON 'OF 'HAZOP TEA~:-~ATION' EVAI~ATED~ BY MANAGEMENT
5 = NO RISK. BUT OPERATIONAL PROBLEM; ACTION AT DISCRETION OF HAZOP TEAM; IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATED BY DESIGN TEAM ( REFER TO CHART C )
~tL~r': Uaitcd States Cold Storage DATES OF STUDY: 'I TEAM MEMBERS: Victor Amc~ C1a~k Toogood, ~'ua PAGE 7 *OF 11
HAZOP STUDY SHEET
NODE- EQUIPMENT GUIDE WORD8 - D~IATION C~SE OF D~TiON - H~ COULD D~ATION C~SE~U~CE OF D~IA~ON PROTE~ON OR PROTE~ D~CES 'RISK ~NG RECOMM~DED A~I~. NO~G OR ~UE~IONS
FROM OPE~TING ARISE
CONDITIONS
~E NODE ~BE ONE~S~ SUGG~ ~ ~S ~ ~ON ID~ CON~ENCES OF D~N. ~ U~ ~G PRO~ ~AT COU~ ~ OR
OR PECE OF E~ENT. ~E HIGH FLOW. ~W F~W. NO
~DYOF ~T NODE ~T~ ~, R~E FLOW. HIGH ~P~ ~:
~TO ACCOUNT ~ PR~URE, LOW P~SSURE, ~S6 ~ ~G. ~ IN V~. HU~ ~ROR. F~E, R~E OF TO~C ~ ~O A~OSPH~E P~ ~ N - NO~S
N~UME~,V~, P~NG OR HIGH ~MP~RE, LOW EQUIP~ FN~RE, COBOL F~RE, ~D ~ SHU~O~, EQU~ENT~GE. ~D NO CONS~U~CE. ~,
EQUPME~AT~F~ ~E ~E~, HIGH ~, ~ ( ~QU~. FLED. TORN~. P~E C~H, R~EF ( ~ ) V~S, R~ ~ON EQUP~, Q-QUE~ONS
OP~N OF ~AT NO~ LOW ~ ~NA~ON ~C. ). ~ ~, ~~ ( ~G~,
~ ~, CONTigeN ~ ~~,
WA~. ~NA~ON ~ OPE~ ~R~G.
OE. ~ ~ PO~. ~D L~ ~ ~Y- R~K
OF CONT~NT, ~r H~D
~ Template ~ T~~e ~w or no Uq~d ~o~a 1~1 ~ &e Possible s~ond s~e
compressor I ~ t~~ ~ ~d c~ out 4 3 5 S,~ci~t ~ot~on e~
~ckc~cool~ ~tercooler / reck~tor ~e on s~o~ s~ co~resso~
~o~ ~e&ate a Feed ~e ~e 2
~p~ syst~) b No ~mo~a ~ ~ ~ receiver 3 F~ ~o~on e~~
c ~ &sp~ces ~o~a i ]4 S~ ~ ~pec~on
i 5 ~ ~on of elec~c~
F~e - ca~ed ~ ~le~e of m~c ~te~ - ~ ~ess~e ~pmmt 2 3 3 R - ~clude
a E~c~ &e ~ e~ heat (~)~ i6 SPRV on rec~mter s~ at 250 &e ~ s~ssion ~ (cle~
b Hot work ~ PSIG md on o~ pot set ~ 3~ PSIG ~co~ ba~, p~~ md ~e of
c Smo~ ~ ~7 No smo~ ~ ~ e~h~, etc.)
d E~c~ ~~ ~~t~ ~8 Hot work p~~
9 Smoke
~w T~p~e No bs~rdo~ co~e~e
~ ~el Mcc~ ~mc Poss~lc ~sor ~c ~ 1 ~ 1~8 ~q~d det~fi~ ~be, 3 3 4 S~]~ pm~fion e~
a Fe~ ~e fsil~ o~ ~ & ~ 1~1 flo~ shut do~
2 Vis~ l~el mo~to~
Sudd~ p~ss~e r~cfion ~med ~ 3 ~r
~ol ~ h~ ~or. 4 Si~ 1~1
~w ~ Mcc~ ~ [~ss of re~gerafi~ 1 ~w l~el float ~ ~d p~p sh~ 4 2' 5 S-~ ~c~on ~t
a ~ss of ~~ f~d do~
b V~c or ~n~l fffi~c 2 Si~ 1~1 ~1~
~ss of ~g~ ~o~ ro~e 3 Amm~ d~c~on s~
~t~ce, p~ ~c pac~
~ssiom)
· R~K ~NG ( S } s~ (L) ~OOD ~ ( R ) R~ ~ ~QU~
t - ~T~IC 1 - ~GHLY~Y [' I -~N~ A~ RE~ ~TA~ BEGS8 ~Y
...................... 4=..~~ .... (;~iTO ~A~): 4~-~Y-~y .... (~_TO~.B.) .... 4:. N~_ ~N~~AT.~ ~_~; ~A~:~.~. ~ --
FACILITY: United States Cold Storage DATES OF STUDY: PAGE 8 OF 11
Tracy, c,diforni, 12/01/92 Thro~h 12/03/92 HAZOP STUDY S IEET ,,EMBERS: Victor Arncti, Chuck Toogood, run
_ , , Marrella, Larry Jones, Bruce Chandler, Pon Neslcr
NODE - E(~UIPMENT GUIDE WORDS - DEVIATION CAUSE OF DEViATiON - HOW COULD DEVIATION CONSEQUENCE OF DEVIATION PROTECTION OR PROTECTIVE DEVICES *RISK RANKING RECOMMENDED ACTION, NOTES OR
FROM OPERATING ARISE
CONDITIONS
THE NODE W).Z. ~ ONl: V~$$EL SUGG~--rE~. [D~"=NTIP'Y AI.L CAUSES OF [:~:'VIkTION IDEN'flFY ALL CONSEQUENCES OF D~VIATION. i Uffr ALL ~)gI~TING PRO'I~CTION THAT COULD Pt~L~NT OR $ L R
OR PIECE OF E(~JII~tENT. THE HIgH FLOW, LOW FLOW, NO ~ MffISAT~ ( L~$$~N )THE CONSEQUENCE. R · RECOMMENDED ACTION
b"TUOY OF THAT H ODE IMLL TAK~ FL.OW, R~ FLOW, HIGH ~)(AMPL~$: ~PLCg~:
INTO ACCOUhrT ANY PRESSURE, LOW PRESSURE, LOSS OF COOUNG, LEAK IN VALVE. HUMAN ERROR, FIRE, REI.EkSE OF TOXIC MATERiA~ INTO ATMOSPHERE. pLANT EXAMPLE~: N · NOTES
INSTRUMENT, VALVE. Plan G OR HIGH TEMPERATURE, EOW EQUIPMENT FNLU RE, CONTROL FAJUJ RE, AN D EXTERNAL SHUTDOWN, EGUiI~MENT DAMAGE, AND NO CONSEQUENCE. ALARMS, ~IqTERLOCK AND SH UTDO~%N ~tSTEM~, PRESSURE
EQU[PMENT THAT AFF~..,.T~ TH E T~ERATU~. HIGH L.EV~., ~V~NT ( EARTHQUAKE. FLOOD, TORNADO, PLANE C~H, ~ R~L[~F ( ~.~-].y ) VALVES, FLR~ PROTECTION E~U[PMENT, G ~ ClUE~TION$
OPERATION OF THAT NODE LOW t. EVEk, CONTAHINATION ETC. ). I ~ I~TECTOR~, PROCEDURES ( SMI~GENCY,
WrrH AIR, CONTAMINATION WrTHt MAINTENANCE, OPERATIONAL, ETC, ),TRA~ING HiD
WATER, CONTAMNA~OH WITH OPERATiONAL UONITORING.
GL, LOSS Op ~OVV,.=R, AN D Lt:~S SEVERITY UKr:LY.
OF CONT~INMENT, i HOOD
High Temperature Contamination with Human error Loss or reduction of rcfrigeratmn 1 Proper routine oil re, moral 4 2 5 N - Wc have found most suction and
Rccirc/Intercooler Oil a Failure to routinely drain oil / 2 Routine maintenance & operational discharge valves on screw compressors fail to
(Total intermediate properly Loss of second stage cooling/ procedures seat or seal properly - send a message to mf~
piping system) Mechanical failure
a Suction check valve fails on screw
compressor suction when
compressor is stopped and oil
is running - example during
pump
startup & shutdown~
b Booster compressors oil
coalescing filter clements or
second_ sts~e oil return fails
Loss of Power Supply failure from power plant No bsvsrdous consequence
G-round fault interruption trips main
F. quiPmgnt fslh~re tri?s rosin
Loss of Contaimnent Mechanical failure Release of toxic material 1 Prev~tive maintenance 2 3 3 ~ufficient protection exists
a Ammonia pump seal failure 2 Ammonia sensors
Human error 3 Operator training
a Forklift breaking piping 4 Emergency response procedures
External event ~ Door lock and _slsrm on ammonia
a Earthquake i diet-user
~ Sabotage i 6 Property fencing
a ~cr valves arc accessible to
outside and could be opened
·RtSK RANKING ( $ ) EEVERfl~ ( L ) U~UHOOD ( R ) ~ OP CONSEGUENCE
' I · ~ 61GNIFICANT:, ~ RC-QUbRB~, M:t,EMENTATiON B~OIN$ IMb~DIA'TELY
t · CATA~'ROPHIC t · HIGHLY LIKELY ] 2 · ~$NIFICANT; ACTION REQUIRE~. BIPI. EMENTATION BEGINS IN THREE MONTHE
2 - EXTE~tgVE 2 - LI<ELY
-}.-MODERATE :3~-=UNLI~.LY- L ..... ,3~- N~OT_v~RYglO N IFIDANT; ~ ACTION A~ REQUIF~ED; _ IdI~LEMENTA'I1ON BEG IN $_wt"rH IN A _YEN~
4 · OPERATiONAL ( I=~FER TO CHART A ) 4 · ~Y UNI,.IKELY ( R~FER TO GH~, B ) '4 - NOT 61ONIFIGANT; ACllON AT DISCRETION OF I.L4ZOP'TEAM; IIFI.~MEN~'I~IO~E~ATED'BY MANAOE~
I 5 · NO RISK, BUT OPERATIONAL PROB~ ACTION AT DISCRETION OF HAZOP TEAM; IMPI~ENTATION BVAUJATED BY DF~IGN ~ ( REFER TO CHART D )
~Ac~crry:. United States Cold Storage DATES OF ~I'UDY: I TEAM MEMBERS: Victor Arnett~ Chuck Toogood, J*u'n
Tracy, CAlifornia 12/01/92 Thron~h HAZ-_OP STUDY SHEET
NODE - EQUIPMENT GUIDE WORD8 - DEVIATION CAUSE OF DEVIATION - HOW ~OULD DEVIATION CONSEQUENCE OF DEVIATION PROTECTION OR PROTECTIVE DEVICES *RISK RANKING RECOMMENDED ACTION, NOTES OR QUF. S¥iONS
FROM OPERATING ARISE
CONDmON$ ~ ,.
THE NODE WILL BE ONE V~S~.. SUGGESTED: IDENTIFY ALL C. AUSE$ OF CI~VIATION IDEN*rlFY ALL CON ~EQUEN ~E$ OF D~IATION. I LIST A~ EDCSTIN G PRO~E~ON TI4AT COULD PREV~HT OR $ I. R
OR PIECE OF EQu~IvlENT, THE HIGH FLOW, LOW FLOW, NO MITIGATE ( LE$$~N ) THE CON~.QUENCE, R ,. RECOMMENDED ACTION
b'rUDYOFTHATNODEWII.LTAK~ I~_OW, REVERSE FLOW, HIQH * EXAMPLES: EXAMPLE~: i N ,~NOTE$
ldTO ACCOUNT ANY PRE~JRE, LOW PRE.UR;, LOSS C~ COOLING, LEAK IN VALVE, HUMAN ERROR, F~:, RELEASE OF TOXIC MATERIALS INTO ATMOSPHERE, PLANT
IqSTRu MENT, VALVE. pPING OR I.lIG H TEMPERATURE, LOW EQUIPI~-NT FNL.U RE, CONTROL. FAJLU ~E, AND EXTERNAL SHUTDOWN, EQUIPMENT DAMAG E. AND NO CONS~EQUENCE* ALARMS, INTERLOCk< AND SHUTDOWN g~'T-r.M~. I=~E$$URE
EQUIPMENT THAT AFFEC'T~ THE 'TEf~ERATU F~, HiGH LEV~., EV~/T ( EN~FH QUA)qE. FI.OOD, TORNADO, PL.AN E CRASH. REUEF ( S.~eE.j.y ) yALVE$, FiRE f=~OTECTION EQUPMENT. G ~ QUESTIONS
OPERATION OF THAT NODE LOW LEVEL, CONTAMINATION ETC. ).~ LEAK DETECTORS, PROCEDURES ( EMERGENCY.
W1TH AIR, CONTAMINATION wT'rH ~ MAINTENANCE, OPi~ATIONAL~ ETC, ),TRAINING AND
WATER, CONTAMNATIOIq WTI'H I OPERATIONAL MONITORING.
OIL, LO~S OF POV~R, AND L.C~$ SEVERI'rY I.J)~LY-
OF CONTAINMENT.I HOOD
Low Temperature High flow Severed Freezer suction linc (2 ?S[G to Release of toxic material 1 Ammonia sensors :2 3 3 Su~cicnt protection exist
Recirculator (All Low 5 PSIG) or pump liquid f~:l line (40 2 Preventive Main~ce
temp. piping system) PSIG to 45 PSIG) 3 Building designed according to
Mechanical failure - ammonia pump seismic zon~ 4
se. al, valve, or flange f~ilur~ 4 Pressure gauges
~.xtern~l event - earthq~mke t 5 Emergency response procedures .,.
Low Flow / No Flow Mechanical failure Loss of r~ffrigeration / 1 Low level float alarm & pump shut4 I 5 Suffi¢imt protection exists
a Liquid f~l sol~aoid fails closedIi off
b Liquid feed pump failure 2 Ammonia pump failure alarm
3 Daily op~ralional monitorin~
4 Roi_tine maintenance
Reverse Flow Mechanical failure Oil contamination I 1 Suction check valve 4 2 5 S~rfficieat protection exists
a Screw compressor suction check :2 pump check valves
valve failure Loss of refrigeration i3 High level ,l,rm & shutdown
b Ammonia pump check valve Increase vessel liquid level i4 Door lock and alarm on the
failure .: ammoaia diffuser valve box.
Human error
a Diffuser high to low cross over
valve opened
High Pressure Mechanical failure Loss of refrigeration - possible ~eleas¢ 1 Fire protection ¢quipmem 3 4 5 R- Include electrical handling equipment in
a CompresSOl~ fail off- pumps and of toxic matctad I 2 Sprinkler system inspection thc fire suppression policy (clem*dz~
evaporatozs continue to run | 3 ~nfrared Ins~on of electrical disco~ battery, placement and type of
Fire - caused by Release of toxic material - high~. ssurc equipment 2 3 3 fire extinguisher, etc.)
a ~cal due to external heat (fire) ~ 4 SPRV on low temp recirculator set
b Hot work at 250 P$IG and on oil pot set at
c Smoking ~ 300 PSIG
d Electrical handling equipment 5 -30°F suction system high pressure.
6 :No smoking policy
t 7 Hot work permitting procedures
8 Smoke detectors in c)//icc an
· RISK RANmNG ( S } SEVERITY ( L ) UKEUHOOD I ( R ) RISK OF C:QN~QUENGE
I · CAT~Pt'IIC 1 · HIGHLY U)~LY [ t "V~RY 61GNIFICANT; ACTtC~ R~=QU~ ~TATION BEQI~I$ ]I4k'IEDIA'TE~Y
2 · Ex'r~NSNE 2 · L~L.Y 2 - ~GN~; ACT1ON REQUI.q~,, IMPI,EM~ATION BEGINS IN TI'I~ MONTHS
~ =blODERATE $= UNUI(E~,.Y l $ =NOT~R'Y~GNFI~, ACllONA~R~QU~. MPI.EM~'%~'TATION r=~JSvA't''HIN A~'=,N~
4 -Of~RATIONN ( REFER TO CHAR'T.A )__ 4~- EXTREM~.YUNI. I~EL,Y _(REFERTOCt'IA~'$) 4 -NOT~IGNIFICANT; ACTION A'TD~CRETION OF HAZOPTEA~ IMPLEMENTATION EVA, LUATED BY MANAGEMENT
........ ~5 ~N O~RitK.= Bi.3T OpERATtONA~ pROBLEM;=ACTiON :AT- Di~CRETi~N:OF:~ -TEAM:= IMPEEMENTATION ;EVA,UJATED; BY; DESIGN =TEAM, (~R~:;- ER ~O-CHART~C:)
;^c~Lrr~: United States Cold Storage v^TEs OF STUDY: TEAM MEMBERS: Victor Amett, Chuck Toogood, Jim PAGE 10 OF 11
Tracy, California 12/01/92 Through 12/02/92 HAZOP STUDY SHEET u=y ones, B=e Neslcr
NODE - EQUIPMENT GUIDE WORDS - DEVIATION CAUSE OF DEVIATION - HOW COULD DEVIATION CONSEQUENCE OF DEVIATION PROTECTION OR PROTECTIVE DEVICES ' *RISK RANKING RECOMMENDED ACTION, NOTES OR QUESTIOfi$
FROM OPERATING ARISE
CONDITIONS
THE NODE Wi/- BE ONE VESSEL SUGGESTED: IDENTIFY At/. CAUSES OF DEViATiON IDEN'/~FY N.L CON ~QU EN CE$ OF DEVtAllON, I LI$~ AU. EXIS'I1NG PROTECTION THAT COULD PREVENT OR $ L
OR PIECE OF EQU~IENT. THE HIGH FLOW, LOW FLOW, NO Mi'I~GATE ( I.~$~ )THE CONSEQUENCE, R "RECOMMENDED ACTION
b'TUDY OF THAT NODE WILL TAK~ FI. OW. REVER~E FLOW, HIGH EXAMPLE~: EXAMPLES:
IqTO ACCOUNT N'ly PRESSURE, LOW PRESSURE. LD$$ OF COOL. G, LEAK IN VALVE, HUMAN ERROR, FIRE, RELEASE OF TOXIC MATERIN.~ INTO ATMOSPHERe, PI.ANT EX.'kMP~ N -NOTES
Iff ~FRU MENT, VALVe, ppING OR HIGH TEMPERATURE, LOW EQUIPMENT FNLURE, CONI~OL FNUJ RE, AND EXTERNAL SHUTDOWN, EQUIPME~IT DAMAGE. AND NO CONSEQUENCE. At.ARM~, IN'FERLOCK AND SH Lrl'DOV~ ~, PRESSURE
EQUIPMENT 'THAT AFFECTS TH E TEMPERA"~.JR~, HIQ H ~ EVENT ( EARTHQU~, FLOOD, TORNADO, PLANE CRASH, REUEF ( ~FETY ) VALVES, FIR~ PROTECTION EQU~MENT, Q ,. QUEb'T1ONS
OPERATION OF'THAT NODE LOW LEVEl. CONTAMINATION ETC. ). .~ I.EN( D~=T~CTO~, PROCEDURES ( ~QENCY,
vv~rH A~, CONTA.U~,'rtON WTI'H 14NNT~JANCE, O~ATIONAL, ETC. ),TRNN~G NID
WATER, CONTAMINAT~ON WFFH } OPERA~ONAL MONITORING.
OL, LOSS OF POWER, ~D LOSS SEVERrl'Y Ui~.LY. RISK
OF ¢ONTAJNMENT. I HOOD
bow Temperature Low Pressure Mechanical failure No h,V~rdous consequence ! 1 Low pzessure alarm & cmouts oa 4 2 5 S,~cicnt protection exists
Eecirculatot (All Low a Compressoz suctioa control compressors
temp. piping system) failure 2 Operational monitoring
3 Suctioa system low p~essurc
iI-~gh Temperature Fire - caused by l~]case of'toxic material - high pressure I Fire protcctioa equipment 2 3 3 R - Include electrical handling equipment in
a Electrical due to cxtcrml heat (tim) I 2 Sprinkler system inspcctioa thc fire suppression poticy (cleaning.
b Hot wo& . I 3 Iufi'ared Impcctioa of electrical disconnecting battery, placcmcat and type of
c SmokingI equipment fire extinguisher, etc.)
d F.l¢c~cal handling cquipmcat ) 4 SPRY oa low tcmp rccirc~stoz set
at 250 ~PSIG an on oil pot set at 300
, PSIG
I 5 No smoking policy
6 Hot work permit~ug procedures
~ 7 Smoke detectors in offic~ and
Low Temper~'e Mech~cal failure No baz~om consequence I' 1 Low pressur~ ~nn & cmouls on 4 2 $ Sufficient protection exists
a Compressor suction control ~ compressors
failure 2 ~tional monitoring
3 System suction low pressure
iHigh Level Mechanical failure Possible compressor d~mag¢ 1 ~ting level prob~ indicator, 3 2 3 S-ff~¢ient protection exists
a Feed valve ~ open controller and high l~v~l ~
2 High l~vel float compl~ssor shin
Sudden pressure rednction caused by l down
control or human c~'ror. ! !3 Visual level monitoring
:5 ~ig~t icrc] co]ultra
16 Manual ~esct a_ft~ high level failu~
I[~,w Level Mcctum/cal faiJm*e Loss o£m~gcratio~ 11 Low ]cvcl float alal'm md pump shut 4 2 $ S-~cicat protcctio~ exist
~ ]boss o£ ammoaia £ccd dow~
b Valve or control failure [2 Sight level column
Loss of refrigerant thro,Eh routine 13 Ammon~ detection system
maintenance, purging, valve packin~
and shaft seal leakage (fugitive
emissions)
· RISK RANKING ( S ) SEVERITY (L) UKEUHOOD i ( R ) RISK OF CONSEQUENCE
1 = CATASTROPHIC 1 - HIGHLY LIKELY 1 - VERY ~IGNIF~; ACT1ON R~ED:, IM~MENTATION BEGIN~ II~TELY
2 = EXTENSIVE 2 = I.I~LY I 2 · ~GNIFICANT: ACllON REQU~ED; IMPLEMENTATION BEGIN8 IN THREE MONTH6
3-MODERATE ~- UNI.~Y $ .NOTV~=RYBIGNF~, ACTION A~ RE~U~, ~w~.~MENTATION BE~INSWr~HINA~
4 · OPERATIONAL ( REFER TO CHART A ) 4 - EXTREMELY Uttt.ll~LY ( REFER TO CI.U~' B ) 4 - NOT ~N~lCah'T: AC'llON AT DISCREllON OF HAZOP TEAM: A~..EMEt~A'T1ON EVAUJATED BY
......... $.~- N_O_I~8[(,_B_U'TOI:~-ERATIONAL PROBLEM;ACTION ATDI~CRETIONOEHAZOP_I--=AM;_IM~ATION EVN,UATED BY_DESIGNTEAM
r~ClLrr~: United States Cold Storage r~TEs OF STUDY: .i TEAM MEMBERS: Victor Amct/, Chuck Toogood, Y~m PAGE
Tracy, Californ/a 12~01/92Through..12/02~92 HAZOP STUDY SHI/ET Matrena, Larry Jones, Bruce Chandler, RonNesler
NODE - EQUIPMENT GUIDE WORDS - DEVIATION CAUSE OF DEVIATION - HOW COULD DEVIATION CONSEQUENCE OF DEVIATION PROTECTION OR PROTECTIVE DEVICES 'RISK RANKING RECOMMENDED ACTION'" NOTES OR QUESTIONS--
FROM OPERATING ARISE
CONDITIONS
THE NODE ~ BE ONE VESb'EL SUGGE$'FE~, DENTIFY ALL CAUSES OF DEVIATION IDENTIFY ALL CONSEQUENCES OF DEVIATION. I tJ~r AU. E,~ST1NG PROTECTION THAT COULD PREVENT OR S L R
OR PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. THE HIGH FLOW, LOW FLOW, NOI MITIGATE ( LESSEN ) THE CONSEQUENCE. R = RECOMMENDED ACTION
b'T1JDY OF THAT N ODE WILL TAK~ FLOW, REVER~E FLOW, HIE H EXAHPLES: EXAMPLES:
INTO ACCOUNT ANY PF~SU~, LOW PRESSURE, LOSS OF COOUNG, LEAK IN VAt.VI/, HUMAN ERROR. FIRE, REI.EA~E OF TOXIC MATERIALS INTO ATMOSPHERE, PLANT EX~4PLES: N - NOTES
INSTRUMENT, VALVE. PIPING OR HIGH TEMPERATURE, LOW EQUIPI~.NT FAILURE, CONI~OL FNLURE, AND EXTERNAL ~HUTDOWN, EQUIPMENT DAMAGE, AND NO CONSEQUENCE. ALARMS, IKTERLOCK AND EHUTDOWN ~f~I~MS, PRESSURE
EQUIPMENT THAT AFFECT~ THE TEMPERATURE. HIGH LEVEL, EVENT ( EARTHQUA~!. FLOOD. TORNN)C, PLANE CRASH, RELIEF ( ~AFETY ) VALVES, FIRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT, Q · QUEb'FtONS
OPERATI(~I OF THAT NODE LOW La-VEl. CONTANINATION ETC. ). LEAK DETECTORS, PROCEDURES ( EMERGENCY.
WITH AIR, CONTN~INATION Wn'H MAIN'i~N~NCE, O~ERATIONAL, ETC.),TRAINING AND
WATER, CONTAI~NATION WITH OPERATIONAL MONITORING.
O~. LOSS OF POWER. N~D LO~$ SEVERrTY ~Y. RiSK
OF CONTAINMENT. H GOD
bow Temperature Cont~'nination with Hum,m error Loss or reduction of refi.igemtmn 1 Proper routine oil removal 4 2 $ N - We ln~ found most suction ~nd
g.ecirculator (All Low Oil a F~ilure to routinely drsin oil I 2 Routine maintemnce & oper~onal disch~e valves on screw compressors f~l to
Icmp. piping system) properly procedures seat or seal properly - send a message to mfg.
Meclnmical f~ilure
a Suction check valve f~ils on screw
compressor suction when
compressor is stopped md oil
pump is nmning - ex~mple during
st~'up & shutdown
Loss of Power Supply fifilure fi.om power plant No hazardou~ consequence i'
Ground fault interaction trips ~
Equipment f~ure trips main
Loss of Contdmnent Mechanical f~lure Rele~e of toxic m~terial 1 Pr*ventive m~dntta~ce 2 2t 21 Sufficient protection exist~
a Ammonia pump seal failure 2 Ammonia sensors
External ,vent 2t Operator training
a Earthquake 4 Emergency respome procedures
Sabotage 5 Door lock ~nd ~!~rm on
,~ Diffus~ x,alves ~re ~c~e~sible to diffijsor v~e box
outside ~md could be opened
I
I
' RISK RN~I~NG ( S ) SEVERITY ( L ) Ut~LIHOOD I ( R ) RISK OF CONSEQUENCE
1 · CATA.~FROPttlC 1 · HIGHLY UK~LY ' 1 · VERY $IGN~'_..~N~rl'; ACTION REQUIRED. II~t.EMENTA~ B!=GIN8
2 · Ex'rEND1VE 2 · I.~ELY / 2 · b"I(~NtF1C. ANT: ACTION REQUIRED;, IUPLL=MENTATION BEGINS IN THREE MONTHS
~ ·MODERATE $ · UNI.~YI $ · NOT~.RY ~I~NFICANT;, ACTION A~ REQI.I~D; I~ATION BEOBI$ wr'I~,IIN AYEAR
4 · OPERATIONAL ( I~ER TO CHART A ) 4 · EXTR~Y UNI.II~=LY ( I~ER TO ,C~ B ) 4 · NOT ~IGNIF]~. A~ON AT D~CRETION OF HAZO~ TEAM; II~A~ EVALUATED BY MANAGEMENT
__ _ L~ __ _E~NORI~K. BI. ITOP. ERA'nONALI?ROBLEMLACTIONAT_DI~CRETION_OF_HAZOP_TEN~. ,_ ~II~.EMENTAT1ONEV_N. UATEO_BYDE$1~_N_TEN4 _ _ (REF~ER.TO_CHART_C.). ___
"EVAPORATIVE2 ]
~ F-7
I
II
HIGH
RECEIVER
I
L. ........... J L- ...........
i,~, FUTURE VI, ',~ FUTURE
J ~EVAPORATIVF~ ' J ~EIVAPORATIVE~
i ~ CONDENSER~ ~l , ~ CONDENSER~ ~
I
? J
EVAPORATIVF~ I
CONDENSER-~ !
· LEGEND
TRUCK DOCK
I
I
®
ROOM
ROOM
ROOM
FUTURE
EVAPORATIVE~
GLYCOL HEATER II __ II
SAFETY
$/,'od.
I I I
I I I
L"'_ ......... 'ti
I '~E'VAPORATIVF~ ,
',~ CONDENSER-? i
i¢~. ~% II I®.~. ~-F Il I®.~ ~% I, , . :, , . :, ; ~
,.~,~'~, ~ I I ,.~ Y,~ ~ I I1 ,.~ ~.~ ~ I I', , _ ~'~ ,', , ~'4 ! ~'~
= . I ~ ~ I I ~ ~ iI [~ · ~
I~1 I~~_1 I1~~_1~ ~- ....... ~--~ ,, ~- ........... u ,, u- ........... ~
~~1~1~'1,~ ............. ~, ,,~ ............. ~ ,,~ ............. ~q
,,,,~,, ~ I~~m~.... .-i i FUTURE ! I FUTURE ! I FUTURE ~'
~~~.[~ I RD8 222 ; I RDB 222 I , RDB 222 >
m BOOSTER I" '3 BOOSTER J l-~ BOOSTER -I
SCREW, COM~ESSOR=., ~CREW~ESSOR (I ~. _ ~ I SCREW COMPRESSOR ~' /SCR~ COUPRESSOR ~' /SCR~ COMPRESSOR,
C1 C2
FUTURE
RWBII 1 O0
HIGH STAGE
AMMONIA
DIFFUSION
SYSTEM
SCREW COMPRESSOR
I
. ~F~--
HIGH STAGE m ~ HIGH STAGE
SCR~ COMPRESSOR = ~ SCREW COMPRESSOR
6O
(1~o wP)
III III III III III III
REFRIGERATED RAIL DOCK
ENGINE: ROOM
FREEZER/COOLER #3
!
=:~__ ! CHARGING
ROOM
~ r~ PENTHOUSE
TOOLROOM
r~[[ZrR/COm[R//2 . .
ABOVE GROUND PiPiNG __
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE
1400 N. Mac ARTHUR DRIVE
TRACY, CA 95376
SCALE 1" = 50'
':JNid
/
1
/
/
/
I
i
o ~
I\
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$1EIH~H.
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I
Text Summary
SITE DATA INFORMATION:
2827234218
Location: BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.59 (Unsheltered single storied)
Date and Time: Fixed at January-7, 1991 0700 hours?
CHEMICAL INFORMATION:
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Molecular Weight: 17.03 kg/kmol
TLV-TWA: 25.00 ppm IDLH: 500 00 ppm
Footprint Level of Concern: 50 ppm7 '
Boiling Point: -28.17° F
Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm
Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 Ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSPHERIC INFORMATION: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)
Wind: 4.5 mph from NW? Inversion Height: .200 fe~t
Stability Class: F / Air Temperature: 44~ F?
Relative Humidity: 9~% Ground Roughness: Urban or forest
Cloud Cover: 4 tenths-~
SOURCE STRENGTH INFORMATION:
Liquid leak from short pipe or valve in vertical cylindrical tank
selected
Tank Diameter: 7 feet Tank Length: 13.3333 feet
Tank Volume: 3,838 gallons
Internal Temperature: 60° F
Chemical Mass in Tank: 9,949 pounds
Tank is 50% full
Circular Opening Diameter: 3/4 inche~
Opening is 3 inches from tank bottom.
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Computed Release Rate: 207 pounds/min
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 81.5 pounds/min
(averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released:
3,329 pounds
Note: The release was a two phase flow.
FOOTPRINT INFORMATION: Model Run: Heavy Gas
User specified LOC: 50 ppm
Max Threat Zone for LOC: 1,385 yard~
Max Threat Zone for IDLH: 261 yards
Note: The Heavy Gas footprint is an initial screening.
For short releases it may be an overestimation.
Be sure to check concentration information at s eci '
P flc locations.
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 1385 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 51.5 ppm
Indoor: 11.9 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 1,410 (ppm,min)
Indoor: 206 (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs a~'e shown with a dotted line.
Footprint Window
2827234118~
Chemical Name:~AMMONiA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas
Wind: 4.5 mph from NW
FOOTPRINT INFORMATION:
Model Run: Heavy Gas
User specified LOC: 50 ppm
Max Threat Zone for LOC: 1,385 yards
Max Threat Zone for IDLH: 261 yards
Note: The Heavy Gas footprint is an initial screening.
For short releases it may be an overestimation.
Be sure to check concentration information at specific locations.
yards
750
250
250
750
M.ay olerest~e lengt]
ion
5OO
1000
1500
2000
yards
Dose Window
2827234158~
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.59 (Unsheltered single storied)~
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
~ Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 1385 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 51.5 ppm
Indoor: 11.9 ppm
Max-.Dose:
Outdoor: 1,410 (ppm,min)
Indoor: 206 (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
Dose (ppm, min)
2,000 _
1,500
1,000
5OO
0
0
20 40 60
minutes
Concentration Window
2827234189
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.59 (Unsheltered single storied)
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 1385 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
" Outdoor: 51.5 ppm
Indoor: 11.9 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 1,410 (ppm,min)
Indoor: 206 (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
ppm
6O
40
2O
0
0
20 4O 6O
minutes
Source Release Rate
2827234204
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
SOURCE STRENGTH INFORMATION:
Liquid leak Trom short pipe or ~valve in vertical cylindrical tank
selected
Tank Diameter: 7 feet Tank Length: 13 3333 feet
Tank Volume: 3,838 gallons '
Internal Temperature: 60° F
Chemical Mass in.Tank: 9 949 pounds
Tank is 50% full '
Circular. Opening Diameter: 3/4 inches
Opening is 3 inches from tank 'bottom
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Computed Release Rate: 207 pounds/min
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 81.5 pounds/min
(averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released: 3,329 pounds
Note: The release was a two phase flow.
pounds/minute
100 -
8O
6O
4O
20
0
minutes
Text Summary
2827233932
SITE DATA INFORMATION:
Location: BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.59 (Unsheltered.single storied)
Date and Ti~e: Fixed at January 7, 1991 0700 hoursf'
CHEMICAL INFORMATION:
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Molecular Weight: 17.03 kg/kmol
TLV-TWA: 25.00 ppm IDLH: 500.00 ppm
.Footprint Level of Concern: 250 pp~
Boiling Point: -28.17~ F
Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm
Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSPHERIC INFORMATION: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)
Wind: 4.5 m~h from.NW' Inversion Height: 200~fee~
Stability C ass: F/ Air Temperature: 44° F
Relative Humidity: 96~ Ground Roughness: Urban or forest
Cloud Cover: 4 tenths/
SOURCE STRENGTH INFORMATION:
Liquid leak from short pipe or valve in vertical cylindrical tank
selected
Tank Diameter: 7 feet Tank'Length: 13.3333 feet
Tank Volume: 3,838 gallons
Internal Temperature: 60° F
Chemical Mass in Tank: 9,949 pounds
Tank is 50% full
Circular Opening Diameter: 3/4 inche~
Opening is 3 inches from tank bottom
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Computed Release Rate: 207 pounds/min
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 81.5 pounds/min
(averaged over a m~nute or more).
Total Amount Released: 3,329 pounds
Note: The release was a two phase flow.
FOOTPRINT INFORMATION:
Model Run: Heavy Gas
User specified LOC: 250 ppm
Max Threat Zone for LOC: 433 yards
Max Threat Zone for IDLH: 261 yards
Note: The Heavy Gas footprint is an initial screening.
For short releases it may be an overestimation.
Be sure to check concentration information at specific locations.
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 433 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 258 ppm
Indoor: 73.4 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 9,660 /ppm,min/
Indoor: 2,190 ~ppm,min
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
Footprint Window
2827233879
Chemical Name: AMMONIA,~ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas
Wind: 4.5 mph from NW
FOOTPRINT INFORMATION:
Model Run: Heavy Gas
User specified LOC: 250 ppm
Max Threat Zone for LOC: 433 yards
Max Threat Zone for IDLH: 261 yards
Note: The Heavy Gas footprint is an initial screening.
For short releases it may be an overestimation.
Be sure to check concentration information at specific locations.
yards
200
100
'0
100
200
May
Che
ove es e 1 ngt
k c n tr rio
100
0
100 200 300 400 500
yards
source Release Rate
2827233921~.
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
SOURCE STRENGTH INFORMATION:
Liquid leak from short pipe or valve in vertical cylindrical tank
selected
Tank Diameter: 7 feet Tank Length: 13.3333 feet
Tank Volume: 3,838 gallons
Internal Temperature: 60° F
Chemical Mass in Tank: 9,949 pounds
Tank is 50% full
Circular Opening Diameter: 3/4 inches
Opening is 3 inches from tank bottom'
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Computed Release Rate: 207 pounds/min
.Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 81.5 pounds/min
(averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released: 3,329 pounds
Note: The release was a two phase flow.
pounds/minute
100 -
8O
60
40
20
0
0
I I
20 40
6O
minutes
.Concentration Window
2827233910~
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas
' .B. uilding Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.59 (Unsheltered single storied)
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/DoSe Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 433 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
outdoor: 258 ppm
Indoor: 73.4 ppm
Max Dose:
outdoor: 9,660 tppm,min)
Indoor: 2,190 ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
ppm
3OO
200
100
0
20 40
minutes
Dose Window
2827233897~__
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy. Gas
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: .0.59 (Unsheltered single storied)
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 433 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 258 ppm
Indoor: 73.4 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor.: 9,660 /ppm,m~n~
Indoor: 2,190 %ppm,mln)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
Dose (ppm, min)
10,000 -
8,000 -
6,000 -
4,000 -
2,000
0
20 40 60
minutes
0
Mc NAIR
-7'9-
RIVER MIST
DISTRICT
-~/- -66- -65- -64-
WHITE
-,soft-.'~- - --~-"~'~'~' ~
..... .~,/'~ ~-~-~
UNITED 5T.-~TES COLD STORAGE
650t D[ST1L~tCT BLVD.
BAICERSFIELD, CA 93313
01Z3456789~0
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WHITE
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~' ~ b ~{~ki · BAI~F~LD, CA 93313'
r 0 i 23 456 T8 9~ .
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Text Summary
2827308992~
SITE DATA INFORMATION:
Location: BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: ~0.85 (Unsheltered single storied)
Date and Time: Fixed at July 1, 1993 1400 hours?
_CHEMICAL INFORMATION:
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Molecular Weight: 17'.03 kg/kmol
TLV-TWA: 25.00 ppm IDLH: 500.00 ppm
Footprint Level of Concern: 50 ppm?
Boiling Point: -28.17° F
Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm
Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSPHERIC INFORMATION: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)
Wind: 8 mph from nw? No Inversion Height ~
Stability Class: A / Air Temperature: 85° F?
Relative Humidity: 23~ Ground Roughness: Urban or forest
Cloud Cover: 1 tenths
SOURCE STRENGTH INFORMATION:
Liquid leak from short pipe~or valve in vertical cylindrical tank
selected
Tank Diameter: 7 feet Tank Length: 13.3333 feet
Tank Volume: 3,838 gallons
Internal Temperature: 70° F
Chemical Mass in Tank: 9,835 pounds
Tank is 50% full
Circular Opening Diameter: 3/4 inches=
Opening is 3 inches from tank bottom
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Computed Release Rate: 238 pounds/min
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 103 pounds/min
(averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released: 3,505 pounds
Note: The'release was a two phase flow.
FOOTPRINT INFORMATION:
Model Run: Heavy Gas
User specified LOC: 50 ppm
Max Threat Zone for LOC: 518 yard~
Max Threat Zone for IDLH: 147 ~ards
Note: The Heavy Gas footprint is an initial screening.
For short releases it may be an overestimation.
Be sure to check concentration information at specific locations.
Footprint Window
2827309011~~--
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas
Wind: 8 mph from nw
FOOTPRINT INFORMATION:
Model Run: Heavy Gas
User specified LOC: 50 ppm
Max Threat Zone for LOC: 518 yards
Max Threat Zone for IDLH: 147 yards
Note: The Heavy Gas footprint is an'initial screening.
For short releases it may be an overestimation.
Be sure to check concentration information at specific locations.
yards
3.00
100
100
3OO
May o' ' gtt
Ch_eck
200
0 200 400 600
yards
Concentration Window
28272277].2
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS ,.
Model Run: Heavy_Gas
Building Air Exchanges per Hour:~ 0.'85' (~Unsheltered single storied)
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION: ~
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 518 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 50.7 ppm
Indoor: 14.2 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 1,590 (ppm,min)
Indoor: 592 (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
ppm
6O
2O
0
minutes
6O
Source Release Rate
2827227724~_
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
SOURCE STRENGTH INFORMATION:
Liquid leak 'from short pipe or valve in vertical cylindrical tank
selected
Tank Diameter: ~7 feet Tank Length: 13.3333 feet
Tank Volume: 3,838 gallons
Internal Temperature: 70° F
Chemical Mass in Tank: 9,835 pounds
Tank is 50% full
Circular Opening Diameter: 3/4 inches'
Opening is 3 inches from tank bottom
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Computed.Release Rate: 238 pounds/min
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 103 pounds/min
(averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released: 3,505 pounds
Note: The release was a two phase flow.
pounds/minute
200 -
150
100
5O
0
20 40
minutes
Dose Window
2827227699
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.85 (Unsheltered single storied)
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 518 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 50.7 ppm
Indoor: 14.2 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 1 590 (ppm,min)
Indoor: 562 (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
Dose (ppm, rain)
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
I T 1
0 20 40 60
minutes
Text Summary
2827308920
SITE DATA INFORMATION:
Location: BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.85 (Unsheltered single storied)
Date and Time: Fixed at July 1, 1993 1400 hour~
CHEMICAL INFORMATION:
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Molecular Weight: 17.03 kg/kmol
TLV-TWA: 25.00 ppm IDLH: 500.00 ppm
Footprint Level of Concern: 250 pp~
B°iling'P°int: -28.17~ F
Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than t atm
Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
_ mph from ~ No Inversion Height
Stability Class: Air Temperature: 85°
Relative Humidity: 23~ Ground Roughness: Urban or forest
Cloud Cover: 1 tenths ?
SOURCE STRENGTH INFORMATION.:
Liquid leak from short pipe or valve in vertical cylindrical tank
selected
Tank Diameter: 7 feet Tank Length: 13 3333 feet
Tank Volume: 3,838 gallons '
Internal Temperature: 70° F
Chemical Mass in Tank: 9 835 pounds
Tank is 50% full '
Circular Opening Diameter: 3/4 inches-.?
Opening is 3 inches from tank bottom
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Computed Release Rate: 238 pounds/min
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 103 pounds/min
(averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released: 3,505 pounds
Note: The release was a two phase flow.
FOOTPRINT INFORMATION:
Model Run: Heavy Gas
User specified LOC: 250 ppm
Max Threat Zone for LOC: 216 yards~/
Max Threat Zone for IDLH: 147 yards
Note: The Heavy Gas footprint is an initial screening.
For short releases it may be an overestimation.
Be sure to check concentration information at specific locations.
Footprint Window
2827308940
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas
Wind: 8 mph from'nw
FOOTPRINT INFORMATION:
Model Run: Heavy Gas
User specified LOC: 250 ppm
Max Threat Zone for LOC: 216 yards
Max Threat Zone for IDLH: 147 yards
Note: The Heavy Gas footprint zs an initial screening.
For short releases it may be an overestimation.
Be sure to check concentration'information at specific locations.
yards
150
5O
5O
150
May o', . ' lengtI
/
Check on
100 0 100 200 300
yards
Dose Window
2827226423~_
single storied)
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0'85 (Unsheltered
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 216 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 253 ppm
Indoor: 68.9 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 7,850 (Ppm,min)
Indoor: 3 000 (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor ~raphs are shown with a dotted line.
Dose (ppm, min )
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
20 40 60
minutes
Concentration Window
2827226437
~Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour:' 0.85'~i(Unsheltered single storied)
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 216 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 253 ppm
Indoor: 68.9 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 7,850 (ppm,min)
Indoor: 3,000 (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
ppm
300 -
200
100
0
0
minutes
Source Release Rate
2827226449
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
SOURCE STRENGTH INFORMATION:
Liquid,leak-from short pipe or valve in vertical cylindrical tank
selected
Tank Diameter: 7 feet Tank Length: 13.3333 feet
Tank Volume: 3,838 gallons
,Internal Temperature: 70° F
Chemical Mass in Tank: 9,835 pounds
Tank is 50% full
Circular Opening Diameter: 3/4 inches
Opening is 3 inches from tank bottom
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Computed Release Rate: 238 pounds/min
Max Average~ Sustained Release Rate: 103 pounds/min
'(averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released: 3,505 pounds
Note: The release was a two phase flow.
pounds/minute
200 -
150
100
50
20 40
minutes
6O
\
\
I
t/
RUSHING~ ~=~ CJ ~ i .....
~ I 6501 DIST~CT BL~. .J BLU~ __
'~ r~LX wY. i % N ~ BAI~F~LD, CA 93313 J '~
AvE. j ' ;
SEr_I~
~. Text Summary
2827402354~
~-..~'.SITE DATA INFORMATION:
Location: BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0'59 (Unsheltered single storied)
Date and Ti~e: Fixed at January 7, 1991 0700 hour~
CHEMICAL INFORMATION:
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Molecular Weight: 17.03 kg/kmol
TLV-TWA: 25.00 ppm IDLH:. 500 00 ppm
Footprint Level of Concern: 50 pp-m
Boiling Point: -28.17° F
Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 arm '
Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSPHERIC INFORMATION: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)
Wind: 4.5 mph from NW Inversion Height: 200
Stability Class: ~ Air'Temperature: 44° F
~ Relative Humidity: 96% Ground Roughness: Urban or forest
Cloud. Cover: 4 tenths7
SOURCE STRENGTH INFORMATION:
Liquid leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank selected
Tank Diameter: 5 feet Tank Length: 12 feet
Tank Volume: 1,763 gallons
Internal Temperature: 16° F
Chemical Mass in Tank: 3,177 pounds
Tank is 33% full
Circular Opening Diameter: .087 inches?
Opening is 0 inches from tank bottom
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Computed Release Rate: 5.01 pounds/min
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 1.29 pounds/min
(averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released: 77.6 pounds
Note: The release was a two phase flow.
FOOTPRINT INFORMATION:
Model Run: Heavy Gas
User specified LOC: 50 ppm
Max Threat Zone for LOC:~ 185 yards,
'Max Threat Zone for IDLH: 34 yards
Note: The Heavy Gas footprint is.an initial screening.
For short releases it may be an overestimation.
· Be sure to check concentration information at specific locations.
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 185 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 51.2 ppm
Indoor: 21.2 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 2 580 (ppm,min)
Indoor: 6~. (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
Source Release Rate
2827402343~
Chemical ,Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
SOURCE STRENGTH INFORMATION:
Liquid leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank selected
Tank Diameter: 5 feet Tank Length: 12 feet
Tank Volume: 1,763 gallons
Internal Temperature: 16° F
Chemical Mass in Tank: 3,177 pounds
Tank is 33% full
Circular. Opening Diameter: .087 inches
Opening is 0 inches from tank bottom
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Computed Release Rate: 5.01 pounds/min
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 1.29 pounds/min
(averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released: 77.6 pounds
Note: The release was a two phase flow.
~@unds/minute
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
20 40
6O
minutes
· Concentration Window
2827402332
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy.Gas
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.59 (Unsheltered single storied)
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 185 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max..Concentration:
Outdoor: 51.2 ppm
Indoor: 21.2 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 2,780 (ppm,min)
Indoor: 627 (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
ppm
60
4O
20
20
4O
minutes
Dose Window
2827402319~
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas.
"Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.59 (Unsheltered single storied)
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 185 yards
~ Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
...... Outdoor: 51.2 ppm
Indoor: 21.2 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 2,780 (ppm,min)
Indoor: 627 (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
Dose (ppm, min)
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
0 20 40 60
minutes
Footprint Window
2827402302~
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model'Run: Heavy. Gas
Wind: 4.5 mph from NW
FOOTPRINT INFORMATION:
Model Run: Heavy Gas
User specified LOC: 50 ppm
~ Max Threat Zone for LOC: 185 yards
Max Threat Zone for IDLH: 34 yards
Note: The Heavy Gas footprint is an initial screening.
For short releases it may be an overestimation.
Be sure to check concentration information at specific locations.
yards
75
25
25
75
0 50 100 15.0 200
yards
Text Summary
2827402628
SITE DATA INFORMATION:
LocatiOn: BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA ·
i Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.59 (Unsheltered single storied)
Date and Ti~e: Fixed at January 7, 1991 0700 hours
CHEMICAL INFORMATION:
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Molecular Weight: 17.03 kg/kmol .....
TLV-TWA: 25.00 ppm IDLH: 500.00 ppm
Footprint Level of Concern: 250 ppm7
Boiling Point: -28.17° F
Va~,or Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 arm
Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSPHERIC INFORMATION: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)
Wind: 4.5 mph from NW/ Inversion Height: 200 fee~
Stability Class: F~i Air Temperature: 44° F~
Relative Humidity: 96% Ground Roughness: Urban or forest
Cloud Cover: 4 tenths[
SOURCE,'STRENGTH INFORMATION:
Liquid leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank selected
Tank Diameter: 5 feet Tank Length: 12 feet
Tank Volume: 1,763 gallons
Internal Temperature: 16° F
Chemical Mass in Tank: 3 177 pounds,.
Tank is 33% full '
,. Circular Opening Diameter: .087 inches-?
Opening is 0 inches from tank bottom '
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Computed Release Rate: 5.01 pounds/.min
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 1.29 pounds/min
(averaged over a minute or more)~
Total Amount Released: 77.6 pounds
Note: The release was a two phase flow.
FOOTPRINT INFORMATION: Model Run: Heavy Gas .....
User specified LOC: 250 ppm
Max Threat Zone for LOC: 55 yards~
Max Threat Zone for IDLH: 34 yards
Note: Footprint wasn't drawn because effects of
near-field patchiness make plume presentation
unreliable for short distances.
TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 55 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 262 ppm
Indoor: 114 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 15,200 (ppm,min)
Indoor: 3,590 (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
Source Release Rate
2827402616~
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
SOURCE STRENGTH INFORMATION:
Liquid leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank selected
Tank Diameter: 5 feet Tank Length: 12 feet
i Tank Volume: 1,763 gallons
Internal Temperature: 16° F
Chemical Mass in Tank: 3,177 pounds
Tank is 33% full
Circular Opening Diameter: .087 inches
Opening is 0 inches from tank bottom
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour
Max Computed Release Rate: 5.01 pounds/min
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 1.29 pounds/min
(averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released: 77.6 pounds
Note: The release was a two phase flow.
pounds/minute
1.5
1
0.5
0 .~ 20 40 60
minutes
Concentration Window
2827402602
Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.59 (Unsheltered single storied)
'TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
:, Downwind: . 55 yards
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 262 ppm
Indoor: 114 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 15,200 (ppm,min)
Indoor: 3,590 (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
ppm
300
.200
100
0
minutes
I 1' 1
0 20 40 60
Dose Window
2827402585~
'~Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS Model Run: Heavy Gas'
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.59 '(Unsheltered single storied)
~TIME DEPENDENT INFORMATION:
Concentration/Dose Estimates at the point:
Downwind: 55 yards .~
Off Centerline: 0 yards
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 262 ppm
Indoor: 114 ppm
Max Dose:
Outdoor: 15,200 (ppm,min)
Indoor: 3,590 (ppm,min)
Note: Indoor graphs are shown with a dotted line.
Dose (ppm, min)
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
0 20 40 60
minutes
Footprint Window
2827402555~_
.Chemical Name: AMMONIA, ANHYDROUS
Model Run: Heavy Gas
Wind: 4.5 mph from NW
FOOTPRINT INFORMATION: Model Run: Heavy Gas
User specified LOC: 250 ppm
Max Threat Zone for LOC: 55 yards
Max Threat Zone for IDLH: 34 yards
Note: Footprint wasn't drawn because~effects of
near-field patchiness make plume presentation
unreliable for short distances.
Model
User
Max
Run: Heavy Gas
specified LOC:
Zone
Max
Threat
Zone
Note:
Threat
Footprint
for
250
LOC:
ppm
55
for
IDLH'
·
34
wasn' t
drawn
near-field
unreliable
patchiness
for short
make
distan
D
April 5, 2001
FIRE CHIEF
RON FRAZE
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
2101 "H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3941
FAX (661 ) 395-1349
SUPPRESSION SERVICES
2101 "H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
.VOICE (661) 326-3941
FAX (661) 395-1349
PREVENTION SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (66!) 326-3951
FAX (661) 326-0576
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3979
FAX (661) 326-0576
TRAINING DIVISION
5642 Victor Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93308
VOICE (661) 399-4697
FAX (661) 399-5763
The Bakersfield Californian
Legal Notice Division
P,O. Bin 440
Bakersfield, CA 93302
Dear Sir:
Please publish the following public notice one time only.
A Risk Management Plan (RMP) hasbeen prepared by United States Cold
Storage located at 6501 District Bpulevard, Bakersfield, CA 93313. The
RMP describes programs and controls designed to prevent accidental
releases of a regulated substance, 'This RMP will be available for public
review for the next 45 days at the Bakersfield Fire Department, Office of
Environmental Services, 1715 Chester Avenue, Bakersfield, CA 93301.
Please contact Howard H. Wines, III for information regarding this RMP.
The bill for this service should be charged to City of Bakersfield Fire
Department EMMA account. Invoices should be sent to me at the Office of
Environmental Servicesl 1715 Chester Avenue, Bakersfiel~l, CA 93301. Please send
me proof of publication of this notice. If you need any further information regarding
this legal notice, please call me at 326-3979.
Sincerely,
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Materials Technician
Office of Environmental Services
HHW/db
s:April2001\The Bk CalitbmianLglNotthn.sl4
March 17, 1997
Mr. Ron Whisenant
United States Cold Storage
6501 District Blvd.
Bakersfield CA 93313
NOTICE TO COMPLY WITH FEDERAL ACCIDENTAL
RELEASE PREVENTION PROGRAM WITHIN 60 DAYS
Dear Mr. Whisenant:
You are hereby notified that pursuant to Section 25535(d) California
Healthand Safety Code (CH&SC), that United States Cold Storage shall
implement all programs and activities in the Risk Management Plan (40 CFR
68.150 et seq) before operations commence in the case of a modified facility.
Furthermore, pursuant to Section 25543.2(I>)CH&SC, United States Cold
Storage shall revise the Risk Management Plan (RMP) to conform with 40 CFR
Part 68 and submit the RMP to this office expeditiously, but not later than 60 days
from the date of this notice.
If you have any questions, please call me at 326-3979.
Sincerely,
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Materials Technician
HHW/dlm
'Incident Investigation Form
Incident RePort
Facility Bakersfield C/S
I Case Number 07-2-3-15
I Date 3/17/9~
Date of Incident: 3/15/97
I Time 6: 45pm I Deparknent Refrigeration~
Employee Involved with the Incident
Ron Whisenant
Employee's Usual Occupation:
Chief EnKineer
I Location Roof
Employee Supervisor
Cari Willis
OccuPation at time of Incident:
Same
Length' of Employment:
[ ] Less than I Month
[ ] 1-5 Months
[ ] 6 Months to 5 Years
IX] More than 5 years
IEmployment Category
Regular, Full-time
Re~lular, Part-time
Nonemployee.
Temporary
Seasonal
TEAM MEMBERS SIGNATURE TITLE/POSITION
Team Leader .'
VictOr Arnett
James C. Mar=ella
Ron Whisenant
David Glazebrook
Chuck Taylor
Carl Willis
western Regional Eng.
EPA/OSHA Coordinator
Chief Engineer
The Stellar Group
~n~rml Suoerintendent
The Stella~ Group
Divigion Manager
Plant Manager
INCIDENT TYPE: (Check any that Apply)
[X ] Refrigeration System [ ] Other (Building) Others:
[ ] Near-Miss {X ]Vapor Release
[ ] Property Damage [X ] Liquid Spill
[ ~lefrigeration Piping/Fork Lilt [ ] Fire
PRIMARY SOURCE OF REFRIGERANT RELEASE (Check One)
Oil Drain Line
Compressor
Condenser/Desuperheater
EvaPorator
[ ] Pump
[ ] Pressure Vessel
IX] Piping
[ ] Hand ValVe
[ ] Pressure Relief Valve
[ ] Automatic COntrol Valve
[ ] Charging Connection/Source
[ ] Other
?SM-II01. AP-A
Revised 10/5/94
page 2
· United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Incident InvestigatiOn Form
Incident Report
CAUSE{s) CONTRIBU'HNG TO A RELEASE_{_Check an that~
IX] Human Factors .. [ ] Equipment Defect/Malfunction
Design Flaw
Misapplied Equipment
Power Failure
Corrosion
Inadequate Maintenance
Natural Disaster
[ ] Improper Installation
[ ] Mechanical Damage
[ ] Hydrostatic Expansion
[ ] Hydraulic Shock
· [ ] Inadequate Administrative
[ ! Control
Control Failure
Process Upset
System Change
Maintenance Activity
Inadequate Labeling
Other
RESULTS OF INCIDENT
J]Estimate Quanty of Refrigerant Release:
I Estimate of Property/Product Damage:
I!,Number of Serious Injuries
Other:
Community complaints
ClRCUMSTANCE LEADING UP TO THEINCIDENT
C[-~;friReration tie-in for new 1997 plant expansion
EVENTS AND ACTIONS AS INCIDENT OCCURRED
See attached sheet (Appendix A)
t
ASSESSMENT OF ROOT CAUSE OF INCIDENT:
Improper pump out of liquid line
PSM-IIOI AP-A ~;~.
Revised 10&b~g4
page 3
ASSESSMENT OF ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSES:
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Incident Investigation For.m
Incident Report
Failure of the contractor to realize the danger of an improper pump out.
Failure of USCS to monitor and control contractors pump out procedures.
ACTIONS WHICH HELPED TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF THE INCIDENT
Due to the short duration of the release there was no mitigatin~ ~ction taken.
CIRCUMSTANCE COVERED UNDER PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS? [Z ] YES [ ] NO
Global System. pages 13 - 14. guide word - human error, deviation - human error
Loss of containment, cause #12, failure to properly pump-out refrigeration equipment.
See Appendix "B"
PROPOSED CHANGE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE REQUIRED? [ ] Yes ~ ] No
Re~nf~rce the policy stated ~n our psm mannual under Section 5. Contractors Screenin~
as it pertains to the Chief Engineers responsibility during line opening operators.
See Appendix "C"
Oopy Distribution Team Members Team leader _~./_~'C~"'/~. , ~~--~/, ~,/~-~
R.G. Noll Sl~. nature Oa~'e /
Howard H. Wines. III : ~,~&
Team Leader or Team Member fg[ more information.
P.OI
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Freezer Addition, Bakersfield, CA
Calendar of Events
Maroh 15, 1997
Approximately 1:00 p.m.
· Closed L.T.R.L. line at pumps.
· Hooked hose from L.T.R.L. to L.T. rccirculator.
· Closed all L.T.R.L. and H.G. valves to coils.
· Did this process twice because trucks were going to be unloading all day.
Approximately 2:45 p,m. · Closed remaining valves to coils.
· H.T.R.L. - H.T.R.S. - L.T.R.$. - b),pa.~s H.T.R.L. at pump.
Approximately 3:00 p.m. · Bled of H.O. into L.T.R.$. which was in a vacuum.
· Shut down L.T.R.S. main on root'.
· Opened LT.R.$. main to atmosphere; no release.
Approximately 3:15 p.m. · Cut L.T.P,,$. line.
· Tied in L.T.R.S. line.
Approximately 4:00 p,m, .
· · Pulled H.T.R.$. line into vacuum.
· Shut H.T.R.S. main valve.
· Opened to atmosphere; no retease.
Approximately 4:10 p.m. · Shut L.T.R.L.drain valve off.
· Opened L.T.R.L. threw crossover to L.T.R.S..
· Bled air out at new crossover point.
Approximately 4:30 p.m.
· · Cut H.T.R.S.
· Tied in I-[.T.R.S. line
IdAR-17-19c3'7 14:01
United .States Cold Storage, lac.
Bakersfield, CA
F~eczer Addition
Cnlcndn~ of Events
March i 5, 1997
Approximately 4:45 p.m. · Cut L.T.K.L. line.
· Tied in L.T.\P,.L. line.
Approximately 6:00 p.m.
· Put_hose on H.T.E.L. to L.T. reclrculator.
.~'.'"' St~e~"~ump down.
· 'Opened H.T.R.L. through crossover to H.T.R.S.
· Bled air out at new crossover point.
Approximately 6:00 p.m.. · Closed pump-out valve on H.T.R.L
· Opened H.T.R.L. line off to atmosphere; no release.
Approximately 6:30 p.m.
· , Cut H.T.R.L. line.
Approximately 6:40 P.m.
· · Flash ofammonia out oFH.T.R.L, line.
· "I was downstairs; went upstairs. Ammonia downwind pretty bad.
· Checked line, no ammonia coming out.
· Fire truck shows up about 7:00 p.m. Told them wc had a release. We'were nhnost
tinished and release had slopped. Offered to show them.
· As soon as they lelt, we had another larger r~lease~ went upstairs to make sure
everyone was okay.
Went downstalts; checked valves.
· Turned valve on pump dischmge i/2 turn more.
· Opened pump-out ilne and turned compressors on.
· While finishing tie in, Fire Dcpatt,,,ent was back in a few minutes and took them to
the roof.
Approximately 7:46 p.m.
,, Fhdshed lie-la.
Approximately 8:30 p.m. · Sbu'ted plant.
TOTAL P.02
Ho~ksheer.
Company: Un,ted S~a~es Cold Storage, Inc.
· ac2~£c~: Ammonia refr~geran~ facility.
Page:
SessiOn; 1 0V-13-93
:Drawings: FSi
;~ramecer: Loss
i. nr. ention: C~ece
t
!
!
!i
:!
!l
:!
'!
:1
1
I
i
I
I
!
!
I
i
i
1
I
!
Humn Error Loss 6. severed line, hit b~ 3. Releue of ref~/gerancl21. Piping is loeaced on 131111
of Containment fork lift. to warehouse area Jroof, m~-~izes poce~all
(e~closed area). Ifor external ~an ~ade
Jeven=s, i.e. forklift
I impact.
122. Proper cra~a~-g of
I forklift operators.
I
123. Various warehouse
]rules per=a~-~-g co t. he
proper opera:ion of
24. Proper ~_~a~-~-g of
all plan: operators and
Cal-OSH~'s Process Safecyl
Management Program,
(pSMP) and Risk
Management Prevention
Pro,ram (~MPP!.
2S. Height of ~he dock
area e~n~mizes potential
for external man made
even=s, i.e., forklift
impact.
26. Proper tr~fling of
l all plants operators and
I Cal-OSH~,s Process Safe=yl
J (PSMP) and R/sk
I ~gemenc Prevention
I
7. Failure to follow
Iproper oil re.oval
]procedures.
J8. Poor locac£on of
Jrecirculator oil oUC
I ~ocs.
19. No pressure gauges
I supplied on oil ouc po~s.~cO engine roo~'area
I I~encloaed area).
110. No oil out poc for
i4. Release of refrigez-dnc
[co ware~mse area
(en~lose~ area).
IS. Re~eue of refr~ge:antl2?. None
ICoongine :oeuarea
[(enclosed area).
I
16. Release of refrigerant 28. None
2111~
~. Release of refrigerant
21213
II
II
II
141212
III
III
Ill
29. None
I
~ZOP-PC 3.02 ~ Prima~e~h Inc.
121512
3. ~--~iev prints co IBC
detect, ne proper locacionl
of piping for =he rsil l~X
and truck dock.
4. Sufficiont safeguards
I
'-
~$. _e~--ider relocating BC
Jrec/xculacora oil ouc IMK I I
I I III
Is. c~s~aar ~stalling IBC
Iprsssure gauges ~ all I I I
I I'1 I
Uor~eet
Company: United S~a~es Cold $~crag~0 2nc.
Session: L 07o13o93 Revision: 0
Node: 2 Global System
Drawings: FS1
Paramo=er: Loss of Containment
Page: 14
In=en~.~on: Complete facili=y.
J (~los~ ~ea). ] ~ ~ ~ =o ~ oil ~llec=or.
I I III
[11. ~ e~r,' faille 8. Relic of refr~ger~=~30. ~er =rang of ~3J2~2 8. ~fici~= saf~
J-~a ~ ~fore (~clos~ ~ea). j~l-~'s Process Safe=yJ
I I~ ~)- I
I I I
112. ~l~e ~o p~erly 9. ~lme of refrige~c131. ~r =~(n~ng of 131~12 I~. ~fci~= sa~
~ ~= refrig~cion ~ ~e ~ ~ea all pl~ ~era~o~ ~ [ ~.
e~C for r~. {~clos~ ~ea). ~l-~'s ~cess ~fe=y~
10. Release of
refrigeran= ~o che
atmosphere.
Menage~en= Proc'ram,
(PSMP) and Risk
Manag~nc Prev~n=ion
~1 pl~= ~era=ors
~ (A.D.T. } ·
34. V~=ila=ion
se= =o ~ off ~e
~a de=cc=or.
:36. Opera=or visually 1~1312 11o. Sufficien= safeguardsl
IMe~-~cal Mechanical Failure 13. ~chan/cal failure of
]Failure .[Loss of ---~-~a pump, ~-~c~l
[ ] C~=ainme~= seal .~ailure.
I I 14 .' Leak from H.P. 11. Release o'f
[ J Recelv~r, sigh= glass' refrige=an= ~o engine
H~ZOP-PC 3.02 1~, Prima~.ech Inc.
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Process Safety Management Manual
PURPOSE:
.SCOPE:
United States Cold Storage, Inc. (USCS) is
committed to the safe operation of our facilities to
protect our workers, the public, and the
environment. This is accomplished to a great
extent by a well developed and implemented
Process Safety Management Program (PSMP).
One of the elements of our PSMP is "Contractor
Screening". This element covers contractors
performing maintenance or repair, turnaround,
major renovation, or specialty work on or adjacent
to an ammonia refrigeration system. It does not
'apply to contractors providing incidental services
which do not influence process safety, such as
janitorial work, food and drink services, laundry,
delivery or other supply services.
The intent of this section is to help all USCS
facilities to hire and use Contractors who
accomplish the desired job task without
oompromising the safety and health of any
employees. Contract employees must perform their
work safely. Considering that contractors often
perform very specialized and potentially hazardous
tasks, such as nonroutine repairs, their work must
be controlled while they are on or near our
refrigeration system.
The Contractor Safety Program includes the
following elements:
Initial Contractor Screening;
Contractor Employee Training; and ,
Contractor Safety Performance
Monitoring.
It will be the responsibility of the Chief Engineer to
be the overall coordinator of the facility Contractor'
Screening Program (CSP).acting as the
representative Of the Vice President and General
Manager of the facility, who has the overall
responsibility for the success of this program.
The Contractor Screening Program (CSP) involves
responsibilities on the part of USCS relating to
Contractor Screening: Page 1 ~' Revised: Sept. 1993
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Process Safety Management Manual
contractors and their employees performing
maintenance or repair, turnaround, major
renovation, or specialty work on or adjacent to a
covered process. The responsibilities include
informing them of known hazards related to their
jobs, training them to our work practices when
necessary to safely perform their jobs and
informing them of any applicable safety rules of the
facility. In addition, the Contractor Safety Program
involves responsibilities on the part of Contractors
who perform the applicable work. The Contractor'S
responsibilities are training employees in safe work
practices, hazards related to their assigned job and
the site's emergency action plan. In addition, the
Contractor will maintain documentation relating to
training of each contractor employee and assume
that any unique hazards presented or found during
their work are.reported to USCS.
CONTRACTOR
SCREENING
PROGRAM:
INITIAL CONTRACTOR
SCREENING:
The Contractor Screening Program includes the
following elements:
Initial Contractor Screening;
· Contractor Employee Training;
Contractor Safety Performance
Monitoring; and
Contractor Employee Injury/Illness Log.
The Chief Engineer shall designate all processes
that are covered by the OSHA PSM regulations. All
contractors who will work on covered processes will
have to be screened, to Insure compliance with this
section,
The chief engineer of the facility that is seeking to
engage a contract employer shall be responsible
for ensuring that the contract employer is informed
of this requirement, At the earliest possible point, a
request for employee safety information should be
sent to the contract employer (see Appendix A).
This request is designed to determine the details of
the Contractor's safety program and information on
their past performance.
Contractor Screening: Page 2 '~, Revised: Sept. 1993'
MAR-24-199? 13:47
THE STELL AR GROUP
P,O1
FAX cOVER SHEET
DATE:.
· o: ~~ /-/,.,.cf
COMPANY/DEPARTMENT
NUMBER OF PAGES: '7
FAX#:
('INCLUDING COVER SHEET)
OFFICE:
FAX:
(209) 834.5947
(209) 834-2207
COMMENTS:
MAR-24-199? 13:47 P.02
THE. STELLAR" GROUP
March 21, 1997
Ralph Huey
Hazardous Material Coordinator
Hazardous Material Division
2130 "G" St.
Bakersfield, Ca 93301
Reference: Ammonia Release
United States Cold Storage
Incident Report
Dear Ma'.. Huey,
This letter is a follow up summary of our discussion on Tuesday, March 19, 1997 in regards to
the ammonia release at USCS on District Avenue on Saturday, March 17, 1997.
USCS and The Stellar Group prepared a detailed incident report and it has been submitted by
U'SCS to your department separately. It details the events and will not be readdressed in this
letter.
As we discussed and is detailed in the incident report, human error on the part of our
Superintendent, David Glazebrook, was the cause of the release.
You expressed three specific concerns about The Stellar Group and our attitude toward Rules and
Regulations that might have contributed to the event. The three concerns, as we understood them
are as follows:
After someone from the fuel provider talked to your office about permits for a fuel tank on
site, you found a fuel tank on site without a permit. You feel this represented a blatant
disregard on our part tbr the Bakersfield permit process.
The section in the permit application requesting information about the status of hazardous
materials on the proposed site was not completed when the permit was filled out, resulting in
your department not knowing that USCS was going to have a hazardous material on site.
You felt this might bare been a deliberate attempt on our part to deceive the permitting
officials about the intent of the project.
7828 South Maple, Fresno, CA. 93725 · Telephone (209) 834-5947 · FAX (209) 834-2207
You felt the pump out and tie-in procedures as defined and documented by USCS was
dangerous to the community. You felt that if we followed those procedures, we would have
acted irresponsibly.
Rest~on~e - General
The Stellar Group is one of the largest ammonia refrigeration contractors in this country. We
work with municipalities, government agencies, and customers from coast to coast. As a leader
in this industry, there is nothing that takes priority over our responsibility for the safety of our
communities, customers and employees. Having a safety modifier rate of 0.8 clearly indicates
that we are well above the industry average in safety. We have had numerous OSHA inspections
around the country and have an excellent record with no serious violations. We have a safety
director, Phil Hinrichs, who is responsible for our entire safety program and I encourage you to
talk to him at our corporate headquarters (800-488-2900). A visit to the job site will clearly
demonstrate that our commitment to safety is far superior to most contractors that work in this
community and the industry as a whole.
Response - Item ~1
It was clearly our intent to get a permit to have a fucl'tank on site. Every request by your
department on how to install the fuel tank was completed. We met with your department to
understand what they wanted because we have every intention of meeting your requirements.
We had a site supervisor who was doing the permit investigation and the contract negotiations
with the fuel service suppliers. }Ie resigned during the process and another supervisor resumed
the effort. In the changeover, the new site supervisor failed to confirm the fuel supplier had
actually obtained the permit. We have removed the tank from the job. To prevent this from
happening again we have instituted a company policy, nation wide, not to -allow fuel tanks on
any site.
Response - Item #2
During the permit process, we worked hard to address every request made by the building
officials. We were also under an enormous time constraint to meet the needs of your customer
and mine, USCS. When the permit was finally ready we sent oar most available employee to
meet with the City and he filled out each section 0fthe permit that the permit office told him he
needed to fill out. The hazardous material compliance section, which must to be filled out and
signed by the owner or owner's agent, was not brought to our attention and we were given the
permit without having completed that section. The drawings that were submitted, clcaxly show
our intent to use anhYdrous ammonia and throughout our review process we discussed it with thc
City of Bakersfield in great length. I understand that this was some type of trigger for your
department and for that we apologize. To prevent this in the future we have implement a policy
that the project manager responsible for getting the permit, be responsible for making sure every
detail of the permit is filled out correctly and completely, and we will not rely on the owner or
the City to insure complete execution of the permit tbrm.
In addition, we, in conjunction with USCS, made a concerted effort.to inform your department
specifi~lly. We agreed that USCS, Ron Wisenaunt, would call your department and inform you
of our intent. Mr. Wisenaunt called Howard Wines of your department before the project began
and informed him of our plans and asked if there was anything else that needed to be filled out.
Mr. Wines instructed him that the phone call was sufficient.
Respor~.~e ,Item #3
It is The Stellar Group's written policy that our employees will not purposefully release
ammonia to atmosphere at any time, including during a pumpdown. Attached pleaSe find The
Stellar Group's general pumpdown procedures. To prevent this in the future I have already had a
meeting with the four personnel of our company whom are permitted and qualified 'to do
pumpdowns. In that meeting I reconfirmed our policy that we will not, under any circumstance,
purposefully release ammonia to atmosphere. I reiterated our responsibility and liability to our
community, customers, and employees. I explained to them that intentional release of anhydrous
ammonia to atmosphere was grounds for disciplinary action including dismissal.
The Stellar Group regrets the events that led up to the release and have taken aggressive steps to
prevent it from happening again. We welcome any suggestions that you have to make us a better
company and remain available for questions or comments.
Sincerely,
Charles R. Taylor, P.E.
Vice President
Ralph Huey
Ammonia release at USCS
3/21/97
Date:
To:
From:
Subject:
April 25, .1996
All ammonia refrigeration service technicians and superintendent
Charles R. Taylor, P. E.
Ammonia pump down procedure - general
These procedures are general guidelines and policies for pumping down live ammonia
refrigeration systems. Only employees who have completed training and are certified in PumP-
out procedures, lock out tag procedures, hazardous materials first responder course and
authorized by a Principle of this company is permitted to pump down a system.. Any other
employee doing so without proper authorization is grounds for disciplinary action including
termination.
Every effort will be made to prevent release of anhydrous ammonia to atmosphere. Purposeful
releases are not authorized and are grounds for disciplinary action including termination.
One person will be the responsible party for the pump down procedure. This person will be
known as the Pump Down Supervisor, or PDS. The PDS has total responsibility for the site
during a pump down and the full authority to direct every Stellar employee, as needed to facilitate
the safe evacuation of the system. The PDS has total responsibility for the safety and welfare of
every'person on the site and to the community.
If the owner wishes to be responsible for the pump down,, it is the responsibility of our PDS to
follow the owner's representative's instructions unless the PDS feels the instructions jeopardize
the safety of the pump down. It is the PDS's responsibility to confirm every step that thc
owner's personnel makes to confirm it is done correctly.
The PDS is responsible for developing the sequence of events, delegating and managing the
personnel around him as needed and to confirm all procedures and actions are followed correctly.
As each valve is closed the valves are to be tagged Out according to The Stellar C~roup's standard
lock out tag out procedures.
Each plant and facility is different and must be evaluated individually. Some basic guidelines are
as follows:
Evaluate the system to determine how the part of the system to be modified can be pumped out
to other parts of the system. This is the safest means of pumping a system out and should be the
first method explored. The PDS is to develop the plan and review it with all of the personnel on
site prior to pump down.
Before any system is opened up to atmosphere, the PDS should have a clear signal from each
personnel involved. Any personnel involved in a pumpdown has the authority to prevent the
system from being opened up to atmosphere.
In the event that the charge can not be pumped to a different part of the system and has to be bled
it is to be discharged to water. The best method is to bleed the system through a water venture.
The water venture pulls the ammonia charge out of the system, (it can actually pull a deep
vacuum on the system) and mixes and neutralizes the ammonia for easy disposal. If the venture
is not viable the ammonia must be bled to a container of water. Water should be available in
quantities of one gallon of water for each pound of ammonia.
It is important to remember that when isolating a header or pipe to be pumped down, every line
that is attached to it must be traced down and valved off with a solid isolation valve. Solenoids
or check valves are not acceptable. During the isolation process, be carefully not to lock liquid
between valves that could hydrostatically expand.
Specific situations:
~: All suction lines should be bled down either through the system or through a
water source. Suction lines many times have liquid laying in the headers, especially at traps. If
necessary, the PDS is authorized to remove insulation at low spots to check for frosting, which is
a good'indicator that liquid is present. Before a suction line is cut open, a valve should be
opened to atmosphere and allowed to breathe for a minimum often minutes. Because oil will
hold ammonia and cause it to "smell" for a long time, connect a vacuum hose to the suction
header up stream of the cut in point and discharge it to water to minimize vapors at the cut in
point.
H~ Hot gas lines are usually the easiest to pump out. The same constraints and
precautions apply that apply to suction lines apply to hot gas lines.
High-pressure liquid lines: High-pressure liquid lines are extremely dangerous because they carry
so much ammonia in a liquid form and at a high pressure. Make absolutely sure the source of the
high-pressure liquid (receiver) is valved off. The ammonia should be bled offto other parts of
the system. As the pressure is relieved into another part of'the system, check the liquid line for
frosting, especially at low points. Carefully apply heat to the frosted areas until the pipe is
completely empty.
Recirculated liquid lines: Recirculated liquid lines are the most difficult and dangerous pipes to
pump down. Because the liquid lines are usually insulated, it is difficult to tell if all of the liquid
is gone even when the header is pumped down to atmospheric pressure. The best way to pump
one down is to bleed it offto another part of the system at the lowest part of the liquid header. A
properly designed header will slope bac.k to the low point and a bleed valve will be installed
there. Bleed from this point until the bleed line is no longer frosted. Carefully open the bleed
MAR~24-1997 13:50
line to atmosphere after all of the frost is gone and the pipe is at atmospheric pressure t'or a
minimum often minutes. If a bleed valve is not available, the PDS is authorized to remove
insulation at the low spot to add heat to the pipe to boil offthe liquid.
P. 07
TOTAL P.O?
MAR 15 ~97 08:38pM OES HQ SACRAMEMTO
IDATE: 03/15/97
TIME: 1939
1. ,PERSON NOTIFYING GOVERNOR'S ogs:
a. NAME: b. AGENCY:
RECEIVED BY:
Laurie Smith
[Barbara Camps
IKem Co Conu~umca6on
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY SERVICES
Hazardous Materials Spill Report
[CONTROI~:
97-1087
c. PHONE//: tLExt: e. PAG/CELL:
l, so~-a61-25oo 1 . ""-[
2. RESPONSIBLE PARTY:
a. NAME: b. AGENCY:
c. PHONE//: d. EXT.:
d. I~CIDENT LOCATION:
e.,CITY:
Bakersfield
h. MAiL ADDRESS;
5301 Caracas Avenue- US Cold Storage'
f. COUNTY: g, :ZIP
Kern County
i. CITY: j. STATE:
CA
k~ zn~:
3., SUBSTANCE TYPE:
a. S'IJ~STANC]~: b.0..?ff: > = < Amount Mtatui, e C 'I~KPE: d. O~J~R:
1; amonia = 150 ~,. VAPOR
4,
e_ DESCRIPTION: Circumstances of release still under investigation. The Fire Dept on sc~ne, the vapor is being
allowed to dissipate into the atmosphere.
f. CONTAINED: g. WATER INVOLVED: h. WATERWAY:
· Yes No
4. INCIDENT SUMMARY:
a. DATE: 03/15/97 TIME tMilitsrvl: 1915 b. SITE: Industrial Plant
c. INJURIES// d. FATALS #: e. EVACS #: f. CLEANUP BY:
0 0 0. No cleanup
5. NOTIFICATION INFORMATION:
a. NRC//:
c, OTHER ON SCENE:
b. ON SCENE:
Fire Dept.. Police ,Dept.
d. OTHER NOTIFIED:
e. ADMIN. AGENCY:
f. SEC. AGENCY:
DOG Un/t:
· ~ FOOD
RWQCB Unit: 5C
~__] oEs PI,AH$ UNIT
·
~]USEPA
~J USFV~'E
~ Of dER
MAR iS '97 08:BSPM OES HQ SACRAMENTO
GOVERNO [ IS OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY SERVICES
Hazardous Material Spill Update
CONTROL#: 97.1087.
P.2/~
DATEflTIME: 03/15/97 RECEIVED BY:
/ 1939 Laude SmiH
CITY/OP, AREA:
Bakersfield/Kern County
PERSON CAIJLI~G OES: Barbara Camps
AGENCY: Kern Co Communication
PAGER #(CELIA'HONE):
PHONF-~: 805-$61-2500 Ext:
SUBSTANCE TYPE:
a. StrBSTANCE: b. QTY: c TYI~E: d, O~:
Amo~ Me.ute
~ .~no~a 150 Lbs. V~OR
SITUATION UPDATE: 2000 3/15/97 Ron Whienant, US Cold Storage
The correct location of release was 6501 District Bird, Bakersfield, The cau,~ was a problem with the system
tic-in to an expansion. The source has been stopped, No ¢leanut~ done it was a release to atmosphere.
FAX NOTIFICATION LIST: AA/C~PA, AIR RESOURCES BD, DFG-OSPR. DT$C,
RWQCI~ SFM, US EPA~ USFWS
AI)M/~NISTERING AGF, NCY:
SECONDARY ACENCY:
OTHER NOT, II'lED:
Creak;ed by: Warning CenTer on; 05/15/97 08:32:1 $ PM I. est Modified by: Warning Center on: 05tl 5157 08:30:13 PM
BAKERSFIELD
FIRE DEPARTMENT
August 4, 1997
FIRE CHIEF
MICHAEL R. KELLY
ADMINISTRA11VE SERVICES
2101 'H' Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (805) 395-1349
SUPPRESSION SERVICES
2101 'H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (805) 395-1349
PREVENTION SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3951
FAX (805) 326-0576
ENVIIIONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3979
FAX (805] 326-0576
TRAINING DIVISION
5642 Victor Street
Bakersfield, CA 93308
(805) 399-4697
. FAX (805) 399-5763
Thc Bakersfield Calit'brnian
Legal Notice Division
P.O. Bin 440
Bakersfield, CA 93302
Dear Sir:
Please publish the following public notice one time only.
A Risk Management Plan (RMP) has been prepared by United States Cold
Storaue located at 6501 District Blvd., Bakersfield, CA. The RMP describes
progr~ams and controls designed to prevent accidental releases oF a regulated
substance. This RMP will be available for public review for the next 45 days
at the Bakersfield Fire Department, Office ofEnvironlnental Selwices, 1715
Chester Ave, Bakersfield, CA 93301. Contact Howard H. Wines, 11I fbr
intbrmation regarding this RMP.
The bill tbr this service should be charged to City of Bakersfield Fire
Department EMMA account. Invoices should be sent to ine at 'the Office of
Environmental Services, 1715 Chester Ave., Bakersfield, CA 93301. Please send me
proof of publication of this notice. If you need any further intbrmation regarding this
legal notice, please call me at 326-3979.
Sincerely,
Ralph Huey
Hazardous Materials Coordinator
Office of Environmental Services
RISH/dhn
BA KE.RS F I E L D
FIRE DEPARTMENT
August I', 1997
FlEE CHIEF
MICHAEL R. KELLY
ADMIN~ SERVICES
2101 'H' Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (805) 395-1349
SUPPRESSION SERVICES
2101 'H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (805) 395-1349
PREVEN11ON SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA, 93301
(805) 326-3951
FAX (805) 326*0576
ENVffiONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3979
FAX (805) 326-0576
TRAINING DIVISION
5642 Victor Street
Bakersfield, CA 93308
(805) 399-4697
FAX (805) 399-5763
Ms. Cad Willis, Manager
United States Cold Storage
6501 District Blvd
Bakerslield, CA 933 ! 3
Dear Ms. Willis:
Tile Office of Environmental Services finds the Risk Management Plan (RMP)
prepared by United States Cold Storage regarding the handling of Ammonia
6501 District Blvd. in Bakersfield to be complete in scope and content. The
Bakerslicld Fire Department xviil conduct tbllow up inspections to verity, compliance
with the risk management measures described in this plan.
Notice of completion of the RMP will be published in the Bakerstield
Californian. RMP will then be subject to a 45 day review period during which the
Office of Eiwironmental Services will consider all public comments regarding the
adcqtlacy of this RMP.
Please call me if l can provide any fhrther assistance or clarification regarding
the Risk Management Plan.
Sincerely,
Hazardous Materials Coordinator
Office of Environmental Services
REH/dlm
B A K.E R S F I'E L D
FIRE DEPARTMENT
FII~E CHIEF
MICHAEL R. KELLY
ADMINI~E SERVICES
2101 'H' Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (805) 395-1349
SUPPI~r~ION SERVICES
2101 'H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (805) 395-1349
PREVENTION SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
BakersfielO, CA 93301
(805) 326-3951
FAX (805) 326-0576
ENVIRONMENTAl. SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326;3979
FAX (80,5) 326-0,576
TRAINING DIVISION
' 5642 Victor Street
Bakersfield, CA 93308
(8O5) 399-4697
FAX (805) 399-5763
August 4, 1997
Mr. Karl Luff
Luff Environmental Consulting
5531 Business Park South #250
Bakersfield, CA 93309
Dear Mr. Luff;
A Risk Management Plan (RMP) has been submitted by United States'Cold
Storage located at 6501 District Blvd., Bakersfield, CA. The RMP describes
programs and controls designed to prevent accidental releases of regulated
substances. This RMP will be available tbr public review/hr the next 45 days at the
Bakersfield Fire Department, Office Of Environmental Services, 1715 Chester
Avenue, Bakersfield, CA 93301.
If you need any fi~rther information regarding this legal notice, please call me
at 326-3979.
Sincerely,
Hazardous Materials CoordinatOr
Office of Environmental Services
REH/dlm
BAKERSFIELD
FIRE DEPARTMENT
FIRE CHIEF
MICHAEL R. KELLY
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
2101 'H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (80,5) 395-1349
SUPPRESSION SERVICES
2101 "H" Street
8akersfiela, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (805] 395-1349
PREVENTION SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805] 326-3951
FAX (805] 326-0576
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave,
Bakersfiela, CA 93301
(805] 326-3979
FAX (805) 326-0576
TRAINING DIVISION
5642 Victor Street
BaKersfield, CA 93308
(805) 399-4697
FAX (805) 399-5763
March 17, 1997
Mr. Ron Whisenant
United States Cold Storage
6501 District Blvd.
Bakersfield CA 93313
NOTICE TO COMPLY WITH FEDERAL ACCIDENTAL
RELEASE PREVENTION PROGRAM WITHIN 60 DAYS
Dear Mr. Whisenant:
You are hereby notified that pursuant to Section 25535(d) California
Health and Safety Code (CH&SC), that United States Cold Storage shall
implement all programs and activities in the Risk Management Plan (40 CFR
68.150 et seq) before operations commence in the case of a modified facility.
Furthermore, pursuant to Section 25543.2(b) CH&SC, United States Cold
Storage shall revise the Risk Management Plan (RMP) to conform with 40 CFR
Part 68 and submit the RMP to this office expeditiously, but not later than 60 days
from the date of this notice.
If you have any questions, please call me at 326-3979.
Sincerely,
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Materials Technician
HHW/dlm
RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN DATA ELEMENTS
1. REGISTRATION:
1.1 Source identification:.
a. United States Cold Storage of California
b. 6501 District Blvd.
c. Bakersfield d. Kern e. California
g. Latitude 35° 18.76' North h. Longitude 119° 4.50' West
1.2
NA
1.3
Dun and Bradstreet number:
Corporate parent
a. United States Cold Storage, Inc., Cherry Hill, N.J.
c. Dun and Bradstreet number: NA
93313
1.4 Operator:
a. Cad Willis b. 805/832-2653
c. 6501 District Blvd. Bakersfield, CA. 93313
1.5 Person responsible for Part 68 implementation
Cari Willis, Manager
1.6 Emergency contact:
a. Ron Whisenant b. Chi&Engineer
c. 805/832-2653 d. 805/393-4463
1.7 Covered process: Refrigeration
a. 1. Anhydrous ammonia 2. CAS 7664-41-7
3.20,000 lbs 4. SIC 4222 5. Level 3
1.8 EPA Identifier
NA
1.9 Number of full-time employees:
25 employees
1.10 Cover by
a. OSHA PSM
b. EPCRA section 302
c. CAA Title .V operating permit
Yes 2. No
Yes 2. No
Yes 2. ,/ No
1.11 Last safety inspection:
a. December 14, 1994
b. OSHA c. Cai-OSHA
EPA
e. State EPA
f. / Fire department
Executive Sum~nary
United States Cold Storage, Bakersfield, CA.
Accidental Release Prevention/Emergency Resnonse Policies:
United States Cold Storage is committc~d t° ~he sai'e operation of all our facilities to
protect our workers, the public and the environment. This is accomplished to a great
extent by a well developed, up-to-date and implemented Risk Management Program. All
USCS facilities shall operate in a prudent and safe manner. It shall be the responsibility
of the Plant Manager to ensure that all procedures are followed as set forth in our risk
management and process safety management programs. In thc unlikely event of an
accidental release it is USCS' policy to immediately call the local fire department and
emergency response team and to assist these agencies.
It is also USCS' belief and policy to work openly with all state and federal agencies for
the betterment of the community and the industry.
Stationary Source and Regulated Substances:
United States Cold Storage, Bakersfield is a public refrigerated Warehouse located at
6501 District Boulevard that uses anhydrous ammonia as a refrigerant in a closed loop
refrigerating system. The refrigerant charge is 20,000 pounds. Typical items stored
within USCS facilities are raw or processed food items. Temperatures range
between -30°F to + 45°F.
Release Scenarios:
For this document, two (2) separate ammonia release scenarios were used: the "Worst
Case" as required by law and the "Alternative release" (most likely). The Worst Case
release scenario was based on the high pressure receiver completely filled, discharging
970 pounds per minute for a period of 10 minutes. Distance to the end point of 200 ppm
is 1.8 miles.
The Alternative' Release scenario was identified through the What-If Study performed on
April 8, 1997. The team was asked to identify what they though't would be the most
likely cause of an ammonia release. The team determined that an ammonia pump
mechanical seal leak located in the compressor room was the most likely case.
All the refrigeration vessels and piping have been installed according to ASME vessel
and piping codes and applicable California Building, Fire, and Mechanical Codes. The
building was engineered and built to Seismic #4 Earthquake Codes.
In an unlikely event ora refrigerant leak in any refrigerated space, the ammonia vapor
would be contained inside that space, due to the vapor tight construction of the facility.
It could then be vented and treated under controlled conditions. The compressor room
contains most of the large refrigerating machinery and vessels. The facility is equipped
with ammonia detectors throughout to help lessen any leak or spill that might occur and
to provide an early warning to the operating personnel.
Risk Management Program Executive Summary
page 1
General Accident Release Prevention Program:
The following programs and procedures have been in 'place since the facility was opened
in the fall of 1993:
California Risk Management Program;
Cai-OSHA Process Safety Management Program;
USCS's Respiratory Protection Program;
USCS's Lockout/Tagout Progrmn;
Local facility's Emergency Response Plan.
Chief Engineer will assume the responsibility for refrigeration modification and
equipment pump downs and tie-in.
Five-year Accident History:
The USCS Bakersfield facility was opened in the fall of 1993. In the fall of 1996 it was
determined that additional freezer space was required. During the spring of 1997, while
the contractor was making a scheduled refrigeration tie-in for the new freezer, there was
an estimated 26 pounds of ammonia accidentally released to the atmosphere. This release
was due to a vertical leg in the liquid line not being properly pumped out. There was no
offsite injuries or evacuation of the surrounding community.
Emergency Response Program:
Although the facility has an emergency response program and the local fire department
and hazardous material team have toured the facility, scheduling for a joint training and
exercise program has yet to be done.
Planned Safety_ Changes:
During the What-If study the. following items were identified to increase the safe
operation of the facility.
Revising compressor maintenance procedures to include the proper torque for the
oil separator access cover bolts after the installation of a new gasket.
Revising compressor maintenance procedures to include testing of all electrical
safety cutouts through pressure activation.
Verify the manufacturer of the pressure safety relief valves for all the oil cooler on
the screw co~npressors.
'Risk Management Progrmn Executive Summary page 2
Tagging out the manual cross-over, interconnection valve between the high side
and Iow side suction valve.
Installing a pipe plug at the inlet of the charging connection.
Install warning signs for "Hydraulic Lockup" at the charging system valve station
and proper maintgnance procedures for the exterior piping.
Install guard post: to protect the emergency ammonia diffusion station located
outside of the engine area.
Risk Management Program Executive Summary page 3
2. TOXICS WORST CASE
Anhydrous Ammonia
2.1
2.2 Physical.
a. Gas b. ~r liquid
2.3 Results based on:
a. ~r Reference table
Model used:
2.4
a.
Scenario:
Explosion b. F:ire
2.5 Quantity released 9,70,0 lbs.
2.7 Release duration (if mOdeled)
2.8 Wind speed 1.5 m/se%
Modeling
c. ,/Toxic gas release
2.6 Release rate
10 min.
2.9 Stability class F
d. ~r Liquid spill/vaporization
· 970 lbs/min.
2.10 Topographya. ,/'Urban b. Rural
2.11 Distance to endpoint:i 1.8 miles
2.12 Residential populatiOn within distance (number)
51,000 people :
2.13 Public receptors (check all that apply)
a. e' Schools d. Prisons
b. d' Residences ' e. ,,r Public recreational areas or arenas
c. ~ Hospitals ~ f. vr Major commercial, office, or industrial areas
2.14 Environmental recePtors within distance (check all that apply)
a. National or state parks, forests, or monuments
b. Officially designated wildlife sanctuaries, preserves, or rufuges
c. Federal wilderness hreas
2.15 Passive .mitigation c'bnsidered (check all that apply)
a. Dikes d. ~ Drains g. Not applicable
b. ,/ Enclosures e. ~r Sumps
c. Berms f. Other (specify)
RMP Data Elements - USCS, Bakersfield
-page 2-
3. TOXICS ALTERNATIVE RELEASES (complete for each toxic)
3.1- Anhydrous Ammonia
3.2 PhYsical
a. e'Gas b. liquid
3.3 Results based on:
a. Reference table b. ,/'-Modeling
Model used: ALOHA
3.4 Scenario!
a. Transfer hose failure d. Overfilling
b. Pipe leak e. Rupturedisk/reliefvalve
c. Vessel leak f. Excess flow valve failure
g. ,,r Other (specify)
g. Mechanical seal on ammonia pump.
3.5 Quantity ~eleased 78.6 lbs.
3.6 Release rate 1.31 lbs/min.
3.7 Release duration (if modeled) 60 min.
3.8 Wind speed 2 m/sec. 3.9 Stability class F
3.10 Topography a. e' Urban b. Rural
3.11 Distance to endpoint: 0.04 mile
3.12 Residential population within distance (number)
0 population
3.13 Public receptors (check all that apply)
a. Schools d.
b. Residences e.
c. Hospitals f.
Prisons
Public recreational areas or arenas
Major commercial, office, or industrial areas
3.14 Environmental receptors within distance (check all that apply)
a. National or state parks, forests, or monuments
b. Officially designated wildlife sanctuaries, preserves, or rufuges
c. Federal wilderness areas
3.15 Passive mitigation considered (check all that apply)
a. Dikes d. Drains g. Other (specify)
b. e' Enclosures e. e' Sumps h. 'Not applicable
c. Berms. f. Other (specify)
3.16 Active mitigation considered (check all that apply)
a. Sprinkler systems e. Excess flow valve
b. Deluge system f. Flares
c. Water Curtain g. e' Scrubbers
d. Neutralization h. ,,' Emergency shutdown systems
I. Other (specify)
RMP Data Elements - USCS, Bakersfield -page 3-
6,0 FIVE-YEAR ACCIDENT ItlSTORY (complete the following for each release)
6.1Date March15,1997 6.2 Time 6:45pm: ..
6.3 Release duration. 1 to 2 minutes
6.4 Chemical(s) Anhydrous ammonia
6.5 Quantity release (lbs) 28 pounds
CAS 7664-41-7
6.6 Release event 6.7 Release source
a. d' Gas release a. Storage vessel
b. d' Liquid spill/evaporation b. d' Piping
c. .Fire c. Process vessel
d. Explosion d. Transfer hose
e. .Valve
f. Pump
6.8 Weather cOnditions at time of event (if known)
a. Wind speed/direction 8mph NW
b. Temperature 70°F(s)
c. Stability class B-C
d. Precipitation present No
e. Unknown
6.9 On-site imPacts
a. Deaths 0
b. Injuries 0
c. Property d. amage
$0.00
6.10 Known offsite impacts
a. Death 0
b. Hospita!izations 0
c. Other medical treatment 0
d. Evacuated 0
e. Sheltered in place Yes
f. Property damage $0.00
g. Environmental damage None
6.11 Initiating event
a. Equipment failure.
b. ,/' Human error
c. Weather condition
6.13
Offsite responders notified
6.12 Contributing factors (check all that applY)
a. Equipment failure
b. ,,r Human error
c. ,/' Improper procedures
d. Overpressurization
e. Upset condition
f. By-pass condition
g. Maintenance activity/inactivity
h. Process design
i. Unsuitable equipment
j. Unusual weather condition
k. ,/Management error
a. ~'Yes b. No
6.14
a.
b.
C.
d.
f.
Changes introduced as a result of the accident
Improved/upgrade equipment g. Revised emergency response plan
Revised maintenance h. Changed process
Revised training i. Reduce inventory
New process controls j. d' Other Reconfirm authority
New mitigation system k. None
RMP Data Elements - USCS, Bakersfield -page 4-
7. PREVENTION PROGRgM
7. I. SIC code for process: 4222
PROGRAM 3 (For Each Program 3 Process)
7.2 Name of substance(s) covered:
a. Anhydrous ammonia b. c.
7.3 Date on which the safety information was last reviewed or revised:
March 3-6, 1997
7.4 PHA:
a. Date of completion of the last reviewed/revised:
March 3-6, 1997
b. The technique used:
1. vt What If 5.
2. Checklist 6.
3. What If/Checklist 7.
4. HAZOP
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis
Other
c. The expected date of completion of any changes resulting from PHA:
April 1, 1997
d. Major hazards identified (check all that apply):
1. vt Toxic release
2. vt Fire
3. Explosion
4. Runaway reaction
5. Polymerization
6. vt Overpressurization
7. Corrosion
8. Overfilling
9. ContaminatiOn
10. vt Equipment failure
11. Loss of cooling, heating, electricity, instrument air
12. vt Earthquake
13. Floods (flood plain)
14. Tornado
15. Hurricanes
16. Other
e. Process controls in use (check all
1. vt Vents
2. vt Relief valves
3. vt Check valves
4. vt Scrubbers
5. Flares
6. vt Manual shutoffs
7. vt Automatic Shutoffs
8. vt Interlocks
9. vt Alarms and procedures
10. Keyed bypass
11. Emergency air.supply
16
17
18
19
20
that apply):
12 Emergency power
13 Backup pump
14. Grounding equipment
15 Inhibitor addition
Rupture disks
Excess flow device
Quench system
Purge system
vt Other
Seismic shUt down switch.
RM.P Data Elements - USCS, Bakersfield
-page 5-
7.4 PHA: continued
f. Mitigation systems in use (check all that apply):
l. vt Sprinkler system
2. Dikes
3. vt Fire walls'
4. Blast walls
5. Deluge system
6. Water curtain
'7. vt Enclosure
8. vt Neutralization'
9. Other
g. MonitOring/detection systems in use (check all that apply):
1. vt Process area detectors
2. Perimeter monitors
3. Other
h. changes since last PHA update (check all that apply):
1. Reduction in Chemical inventory
2. Increase in chemical inventory
3. Change in process parameters
4. Installation of process controls
5. Installation of perimeter detection systems.
Installation of perimeter monitoring systems
7. Installation of mitigation systems
8. - Other~
9. vt None required/recommended
7.5 Date of the most recent review or revision of operating procedures:
March 3-7, 1997
7.6 Training:
a. Date of the most recent review or revision of the training program:
June 19, 1996
b. The tyPe of training provided:
1. Class room 2. vt Classroom plus on the job
RETA monthly and annual meetings
IlAR annual meeting
USCS Chief Engineers training programs
RETA Certification
3. Onthejob 4. vt Other
c. Type of competency testing used:
1. vt Written tests 2. Oral tests
5. Other
3. vt Demonstration
4. vt Observation
7.7 Maintenance:
a. The date Of the most recent review or revision of maintenance Procedures
June 25, 1997
b. The date of the most recent equipment inspection or test
June 25, 1997
RMP Data El'ements - USCS, Bakersfield
-page 6-
7.7 Maintenance: continued
c. The equipment inspected or tested
Screw compressors, pumps, vessels,
7.8 Management of Ch'ange: .
a. The date of the most recent change that triggered management of change procedures:
December 17, 1996
b. The date of the most recent review or revision of management of change procedures:
July 22, 1996
7.9 Date of the last pre-startup review:
April 4, 1997
7.10 Cornpliance audits:
a. Date of the most recent compliance audit:
May 3, 1996
b. Expected date of completion of any change resulting from the compliance audit:
June 19, 1996
7:11 Incident investigation:
a. Date of the most recent incident investigation:
March 17, 1997
b. Expected date of completion of any changes resulting from the investigation:
April 17, 1997
7.12 Date of the most recent review or revision of employee participation plans:
May 3, 1996 '
7.13 Date of the most recent review or revision of hot work permit:
July 22, 1996
7.14 Date of the most recent review or revision of contractor safety procedures:
April 17, 1997
7.15 Date.of the most recent evaluation of contractor shfety performance:
April 17, 1997
RMP Data Elements - USCS, Bakersfield
-page 7-
Section 1. Registration Information
1.1 Source Identification:
a. Facility Name:
b. Parent Company #1 Name:
c. Parent Company #2 Name:
1~3 EPA Facility Identifier:
1.3 Other EPA Systems Facility Mentil~r:.
1.4 Dun and Bradstreet Numbers {DUNS):
a. Facility DUNS: 157537127
b. Parent Company ~1 DUNS: 001215136
c. Parent Company ~2 DUNS: 009108150
1.5 Facility Location Address:
6501 D~-t~ct Blvd.
a. Street 1:
b. Street 2:
c, City: Bakersfield
f. Oounty: Kern
Facility Latitude and Longitude:
g. Lat, (ddmmss_~): 35
i- Lat/Long Method..
j. ['at/LOng DescripUon:
1.6 Owner or Operator:
a. Name: Randy Dorrell
b. Phone: (661) 832*2653
Mailing address:
c. Stre~ 1: 6501 D~trict Blvd.
e. City: Bakersfield
18
PG
United Slates Cold Storage, Bakersfield
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
United States Cold Storage of California
d. State: CA
e. Zip:
h. Long. (dddmmss.~): -119
Interpola'don - Digital map source (TIGER)
Plant Enlmnce (General)
d. ~trnet 2:
f. S'.~;~: CA g. Zip:
93313
93313 -
04 32.0
1.? Name and title of person or position responsible for part 68 (RMP) implenx,3;a~on:
a. Name of person: Ron Whisenant
b. Title of person or position: Chief Engineer
5/20/1999 5:21:08 PM
Page' 1 of 11
1.8 Eme~Jency COntact:
a. Name: Ron Whisenant
b. Title: Chief Engineer
c. Phone: (661) 832-2653
d. 24-hour phone: (559) 250-4182
e. Ext. or PIN:
1.9 Other points of contact:
a. Facility or Parent Company E-Mall Address:
b. Facility Public Contact Phone:
c. Facility or Parent Company WINW Homepage Address:
1.10 LEPC: Region 5 LEPC Inland South
1.11 Number of full time employees on site: 23
1.12 Covered by:
a. OSHA PSM: Yes
b. EPCRA 302: Yes
c. CAA Title V: No
Air Operating Permit ID:
1.13 OSHA Star or Merit Ranking: No
1.14 Last Sa;ely inspection(by an External Agency) Date:
1.15 Last Safety Inspection Performed by an External Agency:
1.16 Will this RMP involve predictive filing?: No
12/14/1994
Fire Department
5/20/1999 5:21:08 PM
Page 2 of 11
Section 1.1 7 Process(es)
a. Process ID: 20 Program Level 3 Ammonia Refrigeration
b. NAICS Code
49312 Refrigerated Warehousing and Storage Facilities
c. Process Chemicals
c.1 Chemical Name
Ammonia (anhydrous) '
c.2 CAS Nr.
7664-41-7
c.3 City (lbs.)
22,957
Section 6. Accident History
AccidentHistoryID: 1_.~0
6.1 Date of accident: 03/15/1997
6.3 NAICS Code of process involved:
6.4 Release duration: 000
6.5 Chemical(s):
a. Chemical Name
Ammonia (anhydrous)
6.6 Release even{:
a. Gas release: No
b. Liquid spill/evaporation: Yes
c. Fire: No
d. Explosion: No
6.8 Weather conditions at time of event (if known):
a. Wind speed: 3.0
b. Temperature: 84
c. Atmoshperic Stability Class:
d. Precipitation present: No
e. Unknown weather conditions: No
6.9 On-site impacts:
a. Deaths
b. Injuries
c. Property damage ($):
6.10 Known Off-site impacts:
a. Deaths:
6.2 Time accident began (HHMM):
49312
Hours (HHH) 01 Minutes (MM)
Employees or contractom:
0
0
6.7 Release source:
a. Storage vessel:
b. Piping:
c. Process vessel:
d. Transfer hose:
Units: mile/h
Degrees Fahrenheit
D
Public responders:
0
0
0
0 d. Evacuated:
0645 ~-~ AM
CAS Number
7664-41-7
No e. Valve: No
Yes f. Pump: No
No g. Joint: No
No h. Other (Specify):
Direction: NW
Public:
0
0
~ PM
b. Quantity
Released (lbs)
c.%
Weight
5/20/1999 5:21:10 PM Page 5 of 11
6.11
6.12
6.13 Offsite responders ~:
b. Hospitalization:
c. Other medical treatments: 0
g. Environmental damage:
1. Fish or Animal Kills:
· 2. Tree, lawn, shrub, or crop damage:
3. Water contamination:
4. Soil contamination:
$. Other (specify):
Initiating event: b
Contributing factors:
a. Equipment failure: No
b. Human error. Yes
c. Improper procedures: Yes
d. Overpressurization: No
e. Upset condition: No
f. By-pass condition: No
Unknown
Human Error
e. Sheltered-in-place:
f. Property Damage ($):
No
No
No
No
g. Maintenance acfivityrmacfivity: Yes
h. Process design failure: No
i. Unsuitable equipment: No
j. Unusual weather condition: No
k. Management error. No
I. Other (Specify):
6.14 Changes introduced es a result of the accident:.
a. Improved or upgraded equipment: No
b. Revised maintenance: No
c. Revised training: No
d. Revised operating procedures: No
e. New process controls: No
L New mitigation systems:. No
g. Revised emergency response plan: No
h. Changed process: No
i. Reduced inventory: No
j. None: No
k. Other(Specify): Reinforce existing programs
Section'7. Prevention Program 3
Process M: 20 -Ammonia Refrigeration
Prevention Program ID: 20
Prevention Program Description:
7.1 NAICS Code: 49312
7.2 Chemicals: Chemical Name
Ammonia (anhydrous)
7.3 Date on which the safety information wes last reviewed or revised:
7.4 Process Hazard Analysis (PHA):
Ammonia Refrigeration, Cold Storage facility
05/20/1999
500
0
1
1
5/2011999 5:21:11 PM rage
a. The date of last PHA or PHA update:
b. The technique used:
What If: Yes
Checklist: No
What If/Checklist: No
HAZOP: No
05/20/1999
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis: No
Fault Tree Analysis: No
Other (Specify):
c. Expected or actual date of completion of all changes from last PHA or PHA update:
d. Major hazards identified:
Toxic release: Yes Contamination:
Fire: Yes Equipment failure:
Explosion: Yes Loss of cooling, heating, electricity, instrument air:.
Runaway reaction: No Earl~quake:
Polymerization: No Floods (fio~d plain):
Overpressurization: Yes Tornado:
Corrosion: No Hurricanes:
Overfilling: Yes OIJter (Specify):
e. Process controls in use:
Vents: No Emergency air supply: No
Relief valves: Yes Emergency power:. No
Check valves: Yes Backup pump: yes
Scrubbers: Yes Grounding equipment: yes
Flares: No Inhibitor addition: No
Manual shutoffs: Yes Rupture disks: No
Automatic shutoffs: yes Excess flow device: No
Interlocks: No Quench system: No
Alarms and procedures: yes Purge system: yes
Keyed bypass: No None: No
Other (Specify):
f. Mitigation systems in use:
Sprinkler system: yes Water curtain:
Dikes: No Enclosure:
Fire walls: Yes Neutralization:
Blast walls: No No~e:
Deluge system: Yes Other (Specify):
No
No
Yes
No
g. Monitoring/detection systems in use:
05/20/1999
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
5/20/1999 5:21:11 PM
Page 7 of 11
Process area detectors: Yes
Perimeter monitors: No
h. Changes since last PHA or PHA update:
Reduction in chemical inventory:
Increase in chemical inventory:
Change process parameters:
Installation of process controls:
Installation of process detection systems:
None:
Other (Specify):
No
No Installation of perimeter monitoring systems:
No Installation of mitigation systems:
No None recommended:
No None:
No Other (Specify):
7.5 The date of most recent review or revision of operating procedures:
7.6 Training:
a. The date of the most recent review or revision of training programs:
b. The type of treining provided:
Classroom: Yes On the job: No Other (Specify):
Indust~ schools
No
No
No
Yes
05/18/1999
09101/1993
Written test: Yes Observation:
Oral test: No Other (Specify):
Demonstration: Yes
7.7 Maintenance:
Yes
a. The date of the most recent review or revision of maintenance procedures:
b. The date of the most recent equipment inspection or test:
c. Equipment most recently inspected or tested: Purger
7~ Management of change:
a. The date of the most recent change that triggered management of
change p _roc~__urss:
b. Thedata of the most recent review or revision of management of
change procedures:
7.9 The date of the most recent pre-startup review:
7.10 Compliance audits:
a. The date of the most recent compliance audit:
b. Expected or actual date of completion of all changes resulting from the compliance audit:
7.11 Incident investigation:
a. The date of the most recent incident investigation (if any):
b. The expected or actual date of completion of all changes resulting from the investigation:
7.12 The date of the most recent review or revision of employee participation plans:
05/19/1999
05/1411999
09/29/1994
04/04/1997
05/24/1996
03/1711997
03/17/1997
08/0911994
Page 8 of 1 I
5/2011999 5:21:12 PM
7.13 The date of the most recent review or revision of hot work permit procedures:
7.14 The date of the most recent review or revision of contractor safety procedures:
7.16 The date of the most recent evaluation of c_o~ safety performance:
Section 8. Prevention Program 2 -- No Data To Report
Section 9. Emergency Response
09/01/1993
10101/1994
05/2011999
9.1 Written Emergency Response (ER) Plan:
a. Is facility included in whiten community emergency response plan? Yes
b. Does facility have its own written emergency response plan? Yes
9.~ Does facility's ER plan include specific actions to be taken in response
to accidental releases of regulated substance(s)? Yes
9.,1 Does facility's ER plan include procedures for informing the public and
local agencies responding to accidental releases? Yes
9A Does facility's ER plan include information on eme~ency heath care? Yes
9.6 Date of most recent review or uPdate d facility's ER plan: 08/1411998
9.6 Date of most recent ER I~aining for facility's employees: 02F20/1999
9.7 Local agency with which facility's ER plan or response activities are coordinated:
a. Name of agency. Bakersfield Fire Department
b. Telephone number:. (661} 861-3636
9.8. 9ubject to:
a. OSHA Regulations at 29 Ci:R 1910.38: Yes
b. OSHA Regulations at 29 CFR 1910.129: Yes
*C. Clean Water Act Regulations at40 CFR 112: No
d. RCRA Regulations at 40 CFR 264, 296, and 279.62: No
e. OPA-90 Regulations at 40 CFR 112:33 CFR 164, 49 CFR 194, or 30 CFR 264: No
f. State EPCRA Rules or Laws: Yes
g. Other (Specify):
Executive Summary
United States Cold Storage, Inc. is committed to the safe operation of all our facilities to protect our WOrkers, the
public and the environment. This is accomplished to a great extent by a well developed, up-to-date and
implemented Risk Management Program. All USCS facilities shall operate in a prudent and safe manner. It shall be
the responsibility of the plant manager to ensure that all procedures are followed as set forth in our Risk
Mana(~ement an~l Proc, e~ Safety Manaoement oro~rams. In the unlikely event of an acgidente~ relepse it is U,~CS
5/20/1999 5:21:12 PM Page 9 of 11
policy to immediately call Ihe National Response Center, Local Emergency Response Committee, the local Fire
Department and other agency(les) that may be required. Ail USCS facilities will have an emergency response team
to assist these agency(les).
United States Cold Storage, Bakersfield, is a public refrigerated warehouse that uses anhydrous ammonia as a
refrigerant in a closed loop system: Anhydrous ammonia, most commonly known as ammonia, is an excellent
refrigerant and is commonly used in most of the wodd's indusl~ial refrigeration systems. Ammonia has an excellent
warning property, its odor. Ammonia's odor is familiar to most people due to the fact that it is commonly used in
household cleaning solutions. Ammonia can be detected as Iow as 5 parts per million (PPM) and has an average
life span of 7 days in the environment before it breaks down to ils common elements n~ogen and hydrogen.
Typical items stored within USCS facilities are raw or processed food items that can be found in your supermarket
or local restaurant. Temperatures range between -30 degrees to +45 degrees F. The refrigeration equipment and
piping are located throughout the facility. The condensers and related piping are on the machine room roof with
the piping to and from the freezers, coolers, l~uck and rail docks located on the warehouse and dock roofs. The
machine room contains most of the large refrigeration machinery and vessels. In an unlikely event of a refrigerant
leak in a refrigerated space, the ammonia vapor would be contained inside the space, due to the vapor tight
construction of the facility. It then may be treated and/or vented under controlled conditions. The facility is equipped
with ammonia detectors throughout to help lessen any leaks that might occur and to provide an early alert.
USCS believes that prevention is foremost. Ail of USCS facilities are maintained by a staff of trained maintenance
personnel. Most of these people are members of the Refrigerating Engineers and Technicians Association (RETA)
and all Chief Engineers are members of the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (ILAR) and hold a
RETA Certification Level A. USCS has on staff at the corporate level an OSHA and EPA coordinator/trainer who is
a certified OSHA Instructor. Ail facilities comply with OSHA's Process Safety Management without regard to the
ammonia threshold quantity. Ail ~ vessels and piping have been installed according to ASME vessel and piping
codes and applicable local Building, Fire and Mechanical Codes. The Bakersfield facility was engineered and built
to a Seismic 4 Earthquake Code.
The faciliys emergency response program is based on the OSHA requirements for 29 CFR 1910.38-Emergency '
Action Plan, OSHA's 1910.119, Process Safety Management and 1910.120 HAZWOPER standards. We have
trained employess for emergency response and maintain a written emergency response plan.
FIVE-YEAR ACCIDENT HISTORY:
The USCS Bakersfield faclr~ty has been operating at this location for the past 5 years. Within that history the facility
has seen one refrigerant releases.
OFFSlTE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS:
Worst-case release scenario analysis: As required by law under T~de 19, Public Safety, Chapter 4.5 California
Accidental Release Prevention Program, Section 2750.3, and 40 CFR Part 68.25, Worst-case release scenario
analysis, an analysis was prepared for the Bakersfield facility. The United States Environmental Protection
Agency's Risk Management Comp computer program for Ammonia was used for this analysis. This worst-case
release scenario is estimated to create the greatest distance in any direction to an endpoint of 200 ppm from the
accidental release of anhydrous ammonia used as a refrigerant in a dosed-loop refrigeration system. The quantity
release was based on a "Worst-case" release scenario for a toxic gas liquified under pressure that is normally a
gas at ambient temperature. The release was generated from the facility's High Pressure Receiver. Releasing 724
pounds per minute for a 10 minute period with passive mitigation system in place, inside a facility. The Bakersfield
facility has offsite consequence.
The dispersion analysis used a wind speed of 1.5 meters per second and an "F" atmospheric stability class. VV'd~
an ambient temperature of 77 degrees F (25C) and a relative humidity of 50%. Using a release height at ground
level and a surface roughness class of Urban. Dense gas was used for gas density.
Alternative Release Scenario Analysis: As required by law under 40 CFR Part 68.28, Alternative release scenario
analysis was prepared for the facility. The United States Environmental Protection Agency's Risk Management
Comp computer program was used for this analysis. This alternative release scenario is estimated to create a
distance to reach off-site in any direction to an endpoint of 200 ppm from an accidental release of ammonia used
as a refrigerant in a closed-loop refrigeration system. The Bakersfield facility has offsite consequence.
The aitemative release scenario was a mechanical seal failure on an ammonia pump for the Iow temperature pump
receiver. The mechanical seal failure was identified through the review of our process hazard analysis (PHA) for
the Bakersfield facility's What-If Study. The failure scenario was identified under Subsystem(s) #17, Low
Temperature Pump Receiver, question ~3. Passive mitigation system was in place, the release took place inside
the facility. The following administrative controls are in place: Engine room log is maintained with visual checks of
all of the equipment including the amonia pumps. Oil that is added to the refrigeration equipment is noted on the
Daily Engine Room Log. Annual preventive maintenance of the refrigeration equipment includes the ammonia
5/20/1999 5:21:12 PM Page 10 of 11
pumps. Housekeeping of the engine room area includes wiping up and investigating oil leaks and moping the floors
on a daily to weekly bases.
The second PHA recentiy performed for this facility produced no recommendations to improve safety. However the
first PHA produced 7 recommendations to improve safety at the Bakersfield facll'W. Such recommendation
included Izaining, installgdon of now mitigation equipment.
RMP Validation Errors -- No Data To Report
5/20/1999 5:21:12 PM
Page 11 of 11
CITY OF BAKERS ELD
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave., Bakersfield, CA 93301 (805) 326-3979
FACILITYINFORMATION
Facility:
2735.5 (c)(3) Provide evidence that response actions have been coordinated with
local emergency planning and response agencies for Program 1
2735.6 (a) Development of a management system to oversee the implementation
of the RMP elements for Program 2 and Program 3
2735.6 Co) Assign a qualified person or position that has overall responsibility for
the development, implementation, and integration of their RaMP
elements for Program 2 and Program 3
2735.6 (c) When responsibility for implementing is assigned to other than person
identified under section Co), the names or positions of these people
shall be documented and lines of authority der-reed through an
organization chart for Program 2 and Program 3
2740.1 (a) Complete and sub~it the California Accidental Release Prevention
Program Registration Form (OES Form 2735.6) to the AA for
Program 1, Program 2 and Program 3
2740.2 (a) Complete federal registration form and include in RMP for Program
1, Program 2 and Program 3
.2745.1 (a) Owner or operator of s~ationary source which handles more than
threshold quantity of regulated substance shall submit single RMP for
all covered processes for Program 1, Program 2 and Program 3
2745.1 (a)(l) RMP submitted to AA for Program I, Program 2 and Program 3
2745.1 (a)(2) RMP submitted to USg-PA in method and format specified by USEPA
for Program 1, Program 2 and Program 3 if regulated'chemical and
threshold quantity from Tables I or Table 2 and not Table 3
2745.3 Provide aa executive summary for Program 1, Program 2 and
Program 3
2745.3 (a) Brief description of the accidental release prevention and emergency
response policies for Program I, Program 2 and Program 3
2745.3 Co) Brief description of the stationary source and regulated substances
handled for Program 1, Program 2 and Program 3
2745.3 (c) Brief des?ription of the worst case release scenario(s) for Program l,
Program 2 and Program 3; alternative release scenario(s) with
administrative controls and mitigation measures to limit distance to
end-point for each scenario for Program 2 and Program 3
~CAAI398.DBC-W56
Facility:
cITY OF BAKERS~LD
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave., Bakersfield, CA 93301 (805) 326-3979
FACILITY INFORMATION
........ I ................................. k'age 3 of 4
2750.7 Offsite COnSequence analysis review attd update at least once every
five years for Program 2 and Program 3
2750.7 Up date and submit revised RMP within six months for aspect to
change endpoint by factor of two or more for Program 1, Program 2,
and Program 3
2750.8 Offsite Consequence Analysis Documentation records for Program 1,
Program 2, and Program 3
2750.9 Five Year Accident History data for Program 1, Program 2, and
Program 3
2755.1 Detail of Program 2 Prevention Program related to Safety Information
2755.2 Detail 'of Program"2 Prevention Program related to Ha:,ard Review
2755.3 Detail of Program 2 Prevention P~ogram related to Operating
Procedures
2755.4 Detail of Program 2 Prevention Program related to Training
2755.5 Detail of Program 2 Prevention Program related to Maintenance
2755.6 Detail of Program 2 Prevention Program related to Compliance Audits
2755.7 Detail of Program 2 Prevention Program related to Incident
Investigat!oa
2760. I Detail of Program 3 Prevention Program related t° Process Safety
Information
2760.2 Detail of Program 3 Prevention Program related to Process Hazard
Analysis
2760.3 Detail of Program 3 Prevention Program related to Operating
Procedures
2760.4 Detail of Program 3 Prevention Program related to Training
2760.5 Detail of Program 3 Prevention Program related to Mechanical
Integrity
2760.6 Detail of Program 3 Prevention Program related to Management of
Change
,.;CAA 1398.nBC-W§6
CITY OF BAKERSF LD
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave., Bakersfield, CA 93301 (805) 326-3979
Facility~
Pa 2 of 4
2745.3 (d) Brief description of the general accidental release prevention program
and chemical specific prevention steps for Program 2 and Program 3
2745.3 (e) Brief description of the five year accident history for Program 1,
Program 2 and Program 3
2745.3 (f) Brief description of tho emergency response program for Program 1,
Program 2 and Program 3
:2745.3 (g) Brief description of tho planned changes to improve safety for
Program 2 and Program 3
2745.4 (a)(2) One Worst Case release scenario for all toxic gases and of all
flammables for Program 1, Program 2 and Program 3
2745,4 (a)(2) One AltemativO release s~nario for each toxic gas and one for all
flammables for program 2 and Program 3
"2745.5 Information on Five year Accident History for Program I, Program 2,
and Program 3
2745.6 Information on Program 2 Prevention Program
2745.7 Information on Program 3 Prevention Program
2745.8 Information ~oa Emergency Response Program for Program 1,
Program 2 and Program 3
2745.9 Certification statement provided ia Section 2735.5(¢)(4) for Program 1
Certification that information submitted is true,' accurate, and complete
for Program 2 and Program 3
2745.10 Review and update RMP as specified for Program I, Program 2, and
Program 3
2750.3 Worst Case release scenario(s) as specified for Program 1, Program
2, and Program 3
2750.4 Alternative Release scenario(s) as specified for Program 2 and
Program 3
2750.5 Offsite impact on populations for Program 1, Program 2, and
Program 3
2750.6 Offsite impacts on environment for Program 2 and Program 3
.;CA,*, I398.DBC-Wf6
CITY OF BAKERSFIELD
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.' Bakersfield, CA 93301 (805) 326-3979
FACILITY INFORMATION
Facility:
Page 4 of, 4
2760.7 Detail of Program 3 Prevention Program related to Pre-Startup Safety
Review
2760.8 Detail of Program 3 Prevention Program, related to ComplianCe Audits
2760.9 Detail of Program 3 Prevention Program related to Incident
Investigation
2760.10 Detail of Program 3 Prevention Program related to Employee
Participation
2760.11 Detail of Program 3 Prevention Program related to Hot Work Permit
2760.12 Detail of Program 3 Prevention Program related to Contractors
2765.2 Detail of Progran{ 3 Prevention Program related to Emergency
Respoaso Program
NOTE:
Location in RMP for CCR Section is designated by "NA" (Not Applicable) if
CCR Section does not apply to the RMP Program being documented, e.g., if
RMP is only for Program 3 than each CCR Section that refers only to
Program 1 or Program 2 has the location in RMP for that CCR Section
designated by "NA'
BAKERSFIELD
FIRE DEPARTMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave. · Bakersfield, CA 93301
Business Phone (661) 326-3979 ° FAX (661) 326-0576
FAX Transmittal
COMPANY: (._.)
FROM: ~ /..~,.,,-,E~
FAXNo. ~"~-'z . -~46
COMMENTS:
~.o3~-c.T . ~ Acc
/
CAL 0RNIA ENVIRONMENTAL 'ALTH ASSOCIATION
2000 Annual Education Symposium
Navigating the Future of Environmental Health
.Turning Tomorrow Into Today"
December 12, 1999
Howard Wines
1715 Chester Avenue
Bakersfield, CA. 93301
Subject: Speaker 2000 CEHA AES
Dear Howard;
Thank you for accepting our offer to make a presentation at the upcoming 2000 AES at
the Radisson Hotel and Conference Center in Fresno, CA. The theme of the AES is
"Navigating the Future of Environmental Health". The California Environmental Health
Association (CEHA) is a group of dedicated professionals that practice in many fields of
Environmental Health. CEHA is dedicated to improving the quality of life and health
through environmental education and protection.
The emphasis of your presentation will be "Reaching Facility Compliance". Your
presentation will be on April 26, 2000 and begin at approximately 3:00 pM and end at
4:00 PM. Room scheduling will be provided as soon as poss~le. Please allow for a
question and answer period at the end of your presentation.
Please forward a speaker abstract, audio/visual needs, and biographical sketch as soon as
possible to (fax 209.384.1593). If possible, please bring your own audiovisual equipment
since you will be familiar with the equipment and this will allow for a smoother
presentation.
'We wish to extend an invitation to lunch and to participate in the program. Please inform
me if you will be taking advantage of either of these Rems. When you arrive, please stop
by the CEHA registration table located in the Hotel lobby and let them know you are a
speaker. You will receive your speaker's package, which will include your nametag and
lunch ticket. I look forward to seeing you at the AES. If there is anything else I may
help you with, please contact me at 209.381.1084.
Public Health Foundation Enterprises, Inc. / California Environmental Health Association, Central Chapter
13200 Crossroads Parkway North, Suite 135, City of Industry, California 91746-3423
562-699-7320 ~, fax562-692-6950
Time
7:00 AM -
8:00 AM
8:00 AM -
9:00 AM
9:00 AM -
10:00 AM
10:00 AM
! 1:00 AM
11:00 AM
12 Noon
12 Noon -
1:00 PM
1:00 PM -
2:00 PM
2:00 PM -
3:00 PM
I:00 PM -
4:00 PM
00 PM -
5:00 PM
Wednesday
April 26, 2000
Registration
Continental Breakfast
Exhibit Viewing
Opening Session
Christenson - AES Co-Chair Central Chapter
Fresno County Representative
Alicia Enriquez - President CEHA
Keynote Speaker
Bruce Pomer - Executive Director of The Health Officers
of California
Exhibit Viewing
Lunch 12Noon- I:30PM
CEHA Business Meetin$
Student Forum
Technical Session Breakouts 2:00 - 5:00 PM
CUPA
Fa~I~
Swbnmin8 Salud Para El
Pools md Spas Pueblo
D~mis
IaSchard TBA
F~sno County
AB3030 CAL~PA
Update Cslifomia -
lVlexico
H~d~h Issues
[Thursday
A il 27, 2000
Registration
Continental Breakfast
Fmnk
O'Sullivan
Hotming
Caroline
Anderson
Los Ansele~
U~i~8~e
Attorney's
Housm8 &
Institutions
Jack M~aurk
Trauma
ehanup
Chris Brown
Futu~ Foeu~
saree
Manag~n*nt
Liquid Was~
Pesgy tangle
Sama Barbntn
~ T~
Sack in th* Box
County
"Food
C._~6fica~n - Is
it doing x~hat i~ is
supposed to dot'
Tim Snellings- President CCDEH
Gary Coleman - NEHA President
Tom Sheehan - Western Governors' Association
Lunch
CELIA Awards
12 Noon - 1:30 PM
Vel:too
L~li~ Hie. k~
Rod~t
Lyme
Tomol~ow~
Food
A
Which
i~t for Your
Cou~
T~o~
~ S~
Rich Wilson
Bill Wilson
dodem
Wholis6~
Oo.Oe Sy~m~
Rodney
Ruskin
G~o Flow
Sub.'face d~p
Liquid Waste
Lk~d
Hedenland, ~r.
'~ Waste
Todd ~e~
Wa~t~ Tam Fh~ in
Tn~e Fire
Stmislaus County
Friday
28,2000
Registration
Continental Br~kfast
Health Risk
AB2.588
Winkle
Fresno
Lunch
CEHA Board of Directors Installation Luncheo
General Session
Peter Thornton
"Will The Future of Environmental
Health Include You?"
02/17/00 10:42 8661 326 0576 BFD HAZ MAT DIV ~001
ACTIVITY REPORT
TRANSMISSION OK
TX/RX NO.
CONNECTION TEL
CONNECTION ID
START TIME
USAGE TIME
PAGES
RESULT
4939
8325646
02/17 10:40
01'40
3
OK
Un~i~ed States Cold Storage, Inc.
Process Safety Management
Management of Change
Page 1 Date: j) /c~,2/qcl
Management of Change
Number
This number is to be assigned by the Chief Engineer and is to be referred to in all documentation.
Location and listing of key personnel involved with the changes:
Facility
(Please Print) '
Originator ' ~, ~k,gC.,36~3~ ~.~-.
(Please Print)
Chief Engineer
(Please Print)
General Manager
(Please ~rint)
Regional Engineer
(Please Print)
Vice President of
Engineering
Ok ~c, lc ~oo.c,
(Please Print)
Coordinator of OSHNEPA
Compliance & Training
(Please Print)
PSM-MOCI.1 AP-A1 Revised 07/22/96
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Process Safety Management
Management of Change
Page 2
SECTION 1-
MOC NUMBER
INITIATION OF MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE FORM
Section 1 is to be completed, by ind~idual originating the MCF and forward to Chief Engineer.
Si{3nature ...... ~ '
PRIORITY OF REQUEST: (CHECK ONE)
[ ]
[ ]
]
CHANGE REQUIRED IMMEDIATELY. Affected portion of system should not be operated
until change is implemented.
Urgent - System can be operated with special care until change.is implemented.
Important - Significant safety implications of change.
Routine - Minimal bafety implication of change.
REASON FOR REQUEST: (CHECK ONE)
[
[
[
[
[
] Incident Investigation Recommendation (Ref. No.
] Mechanical Integrity Audit Recommendation (Ref. No.
] Pre-start Safety Review Recommendation (Ref. No.
] Process Hazard Analysis (Ref. No. )
] Change in Refrigeration Requirements
] Expansion or Renovation of Facility or Systems
] Other (Explain)
DESCRIPTION OF TECHNICAL BASIS FOR CHANGE (PURPOSE, ALTERNATIVES,
REFERENCE SKETCHES OR DRAWINGS):
PSM-MOC2.1 AP-A2 Revised 07/22/96
Unit'~d States Cold Storage, Inc.
Process Safety Management
Management of Change
Page 3
MOC NUMBER
Is this change necessary, consistent with company policy, and an acceptable course of action to
validate the continuation df the MOC?
Date:
APPROVED FOR CONTINUATION BY:
Chief Engineer:'~[ ~, .~)~~~
__] YES [ ] NO Date:
~ Signature -
General Manager: ~ (~
~ ] YES [ ] NO Date: I /'Z~/ ~
Signa'[0~
Regional Engineer:
Signature
Date:
OII 12.1 :~ coO'
NOTE:
If any of the above parties answer "No", then this initiation of Management of Change
form is dismissed. No further action will be taken on this MOC Number. Unless, above
parties agree on an alternative solution or a more descriptive reason for the necessity of
this change.
PSM-MOC3,1 AP-A3
Revised 07/22/96
Page 3
Unit U States Cold Storage, Inc.
Process Safety Management
Management of Change
MCF NUMBER ~-
FACILITY: ~~//~ .
SECTION 2: SCREENING OF MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE FORM
Section 2 is to be completed by the Site Maintenance Supervisor and then a copy of the MCF is to be
forwarded to the OSHNEPA Compliance Coordinator. If the requested modification constitutes a change,
Sections 2 through 8 must b~ completed.
ASSESS TECHNICAL BASIS OF CHANGE
The modification as described in Section 1 is classified as:
Technical Basis
Is the change a replacement in
kind?
Is the modification a major or
minor change?
Is the change permanent or
temporary?
Is the change necessary,
consistent with company policy,
and an acceptable course of
action?
DATE: /)
Assessment
[ ] Replacement in kind.
[]
Change is not a
replacement in kind
Modification is a minor
change.
Modification is a major
change.
Change is permanent.
[ ] Change is temporary.
""~ ] Yes
[] No
Next Action
Change is not part of MOC
procedure.
MOC procedure must be
followed.
Process hazards analysis
may. not be required.
Process hazards analysis
may be required.
Fill in section on MCF
concerning duration of
change.
Change should be forwarded
for preliminary engineering.
Change should not be
~lemented.
PSM-MOC3 APoA3
Revised 07122/96
Uniti~l~ States Cold Storag~ Inc.
Process Safety Management
Management of Change
Page 4
SECTION 3: DURATION OF CHANGE
Is this change temporary? [ ] YES '~]
If "YES" note duration here:
NO
MCF NUMBER
No temporary change shall be granted more than five (5) one week extensions or be allowed to
extend beyond six (6) weeks, including any extensions. The table below should be used to track
temporary changes.
SCHEDULE FOR TEMPORARY CHANGES
I Initiation Date I Expiration Date I Next Action
Initial Request;
Extension #1
Extension #2
Extension #3
Extension #4
Extension #5
UPDATING PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION, PROCEDURES, AND DOCUMENTATION
Identify the process safety information which needs to be revised as a result of this change.
Process flow diagrams
Electrical one-line drawings
Ammonia equipment lists
Criteria for design and operation
Preventive maintenance procedures
Accident investigation procedures
Audit program
Other (describe):
.~___ Piping and Instrumentation diagrams
Fire, water and sewer system drawings
~-~--~ Ammonia instrumentation lists
Standard operating procedures
Operator training procedures
'"'"'~ Emergency response procedures
SECTION 4: PRELIMINARY ENGINEE~,~I~IG,~,
Preliminary design reviewed by:
Date: 1) I~.~/ ~
PSM-MOC4 AP-A4 Revised 07/22/96
Unit
States Cold Storage, Inc.
Process Safety Management
Management of Change
Page 5
SECTION 5: AUTHORIZATION OF CHANGE
MCF NUMBER
,,~
Has a MOC been initiated?' ['~ ] YES [ ] NO
Has an Initial Review been completed? .'[',,~ ] YES [ ] NO
Has all Preliminary Engineering been completed? ~ ] YES[ ] NO
Has a Safety & Health review been completed? [ ] YES [ ] NO
Authorization may be given to accept this change and proceed with final design and installation of
the equipment with the following changes as noted below.
Authorization of Change. is g~en by; , /
Chief Engineer: ~'~"~?~. ~t//~J Date:
Regional Engineer: Date:
General Manager: Date:
SECTION 6: SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW
Does this MOC require a safety and health review? I ]
Date Safety and Health Review Completed.
YES
'[~] NO
Date: /
Does the safety and health review address the impact of change on safety and health?
[ ] YES [ ] NO (Check One)
Safety review checklist reviewed by:
Date: / /
SECTION 7: PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS (IF ANALYSIS IS PERFORMED)
Does this MOC require a hazard analysis? ~ ] YES [ ] NO
'~)oes the process hazards analysis address the impact of change on safety and health?
[\] YES [ ] NO (Check One) ,,/
Hazard Analysisreportreviewedby: ~./j~z'~, Date:/ /~/~"0'
PSM-MOC5 AP-A5 Revised 07/22/96
Unit?d States Cold Storage, Inc.
Process Safety Management
Management of Change
Page 6
FACILITY: ~ ~--',/~ '
SECTION 8: START UP AUTHORIZATION
MCF NUMBER ~- ~?-,~,~~
Date Pre-Start up Safety Review Completed.
Date:
Have all applicable drawings, procedures, and documentation noted in Section 2 been revised
accordingly? [ ] YES [ ] NO (Check One)
Have all appropriate operators, maintenance personnel, and contractors been informed of and
trained in the change? [ ] YES [ ] NO (Check One)
Have all, if any, recommendations from the preliminary engineering, safety and health review and
the process hazards analysis been resolved? [ ] YES [ ] NO (Check One)
Authorization may be given to proceed with start-up of the modification(s) if and only if the
answers to all of the above questions are "Yes" and all changes have been made as noted below:
Copy Distribution
Case Number
MOC Number
Chief Engineer
Signature Date
Name Title
Manager's Signature
Date
NOTE: All employees have the right to review all documents. See Chief Engineer for more,
information
PSM-MOC6 AP-A6 Revised 07122/96
System: 2. Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 1. Air units for the dock and freezer
Type: Evaporators I Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDs
Design Conditions/Parameters:
Session #: I Revision #: I Revision Date: 112712000
What ifs Hazards Consequences S L RR Safeguards Recommendations
1. Leaks from valves, 1. Potential release of 1. Potential ammonia 3 2 '- 2 1. Air units are Io~,ated
fitting, lines, ammonia from leak release to enclosed in remote locations -
instrumentation, etc point, refrigerated area and they are unlikely to be
by human error?, environment, impacted by external
events (such as fork
,fts)
2. A portion of the
valves, piping and
instrumentation
(appro)dmately 70%)
are located on roof to
minimize potential for
personnel exposure
to ammonia leaks
3. Ammonia sensors
located in refrigerated
areas
4. Periodical visual
inspections of piping
and of air units.
5. Air unit piping is
insulated to protect
against extemal
corrosion
2. Loss of~fan? 1. Potential for freezing t. Potential damage to 3 2 2 1. Daily inspection of air
on air unit coils, coil leading to units
ammonia release in 2. Ail air units are
enclosed area. automatically
defrosted.
3. Ammonia sensors
located in all areas
where air units are
located; sensors are
fled into the local
alarm company.
4. Ammonia detector
closes all solenoid
System: 2. Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 1. Air units for the dock and freezer
Type: Evaporators
Design Conditions/Para meters:
Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDs
Session #: I Revision #: I Revision Date: 1/27/2000
What ifs Hazards Consequences S L RR Safeguards Recommendations
2. cont'd -- 4. cont'd '
valves and fans in
leak area.
5. All refrigerated rooms
are vapor fight.
6. USCS's emergency
action plan.
7.'Training of the
maintenance
employees for
emergency response.
3. Loss of flow in suc§on 1. Pressure would 1. No safety or
line Joe., manual valve stabilize in air unit at environmental
closed by mistake? system pressure, consequences
(operability issue).
4. Manual hand 1. Potentially flood air 1. Recirculate liquid
expansion valve is set unit, sending liquid ammonia between air
wide open by back to pump unit and vessel -No
mistake? receivers, safety or
environmental
consequences
(operability issue)
5. Manual valves dosed 1. Potentially increase 1. Potential to 2 1 1 1 .'Training of the
isolafing liquid pressure due to overpressure air unit, maintenance
ammonia in the air thermal expansion of leading to release of employees as to He
unit? liquid, ammonia inside :shut down and the
facility (enclosed valving off of the
areas), refrigeration air units.
2. Ammonia sensors
located in all areas
where air units are
located; sensors are
fled into local alarm
company
System: 2. Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 1. Air units for the dock and freezer
Type: Evaporators Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDs
Design Conditions/Parameters:
Session #: I Revision #:
Revision
Date:
1/27/2000
I
What ifs Hazards Consequences S L RR Safeguards Recommendations
5. cont'd
'- 3. Ammonia dete~or
closes all solenoid
valves and fans in
leak area.
4. Ail refrigerated rooms
are vapor tight.
5. USCS's emergency
action plan.
6. Training of the
maintenance
employees for
emergency response.
6. Plugged strainer in 1. Loss of refrigeration,
liquid supply line? no hazards,
operational issue.
7. Pressure regulator 1. None 1. No safety or
valve has wrong environmental
setpoint for dock consequences
units? (operability issue)
8. Solenoid valve or 1. Loss of ammonia flow 1. No safety or
manual expansion to air unit. environmental
valve closed in liquid consequences
supply line? (operability issue)
9. Various minor leaks 1. Potential release of 1. Potential release of ,1 3 1 1 .Air units are located
from air unit, lines, ammonia from leak ammonia into the in remote locations
instrumentation point refrigerated space or unlikely to be
points? environment, impacted by external
events (such as fork
I~s)
2. Training of the
maintenance
employees as to the
shut down and the
valving off of the air
System: 2. Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 1. Air units for the dock and freezer
Type: Evaporators
Design Condit~onsJPara meters:
Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDs
Session#: I Revision #: I Revision Date: 1/27/2000
What ifs Hazards Consequences S L RR Safeguards Recommendations
9. cont'd -- 2. cont'd '
units.
.3. Ammonia sensors
located in refrigerated
areas
4. The ammonia
detector is monitor by
the local alarm
company.
5. Ammonia detector
closes all solenoid
valves and fans in
leak area.
10. Pipe size for new 1. Operational issues,
units are under not a hazard.
sized?
11. Existing ammonia 1. See What-If question
pump is too small? #10
12. New ammonia 1. No hazard, increase
pump is too large? in pump discharge
pressure, operational
issue.
13. Existing hot gas line 1. Improper defrost of
is too small size? air units. No hazard
operational issue.
14. Hot gas line is too 1. No hazard.
large?
15. The air units are too 1. No hazard.
large?
16. Hot gas line is 1. Buildup of liquid in the 1. Liquid hammer in hot 1. None 9. Consider leaving hot
improperly operated, hot gas line dudng gas line. gas line charged.
System: 2. Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 1. Air units for the dock and freezer
Type: Evaporators I Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDS
Design Conditions/Parameters:
Session#: I Revision#: ]
Revision Date: t/27/2000
What ifs Hazards Consequences S L RR Safeguards Recommendations
16. cont'd 1. cont'd .... 10. Consider installing a
e.g., cycling hot gas off-cycle, liquid drainer on the
on.and off? hot gas line.
11. Determine
movement of hot
gas piping system
on a 100 degree F
delta T.
12. Consider installing
safety cable on all
existing existing
refrigeration piping.
System: 2. Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 2. Glycol Heat Exchanger
Type: Glycol Heat Exchanger __~ Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDs
Design Conditions/Parameters:
Session #: [ Revision #: Revision Date:
What ifs
1. Changes in hot gas
pressure?
2, Float/drainer valve
fails open in the
condensate line from
exchanger? ·
3. Leak from glycol heat
exchanger piping,
instrumentation, sight
glasses due to human
error, i.e., forklift
accident?
4. Leak in exchanger
tubes?
Hazards Consequences
1. None ~ 1. No safety or
environmental
consequences
(operability issue)
1. No safety or
environmental
consequences
(operability issue)
1. Potential release of
ammonia into the
environment.
1. Increase load (false)
in M.T. suction.
1. Potential release of
ammonia from leak
point
1. Ammonia could leak
into glycol system
1. Potential to
contaminate glycol
system with
ammonia; ammonia
could be released to
the environment from
vent in glycol surge
drum
RR
I 1.
2.
1
Safeguards
Glycol heat
exchanger is located
in remote locations
unlikely to be
impacted by external
events (,such as fork
lifts)
Training of the
maintenance
employees as to the
shut down and the
valving off of the
glycol heat
exchanger.
1. Training of the
maintenance
employees as to the
shut down and the
valving off of the
underfloor heat
exchanger.
2, PM includes annual
testing of glycol.
3. Daily inspection of
glycol system.
Recommendations
System: 2. Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 2. Glycol Heat Exchanger
Type: Glycol Heat Exchanger Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDs
Design Conditions/Parameters:
, Session#: I Revision#: t Revision Date:
What ifs Hazards Consequences S L RR Safeguards Rec, ommendations
5. Loss of flow in drain 1. Potentially condense 1. Loss of heating of the 1 2 '- 1 1. Training of the''
line from heat ammonia in glycol, maintenance
exchanger to M.T. exchanger. 2. No safety or employees as to the
pump receiver, i.e., 2. Potentially fail to heat environmental start up operation and
manual valve closed glycol consequences funddon of the glycol
by mistake? (operability issue) heat exchanger.
2. USCS's lockout
tagout program.
3. System operating
conditions and levels
are visually monitored
and logged daily.
4. Any liquid in suction
lines from heat
exchanger will drop
into M.T. Pump
Receiver due to
piping orientation
5. M.T. Pump Receiver
is equipped with a
high level cutout.
6. Loss of glycol flow to 1. None 1. No safety or
exchanger? environmental
consequences
(operability issue)
7. Manual valves closed 1. Potentially increase 1. Potential to 1 2 I 1. Training of the
on heat exchanger, pressures in overpressure heat maintenance
isolating liquid exchanger due to exchanger, leading to employees as to the
ammonia in heat thermal expansion of release of ammonia shut down and the
exchanger?, ammonia inside facility or to the valving off of the
environment, underfloor heating
system.
2. USCS's lockout
tagout program.
3. Pressure safety
valves on
System: 2. Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 2. Glycol Heat Exchanger
Type: Glycol Heat Exchanger
Design Conditions/Parameters:
Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDs
Session #: I Revision #: I Revision Date:
What ifs Hazards Consequences S L RR Safeguards Recommendations
7. cont'd -- 3. cont'd -
exchangers.
- 4. Glycol would tend to
cool (rather than
heat) the ammonia.
8. Plugged strainer in 1. See question #1 for
hot gas supply line? hazards,
consequences and
safeguards.
9. Solenoid valve or 1. Loss of ammonia flow 1. No safety or
manual throttling to exchanger, environmental
valve closed in hot consequences
gas supply line by operability issue.
mistake?
10. Various minor leaks 1. Potential release of 1. Poten§al release of 1 3 1 1. Training of the
from glycol heat ammonia from leak ammonia into the maintenance
exchanger, piping point, environment, employees as to the
inslnJmentation? proper pump out and
isolation of
refrigeration
equipment.
2. Daily visual checks
are made of all
refrigeration
equipment.
3. Daily preventive
maintenance of the
refrigeration
equipment.
11. A closed valve 1. Overpressure of the 1. Release of refrigerant 3 1 1 1. Positive shutoff valve
upstream or glycol heat exchanger into the environment, are not allowed in
downstream of a may develop. Pressure safety relief
pressure safety lines/system.
relief valve?
System: 2. Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 2. Glycol Heat Exchanger
Type: Glycol Heat Exchanger Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDs
Design Conditions/Parameters:
Session #: J Revision #: I Revision Date:
What ifs Hazards Consequences S L RR Safeguards Recommendations
11. conrad
2. Training of the-'
maintenance
employees as to the
start up operation and
function of the roof
heat exchanger
pressure safer7 relief
valve configuration.
3. Roof heat exchanger
relief valve
configuration is piped
into the M.T. suction
line with a special
valve grouping to
allow replacement of
PSRVs with an
attached warning
instruction placard.
4. PSRVs are vented to
the ammonia
absorption tank.
5. PSRVs line is
equipped with an
ammonia sensor and
is monitor by the
computer and local
alarm company.
6. The computer system
is designed to
activate the ammonia
absorption system
and shutdown the
refrigeration system.
7. Training of me
maintenance
employees for
emergency response.
System: 2. Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 2. Glycol Heat Exchanger
I Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDs
Type:
Glycol
Heat
Exchanger
Design Conditions/Parameters:
Session,: IRevisi°n #: IRevisi°n Date:
What ifs Hazards Consequences S L RR Safeguards Recommendations
12. Pressure safety 1. Overpressure of the 1. Release of refrigerant 3 1 '- I 1. Replacement o7 the
relief valve failed i.e. glycol heat exchanger into the environment, pressure safety relief
valves every 5 years.
rusted shut? may develop within 2. Training of the
the unit. maintenance
employees as to the
operation and
function of the piping
and valving
configuration for the
pressure safety relief
system.
3. Training of the
maintenance
employees as to the
proper piping codes
and regulations for
the installation and
maintenance
procedures for
PSRVs.
4. Training of the
maintenance
employees as to the
shut down and the
valving off of the
underfloor heating
system.
5. Training of the
maintenance
employees for
emergency response.
13. Pressure safety 1. This What If question
relief valve is is NOT APPLICABLE
backed up by an for this Node, this
additional PSRV condition does not
downs~eam? exist.
System: 2. Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 2. Glycol Heat Exchanger
Type: Glycol Heat Exchanger I Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDs
Design CondifionsJPara meters:
Session #: I Revision #: Revision Date:
I
What ifs Hazards conSequences S L RR Safeguards Recommendations
14. Pressure safety 1. This What If question ....
relief valve piping is is NOT APPLICABLE
not vented to the for this Node, this
atmosphere? condition does not
exist.
15. Pressure safety 1. See question #12 of
relief valve setting is this section for
to high (more than hazards,
design) for the safe consequences and
operation of the safeguards.
refrigeration
system?
16. Pressure safety 1. Pressure safety relief 1. Premature (false) 3 1 1 1. All pressure safety
relief valve setting is valve may open due release of refrigerant relief valves are
to Iow for the system to normal pressure to the M.T. system, supply by the
normal operating within the refrigeration con, actor at time of
pressure? system, purchase with the
equipment.
2. USCS PSM program
"Replacement in
kind".
3. Training of the
maintenance
employees as to the
operation and
function of the piping
and valving
configuration for the
refrigeration pressure
relief valves system.
4. System operating
cond'rtions and levels
are visually monitored
daily.
5. PSRVs are vented to
the ammonia
System: 2. Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 2. Glycol Heat Exchanger
Type: Glycol Heat Exchanger
Design Conditions/Parameters:
Session #:
Revision #:
What ifs
16. cont'd
17. The pressure safety
relief valve oPens
below its set point?
18. Hot gas line installed
is too small?
19. The new heat
exchanger is too
small?
20. The new heat
exchanger is too
large?
21. Roof cannot support
the weight of the
Hazards
1. See question #16 of
this section for
hazards,
consequences and
safeguards.
1. None, operational
issues.
1. None, Operational
issues.
1. None, operational
issues.
1. Failure of roofing
system.
Consequences
1. Release of ammonia
into the environment.
Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDs
RR
S
Revision Date:
Safeguards
5. cont'd -
absorption tank.
· 6. PSRVs line is
equipped ~ an
ammonia sensor and
is monitor by the
computer and local
alarm company.
7. The computer system
is designed to
activate the ammonia
absorption system
and shutdown the
refrigeration system.
8. Training of the
maintenance
employees for
emergency response.
1. All engineering was
done by the design/
Recommendations
13. Consider as'king
Stellar to check the
System: 2, Bakersfield building addition Phase 3
Subsystem: 2. Glycol Heat Exchanger
Type: Glycol Heat Exchanger
Drawing: Phase 3, R-4, AHU P&IDs
Design Conditions/Parameters:
Session #: Revision #:
What ~fs
21. cont'd
heat exchanger?.
Hazards
Consequences
S L
Revision Date:
RR
Safeguards
1. conrd -'
bui~ cona'actor.
2. USCS has on site
personnel.
Recommendations
13. cont'd
structural load of
new system to
confirm the
engineering
numbers for the roof
loads for the new
sprinkler piping
system on dock and
where the glycol
heat exchanger is
mounted.
US Cold Storage/Bakersfield
Phase III Tie In Schedule
Time ite"m '" Valve # f Ope~"a'ted by
- , F-r'i~l'~y 1/28/~(~ ...........................
' '~P-M Start system p~'~p 'down
~'~........... 1) close feed valve to high temP suctior~"~cumulator ......... ........ 45
~:_--_': ~::')~i'Ose feed valve to ~ ie-~ ~ ~~.: . ..... 72 .
........... Wait for_high temp su~i~'"~ccumuiator to shutdown. ~,,n,_l.ow level ...... ...:.:.'_' ......
............. 3)Shut off pump then close Iow temp pump disch"arg..e._v, alves, 57___&_6'.:~" . .......
Wai~'~"l~w temp suction accumulator to shutdown on iow I~;~i .................
_ _4..)~hut off pump then close Iow temp pump discharg__e valves, _l~...&.. :13 ........
.... 5) Conne~-~0~e from oil pot to high temp liq~!d_!ine to remove' .... _ ....... 63..t_o 54 ..............
........ ii'"'i:..'fiquid from liquid mains throughout plant
......... 6) Connect ho~'¥rom 0il pot to Iow temp liquid line t~" remo~e-" 86 to-~ ........
......... liquid from liquid mains throughout plant ........................
'~i__-_~.'0.ntinue to monitor in sight glass in hoses f~'liq--uid then go to
........ 8) Close High Temp & Low Temp liquid feed to each evaporator in Plant ........... - ...... ]"'
I
AHU 1 .....
.......................... AH~ . 2 .... - .... . ......... ' ......
............... AHU ......... 3 ..... 1 ..............
AHU 4
........ kHU 5 - ........
AHU 6
AHU 7
AHU 8
AHU g
..... ..... ' ......AHU AH'U- 11 10 ....... . ........ ._:- .......
AHU 12
.......... AH~ 13 ...., ' .....
AHU 14
AHU "~'~ ......
AHU 16
............ AH0 'i:7- ...........
AHU 18
AHU 19
AHU 20
............ .~'HU 21 : .............
......... AHu .... -2~ .................
......... -'-..--::i .........................
Page 1
~O?TO'd 9P8~ ~£8 T99 BO~O±S G~O3 sn ~£:9T 000C-8~-N~£
US Cold Storage/Bakersfield
Phase III Tie In Schedule
,T,..!me Item / .... ValYe # O_p. era~.._ed by
.......... 9) bleed press._ure in hot gas main into Iow temp liquid line ............
..... !.h. rough manifold valves on roof for 10 to 20 minutes until liquid line empty .....
............. 10) bleed pressure in hot gas main into high temp liquid line ...... · .... ~_ ........
through manifold valves on roof for 10 to 20 minutes until liquid line. emPt.y._ ........
11_).....c~lose-~ot g;~s main to roof .':'~:_ ' ....... 29 ........ ' ..... ._. ' ....
,.l_.2.)""~ontinue pump down until no liquid in sight glass is visible
( In hose between oil pot and and suction accumulat0..r_.s) ...........
...... ~. ........... 13) cont.!hue ;~o run compressors and Pull entire systeme into a de~P_ va~'~ ......... ...... .._
14) Isolate each valve group from system
............. AHU
AHU 2
AHU 3
AHU 4
....... AHU ...... 5! ...............
AHU 6
AHU 7
..'_'- i ........ ':" . .... 8 .................
AHU
AHU 10
I AHU 11
AHU 12
AHU 13
AHU 14
AHU 15 I ...........
AHU 16
. AHU 17
......... Xh-u ........
AHU 19
AHU 20
, AHU 21
AHU 2-~ ...........
...... 14) Isoloate Iow temp and high temp suction mains above roof ....... 75 & 48 ........ ' '--
. :::':. 15) Shu. t down comPressors and entire system .._ '":": ............ - ............
....... l_6)_.R, emove hoses from oil pots to liquid lines high temp 63 to 54
Iow temp 86 to 77
17) Connect Vacum pump to liquid line drain valves ' 54 & 77
1
Page 2
US Cold Storage/Bakersfield
Phase III Tie in Schedule
Tim® ............ Item .... .. ' .....t tValve # Operated by
18 )'Introduce air into isolated system through c~m'~n-on manifold on roof ........
.................... Run vacum pump to.~eep air through system before cutting int~' ~'yst..e._m.i
........ 19) System is now ready for tie ins.
................... Saturday 11;~0O' ' ..............
6:00 A_.M._ ,,Welding Crew Arrives / Safety Meeting
to 6:30 AM ......................
7:00 A~' Cut open mains for cross ov~; valves t'0"~ail .....................
dock air units. _B.~gin Welding
7:15 AM Cu.t_.0..p..e._n...mains for cross over Valves to freezer
air uni_t_s_:__B.egin Welding .............. ,........... .~ ...........
10:00 AM Cut open mains for cross ~'-~: Valve~ ~:~' rail ...........................
........ dock air units. Begin Welding ......
2:00 PM_LWelding Complete .
._ 2:~) PM ipump system !n..to v~cum with vacum p'L~mp to evacuate air .............................
5:00 PM iSressure test system for leaks
5:30 PM Insulate tie in points at rail dock cros~ ~'~' ....................
'¥:30 PM "'"'~'$tem 'start u.,_p...Procedure ..................................
Time Item '" Valve #
.....i'~perated by
..!.)_O,pen valves to each'valve group on roof ......... '"'
........... ^HU ..........
................. . AHU ' '""-~ ..........
..... AHU 3
........ AHU 4
.............. AHU 5
.............. AHU 6
.............. AHU 7
........... AHU 8
................. Al;jO' g .......
................... AHU 10i
..... AHU 11
.......... AHU 12 ......
Page 3
~0×£0'd 9~B~ 2£8 Tg~ 3DW~O±S O90D sn ~£:9T 0002-B2-NW£
Fl~ - d I~/U.L
US Cold Storage/Bakersfield
Phase I1! Tie in Schedule
Time ............ Item Valve # Operated by
.............. 1) Open** )~...a_!_v_es t_o_ each valve group on roof (continued) ..............
AiJ[U ..... 1,3, ..............
.............. AHU 14. .....
AHU 15
...... AHU 16 ~--.1 .....................
AHU 17
AHU 18
AHU 19
AHU 20
AHU 21
AHU 22
~-)-""-~'~n i~ain suction 'valve on roof for Iow and high temp mains ......75 & ~ ......
3) Restart compressors
4) sio_w_j.y,...o, pen hot gas main valve ........... 2,9
............... 5) Slowly open pump discharge valve on high tamp li~'~i'~l ...... -I~;I " ...........
tStart Cornell Ammonia pump
..i'iii..~i_'_- ....... 6) Slowly open pume_d._i._scharge Valve on Iow tamp liquid ........... 1-~
Start Corneil Ammonia pump
........ 7) Continue pr0-~e~re 5 & 6 until liquid lines are full .... 1'- ......................
.....A_.t this time it is ok to open vatve 61 & 12 to fullY oi~--, ......
8) -6'l~n 'other p_.u_.m..p, discharge valves .......... .. .5.?__& 13- .....................
....... g) M;3ni,t0r,s. ystem until pressure and temp~r~res are normal ................... ,,,,
~0/~0'd 9~8S ~£8 T99
Page 4
B8W~O±S OqOO SB
S£:9T 000~-8~-N~£
B D
February 2, 2000
FIRE CHIEF
RON FRAZE
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
2101 'H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3941
FAX (661) 395-1349
SUPPRESSION SERVICES
2101 'H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93,..'..'..'..'..'..~) 1
VOICE (661) 326-3941
FAX (661) 395-1 349
PREVENTION SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3951
FAX (661) 326-0576
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3979
FAX (661) 326-0576
TRAINING DIVISION
5642 Victor Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93308
VOICE (661) 399-4697
FAX (661) 399-5763
Mr. Ron Whisenant
Chief Engineer
United States Cold Storage
6501 District Boulevard
Bakersfield CA 93313
Re: Phase III Expansion Ammonia System Tie-In
Dear Mr. Whisenant:
I congratulate you on your successful ammonia system tie-in which
occurred, without incident, on Saturday, January 29, 2000.
Your diligence in bOth the preparation and execution of Process Safety
Management (PSM) standards were matched only by The Stellar Group's
skill in constructing their design. It is a credit to both you and your
contractor that ammonia safety was held as the foremost tenet of the
ammonia system tie-in operation.
Thank you for helping to make the City of Bakersfield a safer place in
which to work and live.
CC:
R. Dorrell, USCS
D. Daughton, Stellar
HW/mv
Sincerely,
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Materials Specialist
Office of Enviromental Services
852 58~6 p.O1/O1
.jAN-Z5-2000
US cOLD sZORAGE
661
April 4, 199'/
Howard I-L Wines, IIi
Hazardous Material Technicians
1'/51 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA. 93301
Dear Mr. Wines, we -,viii be pc, fforrning a tie-in to our refrigeration system
This letter is to inform you that
on Satarciay January 29 Th 2000.
If you have any queStiOnS, Please call mc.
Cell phone 331-3550
393-4463
ttome g32-2653
Work
sincerely,
Ron Whis ·
Chief Engineer
USCS Bakersfield
RW/ma
K. Dorrell.
K. Noll '
1. Marrella
V. Amert
C. ToogOod
ZOTflL P- 01
FII~E
D
December 17, 1999
FIRE CHIEF
RON FRAZE
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
2101 'H' Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (805) 326-3941
FAX (805) 395-1349
sUpPRESSION SERVICES
2101 'H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301 --
VOICE (805) 3263941
FAX (805) 396-1349
PREVENTION SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (805) 326-3951
FAX (805) 326-0576
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (805) 326-3979
FAX (805) 326-0576
TRAJNING DMSION
5642 Victor Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93308
VOICE (805) 399-4697
FAX (805) 399-5763
Mr. Randy Dorrell
United States Cold Storage
6501 District Blvd
Bakersfield, CA 93313
Dear Mr. Dorrell:
The Office of Environmental Services finds the Risk
Management Plan (RMP) prepared by United States Cold
Storage regarding the handling of Anhydrous Ammonia, to be
complete in scope and content. The Bakersfield Fire
Department will conduct follow up inspections to verify
compliance with the risk management measures described in
this plan.
Notice of completion of the RMP will be published in the
Bakersfield Californian. United States Cold Storage's RMP.
will then be subject to a 45 day review period during which the
Office of Environmental Services will consider all public
comments regarding the adequacy of this RMP.
Please call me if I can provide any further assistance or
clarification regarding the Risk Management Plan.
Sincerely,
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Materials Specialist
· Office of Environmental Services
HHW/dlm
cc: R. Whisenant. USCS
The BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN
P.O. BOX 440
BAKERSFIELD, CA 93302
city of bakersfield EMMA
1715 chester ave
Office of Environmental Servic
Bakersfield
CA 93301
PROOF OF PUBLICATION
Ad Number 263865 PO # RMP
Edition TBC Run Times 1
Class Code 520 Legal Notices
Start Date 12/12/99 Stop Date 12/12/99
Run Date(s) 12/12
Billing Lines 28 Inches 2.34
Total Cost 41.16 Account
Billing city of bakersfield EMMA
Address 1715 chester ave
Office of Environmental Servic
Bakersfield CA 93301
Solicitor I.D.: C010
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF KERN
I AM A CITr'Zg.N OF THE UNITED STATES AND A RESIDENT
OF THE COUNTY AFORESAID: I AM OVER ~-$-IE AGE OF
EIGHTEEN YEARS, AND NOT A PARTY TO OR INTERESTED
IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER. I AM THE ASSISTANT
PRINCIPAL CLERK OF THE PRINTER OF THE BAKERSFIELD
· a~LIFORNIAN, A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION,
. RINTED AND PUBLISHED DAILY IN THE CITY OF
BAKERSFIELD COUNTY OF KERN,
AND WHICH NEWSPAPER HAS BEEN ADJUDGED A
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION BY THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE COUNTY OF KERN, STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
UNDER DATE OF FEBRUARY 5, 1952, CASE NUMBER 57610;
THAT THE NOTICE, OF WHICH THE ANNEXED IS A PRINTED
COPY, HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN EACH REGULAR AND ENTIRE
ISSUE OF SAID NEWSPAPER
AND NOT IN ANY SUPPLEMENT THEREOF ON THE FOLLOWING
DATE. R. TO W'IT:
12/12
ALL IN THE YEAR 1999
! CERTIFY ~OR DECL/~) TRUE AND~ECT.
UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURy
THAT THE ~IS
First Text
PUB-L-lC NOTICEA Risk Management Plan
Ad Number 263865
gOO Mohawk St.
Suite 120
ROUSTABOUTS/
WELDERS.
HELPERS
If yOU are qualified, we
need yo~. Immediate
openings for pipeline
job. Must have 1-2
years experience.
Apply in person
Man. -Thurs.,
7:00 am to 12:00 pm.
Times subject sublect
to change
900 Mohawk St. #120
SERVICE MGR/TECH
Salary DOE. Great boner ts.
Apply in parson: Banner Air
4105 Buck Owens B vd, or
cml after 6pm 871-5691
.;H~I' METAL INSTALLERS
& layout positions available.
3-5 yrs. Residential exp.
AI~Iy in per, on,
1000 E. Tru~l:un. ·
ua. ~at.-£g O-,~-~p* st.
S Rogers. Bono a7154757
Phone: 800-554-0322
TERMS: CASH, ATM end
Credit Cards (No Checks)
· GENTt~ YEARLING
Dorset ram, proven fertility,
;250. 536-8601
nurseries, collecton
ful cold hardy WHOLESALE
PALMS for sale · 746-~J99
': STEEL
PLACERS
Wanted independent rebar
placing company to work
with fast growing rebar
fabrication plant in your
area. Please call:
661-256-7~ 14,
Ask for Mike.
S~RMA~I~) POOL
PLUMBER, Exp'd.
o,t east 3 yrs exp. only need
~ apply. Call 871-811
IL! EOOFEIL~ ONLY Experi-
em:ed, with own tools need
· .'al~ly. 661-835-1896
WATER TRUCK
· DRIVERS
We are looking for SO wa-
ter truck drivers. This per-
son must have valid CDL
(Class A or 8). These indi-
viduals must have min.
yea~', of verifiable work ex-
p..e~ence. Tamp to perm po-
sJtlOflS. Paid vGtIOflS
medical banal'ets offered.
Must comply with all com-
oany policies. Bring a cur-
~ent OMV printout, two
f.orms of lO and your enthu.
slasm to a company that
puts Safety first. Apply in
person between 7 am and
12 noon (times subject to
:h _angel at:
sOO Mohawk St.
~'.- Suite 120
WELDERS
-' HELPERS
We are looking for 250
qualified welder0$ helpers.
These individuab must have
min. 6 months of verifiable
qand$ on work experience
.n this field. Job~ are in Taft
area and may need to have
~eliable transportation to
]nd from. All individuals
-oust comply with all com-
:~any pohcies. Paid vaca-
uons and medical benefits
-)flared. Bring your hard
· vorking experience and
· wa forms of ID to a cam-
)any that cares about your
afety first· Apply in person
vlonday to Thursday 7 am
o 12 noon (times subject to
hange) at:
900 Mohawk St.
Suite 120
WELDERS
Must have 2+ years exp.,
reliable transportation &
be dependable.
Drug screen m effect.
Stafl~ng for Success
5000 CaliTorma Ave. $207
631-2243
e*~l~ty In per,on - NO fee
~ item tomorrow in
~e Classified MARKET-
~ACE.
The Bakersfield
C~llfom|an
ness opportunity. It is the
responsibility of the readers
to investigate before they
NEWSPAPER
CARRIER ROUTES
Looking for an excel.
lent sOurce of. supple-
mental income that
may not interfere with
your current employ-
ment or school activi-
· ties?
The Baker~'field Call-
fornian now hat
moming
routes
throughout
Bake~field area.
are alsO
parsons who would
available to
on a regular basis.
· transporta-
tion a must.
G Valid CA driver's li-
cense required
Interested
may call i
their name
(805) 392-5777
Intematlonal Ca.log Co
Local leaders needed
You don't sell; stock; deliver
No risk
13 year old Company
Earning CEO Incomes
For info 661-328-5635
SHIPPING STORE
In 8ksfld. Busy, estab shed
location. Profit potential
$45K+. after debt service
w/~50K down. 634-3359
~UYING OR SELLING? We
have business & contacts.
Call ~onv or Carolyn at
RoPerson Real Estate S88.6609
AT&T - BELL PAYPHONES
Own prime sites! S150K yr
pot'l Lowest prices. 800-
800-3470 24 hrs.
WORM BOXES, wooden.
Star~ your own fishing
· $500 each. 661-588-6989.
I~,~.TSELL~R, uae it to sell
tho~e items you don't need.
I~l, ( :nllSl mellon
~.SulTIlell
~arl: Debra
~nr: 818-24b-ae8J
WaJla~ &
3325 Inndco Ddw
~k~flHd. CA 93308
~,la(1; ~b SmJdl
~onc: 66i-~27.14~6
~hna, CA
Phunc 559-896-1443
mF~ua~ Nml~, ~J Suet-
mr ~m~rUon.
and S~fl~U~ ~7 ~
cha~ al ~e ~Df~
[I d~e price of O~ X~
uoUam (S ] 30 ~) for ea~
pirie ~c T~ pd~ d~ ~1
dude aMy shl~ and
~ts wM~ w~ ~ ~ ad~fl~ m
· r a~vr slel~ ~ ~ pUT-
C~ pflc~ was ~ on ~e
m ~c City for p~ mm-
pine ~. ~ b a non.~dable
pu~hasc. ~ O~ a~m
~lblllly for ~n-~t ofbl~
due to ally delay. ~u~ but not
flmlted to ca~ dday. It ~
bidders ~ to m~
dea~ine ~ a~v~
~5.]20.~.~
~UNG ~
6-~-~)~m
~m N~r.
0~ S ] ~0.~
~O~S~
AW~ DA~
~ 21, ~999
B~ PA~
~R~ D~ON
B~. ~ 9330]
66]-32&3914-~
[~XaAL NOTIC~
NGe~', Kt~'a 1c~ and COld;
esde lee Qeun
S~ab's Cold Slma~. iocak, d In Ibc
g~J of Bakee~ela. ~. ~
J~e 30,1999 (181524)
~U~ OF ~
G~ S~ D~I~ON
~al~ p~ ~1 M ~
unUI II:00 a.m. un
~y 22. ] ~99. al ~e foUo~
I~Unn:
1. Dellw~ In ~ o[ by mud-
~ly AdmJ~s~aU~ Office,
~IM Flor. Plans gild
Speclflcallons Counter.
Rdmlinsln~jw Center. 1 ] 15
l*mxtnn Avenue. Bake~fleld.
~llfomla. From J 2:45 a.m. nn~
I I.:00 a.m, on Ihe a~
bm n~nin~ date p~ls ~ll
AdmJnlslraHve Cartier.
S('n'h'~ ~tvJslo~ of [~ ~Ullty
Administrative om(.e. I 1 IS
']rUXl~ll AVeMUe. Bake~Aeld.
('alJlomla 9]301.4539.
R her which time th~ will b e pub.
Italy o~n~ al~ w~ on that date
hi Iht IIli~ fllmr coJde~n~ ~un
('OllXlrut'lJml Of publh' wufj
t)IRFX.'TOROFT IE(:/TYOF [ ~:~,r.,,.,,,,r ,u. '7~7
8AKE__J. .... ~ P1annhlg I)ln.clor
The Developmenl ~rvlct Din. clot ~JPnr]O. 1999(JBl'tg~ TIlE ERN I[1(;11SCII(~)L --
Il ~vln.~ notice (Jut he ~ hold a / II)INANCE N0.'G.6~7 /}I~RI~ B/l) REQU~T
beadnX ~in~ al 4'~ pm / ~INANCEOF~E~A~ ~
~ESDAY. lely 20 1959 ~'W~ / WSUPEHVI~}~ OF ~ NoU~ Is he,by Wen thai
Dnef~m~l ~ Bo~dm~ / COUN~'OF~.~A~OF ~w~lMm~lv~by~Under. W~;
lTIS~rAvenue ~ld' / O~INAN~&6147 B[e~st ~nyH~Sc~l.
~llfo~o. m i~t'publlc ~ J ~EVE~PME~AGR~. ~must~v~ol~eR~ side
mmly ~ ~e foHo~g ~ ~ Tbe f~low~g o~l~n~, m~. BO~ ~. 5801 SuaVe
~. ~le~ ~p~un: (Site ~un ~ ~oftwo (2)~om.w~d~y Avenne.~eld.~llfo~a
~evlew No. ~9~395} ~ ~ J a~isdypa~and~ 933og.~2~p.m. onW~. 2~~
ae~e~ for ~ mns~on of~ J ~.~e~ofSupe~of~ ~y. July 14.1999. and wlll~ Mas-
publicly ~n~ al ~ abe ~
80 ~1 motel a~ a 60 ~1 mo~l / ~unly of gem. S~.
on a 5.01 +/- ~ U~ ~n~l~ [ ~a, al a ~gular m~n~ ~ ~ R~m ~nf~ R~m E al
an ~s~g 152 ~I mo~l (m ~ [ ~ ~ Su~n held ~ ~ ~e. We~-
~el~ ~ an ~ / 22nd ~yoflune. 1999~ R"B"Hm~ls~u~.Forfur. 1S c.
2.~ ~. fL ~umnt fin ~ ~ foHo~Rvo~.mwlC ~erlnfo~oomn~jm ~
d~oll~) ~ a G2 ~o~1 ~ ~Y~: ~u~mn. ~ ~aoa~.8mmWa~al . like
~e~l}~ne ~ / m~n. Pa~a 827-~221. ~1.
~Jm I~Oo~ J NO~: No~ ~e ~ has d~ ~e
27~e ~ ~E~: None ~ml P~va~R mae of~r ~ only
~PN: 405-101~2.~) J/~ M~ton wf~ ~e I~ In w~ ~ S32~
~Jm ~c . J~lman ~ of wo~ b to ~ ~ffo~ for ea~
7662 ~ ~e '~. Sate of ~Ufo~ ~~ ~ p~
~ ~ ~ooos ~ un ~e at
~a~mt I~al~at 5801 S~-
~e Avenne. ~eld. ~or, cone
FoI-
Q~aU~ Act
~he env~oo-
duty
whit~
H
Refr~
W~
Reft:
Gooc
WA:
In t~e Dryers.
ment Se~lces ~ at 1715
~ Avenue. ~te~leld. Call.
forma, or by ~lepbonln~ ~e ds-
~nment at (805) 326-3733.
mr wUl condder aU pubUc com-
ments n. gma~
Ieee md t~ e~drm~en~ deter.
lln~tJun at the imbllc bearblg.
on or Mesa b~e ~ ~.
WfltLm ~unt~ m~t ~et'et to
*% ~e mmber mi be dltmal to
~e mff mnt~ at the Phnni~
Dq~mmunt, 1715 Cluster Ave-
nun. ~
g3301, lfyeu t
Jalom aa
d at
FOSTED: J~e 30.
NO~ OF ~BUC
H~ B~
P~ING ~ON OF
~OF~
· e ~an~ng
~ion of ~e ~of
~ld. ~ ~g
al 12:15 ~, ~ ~
afar. as ~ ~t~ ~y ~ h~
un MONDAY, J~y 12. 1999 In
ou~1 ~. Qty Hau.
~ay~n ~ ~ for p~.
~on of ~ff t~ony ~y.
~ ~ ~.~ un MOMd~.
neanng ~ ~ mminu~
t~Omony fm~ othe~ al ~:30
p.m., or as ~n f~af~r
DAY. ~ly 15.1999 ~ ~e ~un~
Cham~m of City H~H.
Tmxfnn Argue.
~llfo~ 93~01 to ~nslder
foBowin~ ~u~.
~nslun of time for TenMO~
~ ~869 m~ls~n~ of 2q I sin.
~1~ family ~ldeMUaJ lois on
2. ~Jecl
Sun~ of 8~hall R~. ~sl
Ve~u~ ~n~.
mJ~ a~ll~Jll:
mlthl~ti/USR Inc.
1424 17lb
NOTICE IS R~O IIEREBY GIVEN
· al pumuanl In the Callinmla
ATTEgT:
DENISE PENNELL
Clerk of the Board of
Supervtsorx
By/s/Judy A. Denny,
Deputy CIe~
THE 8OARD OF SUPERVISOIL~
OF THE COUNTY OF I~RN OR-
DA~NS AS FOLLOWS:
aisle e~ 1.13as ordinate
,eat and be In fall fo~ce or
and af~' Ibc 22nd day
1999 and chad be pabllabed oaen
In The 8aker~eld CalU'malaa e
8oa~ of Sn~ vodn~ fro.
.Se~l~n 2. Ordinance G-6147 (De.
]mae 30,1999 (181430)
5UIW, ONTRACTORS
AHD SUPPUERS FOR
BID
JULY 28,199g @ 2:00 P.M.
CDOT ~ID6-3S2724
I~RN CO. NEAR MARICOPA AT
VARIOUS LOCATIONS FROM
1-5 KM NORTH OF SAN MJIS
OmSTO caul'IT u~r~ ~0
0.0~ Ic~ sOtrl`H OF DLq~L'S
GULCh. ROtrr~ 33
GP. RJ~rg CONSTRUcTIoN CO.
P.O. ~OX 5]27
CONTACT: RaN STARK/
H~IDI ARMSTRONG
805.399-336] -PHONE
805-399-3598- FAX
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNTrY EM.
PLOY~L ] 00~
AND PAYMENT BONO
QUL~O. GRAmT~ CONS11WC-
TION COMPANY INTENDS TO
SERIOUSLY HEGOTIATE WITH
QUAUlqED DRE FIRMS FOR
IECT PAgr/cIPATION.
lame 29. 301999 (180621)
REQUEST FOR SUBBI~S
MclC~ J~.cUlc equests DBE Sub.
bids nn the follow~ it~ns:
Rock saw, bortnf, connie dde*
walk3 fMr Federal proJeet No. CML-
5109(O40).
Bids July 7. 1999 al ] 1:00 a.m.
City of Bakersfield.
Mcgee Faecatc
1'106 No. Chester Ave.
8akt~sfleld. CA 93308
(661) 399-3321 .
('661) 399-3323
Inne 30. lu)y 2, 5.1999
(182081)
ORDINANCE NO. G6608
AN ORDINANCE OFTHE BOARD
OF SUPERVISORS OF ']'HI.: COUN.
TY OF IG*:R N. STATE OF
FORNIA. AMENDING
THE ORDINANCE CODE OF
TI*IE COUNTY OF KERN. ~ON*
lNG
ORDI NANO,,3 TO AMEND
ZONING MAP NO. 102- I
ZONE CHANGE CASE NO. 2,1
The foUowlMg ordloam'r.
thg of two (2~ seclluns, wes duly
a,d n'gularly passed and ~dopled
by tbe BoaM of 5upervl.,m~ of
County of I~nl. State
California, at a rellular nikeUng of
nla. Refundable bid depeslt of
S lO0.O0 LIn, qldred.
The Board of Tmslets gem I~
School Dlstdcl reserves ~e d~lt
to reject aU bids aMd/or waive any
bat'~aJad Ues In a bid.
K~n I-IJgh School District
Janet Ford Shah
Diet, or. So,ness Services
Jnne 28.1n1~ 5. 19991180381)
Wa~e Man.~emem Department
Sate of CaUfoenb .
NOTICE TO COXlT~'TORS
CONTRACT NO. ggO43
M~ms prolect In a¢cor-
,~e idam and s~edal
. prov~toos ~emfor to wMd~ si~-
FOR REMRDI~T]ON OF COLLEGE
m~qws 8u]~ DUMA MUbe
~ nnt8 11:00 a.m. aa laly
1,1. 1999 at the fol~ inca.
er ~ndce to ~e gem County
Roada Depart~mt. Pla~ and
PaMtc Ser~lce~ BulMlaR. 2700
"M' Sm, et. ~zralela. Ca~fomb.
Frma 10:.,1S Lin. nnm 1 l:00a.m.
.un ~e auew qaecSL~ bkl oi~
room of aid Public Senlces
2. Mailed ~ United Stak-s Postal
Settee to gem CoonW Roads
Del~ttmen~ 2700 'M* Sen, eL
93301.
In ~e tim float eo~aence room
A mandstm7 p
s~t~ walk wtU u
999 at
Sum
nless It
is made on a blank form
by the Department and accompa.
hied by bidder's secuHty In an
amount equal to ~n percent (1 O%}
of the amount bid In arconlance
waIn the provtsinns se~ forth under
Sectlun 2. 'Proposal gequlrements
and CondfUuns." of the Inly ! 992
Standard Specifications of the
California Deparlmenf of
Transportation as modified by
spec~l provisions. Plato,
tlons, and slandard Bid Pmpoaal
form to be osed for bMding on t/ds
project may be oblained al the
Kern County Roads Depa~lmenC
Plans and Spedflcattoes Counter.
4t~ floor. Pnhlh' Services
Bollding. 2700 *M* SeA-et.
Bakersfield. Calltomla.
The County ri'serves Iht ttght to
reJetl aev and all bids· The mn
WaCl wll]'be awarded by. t/n"
Of 5npervJsors after a ri)replete
contra~l Is po'pared ~ the Imwst
It'qm~lblr bidder who~. pmposa
complies with all o! the
If Iht Job L~
or over, fha SUiTeG
ful bidder shall furnish a
J~ofloam? ~md alld a Paym~ll
Bond each In a sum equal m al
for ti'
more
S75. S.
· w/toy:
(~Si~m~
tress S
made, h
receiver
$325 c
BI~rCLE
locks,
xlnt cc
22
FREEST'Y
Like ne
MOUNT,
dale.
ol3o ·
Carbc-
S1.5OC
our
SELL
Sat-Jo
Over
heav~
truck_
seizur
ernme
For
call 7C
First
BAKERSFIELD
FIRE DEPARTMENT
June 9, 1998
REE CHIEF
MICHAEL R. KELLY
ADMINISTEA11VE SERVICES
2101 'H' Sheet
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (8O5) 395-1349
SUPPRESSION SERVICES
2101 'H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (805] 395-1349
PREVENTION SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(80,5) 326`3951
FAX (805) 326-0576
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326`3979
FAX (805) 326-0576
TRAINING DIVISION
5642 Victor Street
. Bakersfield, CA 93308
(805) 3994697
FAX (805) 399-5763
Mr. Ron Whisenant, Chief Engineer
United States Cold Storage of California
6501 District Boulevard
Bakersfield, CA 93313
InvitatiOn to Provide Ammonia Industry Input into the Facility
Compliance Plan
Dear Mr. Whisenant:
The City of Bakersfield has applied to the California Environmental
Protection Agency (Cai/EPA) to bedesignated as a Permit Consolidation Zone.
Other applicants also include the jurisdictions of Fresno and Kern Counties and a
consortium of agencies within Orange County.
Cai EPA and the agencies to be designated as Permit Consolidation Zones
are actively seeking input from industries which may be willing to participate in
the development of Facility Compliance Plans as a single environmental
regulatory document that incorporates all permit application, monitoring, and
reporting requirements.
Please respond to me before Friday, June 19, 1998 if your organization is
interested in helping to develop the Facility Compliance Plan model. The
commitment will involve consultation meetings with Cal/EPA in Sacramento in
the near future.
Attached, please find some general information, a cai/EPA fact sheet, and
the text of the law establishing Permit Consolidation Zones and Facility
Compliance Plans. If you have any questions, please call me at (805) 326-3979.
Ralph E. Huey, Director
Office of Environmental Services
attachments
'Introduction to SB 1299
Permit Consolidation Zones
and
Facility Compliance Plans
Intent of .Legislation
To create areas within California where environmental
permitting .can be accomplished under 'a flew paradigm .where
.~ .~ the emphasis is on compliance l . .~,.~ ~ ..~ ,~
To create a single environmental authorization document that'
incorporates all environmental media
To expedite the processing of a single environmental
authorizing document by establishing a "fast-track" review
Permit Consolidation Zones (PCZs)
PCZs are areas within a local jurisdiction that have
applied for and received approval to participate in a
limited-term pilot program
Once designated, a PCZ will be in effect until SB 1299
sunsets (January 1, 2002) ·
'PCZs are designated through a competitive process and
approved, by a panel composed.of the Secretary :for ~:.~.~:~./~
Environmental Protection..and 'the' Secretary for Trade
and Commerce
The selection of PCZs is mandated by the enabling
legislation to be'balanced to ensure geographical
diversity.'
Only twenty zones can be designated
PCZs may designate areas within which Facility
Compliance Plans can be used as. an omnibus
environmental permit
PCZs may selectively exclude certain' activities requiring
environmental permits from inclusion within the zone
How Permit .Consolidation Zones Function
Once designated, a PCZ may issue Facility Compliance
Plans (FCPs) to facilities that request this option (this is
not a mandatory program)
FCPs may only be used for "new or expanded facilities"
as these are defined in the implementing regulations
FCPs are processed expeditiously (45 days for
completeness and adequacy)
once an FCP. is d~termined to be complete and adequate
the FCP is deemed' to be apProved
FCPs replace all existing environmental permits in a PCZ
The review of an FCP element, i.e., air, water, solid
waste, is conducted by the permitting .authority that
would normally issue an environmental permit
How "Facility Compliance Plans" Work
FCPs mu. st. contain all the information.necessary to allow
the pemuttlng authority to make a decision on -the
completeness and adequacy of the activity which is
planned ' '
Once approved, an FCP will authorize all " ....
envlronmefital
activities to be conducted within a designated PCZ
FCPs. will provide for coOrdinated inspections On a
defined periodic basis ~,~,
FCPs will consolidate all enVironmental permit.
application fees
An FCP will 'contain all. the required conditions for',~
facility operation
An FCP is intended to proscribe standards of operation
An FCP will address all monitoring and iep0rting
requirements
An FCP is an enforceable document
Miscellaneous Provisions.
PCZs can be amended or volUntarily 'terminated
SB 1299 does nOt supersede other environmental statutes
or regulations
SB 1299 .does" not amend CEQA in any way
All cities and coUnties within a proposed PCZ must agree
to the 'designation
FCPs can be converted to "regular" environmental
permits
Permit Consolidation Zone (PCZ)
Review Process
Amendmen~ $ubmated
Review Panel
Submit Application
for
Permit Consolida~on Zone
to Review Panel
Award
Zone Designation
or
Approve Amendment
Reject/Deny i ~ "'
PCZ Application
or Amendme~ ~:,:', ~;~
PCZ PCZ Acts
Acts to Amend to
Designation Terminate DesignalJon
PCZ
Terminated
· RevlewPanelmusta,=t~n amendments~ 90daYS
or ~ey are automatir.~ approved
l lmpose I
CEQA I
Facility Compliance Plan
Review/Approval
Flow Cha'rt
Facility Compliance Plan r
.(FCP)
Submit Applic~flon '
Distribute FCP
to
Individual permitUng Authorities
for Review
~ ~--~Com~ne~/ ~1 Perrr~.ittlng Auth°rity ~I
FCP Complete
Permit Deemed Issued
Permit Applicant
.Submits Revised FCP
· to Permitting Authority'
Appeal of Permitling Authority's
Determination of Non-Completeness
Denial]
STAT~ OF
CALIFORNIA ENVIRON5 AL PROTECTION AGENCY
SENATE BILL. !299:
PERMIT CONSOLIDATION ZONES
FACT SHEET ..
OCrOB£R 1995
SUMMARY
Senate Bill 1299 (SB) requires the Secretary for Environmental Protecti°n, by
January 1, 1997, to adopt regulations for a pilot program for 1facility permitting that replaces
individual envirohmental permits with a 'single, comprehensive compliance assurance plan.
It requires those regulations to be developed by the Secretary in coordination with other
specified state, agencies and. in consultation with representatives of cities, counties, local
environmental agencies, and certified uniform program agencies.
SB 1299 will be implemented through a pilot program in 2'0 communities throughout- ·
California. '
The Secretary for Environmental Protection and the Secretary for Trade and Commerce are
required to prepare and submit an'annual report to the Governor and the Legislature by
January 31 of each year, and to submit recommendations for additional legislation to-..-
implement the pilot program.
BACKGROUND
Most induStrial facilities now require environmental permits from a broad range of agencies.'
Each agency has its own requirements, which differ considerably in terms of monitoring, permit
term, financial requirements, fees, etc. SB 1185 (Bergeson, Chapter 41-9, 1993) provides a
means of coordinating these permit approvals, but is only a first step in developing a true facility
permit where 'all regulatory requirements would be specified and balanced in a more coherent
document. New Jersey currently is in' the 'third year of a pilot program that collapses their
permits into a facility permit. USEPA is currently considering similar efforts.
SB 1185 created a coordinated environmental permit process. This law requires
environmental agencies' to coordinate their approvals' into a single.action and sets hard time
limits for a final coordinated permit decisiom However, the resulting product is a coordination
of existing permits and not a replacement with a single, internally consistent facility permit. This
approach also still relies on up-front permit .approvals.
'~ P~O'BLEMS CURRENTLY FACI THE REGULATED COMMUNI~rYe
A key difference between California and other stales' environmental laws lies in the
multiplicity of implementing agencies and overlap between the state and local levels. In many
other states, environmental regulation is centralized in a single state structure. Although Cai/EPA
is pursuing greater consistency a~d. coordination at state level, this scattered structure has
produced a mind boggling range of permit forms, ordinances, and implementing facilities.
ANALYSIS
Senate Bill 1299:
Shifts permitting programs away from up-front approval therefore, eliminating
unnecessary and. duplicative permit requirement, si
Makes regulations more concise. Facilities built to regulations, with after-the, fact
audits completed through existing inspection and enforcement procedures, would
provide the same, if not greater, environmental protection than current ways;
Provides possible cost savings to agencies participating in pilot program by reducing
permit development costs; ' ·
Provides for coordinated regulatory assistance through. the Governor's Permit
Assistance Centers; '
· Does not abrogate CEQA; and '"
.· Allows regulatory agencies to shift emphasis from permitting to inspection and '
enforcement, producing cost. savings, and increasing compliance monitoring.-
For additional information regarding Senate Bill 1299 and Permit Consolidation zones,
please .contact Cai/EPA at (916) 445-3846.
OCTOS~tI99$
Permitl~on
~ SB 1299
olida~Cion zone'.-.
County/City
ApplicatiOn
FacilitY
Compliance
Plan
(Equals Permits)
Cal/EPA~TCA
Review Panel
Permit
Consolidation
Zones
New/
Expanding
Business
Coordinated Regulatory ~
Assistance Through Governor'.si
Permit Assistance Centers '~
. (Optional) ~
CEQA
Oeclarab
or EIR
Coordinated Inspection and Enforcement Activities
SB 129~
m2.--..
CI'IAPTEII
All act to acid anti repeal Chapter 5 (commencing wilh
Seeti0n 71035) of Pnr~ I of Division ~4 of ll~e Public
Resources Code, re~ating I-o environmental proteclion.
u~cm~vrn.~ covxsl.:L-s
SB 1299, Peace. Environmental proteclion: permits.
Ufider existing law, the California Environmental
Protection Agency is administered by the Secretary for
Environmental ProtectiOn. Specified state agencies are
established within the agency.
Existing law, the Environmental Protection Permit
Reform Act of 1993, among other things, requires the
secretary to establish an administrative process which
may be usecl, at the request of a permit applicant, to
designate a consolidated permit agency, as. defined, for
projects that require permits from 2 or more
environmental'agencies, as defined.
This bill would require the secretary, by January 1,
-19~, to adopt regulations 'establishing the permit
consolidation zon~ pilot program, as described, consisting
ofspeeified application, administrative, and enfi~rcement
processes. The bill would require those regulations to be
developed by the secretary in coordination x~tith other
specified state agencies and in consultation with
representatives of cities, counties, local, environmental
'-agencies, and certified uniform program agencies. The
bill would prekcribe procedures l~r termination 0f'
involvement in the pilot program. The bill would
prescribe related requirements and procedures for the
program.
Th~ bill xvould require the secretary and the Secretary
for Trade and Gommerce to prepare aod submit an
annual report to the Governor and the .Legislature
containing specified information by January 31 o1' each
year.
The bill would remain in'effect only until January 1
2002. ,
-- 3 -- ~[~i "1299
The people of tb'e State of ~bTornia do enact as [ollor..,s:
SEC'.FION 1. Ch?ter.5 (commeni:i'ng with SeCtion
'71035) is added to Part I of Division 34 of the Public
Resources Code, to read:
CII^P'I'EI[ 5. PI,'-IIMIT CONSOLIDATION ZONE PILOT
· PIIOCII^M
71035. As used in this chapter:
(a) "Certified unified program agency" means a
certified unified progr':un agency as designated under
Chapter 6.11 (egmmeneing with Section 2540 of
Division 20 of the Health and Safety Code.
(b) "Environmental agency" means an
environmental agency as defined in st, bdivisio,]s (a) to
(g), inehlsive, of Section 71011. ,,
(c) "Environmental pcr~nit" means any
environment:d permit issued by an environmental
agency or a certified unified program agency.
((!) "Facility compliance plan" means a plan that does
all of the following:
(1) Contains information and data for all emissions and
(liseharges from the facility and the management of solid
waste and hazardous waste, including all information
revelant to in(lividtml environmental permits that would
otherwise be required[orthe facility
(2) specifies~ measuresl including, but not limila~! to,
monitoring, reporting, emissions limits, mal~llqals
handling, .'md throughputs, .to be taken by the project
applicant to ensure compliance with all environmental
permits that would otherwise be required.
(3) Meets 'the requirements of all individual
elwironmental permits that would otherwise be
required.
(4) l;.;nsures compliance wilh all applicable
environmental rules, regulations, laws, an(i ordinances.
· - 71035.1. 'On or before January 1, 1997, the secretary
shall a(lopt regulations eslal)lishing the permit
SB 129~ --4--
consolidation, zone pilot progr;~m consisting or all of the
following:
(a) An application process whereby cities nnd counties
may request that all or part of their juris(lietion be
designated a permit eonsolidatioi] zone.
(b) An ~(Iministrative process which may be used for
new or expan(led facilities within ;~ designate(I I)erm!t
consolidation zone, at the option of the permit applicant,
to .substitute a facility Compliance plan for any
environmental permit. The application process shall
contain a means to determine that new or expanded
facilities are in compliance with all applicable laws an(l'
requirements.
,(c) A process to coordinate inspection and
enforcement activities among the agencies Ihat would-
otherwise ~ have issued individual permits for facilities
choosing to be permitted through a facility compliance
plan..
(d) Procedures pursuant to which applicant cities and
counties may amend or terminat'e the designation.
71035.2. The regulations required by Section "/1035.1
shall be developed by the secretary in coordination with
the Secretary for Trade and Commerce, the Secretary of
the llesources Agency, and the. Secretary for Business,
Transportation and Housing, and in consultation with
representatives of cities, counties, local environmental
agencies, and certified unified program agencies.
71035.3. The application process required by
subdivision (a) of Section 71035.1 shall provide for all of
the. following:
(a) A competitive application process which
designates not more than 20 cities and counlies with a
population greater than $,000 as determined'in the 1990
census, or parts thereof, as a permit consolidalion zone.'
(b) The award of designations by a review, l)anel
compose(I of the secretary and the Secretary £or ']'ra(ie'
and Commerce.
(c) The award of designations based on the
applicatio,,s submitted. In awarcling (lesignations, the
review I ~1 shall consider the extcnt to which' Ihe
~ 5 ~ SB 1299
nl)l)licant has inslill~tc(I permit sl'renmlining measures for
permits under its authority, whether there is a single
certified unified program agency wilhin the boundaries
of the area l)roposecl in the application, whether
provisions arc included to ensure adequate public
pm'licipation in the final l)ermit decisions on facilities
subject to a fimility compliance plan, and the extent
existing or proposed agreements belween Ihe'applicant
an(i olher Iocad, slate, and regional l)ermitting agencies
with juriscliclion within the boundaries of tile, a
l)rOl)osed in the application.
((I) A requirement that all elites, counties, and local
environmental agencies with. permit aulhority over the
projects subject to a facility compliance plan within the
l)ropos~d permit consolidation zone agree to the
(lesignation.
(e) In awar(ling designalions, ensure a diverse range
of permit consolidation zones, including, bul not limited
to, urban and rural counties, large and small cities, and
communities encompassing military base or reservations
retise, -
71035.4. (a) (1)' A designated city or cOunty may
terminate '
~ts involvement in the pilot program
established pursuant to this cliapter following 180 (lays'
written notice to the secretary. The permit consolid~n
zone shall be deemed terminated at the end o~e
180-day notice period.
(2) Nolwithshmding any other provision or law, any
facility within the terminated permit consolidation zone
permilted through ~ facilily compliance l)lan pursuant to
Seclion 71035.5 shali-I)e deemed Io hold valid
environmental I)ermils tmlil in(livi(hml environmental
l)ermils are issued or dcnie(I.fOr Ihe facility by the
~q)l)lical)le enviromncnlal agencies.
(b) An apl)licalion~ for amendment ~o a permit
consolidation zone (lesignaHon shall I)e sul)n~ilted by t e '
nl)plical)le ci[), or cotmty-tO I'he review panel, unaher
Section "/1035.3. Any nmcn(hnenl slmll become effective
wilhin 90 days aficr II:m (l~fle of recciPt hr the review
pnnel. ·
SB 1299 6
(c) The procedure for replacing a fi~cility complianc'e
plan in whole or in part with individual.environmental
permits, as a result of an amendment or termination of a
permit consolidation zone designation, shall be specified
in the applications submitted pursuant'to Section 71035.3.
71035.5~ The facility compliance plan substituted
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 71035.1 shall
provide for all of the following:
(a) Substitution of the plan for all individual state
agency 'and local environmental permits that would
other,vise be recluired for the proposed project, unless
otherwise specified in the designation application
submitted by the applicant city or county.
(b) Measures to be taken by the project applicant to
ensure compliance with all applicable rules, regulations,
ordinances, and statutes and to ensure that the facility
compliance plan is as enforceable as individual permits.
(e) The equivalent opportunity for public notice,
hearing, comment, participation, administrative appeal,
and judicial review as provided in the environmental
permit process that would otherwise be applicable.
(d) All applicable individual environmental permits
for the project to be deemed to lmve been issued upon
receipt of a complete and adequate facility compliance
plan by the secretary.
(e) A filing fee to reflect the reasonable costs of all
agencies that would otherwise issue individual permits
for the project covered by the facility compliance plan,
and that also reflects the reduced costs of the applicable
agencies through reduced staff review of individual
permits. Any fee shall be subject to Section 57001 of the
Health and Safety Code. Tile project applicant shall not
be liable for any application fees for any individual permit
that is otherwise addressed in tile facility compliance
plan. Local agencies shall i¢lenlify and quantify auy local
fees in tile application submitted purstmnt lo Section
'71035.3. ..
71035.6. (a) Environmental agencies, wilh
jurisdiction over porlions of the compliance plan shall
¢letcr~ni~c il';r compliance pi;ut is complele and a¢lequale,
.',,
in accordance with th'is section, as ii relates to '~h~ir
particular area of jurisdiction.
(b) A determimttion of completeness and adequacy
'shall be based solely upon whether there is compliance
with the rules, regulationS, ordinances, and statutes
governing the environmental agency. As part of the
determination of adequacy, an environmental agency
may require additional conditions necessary, in its
judgment, to make the facility compliance plan
consistent with its rules, regulations, ordinanqes, and
statutes.
(c) If an environmental agency possessed
discretionary authority over a facility prior t~the
enactment of this chapter, then the determina~ of
completeness and adequacy shall be a discretionary
action for purposes of the California Environmental
Quality' Act (Division 13 (commencing with Section
21000) ). If, subsequent to the enactment of this chapter,
an environmental agency, by regulation, eliminates its
discretionary authority over a facility, then the
determination of completeness and adequacy shall not be
a discretionary action fgr purposes of the California
Environmental Quality Act.
(d) An environmental agency shall trans~nit its
determination to the secretary within 45 days from the
date of receipt of the facility compliance plan.
(e) (1) if an environmental agency determines that a~
fi~cility compliance plan is not complete and ad~te,
the agency shall, within the 45-day period speci~ in
subdivision (d), transmit that determination, in writing,'
to the project applicant. The agency's determination shall
specify those parts of the l)ian that are incomplete or
inadequate and shall indicate the manner'in which they
· can be made complete and adequate, including a list and
thorough description of tho specific information needed
to make the plan complete and adequate. The project
applicant shall submit materials lo thc environmental
'.agency in rcsl)OnSe to the list and clescril)tion.
:' (2) Not later than 30 calendar days after receipt of the.'
~ submitted materials, thc cnviromucntal agency shall
SB 1299 t{
determi,~e i~ writing wl~ether t'he)' are complete
adequate and shall immediately ira.stair tl~at
determinatio~ to the applicator. If thc written
cletermim~tion is not made withii~ the 30-da), i)eriocl, the
ai)plication togelher with the submitted materials shall
be deemed complete a.d adequate for I~ttrlm~es o{' Ihis
chapter.
(3) If Ihe pla~ tog~lher with thc submitlcd malcrials
are (letetmi~cd not to I)c complete :mci ;tclccluale
pursuant Io 'l)aragraph (2), the environmental agency
shall provide a I)roccss rot Ihc apl)licant to al)l)cal that
decision i, writing to the govcrni~g body of thc agericy
or, ir there is no governi~g body, to the director or the
agenc),, as provi(Icd b), thai agency. There shall be a final
written delerminaiion I)y the agency on the appeal
later than 60'calendar days after receipt of thc
written al)pea!. ~otwithstan(ling a (lecisio~ pursuant to
paragraph (2) that [he application and submitted
materials are not complete ;md adequate, if the ri~,;~l
written determinatio~ o~ the appeal is not made withi~
that 60-day perio(l, the application with the std)mitte(I
mate~rials shall be deemed complete and adequate for the
purposes of this chapter.
'(4) Nothing in this section precludes an applicant and
an environmental agency h'om mutually agreeing to
extension of an), time limit provided by this section.
(0 All apl)licable in(lividual cm, ironmcntal permits
for the project shall be deemed to have bccn issued upon
receipt of a complete and adequate facility COml)liancc
plan, as determined by thc secretary, after receiving thc
determinations of completeness and adequacy from
em, irom]~cntai, agencies ptlrst~ant to subdivision (a). In
determining COml)lctencss and adequacy, thc sccrclar),
shall not substitute his or her judgment I~r that of thc
applicable environmgntal agencies.
71035.?. Thc sccrctar), shall provide
assistance wilh regard to projects l)crmitted through
· facility COml)lia,cc plan.
71035.8. Vacility compliance plans may not be al)l)lic(I
to projects involving any of Iht rollm~,ing:
299
(:l) 'l'l~e in(:illcralio,i or wastes.
(b) The slorage, Irealme~lt, IrallSl)Orlalion, or disposal
of ra(lioaclive materials.
(c) Olher aclivities that the secrelary (lelermines.
base(! on risks lo thc enviromnent a~d the i)ul)lic health
a~(I safely, Io I)c al)l)rOl)rialcly rcgulalc(I. Ihrough
in(lividu:d permits.
(d) Olher activities within .a si)coif it permit
consolidation zone as requeslcd I)y the city 0r county in
ils al)l)lication sul)mitte(I lmrsua~t to Section 71035.3.
71035.9. This chal)ter shall be implemented by the
scc'relary only lo the cxlcat consistent with federal la
and any .delegation agreements ~t, ith federal agencies.
71035.10. 'Phc secretary and the Secretary for Trade
and Co~nmerce shall prepare and submit an anm~al
report to the Governor and the Lcgislaturc by January 31
of each ),ear, contain)lng the following~
(a)'A description and location of facilities permitted
through a I~cility complia~ce plan, inclutling the mm~ber
or intlivitlt~al envh'onn~cntal pcrmils that otherwise
would have been requii'e(I, a~ estimate of cost savings to
the .participating ' facilities and the involved
em, iro,me~t,I agencies as a result.0f the pilot program,
and the degree to which compliance with the applicable
e~vironmental laws and regulations has been maintained
or increased through the pilot progra~).
(b) As al)propriate, recommendations ~'
modification, expansion, or elimination of the l)il~'
program cstablishc(I by this chapter.
(t:) l{ccommentlations 'l~r how thc )ilot )rogram
could beexl)antl~d tocomplex . ! ! _
[acililies including, but not
limited 'to, whcther the ,15-flay review of facility plan.
COml)lelencss and adequacy shoul(I be exl);m(le(l.
71035.11. This.chal)tcr shall remain in cfl~ct tmtil
.lanuar), 1, 2002, and as of that dale is' repealed, unless a.
later cm~cled stalulc, which becomes effeclive on or
before January 1, 2002, deletes or extends Ihal (late.
BAKE RS F I'E L D
FIRE 'DEPARTMENT
M E M.O'ROAN D U-.M
I)ATE: .lidy 17, 1.997
TO: Ralph F~. tluey, tlazardous Materials Coordiuator
lrROM:' ~tloward Il. Wines, Hazardous Materials Teehuician
SUILJECT: Joint Haz-Ma~ Exercise Proposal at US Cold' Storage for Simulated
Ammouia Release & Continuing Training
I have been in contact wilh Ron Whisenant who suggested that his facilit and a '
w~th lhe J-laz Mat Teams or,,anize ~ ;,-;,-, ~, ....... , y. cur ottice, together
,,..., ,, .......... ,.. ~ ,,j~,,,,, uaz ~v~at ammonm re~ease exercise to be conducted at
,.t: ~j:~ t..om ~lorage lac~l~ty m November 1997
Ron will also provide our office with membership lbrms for.joining RETA (Refi-igeration
Engineers Association) a,'s well as pr~Svide information on regular training that.is ~5onducted at US
Cold Stor~-~ge in coniunclion W th RE]'A and San Joaquin Valley College.
The next such training is ofl'ered on Tuesday Night, July 22, 1997at US Cold Storage, beginning
at 6:30 I).m. I Would like to attend so that ! can brief the Haz Mat Team at our next scheduled
meelmg, July 3 I, 1997.
1--i H W/dim
BAKERSFIELD
FIRE DEPARTMENT
FIRE CHIEF
MICHAEL R. KELLY
ADMINISTRAtiVE SERVICES
2101' 'H' Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
F~ (805) 395-1349
SUPPRESSION SERVICES
2101 'H" Street
Bakerstielcl, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (805) 395-1349
PREVENtiON SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3951
FAX (805] 326-0576
ENVIRONMENTAl. SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3979
FAX (805) 326-0576
TRAINING DIVISION
5642 Victor Street
Bakersfield, CA 93308
(805) 399-4697
FAX (805) 899-5763
May 29. 1997
Ms. Cad L. Willis, General Manager
United States Cold Storage
P O Box 41000
Bakersfield, Ca 93384
RE: Approval of 60 Day Extension fbr RMP
Dear Ms. Willis:
Pursuant to your May 21. 1997 ~vritten request tbr a 60 dav extension, this
letter confirms the approval ~fv°ur request. '
Our office is also available to assist 3'our staffin resolving xdlatever
ditt~culties may be causing the delay, if within our ability to do so. Please call if we
can be ot'any assistance.
Sincereh/
Howard H. Wines~ III
Ofl'~ce of Environmental Services
HHW/dlm
IJNITED STATES COLD STORA6E
OFC4LIFORNIA ~,.., Address: 6501 District Blvd.. Bakersfield, CA 93313
Mailing Address: RO. Box 41000 · Bakersfield, CA 93~84
Phone: 805 / 832-0OLD (2653) · Fax: 805 / 832-5846
April 2, 1997
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Material Technicians
1751 Chester Ave~ -
Bakersfield, CA 93301
Dear Mr. Wines,
We have scheduled April 15, 1997 to start our RMP. Mr. Jim Marrella and Mr. Victor
Amett will be on this team, We will begin with a "What If?." study and will be working
through the week. Please let me know if you will be able to attend.
If you have any questions, please call me.
Sincerely,
Ron Whisenant Jr.
Chief Engineer
USCS Bakersfield
RW/ma
xc:' J. Marrella V. Amett
C. Willis
[~ Swire Group..
FIRE CHIEF
RON F R,~\ZE
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
2101 "H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3941
FAX (661) 395-1349
SUPPRESSION SERVICES
2101 "H' Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3941
FAX (661) 395-1349
PREVENTION SERVICES
F~E SAFETY SERVICES * ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3979
FAX (661) 326-0576
PUBLIC EDUCATION
1715 Chester Av~.
Bakersfield, CA 9,,3,301
VOICE (661) 326-3696
FAX (661) 326-0576
FIRE INVESTIGATION
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3951
FAX (661) 326-0576
TRAINING DIVISION
5642 Victor Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93308
VOICE (661) 399-4697
FAX (661) 399-5763
November 17, 2003
Mr. James C. Marrella
United States Cold Storage
8424 West 47th Street
Lyons, I1 60534 <
FINAL DETERMINATION OF ADEQUACY
CalARP RMP Audit at United States Cold Storage, Bakersfield
6501 District Boulevard in Bakersfield, California
Dear Mr. Marrella:
This is to confirm that The Stellar Group has adequately responded in
writing to the Preliminary Determinations referenced in the June 2003
CalARP RMP Audit.
This Final Determination hereby adopts the corrected piping schedule
for the ammonia relief piping submitted by The Stellar Group in
response to the Preliminary Determinations, and no further revision or
modifications to the RMP are required at this time.
Thank you for your continuing efforts in helping to keep the City of
Bakersfield a healthier and safer place in which to work and live.
Sincerely,
Ralph E. Huey
Director of Prevention Services
by:
Howard H. Wines, HI
Hazardous Materials Specialist
Registered Geologist No. 7239
Office of Environmental Services
CC:
C. Taylor, The Stellar Group
R. Dorrell, USCS, Bakersfield
June 17,2003
FIRE CHIEF
RCN FRAZE
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
2101 "H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3941
FAX (661 ) 395-1349
SUPPRESSION SERVICES
2101 "H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3941
FAX (661) 395-1349
PREVENTION SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3951
FAX (661) 326-0576
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
VOICE (661) 326-3979
FAX (661) 326-0576
TRAINING DIVISION
5642 Victor Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93308
VOICE (661) 399-4697
FAX (661) 399-5763
Mr. Randy Dorrell, Plant Manager
United States Cold Storage of California
6501 District Blvd.
Bakersfield, CA 93313
RE: CalARP RMP Audit at USCS Bakersfield Facility
Z65_0~lTI~igt~'ct~'~_~,d~
Dear Mr. Dorrell:
Enclosed please find the California Accidental Release Prevention
(CalARP) Risk Management Plan (RMP) audit conducted at the
United States Cold Storage of California, Bakersfield Facility (USCS
Bakersfield) throughout the last several months.
The audit report findings are very favorable and the staff at USCS
Bakersfield is to be commended for the continuance of their efforts in
helping to prevent accidental anhydrous ammonia releases within the
City of Bakersfield.
The audit team has identified two (2) specific RMP deficiencies which
shall be addressed within ninety (90) days. Please respond in writing
within this 90 day period as to how the deficiencies have been
addressed. These preliminary determinations are listed in Section 13
of the audit report, beginning on page 12 of the enclosed document.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 661-326-3979.
Sincerely,
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Materials Specialist
Registered Geologist No. 7239
Office of Environmental Services
Enclosure
9. EMERGENCY RESPONSE
9.1 Do you have a written emergency response plan? a. i,r Yes b. No
9.2 Does the plan include specific action to be taken in response to an accidental release ora
regulated substance? a. ~ Yes b. No
· 9.3 Does the plan include procedures for informing the public and local agencies responSible fOr
responding to an accidental release of a regulated substance? a. ,/' Yes b., No
9.4 Does the plan include information on emergency health care? a. ,/Yes b. No
9.5 The date of the most recent review or update of the emergency response plan:
June 25, 1997
9.6 The date of the most recent emergency response training for employees:
March 27, 1997
9.7 The name and telephone number of the local agency with which the plan is coordinated: ·
a. Bakersfield City Fire Dept.
b. 911 (805/324-4542)
9.8 Subject to (check all that apply)
a. vr OSHA 1910.38 Emergency Action Plan
b. ~r' OSHA 1910.120 HAZWOPER
c. Clean Water Act/SPCC
d. RCRA.
e. OPA-90
f. ,/ State EPCRA Rules/Law'
g. Other (specify)
RMP Data Elements - USCS, Bakersfield
-page 8-
United States Cold Storage
6501 District Boulevard
Bakersfield, CA. 93313
Certification Statement Program 3
I, Cari L. Willis, Manager of United States Cold Storage, Bakersfield hereby certify that I
have reviewed the existing Risk Management Program with Ron Whisenant, Chief
Engineer and at,er reasonable inquiry, the information submitted is true, accurate and
complete as per 40 CFR {}68.185(b).
Manager
Date
........................... . Session 2 for BAKERFLD .......... ~_-- ............
Session Date: 03-04-97
Name 'Phone number Location
Leader: Victor Arnett, Regional Eng. 916/391-7829 Sacramento
Scribe: James Marrella, Coot. OSHA Reg 708/442-6660 - USCS, Lyons
Team: James Marrella, 708/442-6660 USCS, Lyons
Ron Whisenan~,. Chief Engineer 805/832rCOLD Bakersfield
'1
Con~uents: This HAZOP is being performed due to the additional freezer spac
added in the spring of 1997. Additional equipment added is as
follows:
Refrigeration Compressors:
1, Booster RDB 222 Prick screw compressor
1, High Stage RWBII 100 Prick screw compressor
Condenser:
1; BAC VC2-982-KM
Evaporators:
Room 4, 1, EVAPCO NTL2-5364-200L
" .Ro~m 5,. 1, EVAPCO NTL4-12484-300L
Room 6, 4, EVAPCO NTL3-7384-200L
'. ' Truck dock, 3, EVAPCbNTX2-1'784-033P
Heat Exchanger
' .,1, underfioor E. L. Nickle, SS-375 NB #44404-
The equipment added is identical to the existing equipment, thus
the HAZOP
team determine an additional HAZOP would not be required for
those pieces of equipment. However, the team did determine an
'HozoP for the entire refrigeration system was required under
"Global-Composition., The team also determine that no additional
refrigerant would be required.
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
· Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
,. Session: i 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: i High Pressure Receiver
Drawings: FS1
Parameter: Flow
Worksheet
Pa~: I
Intention: Storage vesse!, ammonia refrigerant
] G~ I DEVIATION I CAUSES
........... . ........... + I CONS~.O~CZS I S~.~.~S ,s,~ ~ ~
' ~o ................................. + ...............
JNo Flow ~1. Mec~nical failure, [1. High level in H. P: [1. ~erational monitoringJl[3~l
Receiver.
12. High discharge (Head)
Ipressure, potential
Irelease of refrigerant.
linto atmosphere due to
IOver pressurization.
I
I
13- Component failure'due
land (Process Safety
]Management Pro,ram)
I operator's training.
~ I
12. Operational monitoring]
land preventive
Imaintenance program.
I
13. Safety relief on H.
IReceiver set at 250 PSI.
I
14. Scrub tank (water
Itank} air scrubber.
I
iS. High discharge
Ipressure cutout/alarm on
Ihigh stage compressors.
16. Pressure Safety Valve
Ion H.P. Receiver.
I
]7. Scrub tank (water
Itank) air scrubber.
I
18. Compressor are
RECOMMENDATIONS IHx ISlL]R I COMMENTS
1. Sufficient safeguards -'
exist.
12. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
Ito Over pressurization, lequipped with Pressure
lRelease of refrigerant tolSafety Valves {PSV).
lengine room area .
l(enclosed area}. ' '
19. A~nonia detector in
] lengine room.
I
] IlO. Scrub tai"~ (water
I Itank) and.air scrubber.
I I
14. Cannot maintain levelstll' Operational
in system vessels. Imonitoring of vessel
Ilevel (Sight Glass).
lalarms are mornitored by a
lalar~ company and
tCOmputer controls.
I
112. Compressor eguipped
Iwith Low Suction Pressure
Icutout/alam-m.
13. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
1113~1 14. Suffic'ient safeguards
lexist.
]King Solenoid Valve (KSV)
lot feed valve for
lintercooler fails to
Iopen.
IHi~h
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: A~onia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 -
Node: I High Pressure Receiver
'Drawings: PS1
Parameter: Plow
W~rksheer
Page: 2
Intention: Storage vessel, ammonia refrigerant
................................................................... ...................................
I ~ I DEV~ATZON CAUSES CONS~0UENCES I s~uu~s.
I .......................... ~ " .............. ~ ........ :* ..................................................................
'lwi:h 1Ow float
Icutout/alarm.
I
114. Proper training of
lall plant operators and
ICa~-OSHA's Process Safety
IManagement Pro,ram,
I(PSMP) and Risk
IManagement~ Prevention
IProgram (RMPP).
I
15. Cannot maintain proper115. Operational problem
Istorage temperatures. Ino hazard.
I
116. Operational problem
Ionly, no hazard.
17. Same as numbers 1-10. Ill Jl 15. Sufficient safeguards'
II I
18. Same as numbers 2-10. 111311 16. Sufficient safeguards
'19. Same as numbers 1~10. 1212 1 17.~Sufficient safeguards
I exist.
120. Proper training of
lall plant operators and
I Cai-OSHA' s Process Safety
I Management Program, "
I (PSMP) and Risk
I Management Prevention
I Program (RMPP) .
121. Same as Valve failurel212I 8. Sufficient safeguards
122. Same as valve failurel21312 19. Sufficient safeguards
I I I I l exist.
I
Power failure. 16. Plant shutdown, no
lconsequences.
I.
Coil on solenoid valvel7. Same as numbers 1-5.
Ifails.
I
NO power to coil on 18. Same as num..ers 1-5.
IKSV or intercooler feed.
Manual King Valve 9. Same as numbers 1-5.
'lclosed.
Liquid strainer 10.-Same as valve
Iplugged. failure.
Control failure. 11. Same as valve
Ifailure.
18. Severed H.P. liquid 112. Release of 123. Proper training of 131111 110. Sufficient safeguards
I!ine-Human error, hit by Jrefrigerant to warehouse Ifork!ift operators. I [ I lexist-
Ihandling equipment, larea (enclosed area). I I I I I
I I 124. Various warehouse ] I I
J : I I I I:~lss pertaining to t~e I I I ' I " '!'
HAZOP-PC 3.~2 by Primatech Inc.* + + ..... +1 ............................ ~ .........................
'1
I High Plow
I
I
Worksheet
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Sessi0n~ i 07~13-93 Revision: 0 -. -
Node: i High Pressure Receiver
Drawings:
Parameter: Flow
Intention: Storage vessel, ammonia refrigerant
. GW DEVIATION
~age ~ 3
CAUSES CONSEQUENCES sAFEGUARDS
9. Leak from H.P.
Receiver, sight glass
broken or blown out.
13~ Release of
refrigerant to engine
room area (enclosed
area).
14. Release of
refrigerant to engine
room area (enclosed
area).
proper operation of
handling, equipment.
25. Ammonia detector i~
warehouse.
26. Control shut down by
a~onia detector in alarm
area.
27. Proper training of
all plant operators and
Cal-OSHA's Process SafetyI
Management Program,
(PSMP) and Risk
Management Prevention
iProgram (RMPP).
:28. Operational
.ilmonitoring and preventive
Imaintenance pro,ram%
129. A~monia detector in
lengine room area.
130. Ammonia detector in
larea which alarms the
I computer and Alarm
ICompany (A.D.T.).
131. Scrub tank (water
Itank) air scrubber.
132. Proper training of
fall plant operators and
ICal-OSHA's Process Safety!
IManagement Program,
I(PSMP) and Risk
IManagement Prevention
IProgram (RMPP).
133. Operational
Imonitoring and preventive
[maintenance program.
10. Severed H.P. liquid
line in engine room area.
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Pri'matech Inc.
11. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
12. Sufficient safeguards l
exist.
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: ;~umonia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: I High Pressure Receiver
Drawings~ FS1
Parameter: Flow
Intention: Storage vessel, ammonia refrigerant
Reverse
Low
Worksheet
Page: 4
~O~Z~A?IONS {BY {SlL{a I ~S
{ D~VIATIOR .I' c~usEs coNs~om~c~s I s~J~S ISILIR I
I I 13~. Ammonia ae=ector in III I I I, I
] I' {engine room area. II I I I' I'
I I I.I I'1 I I
I' 11. Draining oil from 15. Same as number 14. 135: Proper training of 1313 13 {13. Pi~e H.P. Receiver'
H.P. Receiver, human lall plant operators and I Ioil drain to oil-
error or valve failure. ICal-OSHA's Process SafetyI collector
IManagement Program
I(PSMP) and Risk
IManagement Prevention
IProgram {RMPP) .
12. Severed charging 16. Release of
line. (Covered ~under Irefrigerant to engine
~arging Node.) 'lroom area or atmosphere.
13. V~mdalism with
{diffusing system. {
1(Covered under Sabotage) {
Reverse Flow {14. Severed line from the{ { ,{ '
{evaporative condenser on { , { { ' '
Ithe roof. (Covered under I , I
115. Severed equalizer { {
{line, on roof. (Covered { ' {
lunder Olo~ai) I I 'l
Low Flow {16. Light load {17. No safety or {' '
{conditions. {environmental I '
{ {consequences (operability { { '/
{ lissue) I I
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by~rimatech Inc.
Worksheet
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant faci!ity~
session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: i High Pressure Receiver
Drawings: FS1
Parameter: Temperature
Intention: Storage vessel, ammonia receiver
Page: 5
DEVIATION I CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS
IHigh Temperature I1. High condensin~ 1. No safety or 1. No consequences, no
Ipressure. environmental safeguards ~equired.
consequences (operabilityl~ ·
issue)
2. Fire (Covered under
Global)
Temperature 3. Excessive cooling due 12. No safety or 2. No consequences, no
to control failure, i.e.,lenvironmental safeguards required.
condenser fans stay on Iconsequences (operabilityI
lall the time. lissue)
{AZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
'Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 -
Node: I High Pressure Receiver
Drawings:
Parameter: Pressure
Worksheet
Page: 6
Intention:..Stora~e Vessel, ammonia refrigerant.
I DEVIATION I CAUSES
I ~ ........... ~ .............
''t.' ...................................... I . CONSE UENCE I EGUARDS ;SILIR ] RECOMMENDATIONS
+ .......... +_ O S SAF
· [High ~Hi h Pres ................. +
~ sure Il. Human error, failure 1. Release of refrigerant i Pro ...... ~ .... ~"ii7'~'~"T .........
Ito properly pump out H.P. Jthrough Safety Relief [plan= operators and 'Ca1- lexist'
~ . , · F=z uraznlng oz al/ 2 I I I1. Sufficient safeguards
' J IReceiver before isolating Valve to scrubber tank. JOS~A's Process Safety
e Ifrom system (trap
Ili~uid)' IMana~ement Program,
, I(PSMP) and Risk
IMana~ement Prevention
IProgram (RMPp). I
I
12- Pressure ~auges are
linstalled for operator,s
Ivisual inspection.
I
I [3.~ Pressure Safety Valve
I Ion H.P. R~ceiver.
12. Fire (Cover under
IGlobal)
· ·
13. Loss of cooling; 12 Release of refrigerant 121211
Icontrol power failure, Ithrough Safety Relief '] I I exist.
Ic0ndenser water pumps, Valve to scrubber tank.
,. Ifans and water supply. I I I
15. Operational monitoring[
land operator,s training.
" 16. System parameters will
Ibe lo9 once every hour,
Ihi~hli~htin~ all pre-
.I Jalarms and alarms. Lo~ is
? I 'lmonitored daily.
Isafety control set '
'l Ipoints, Wron~ Pressure Iwith highdischarge
ISafe~Y Val~es installed. Ipressure cutout/alarm.
18. Pressure Safe~y Valve
Ion H.P. Receiver, set at
12so PSI.
;
I I~. sc~ tank (water
Itank) air scrubber.
.................................................................................................... 2 ............ ·
/F, AZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
· : Worksheet
Co...~any: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
· . Facility: ~.=~ia refrigerant facility.
Session: 1 ~7-13-93 Rev/sion: 0
Node: '1 High Pressure Receiver
Drawings:
Parameter: Pressure
Intention: S=crage vessel, ammonia refrigerant.
I .............................. GW I DEVIATION CAUSES' .I CONSEQUENCES I SAFEGUARDS ISILIR I RECOMMENDATIONS IBY IS[L~R ] COMMENTS
'~'-- · I il0. Ammonia detector in
I I larea which alarms the
I I computer and Alarm
I' ' ' I Company (A.D.T.) .
Ill. Operational and
IEmer~encyResponse
Itraining.
112. Pressure gauges are
Ii,stalled for operator's
Ivisual inspection.
113.'System parameters
Iwill be log once every
Ihour, highlighting all
Ipre-alarms and alal~s.
ILog is monitored daily.
I;%11 alaITfls are monitored .
I Iby a alarm company, i.e., '
' ' ADT, Wells Fargo.
114. Proper training of
lall plant operators 'and
J Cal-OSHA's Process SafetyI
I~anagement Program,
'I(PSMP) and Risk
IManagement Prevention
I Progra~ (RMPF) .
115. Automatic Purger
I
[ 16. Operational
'1 - I~nitoring and operator,s
Itraining.
117. System parameters
Iwill be log once every
IhoUr, highlighting all
Ipre-alarms and alar~ns.
I.Log is monitored daily.
16. Compressor safety
Ifailure, (Covered Under
IHigh Stage Compressor
HAZOF-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc. ' ....................................................
Pa~e: 7'
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant 'facility.
Session: i 07-13~95 Revision: 0
Node: 1 High Pressure Receiver
Drawings: FS1
Parameter:'Pressure
Intention: Storage vessel, ammonia'refrigerant.
Norksheet
Page: 8
} GW DEVIATION. { CAUSES { CONSEOUENC~S { SAFEGUARDS IS{LIR .{ RECOMMENDATIONS IBY ISIL{R { . C(N~4ENTS I
Low Pressure 17. Excessive cooling due iS. No safety or 118. No consequences, no
Ito control failure, i.e.,..[environmental Isafeguards required.
Ifans Stay on. 'lconsequences (operabilityI
lissue) I
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
Worksheet
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Pacility: .Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 .
Node: i ~igh Pressure Receiver
Drawings: FS1
Parameter: Level
IntentiOn: Storage vessel, ammonia refrigerant
I GW I DEVIATZON I CAUSES I CONSEQUENCES I SAFEGUARDS ISI~'I~ I RECOI~ATZ ONS IS~
IHigh IHigh Level I1. Mechanical failure of Il. 14igh pressure in 14. P. I1. Proper training of a11121312 ti. Sufficient safeguards
I .. IKing Solenoid Valve (KSV) JReceiver. Release of ]plan= opera=ors and Cal- I exist.
I fails to open feed to the I refrigerant through ]OSHA's Process Safety
I intercooler. JSafety Relief Valve to IManagement Program,.
scrubber ta~k. I (PSMP) and Risk
I Management Prevention
I Program (RMPP) .
12- Pressure Safety Valve
Ion I4.P. Receiver.
13. Cross over in
]diffusion System to
I equaliz~ pressure.
14. Operational monitoring
I and preventive
I maintenance program.
15. High discharge
Ipressure cutout/alarm on
I high stage compressors.
16. 'Operational monitoring
Iof vessel level {Sight
I Glass ) .
2; Carn~ot ~in~ain levels 17. Operational monitoring 111311
lin system vessels. Loss "lof vessel level (Sight
Iof refrigeration. IGlass) .
18. Compressor equipped
I with Low Suction Pressure
i cutout/alarm.
19. ~monia P%~mp equipped
Iwith differential
i cutout/alarm. ."
I 110. Compressor equipped
" I . .I Iwith Low Suction Pressure
I I I cutout/alarm. ' '
I 12. 14uraan error over 13. Same as I and 2 Ill. Same as I thru 10. 121111 12. Sufficient safeguards
F~OPrPC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
Company: United States Cold Storage, ~nc.
Facility: ;%mmonia' refrigerant facility.
.Session: I C7-13-93 Revision: 0 -
Node: I High Pressure Receiver
Drawings: FS1
Parameter: Level
Ih=eh=ion: Storage vessel, ammonia refrigerant
I GW I DEVIATION I CAUSES I CONSEQUENCES
I 13. 'Coil on King Solenoid 14. Same as numbers 1-3.
IValve .(KSV) fails.
4.'
NO power to coil on 15. same as nun~ers 1-3.
15..Manual King Valve 16. S~me as n%unbers 1-3.
closed.
Worksheet
112. Same as numb,ers 1-10. 121111
13. Same as nun%bets 1-10.
14. Same as numbers 1-10. 121111
Page: 10.
}'Low Low Level {6. Low inventory of
} {refrigerant due to
{ Iroutine maintenance,
{ Ilosses through valve
Ipacking and shaft seal
Ileakage (Pugitive
lemissions). '
'
17. Blocked or no air flow
Ion evaporator(s).
J8. Feed valves failed
Jopened on vessels
I(Covered under vessel
INodes).
Cannot maintain proper115. Operational
Ilevel in refrigeration {monitoring of vessel
Isystem vessels. Ilevel (Sight Glass).
'
,116. Proper training of
. ,lall plant.operators and
ICal-OSHA's Process Safety
IManagement Program,
J (PSMP} and Risk
IManagement Prevention
IProgram (RMPP).
8. Ix~ss of refrigeration~
17. Same as number i5.
RECOMMENDATIONS. IBY {S{L{R I'. COMMENTS '
3. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
4. Sufficient safe~/ar~
exisU.
5. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
1{4 I1 {6. sufficient safeguards
exist.
J 1 { 3 { 1 { 7. Sufficient safeguards
{exist.
~L%ZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech inc.
.Worksheet
Company: United Sta~es Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 -
Node: 2 Global System
Drawings: FSi
Parameter: Loss of Containment
Intentioni Complete facility..+ ......................... ._..j ............................................................ + + + + . ~ ......................................... + + . + + +..
............................. IBY ISlLIR I ~NTS ~i
I GW DEVIATION I CAUSES CONSEQUENCES I SAFEGUARDS ISILIR I P~CO~ATIONS
Fire Loss of
Containment
I1. Electrical
12. Ho~ Work
13. Smoking
14. Electrical, Material
Handlin9 Equipment
IFire
1. Release of refrigerantl
through Safety Relief
Valve to scrubber tank
due to high pressure in
vessels.
H~OP-PC 3.02 by Pri~tech Inc.
1. Fire protection
lequipment:
12. Sprinkler system
linspection.
13. Infrared inspection of
lall major electrical
lequipment.
'14. NO Smoking policy.
15. Fire drill and
levacuation procedures.
16. Smoke and heat
Idetectors in office and
lan¢illary areas.
17. Scrub tank (water
Itank) air scrubber.
18. Ammonia Diffusion'
System.
9. Hot Work Permit
PoliCY.
10. Proper training of
all plant operators and
Cai-OSSA's Process Safety
Management Program,
(PSMP) and Risk
Management Prevention
Program (RMPP).
I
I
I
I
I~1~1~
I
I
t
I
I-
1. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
11. Proper training of
forklift operators.
Various warehouse'rules
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: ;um~onia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: 2 Global System
· Drawings: FS1
Parameter: Loss of Containment
Intention: Compiete facility.
Worksheet
Page:
HAZOP-P~ 3.02 by Primatech Inc. ' ............................................ 7 ......................................................
2. Release of.refrigerant
(a~uonia) tO the
latmosphere.
Ioperation and maintenance
Iof handling, e.~uipment.
112. Operational and
'lEmergency Response
Itraining.
113. All alarms are
Imonitored by a alarm
Icompany, with automatic
Idispatch to Fire and
IPolice Department.
114. Ammonia detector in
larea which alarms the
I computer and Alarm
I Company.
115. Propez~y fencing. 141
116. Door lock and alarm
Ion a~onia diffusion
117. ;U~monia Diffusion
ISystem'is monitored by
Ithe Computer and Alarm
ICompany, i.e., A.D.T..
[18. Check valve on the
I system char~ing line.
119. ~erational and
IEmer~e~cy Response
Itraining.
[20. Proper training of
lall plant operators and
I Cal-OSHA's Process SafetyI
IManagement Pro,ram, I
I(PSMP) and Risk I
~Management Prevention [
IProgram (RMPP). I
2. Consider replacing
check valve on System
Charging Line to a
combination stop/check.
valve.
Vandalism / 15. Barging valve is
!Sabotage Loss of. Imounted to the exterior
!Containment Iof the building.
I
vandalism/
DEVIATION CAusEs I CONSEQUENCES I SAFEGUARDS ISIL[R I RECOMMENDATIONS [BY [S[LIR I COMMENTS
[pertaining ~o the proper '1
Con~p~y: United States 'Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: AJ~monia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 ' Revision: 0
Node: 2 Global System
. Drawings: .PS1
Parameter: Loss of Contair~ent
f~tention: Complete 'facility.
Worksheet
HAZOP-PC 3.02. by Primatech Inc. ' .............. ........
GW [ DEVIATION I CAUSES ............ 2 ...................................................................... ~ ................ '- i ........
- ............................ . ............................... C~S ·
~Hu~ ~Hu~n Error ~ss 6. Severed line, hit ~ ~3 Release of refrigerate21. Pipin~ is located on J3~1~1 [3. R~iew prints =o ~Bc
~E~or ~of Contai~ent fork lift. warehouse area
~roof, mini~zes potential ~dete~ne pr0~r location
(enclosed area). ~for exte~al ~n ~de ~of pipin~ for the rail
~events, i.e. forklift and t~ck dock.
~22. Proper trainin~ of
~ forklift operators.
~23. Various warehouse
~les pertainin~ to the
~proper operation of
~ handling, e~ipment.
~24. Proper trainin~ of
~all plant operators ~d
~Cal-OS~, s Process Safety
~ ~ement Pro,ram, ~ ~.
~ (PS~) and Risk
~ ~na~ement ~evention
~pro~ram (~pp) .
~25. Height of the dock
~area ~nimizes potential
J for exte~al ~ ~de
~even~s, i.e.; forklift
J7. Faille to follow ~4. Release of refri~er~t[26. Proper trainin~ of [2~111 4. ~fficient safe~ar~
~proper oil removal ~tO warehouse area ~all plan~s operators ~d ~ ~isf.
~procedures. ~ (enclosed area) . JCal-OS~,s Process SafetyJ ~
' J ~ ~(PS~) ~d Risk ~ ~
~ J ~ ~nagement Prevention [ J
~ ~ ~ Program (~p). ~ ~
~8. Poor location of ~5. Release of refrigerant 27-. None - ~31313 ~5. ~ider relocatin~ ~BC ~2~2~1
~recirculator oil out ~to engine room area ~ ~ ] }recir~lators oil out
~po=s. ~('enclosed area). ] ~ ~ ~pots
~ ~9. No pressure ~auges ~6. Release of refri~er~t 28. None ' ~4~2~3 ~6. Co~ider i~=allin~ ~BC ~2~2~1
~ ~supplied on.oil out po~s. ~to engine room area '
~ ~ ~(enclosed area). [ ~ ~ ~pres~re ~au~es on all
~ )10. NO oil OUt pot for ~7. Release of refri~er~= 29. None ~3)3~3 ~7. Consider piping H.P. ~BC ~2~2)1
·
Company: United States Cold storage, Inc.
F~gi!ity: Ammonia refrigerant ~acility.
Session: 1' 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: 2 Global System
Drawings: FS1
Parameter: Loss of Containment
Intention: Complete facility.
Worksheet
Mechanical
IFailure
Pa~e: 1¢~
+-~ ........ + .................. + .........' .......... + . I ~ ) ~ a'l'luN~
[ ' Ithe H. P. Receiver. Ito engine room area J ·
I' .. I I(enclosed area}. I '
Ill. Human error, failure 18. Release of refrigerantl30. Proper training of
Ito properly pump out ~to engine room area lall plant operators and I I )exist.
lammonia pump before I(enclosed area). I Cal-OSHA's Process Safety
lisolating from system I IManagement Program,
I(trap liquid). I I(PSMP) and Risk
I I IManagement Prevention
J12. Failure to properly 19. Release of refrigerant131. Proper training of
I Ipump out refrigeration Ito engine room area lall plant operators and exist.
lequipment for repair. I(enclosed area). ICal-OSHA's Process Safety
I IManagement Pro,ram,
I I{PSMP) and Risk
I IManagement Prevention
I IProgram (R~4PP}.
110. Release of 132. Pr6per training of
Irefrigerant to the lall plant operators and
... latm°sphere' ICal-OSHA's Process Safety
10. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
IManagement Program,
J(PSMP) and Risk
[Management Prevention
I Program (RMPP).
133. Ammonia detector in
larea which alarms the
Icomputer and Alarm
ICompany (A.D.T.).
134. Ventilation fans are
Iset~to run off the
lammonia detector.
'135. Scrub tank (water
tank) air scrubber.
IMechan~cal Pailure113. Mechanical failure of
Loss of tammonia pump, mechanical
Containment Iseal failure.
114. Leak from H.P. 11. Release of
· . [Receiver, sight glass' [refrigerant toengine .
136. 'Operator visually
I inspects'
.,HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Worksheet
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 -
Node: 2 Global Sys:em
D~awings: FS1
Parameter: Loss of Containment
Intention: Complete facility.
I GW DRVIATI ON CAUSES CONSEQUENCES I SAFEG~S I S I L I R
broken or blown out. room area (enclosed
area) . 137- Operational and
I~mergency Response
Itraining.
138. 0%oerational
Jmonitoring and preventive
Imainte~ce program.
I
139. Proper =raining of
lall plant operators and
ICal-OSflA's ~rocess Safety
I~gement'Program,
}(PSMP) and Risk
IManagement Prevention
IPro~ram (RMPP).
}40. Ammonia detector in
larea which alarms the
I computer and Alarm
I Company (A.D.T.).
141. Ventilation fans are
}set =o run off the
laconia detector.
}42. Scrub tank (water
Itank) air scrubber.
143. Operational and
IEmergency Response
Itraining.
144. Proper control of
Idefrost termination.
145. Proper control of fan
land liquid feed solenoid.
146. Operational
Imonitoring and preventive
Imaintenance program.
115. Liquid ha~mmer 12. Release of
I Irefrigerant to the
I latmosphere..
Page: 15
RECOMMENDATIONS IBY [sILI~ I coMMeNTS
11. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
147. Proper training of'
'1 ................ !all plant operators and
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Prima~ech Inc. ' ........................ . ..........
Company: Uni:ed States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: ;u~r. onia refrigerant facility.
Session: i 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: 2 Global System
Drawings: FS~
Parameter: Lbss of Containment
Worksheet
[Earthquake I Earzhquake
Page: 16
.Intention: Comp.~lete facility.
. ........................................ : ................. ~ ............................. ~ .............................. ~ ....~_ ....~ ...........................
I GW I D~VIATION [ CAUSES I CONSEQU~NCES I SAFE~JARDS ISILIR RECOr~-DATIONS IBY ISILIR I' COMMF_uN'TS I
........................................ . ....... ; .................................. : ................ i ........
I' I I I ICal-OS~A's Process SafetyI I
IManagement Pro,ram,
. I(PSMP) and Risk
}Management Prevention
IProgram {RMPP).
113. Release of 148. Building, vessels,
Irefrigerant to the land piping constructed to wired into the controls
atmosphere. ISeismic Zone 4 system.
)requirements.
149. All piping is welded
· Ijoints and all Welders
late certified on site.
150. Proper training of
lall plant operators and
ICal-OSHA's Process Safety
~Management Program, ' ..
I(PSMP) and Risk
IManagement Prevention
IProgram (RMPP).
151. Operational and I [
IEmergency Resp°nse
Loss of I16.'Severed H.P. liquid
Containment Iline, to the USDA room,
13/4" liquid line.
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
Worksheet
Lgh IHigh Flow
'ILow ILow Flow
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: 4. ~'nermosyphon
Drawings: PS1
Parameter: Flow
Intention: Oil cooling of the screw compressors.
I ~ I D~A"v'IATION I CAUSES { CONSEOU'ENCES { SAFEGUAPJ)S {S{L{R { R.~:COI,,~vI~:NDATIONS }BY {S{51R ] CO{$
............................................................................................... T ............................................................... INo Flow I I1. NO safety or
Page: i7
lenvironmental
}consequences (operability{
{issue)
12. No safety or
lenvironmental
Iconse.auences (operability
lissue)
13. Operability issue, no
tsafety or environmental
Iconsequenc~s.
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: i 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node:~'4 Thermosyphon
Drawings: FSl
,Parameter: Pressure
Intention: Coolin~ oil for the screw Compressors.
I GW ] D~;~AT~ON I "CAUSES
Worksheet
High · I High Pressure
· Page
CONSEQUENCES ; SAFEGUARDS ISILIR P-ECO~9~'qgDATIONS ~BY IS[LIR [ COI~E~NTS ' .'[
1. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
I !
I !
I ,I
I
I
I
I'
I
I
.
I
I
I
I
I1. Human error, failure
)to properly pump out
Ithermosyphone oil cooler
I
Jbefore isolating from
Isystem (trap liquid).
12. Same as causes on Highll. Release of refrigerantll. Pressure Safety Valves
Pressure Receiver Node. Ithrough Safety Relief Ion Thermosypon System Set
Valve to scrubber tank. lat 250 and 300 PSI.
12. Scrub tank (water
Itank) air scrubber.
13. All safegUards for the
Ithermosy~hon system is
Ithe same as the H. P.
II
II
II
II
II
II
I
I
I
'1
I
I
I
I
IReceiver Node. I [ [ [
...................... ~. __- ...... ~ ................................. ~ .............................. ?--- ........
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc..
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
'Session: 1 07~13-93 Revision: 0.
Node: 4 Thermosyphon
Drawings: FS! ·
Parameter: Level
Intention: Oil cooling of the screw compressors.
I GW - I DEVIATION I CAUSES CONSEQUENCES
I High I High Level 1.1. Same as High Pressure
I I Receiver Node. See Node
I I#1, High Level.
ILow !Low Level 12. Loss of oil cooling.
1. No safety or
environmental
Iconsequences, operability
'lconditions high
Icompressor oil
Itemperature.
Worksheet
Page .. 19
SAFEGUArdS ISILIR RECO~TIONS I~Y ISILI~ I COqUeTS
......................... +-7-+ ............................. ~___+_+.. ........................
H~OP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: 5 Intercooler
Drawings: FS1
Parameter: Flow
I
Worksheet
Intention: Desuperheating of the boosters discharge gas.
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONsEQUENcES ; ....... ~%[~2 ........ ~2~;::': .......................................................
........... * .... ' ................................. i ......... ' .....
ILow/No Low/No Flow Il. Mechanical failure; a. ll. No safety or I1. Low level float alarm 1113'11 I1. sufficient safeguards
I ILiquid feed solenoid , [environmental land pump shut off. exist.
I Iclosed b. Liquid King Iconsequences (operabilityI
I ISolenoid failed closed, lissue) Loss of 12. Ammonia pump. failure
· lc. Liquid feed pump Irefrigeration. lalarm'
failure.
13. System parameters will
Ibe lo~ once every hour,.
Ihighlightin~ all pre-
lalarms and alarms. LOg is
Imonitored daily.
14. All alarms are
Imonitored by a alarm
I company.
I 15. Operational monitoring
I land preventive
.J .~ ~mintenance program.
IHigh Flow 12. No safety or
lenvironmenta!
Iconsequences. High flow
deals with severed pipe,
will address this'
scer~ario u~der Global
Reverse Flow 12. Mechanical failure.
13. a. Booster screw
}compressor discharge
Jcheck valve failure.
14. b. Ammonia pump check
Ivalve failure.
15. c. ~nual valve openedl3. No safety or 16. Booster compressor
lin l~quid feed and .lenvironmental Idischarge check valves
Isuction crossover line, Ic°nsequences, °perabilitylammonia pump check valvesl
I(Valves are used on s~artlconditions' land the liquid feed line
lup only) I
· Icheck valve.
[ . ~6. Human error manual 14. No safety or 17. Proper training of all
I · Ichange over valve 6n lenvironmental Jplant operators and Cal-
~OP-PC 3.;2 by Primatech Inc~ ............................ :
Worksheet
Co~pany: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: A~onia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 -
Node: 5 Intercooler
Drawings: FS1
Parameter: Flow
'Intention: Desuperheating of the boosters discharge gas.
+ ......... + + CONSEQ~S ~
~evaporator suction }consciences (operability~OS~.s ~ocess Safety
J J ~con~rol s~ation, high/low,issue) ~gement Pr~ram,
~ J ~opened at the same time. ~ J(P~) ~d Risk
~ ~ ~ ~ } ~agement Prevention
Page: 21
FJ%ZOP-PC 3.02 by Pri~tech Inc.
.~ Company: United States Cold storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session:, I '07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: 5 Intercooler
Drawings:
Parameter: Temperature
Worksheet
Page: 22'
Intention: Desuperheatin9 of the booster discharge gas.
I GW [ DEVIATION I CAUSES I CONSEQUENCES [ SAFEGUARDS [S[L[R [ RECOMMENDATIONS
IHigh IHi~h Temperature I1. Failure of =he boosterlk. No safety ~r [1. Compressor equipped 111311 1. Sufficient safeguards
idischarge desuperheatin9 [environmental Iwith High Oil Temperature
Isystem. a. Pump failure Iconsequences, operabilityl~utout/alarm.
Ishut down. '. b. Clogged Iconditions. Possible highI
Istrainer. c. Pump bleed; Istage over heating 12. Compressor equipped
lexpansion valve I Iwith'Hi~h discharge
ladjustment. [ [temperature cutou=/alarm, i
[2. Fire, cover under [
IGl°bal' I
12. No safety or
lenvironmental
Ic°nsequences' °perabili=yl
[Low I Low Temperature
[conditions.
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
Company: Un!=edStates Cold Storage, Inc.
Pacility: An~,.onia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 -
Node: 5 in=ercooler
'Drawings:
Parameter: Pressure
Worksheet _
Page:
Intention: Desunerheating of the booster discharge gas
I · GW DEVIATION CAUS~ ..................... + .........................
+ . + ............... I CONSB0Um~C~S. I Sm'B~DS Isl~lR I R~C~ATIONS
............................ - .................................................................
IHigh Pressure I1. Loss of one or more I1. O~erability issue, no Il. Compressors are
Ihigh stage compressor{s) Isafety or ~nvironmental leguipped with motor
i.e., control failure. ~conseguences. Ioverload cutout.
I' I
[2. Booster compressors
late e~uipped with high
}discharge pressure
Icutout/alarm.
13. High stage compressors
late equipped with High
ISuction Pressure
+ + +
.....................................................
HAZOP-PC. 3.02 by Prima:ech Inc.
JCUtout/alarm.
Slide valve 12. O~erability issue, no 14. Same as numbers 1, 2,
I(load/Unload) not workinglsafety or environmental land 3.
compressor. Iconsequences.
Mis-matched 13. Operability issue, no IS. Proper training 6f all
Icompressors. Isafety or environmental Iplant operators and. Cal-
Iconsequences. IOSHA's Process Safety
I 'lManagement Pro,ram,.
I IManagement Prevention I
I IProgram (RMPP). ' I
' 14- Possible release of 16. Pressure Safety Valve 121211 I1. Review
I~efri~erant through Ion Intercooler set at 250
ISafety Relief Valve'to IpsI.
scrubber tank. I
.: 17. Booster compressor
I'equipped' with high
Idischarse pressure
Icutout/alarm and
18. Scrub tank (water
Itank) air scrubber.
19. Ammonia detector in
· Ivent line. which alarms
Ithe computer for
lemergency shut down and
Ithe local alarm company.
, JLow
I
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility': Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: 1 07-13-93. Revision: 0 -
Node: 5 intercooler
Drawings: PS1
Parameter: Pressure
Worksheet
Page: 24
Intention: Desuperheatin~ of the booster discharge gas.
GW I DEVIATION. I · CAUSES i CONSE +
· .......... . ........... ~ QUENCEs SAFE ........
m ' ! . . - ...... . .................................. . ...................... + ~u~u~u~ +IS[LIR RECOMMENDATIONS
14. Fire, covered under ....... ' ............
ILOw Pressure 15. Mechanical failure, !5. No safety or 1.10. Local lo~ pressure
I compressor suction ,~nvironmental lalarm and cutout. I exist.
'-I control failure. !consequences, operabilityI
:conditions. Ill. Operator visually'
· linspects all operating
Iconditions.
112. System parameters
Iwill be log once every
Ihour,. highlighting all
~pre- alarms and alarms.
ILo~ is monitored daily.
113. All alarms are
· ~monitored by a alarm
: Icompany, i.e., ADT, Wells
16. Huma~ error 'compressor 6. No safety or 114. Same as numbers 10,
Ise~ to ~nnual run. lenvironmental Ill, 22, and ·13.
J tconsequences (operabilityI
I liSsue)
.................................
HAZOP-PC 3.02'by Primatech Inc.
Company:.United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: 5 Intercooler
Drawings: FS1
Parameter: Level
Intention: Desuperheating of the boosters discharge gas.
I GW [ DEVIATION I CAUSES I CONSEQUENCES
IHigh IHigh Level I1. Mechanical failure,
' Ilevel control.
12. Mechanical fai'lure of
Iliquid make-up solenoid
Ivalve,. failed opened.
13. Boil over, sudden
Ireduction of pressure in
Ithe vessel.
14. Compressor load/unload
icontrol failure, swing
Itoo great.
15. Feed valve, ~XV or
Ilevel control on the
Iglycol heat exchanger
Ifailure.
" 16. High side, evaporators
Idefrost problems, hot gas
Ivalve, blow by.
17. Human error, manual I1. Possible high side
Ivalve opened in liquid compressor damage.
Ifeed crossover line,
I(Valve is used on start
lup only).
Worksheet
~ssu~s ISlLIR
I1. Operability issue, no 1114
Isafety or environmental
Iconsequences. Compressor
lec/uipped with motor
Ioverload cutout.
12. Compressors are
Iprotected by a high level
lalarm and cutout.
13. Operational monitoring.
Iof vessel level (Sight
IGlass).
14. Proper training of allI
Iplant operators and Cal- I
IOSHA's Process Safety
IManagement Program,
I(PSMP) and Risk
IManagement Prevention
IProgram (RMPP)~
· HAZOP-PC 3.02 by ~rimatech Inc.
I1 I1. Sufficient safeguards
~exis=.
Page: 25
Worksheet'
Company: Urhued States Cold Storage, Inc.
Pacility: ~m~,onia refrigerant facility.
Session: i ~7-13-93 RevisionS' 0
Node: 5 !ntercooler
Drawings: FSi
Parameter: Level
Intention: Desuperheating of the boosters discharge gas.
I GW. DE~;IATION I CAUSES I CONSEQUeNCeS
ILow Low Level 18- Mecha~.ical failure.
I I(a.) Ix)ss of level ~
I ~control, (b.) Feed valve
I I failure.
19. Human error, improper
ladjustment of hand
~ expansion valve.
110- Low inventory of
I refrigerant due =o
I routine ~intena-nce,
1 losses through valve
Page:
2. No safety or 5. Ix)w level float alarm
ienvironmental land pu,~ shut down.
consequences (operabilityI
issue) Ix)ss of I-6. Operational monitoring
2. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
3. Review booster IBC
Idischarge cooling
:safe~ards when pump I
cutoff.
Ipackings and shaft seals Irefrigeration. Iof vessel level (Sight
Ileakage. (Fugitive IGlass).
emissions.)
17. Ammonia de~ec~or in
larea which alarms'the
[computer and Alarm
ICompany. Relatin9 to
Ismall fugitive emissions.
18. Proper training of all
Iplant operators and Cal'-
OSHA's Process Safety
IManagement Program,
I(PSMP) and Risk
. IMana~ement Prevention
' I prOgram (RMPP) .
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
Worksheet
Co.~any: United Scares Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: An~onia refrigeran= facility.
Page: 27
Session: 1 07-13-93 Revision: 0 .-
Node: 6 Low Temperature Pump Recirculator
Drawings: FSi
Parameter: Flow
Intention: Low stage storage vessel.
I G~ { D~IATION CAUSES I CONSEOU~C~S { S;~G~S S{L{R { P. ECO~NDATZON$ {BY
lenvironmental
{consequences. High flow
'- {deals with severed pipe,
will address this
· scenario under Global
Node.
Low/No Low/No Flow 1. Mechanical failure of
liquid make-up solenoid,
failed closed.
2. Ammonia pump no= 2. No safe=y or 1. LOw level floa= alarm 1{411 1. Sufficien= safeguards
running due =o mechanicallenvironmen=al land pu~ shu= off. exis=. '
failure, consequences (operabili=yl
issue) Loss of 12. Ammonia pump failure
refrigera=ion, lalarm.
13. Opera=ional monitoring
land operator's =raining.
I ''
14. operational moni=oring
land preventive
Imain=enance program. 'l .
'1 · 15. Proper training of allI
I Iplan= operators and Calo
I OSHA's Process Safe=y
{ Managemen=.PrOgram,
I (PSM/~) and Risk
{ Managemen= Preven=ion .?
{' Program (RMPP).
iReverse Reverse Flow 13. Emergency An~nonia
IDiffusion System, manual
tcross-over valve opened. '{ '
{4. Ammonia pump check '
{valve failure.
is. Screw compressor 3. Oil contamination '. { _.
-. tsuction and discharge ·
{check valve failure. 14. Loss of refrigeration. I
.{ {5~ Increase vessel liquidl6. Screw compressor and 114 i 2. Sufficient safeguards
+ .......... ......... ~ .............................................................. + . + 1 .............. i .......................................... + + + + * + + * + 7 ...................
l~OP-PC 3.02 by Primatech lAC.
Worksheet
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Page:.~
session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: 6 Low Temperature Pump. Recirculator
Drawings: FSl
Parameter: Flow
Intention: Low Stage storage vessel.
....................... . .......... r ........ i~ .... i_ _i ........................ ~ ..................................
D~VIATION CAUSES I . CONSEQUENCES I ' SAFEGUARDS ISILIR I REC0~94]~NDATIONS
- Ilevel.. lammonia pump check valvesI
I High level alarm and I
18. Door lock and alarm onI
IAmmonia Diffusion System. I
19. Operational monitoringI
. I land preventive I
I I maintenance program. I
......................................................... + +
HA~OPoPC 3.02. by Primatech Inc.
Company: united States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
session: i 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: 6 Low Temperature Pump Recirculat0r
Drawings: FS1
· P&rameter: Temperature
Intention: Low s~de storage vessel.
Worksheet
Page: 29
? '~1 GW I D~VZATZON C~kUSES I ~ONS~Ot~NC~S s~PE~J~s IsiLIR P~ECO~EN~ATZONS'
IHigh IHigh Temperature 1. Fire, cover under I
I I Global Node I I i
1Low ILow Temperature Il. Operability issue, no
I tsafety or environmental
[ [consequences. ''
~ .......... + .......................... ~ .................. + ................................... ~ .............. +-+-7 ..................... ........
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
· Company: United Sca=es Cold Storage, Inc.
· Facility:,Ammonia ~efrigerant f~cility.
Session: i 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-14-93
Node: 6 Low Temperature Pump Recirculator
Drawings:
Parame=er:,Pressure
Intention: Low stage system.
] GW ], DEVIATION [ CAUSES I CONSEQUENCES
IHigh IHigh Pressure I1. Mechanical failure, Il. No safety or
I [compressors off pumps andlenvironmenta1
I' levaporators continue to Iconsequences, operability
Irun. tconditions.
12. Fire; cover under
IGlobal Node
Low Low Pressure 13. Slide valve
I(load/Unload) not working
Ion compressor.
.I
I
Worksheet
1. Suction, high pressureJll31X
alarm.
Pgge: 30
RECOMMENDATIONS
..........................
:4. Human error compressor 2. No safe~y or 12. Compressor equipped
set to manual run. environmental Iwith low suction pressure
Iconsequences (operability[cutout/alarm.
'issue) I
13. Operational monitoring
land operator's ~rainin~.
14. Proper training of all
Iplant operators and Cal-
IOSHA's Process Safety
IManagement Program,.
I(PSMP) and Risk
IManagement Prevention
'1
I
I
I
I Program (RMPP).
1. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
2. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0
Node: 6 Low Te~erature Pu~mp Recirculator
Drawings: FS1
Parameter: Leyel
Intention: Low side storage vessel.
I GW I' DEVIATION I CAUSES CONSEQUENCES
IHigh IHigh Level I1. Mechanical feed valve
I Ifaiied opened or;.
12. Sudden pressure
Ireduction caused control
lot human error or;
13. Human error,'cross
Ifeed of liquid feed; from
Ihigh stage to low stage
Ipressure vessels or;
Low Level
Worksheet
Page: 31
SAF~-~ARDS I$1LIR I RECOMMENDATIONs IBY ISI"IR C0~ZN~
I1- Operating level probe 1113 I1 I1. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
2. Sufficient safeguards
exist.
I
~4. Human error, manual -I1. No safety or
opened the feed solenoid lenvironmental lindicator, controller and
and failed to monitor thelconsequences, operabilitylhigh level alaz~n.
level. Iconditions. Possible
Ioompressor damage. 12. High level float shut
13. Operational monitoring
Iof vessel level {Sight
IGlass).
14. Proper training of all
Iplant operators and Cal-
IOSHA's Process Safety
1~4%nagement Program,
I (PSMP) and Risk
1~41-nagement Prevention
IProgram (RMPP).
15. F~anual reset after
Ihigh level failure.
S. Mechanical failure.
(a.) Loss of level
con:fol. (b.) Peed v~lve
failure.
2. No safety or 16. Low levelfloat alarm 111311
environmental land ammonia pump shut I
16. ~uman error, improper
ladjustment of hand
lexp~nsion valve.
17. Low inventory of ·
Irefrigerant due to
P~lZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
Worksheet
Co...-~.any: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Amr. onia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 57o13-93 Revision: 0
Node: 6 Low Temperature Pump Recirculator
Drawings:
Parameter: Level
Intention: Low side storage vessel
GW I DEVIATION I CAUSES I CONSEQUENCES 6' SAFEGUARDS IS[LIR I RECO~4Eh~ATIONS [BY [S[LIR I CO~I~
'lconsequences (operabilityldown. I'
17. Operational monitoring[
Iof vessel level (Sight
IGlass).
18. Ammonia detector in
larea which alarms the
Icompu~er and Alarm
ICompany
]routine maintenance,
Ilosses through valve lissue) Loss of
Ipackings and shaft seals Irefrigeration.
leakage. (Fugitive
emissions.)
~ge: 32
HAzoP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant.facility.'
Session: i 07-13-93 Revision: 0 03-04-97
Node: 7 Underfloor Exc~uangers
Drawings: R3, and R9
Parameter: Flow
· Intention: Glycol heater for underfloor system.
+ .......... + .................. +__? ......................
.INo INo Flow I1. Solenoid valve fails
12. System control
Ifailure.
13. Human error valve is
Iclosed by mistake.
I
}4. Pailure of liquid
Idrainer.
[5. Heat exchanger is oil
[logged.
16. Engine room shut down.
High Plow
I
I
'7. Pailure of liquid
drainer.
Worksheet
HAZOP-PC 3.0:
1. Loss of heating of
Iglycol. No safety or
lenvironmental
Iconsequences, operability,
Iconditions.
I1. Compressors are
lequipped with high
Isuction pressure
Icutout/alarm.
I
12. Compressors are
lequipped with motor
Ioverload cutout.
13. Compressors are
lequipped with high
Idischarge pressure
}cutout/alarm.
14. ;ill compressor alarms
late monitor bt the local
lalarm co,any.
[~. The intercooler
Iprotects the high side
Ico~ressors from any
Iliquid slug
8. Pressure safety reliefl2. Higher then normal
valve is open. intermediate pressure.
Page:
by Primatech Inc.
P~CO~'ZN~A?~ONS I E~ IS I ~'1 R I CO~ZNTS I
I
+ + + + +
1
!'
I
1
I
.Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigeran~ facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 03-04-97
Node: 7 Underfloor Exchangers
Drawings: R3, and R9
Param~ter:.Flow
Intention: Glycol heater for underfloor system.
Worksheet
Pa~e: 34
CONSEQUENCES SAFEGIPARDS I$1LIR I RECOMMENDATIONS IBY I$1LIR I COMME~S
~ ........................... T .... .............. T-2 ......
DEVIATION I CAUSES
Low Flow .19. Plugged strainer.
110. Human error, valve is
Inot open all the way.
Ill. Heat exchanger is oil
Ilogged.
112. Liquid drainer is 3. No safety or '. I I
IPartiy plugged, environmental .I I
I Ic°nsequences' °perabilityl I [
I [conditions. [ I I "
Reverse Reverse Flow [13. ~ [ [ [ j
.............................................................................................................. __ + + + +
............... : ................. r ........ : ........ :_Li ......
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Pri~tech Inc.
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refriRerant facility.
Session:.1 07-13-93 Revision: 0' 03-04-97
Node: 7 Underfloor Exchangers
Drawings: R3, and Rg'
Parameter: Temperature
Worksheet
Page: 35
lenvironmental
~consequences, operability
Iconditions.
12. No safety or
lenvironmental
tc°nsequences, operability
· . ..... ~ ............................. ~ .......- ...........................+_+_.._. ....................
IHigh Tempera=ute
ILow Teraperature 12. Low head pressure.
HAZOPTPC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
!n:ention: 'Glycol heater for underfloor heating system.
I ~ I D~,~A~O~ ; ~AUSES I CO~S~ -'--' ........................
· .......... . .... QUENCES I SAFE
..................................................... . uua~u~
IHi_=h I1. LoSS of glycol flow. I1. No safety or
I ........... ?'~ ...... r .................. +-+.+ .............. ~ ............. ----+-~-+--+ .................... +
Company: United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility..
Worksheet
page: 36.
Session: I 07-1B-93 Revision: 0 03-04-97
Node: 7 Underfloor Exchangers
Drawings: RB, and R9
Parameter: pressure
Intention: Glycol heater for underfioor heating system.
........................................................................ ~ ................. ~ ....................................... ~ ..........................................
[ GW' DZVIATION I CAUSES I CONSZQUENCES I SAFEGUARDS ISILIR I RECOMMENDATIONS IBY ISILIRI ~. I
[No
No Pressure
I1. --~ngine room shut down. Il. No safety or
t2. Human error, valve
Iclosed.
13. Control failure.
14. Failure of pressure
Isafe~y relief valves.
t5. Human error, B-way
Ivalve is not open to the
Iproper port.
16. Human error, heat 12. Overpreseurization of
lexc,hanger is not properlylheat exchanger.
Ipump out before
isolating.
tenvironmenta! ]'.
Iconsequences, operabilityI.
Igonditions.
7. Low condensing 13. No safety or
Ipressure. lenvironmental
.[' Iconsequences, operability.
I IcOnditiOns.
1. Training of the .
maintenance men of the
Iproper procedures for
lisolating refrigeration
}equipment.
2. Training of the
maintenance men for the
proper procedures for the
opening and closing of
the 2 sets of r_he 3-way
valves.
]
1. Consider installing a ]VDA
warning/~instruction JRWW[
[placards for the
[positioning of the B-way
[~lve configuration.
]Proper material for this
]placard e.g. 'stainless
Isteel, should be a non- [
[rusting metal, proper
[fixed to the package unit]
Inear the valve grouping. [
[High Pressure
]Low Pressure
HAZOP-PC 3.02 by Primatech Inc.
Worksheet
Company: United States ColdStorage, Inc.
Fa:ility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: i 07-13-93 Revision: .0 03-05-97 ..
Node: 7 Underfloor Exchangers
Drawings: R3, and R9
Parameter: Level
Intention: Glycol heater for .underfloor hea=ing system.
INo INo Level I1. NA I .................................... + ..........................
IHigh Level 12. Pailure of liquid
Idrainer.
13. Human error, valve
Iclosed by mistake.
Low Level 14. Normal opera~in~
Icondition.
I
I
I
Il. LOSS of glycol
'lheating. No safety or
lenvironmental
Iconsequences, operability
conditions.
HAZOP-PC 3.02..by Prima=ech Inc.
Worksheet
, Company: United States Cold Stora=e, Inc.
"Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: i 07-13-93' Rev/sion: 0 03-05-97
* Node: 7 *Underfloor Exchangers
Drawings: R3, and R9
Parameter: Loss of Containment
Intention: Glyco! heater, underfloor heating system.
I~ar~h~uakel~ar~hquake Loss ofl~. ~oor system design, i~- ~e~ease of refrigerantl~. Design contractor is
I IContainment
I to the environment. Ilicensed in the state of
Idesi~ned to shut down the
I Ihot sas supply.
..'Vandalism [Vandalis./Sabotage[2. K/ds in t~e area. ;2. Release of refrigerantl3. Proper~¥ is fenced in. 31111
ISabotage Loss of i:o the environment.
~t I 14. ~uitding is protected
] Ib¥ local alarm company.
] I
't 15- Location of equipment,
I ]remote location, roof.
Human IHuman Error Loss 3. Forklift accident. 13. Release of 16. Forklif: operator
Error Iof Containment iglycol/armmonia to the Itraining program.
!environment.
I. 1
['
'Page: 38
[Mechanical Mechanical Failurel4. Vessel failure. }4. Release of [9. ASMEvessel.
Loss of i~lycol/ammonia to the
Containment ienvironment.
I Iprocedures.
] "' [ Ill. Pressure safety
I I ~relief'valves.
HAZ0P-PC 3~02 by Primatech Inc.
Consequence Classification (Severity)
SEVERITY CLASS
TARGET
HAZARD HIGH Medium Low Operational
(4) (3) (2) (1)
Public Safety Death or severe health Injury or moderate healthMinor injury or minor No injury or health effects
(Prime Target) effects, effects. Health effects
Employee (Operator) Death or severe Injury or moderate Minor injury or minor No injury or occupational
Safety Occupational illness Occupational illness Occupational illness safety impact
Environment Extensive spill of hazardou Large spill of hazardous Spill of hazardous material None
material into surface water material intO a containmen into a containment
surface water or ~
contaminating ground wate
Facility/Equipment Less than one week Between one week and Between one and six month More than six months
Downtown one month
UATTRO
LIKELIHOOD
SEVERITY
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
1 1 1 2
I 1 2 3
1 2 3 4
1 3 4 4
4
Likelihood
4 High
3 Medium
2 Low
1 Very Iow
Occurs more than once a year.
Expected several times during the facility's
lifetime.
Expected once during the facility's lifetime
Not expected during the facility's lifetime.
Numbers Category
4 Unacceptable
3 Undesirable
Description
Should be mitigated with engineering and/or
administrative controls to a risk ranking of
2 or less within a specified time period such
as 6 months.
Should be mitigated with engineering and/or
administrative controls to a risk ranking of
2 or less within a specified time period such
as 12 months.
2 Acceptable with
Controls
Should be verified that procedures or
controls are in place.
Acceptable as is
No mitigation required.
RISKRANK QUATTRO
Consequence'(Severity) Classification
Chart
TARGET
HAZARD
Public Safety
(Pdme Target)
Employee (Operator)
Safety
OPERATIONAL
(1)
No injury or health effects
No injury or occupational
safety impact.
Environment None
Facility/Equipment
Downtime
Less than one week.
SEVERITY CLASS
LOW
(2)
----- MEDIUM
(3)
Minor injury or minor
health effects
Injury or moderate health
effects.
Minor injury or minor
occupational illness.
Injury or moderate
occupational illness.
Spill of hazardous
materials into a
containment.
Large spill of hazardous
materials into surface
water or contaminating
ground water.
Between one week and
one month.
Between one and six
months.
HIGH
(4)
Death or severe health
effects.
Death or severe
occupational illness
Extensive spill of
hazardous materials into
surface water or
contaminating ground
water.
More than six months.
Revised Jl~'y 7, 1993
US Cold Storage
THE STELLAR GROUP
November 25, 1996
Mr. Steven Ewing
1715 Chester Avenue
BakersfieM, CA 93301
RE: USCS - Bakersfield
Project #7601-005
.'!~e eme.-~en~, ~-mon/a discharge system and the machine r~om vent/htion system
o£ the United States Cold Stora~ of California, Bakersfield f~cilit.~.-, was des'.mned and '
ms*,alled in 1993 for the proposed budd out of 400%.
Siacerely,
THE STE~ GROUP
Director of Refrigeration En~oeermg
Chr/s Palumbo
Tom Diekroegcr
Chuck Taylor
Bob Henriksen
F/le
O051docs/lmprOl.doc
2900 Hartley Ro,~d, Jacksonville, Florid~ 32257 · Telephone (904) 260-2900
CITY OF BAKERSrTI,
1715 CHESTER'AVENUL
BAKERSFIELD, CA 93301
' BUILI)INGDEPARTMENT
PERMIT INFO
Permit No..: 96-05224
Per,it Type: COMN
Status ..... : READY
LOCATION
Job Address:
Location...:
Description:
Tr/No/Lot..: TR
Zone ....... : M2
School Dist: 1
Cond Sq Ft.:
CONSTRUCTION
Occ Class..: S-3
Type Const.: V-N
Fire Sprlk.: Y
PEOPLE
6501 DISTRICT BLVD
FREEZER EXPANSION
PANAMA
52414
Applied..:
Approved.:
Completed:
To Expire:
Arch/Engr..:
Contractor.:
Cont Lic No:
Cont Addr..:
FEES
Plan Check.:
Building...:
Mechanical.:
Plumbing...:
Electrical.:
Fire Sprlk.:
Bond ....... :
School Fee.:
Park Fee...:
Habitat Fee:
Special Ins:
Additional.:
Double Fee.:
S.M.I. Fee'.:
P.W. Fees..:
ParCel...:
SPR No...:
Park Dist:-
10/28/1996
385~014-08-001.
Occ No...: 0025
Code ..... : 1994 bBC
020
Owner ....... : UNITED STATES COLD STORGPhoneANo.:
Applicant..: TOOGOOD CHUCK A Phone No.:
Phone No.:
IPhone No.:
Exp Date.:
FLORIDA STELLAR GROUP,
565349
2900 HARTLEY RD
(904)260-2900
3,382 84
3,529 01
845 71
1,388 64
1,294 67
00
00
15,724 20
00
00
00
.00
.00
265. O0
9, ~9!. O0
32257
Total Sq Ft...: 52414
Bldg Valuation: 1,257,936.00
Mech Valuation: 875,400.00
P!mg Valuation: 560.00
Elec Valuation: 202,000.00
Fire Sprlk Val: .00
Bond Valuation: .00
Tot Valuation.: 2,335,896.00
Tot Calc Fee..: 36,421.07
Additonal Fee.: .00
Tot Permit Fee: 36,421.07
Payments ...... : - 3,382.84
Balance Due...: 33,038.23
CALL FOR INSPECTION
24 Hour Recorder Number (805) 326-3728
Please state the Permit NumOer, the Job Address, and the
T¥~e of Inspection. Re~luest for insl~ections shoulcl be
made at least twenty-four hours in advance.
InsDectors office hours are:
8:00 - 8:30 AM and 1:00 - 1:30 PM
DECLARATIONS
Permit is issuecl in accordance with all al~l~licable Federal, State and Local
Ordinances. The permittee I~as properly signed and dated the reverse side
of this form.
This permit expires after 180 days of Inactivity.
;
· I~-?,ARDOUS MATERIALS STATEMENT'__ - ' ' '
than the amounts specified'on:the iistof extremeb?.hazardous substances? See checklist for guidelines.
.......
mYes ~No Will the propmed braiding or.modified facihty be vnthm 1000 feet of the outer boundary of a school?
mYes No Will the intended use of tho buildingrby the applicant or future building occupant requir~ a permit
m-th~ ifawnCoun Air Pol]iifion ~[nitmt Distriet.(ItCAlN2D),or, fimm, the Gity,o~Bak~F'n,e:De ~
~Yes No I have read the Hazardom Material Guideand KGAPGD Permitting Checklist. I undewstand my
i.. He,lib and S~tCede See. 6.0a and Calif, C,o~t. See. 65SS0 and the requirem~ of
· . "~
Owner or Authorized Agent Phone No ' ' ....
DECLARATIONS: The declarations below are mandated by the State of California under Section 198~5 of the Health ~ Code.
LICENSED CoN~rRAcToR$ DECLARATION
· ·. :,~' ~-./,~: ,--.~ . . .
~ hereby affam under penalty of perjury that I am licensed under provisions of Chaptor.-9 (commencing w~_,th,_~~ the' Divmon
of the Business and Professions Code and my license is in full force ~f. effeet.' .... ~
OWNER-BUILDER DECLARATION : ·
and Professions Code: Any city. or county which reqmres a permit to construct, alter, ~mprove, demolish, or reptffr~ny~ to its issuance
also reqmres the applicant for such permit to file a signed statement that he or she is licensed pu~mnt to the provis~hs of411o t~l~J~m License Law
(Chapter 9 commencing with Section 7000 of Division 3 or the Business and Professions Code) or that he or she.iS e~li~~.and the basis
for the alleged exemption. Any violation of Section 7031.5 by any appiicant for a permit subjects the applicant to a C~?t more than five
hundred dollars 15500)): ~.~ ;~i~
~. as owner of the property, or my employees w)th wages as their sole compensation, will do the work and the structu~i~.~]~lmded~ offered
for sale (Sec. 7044 Business and Professions Code: The Contractors License Law does not apply to an owner of Prop~ty'~k~.l~klao~ improves
thereon, and who does such work himself or herself through his or her own employees, provided that such improvements m~l~lOt~lt~l~ or offered
for sale. If. however, the budding or ~mprovement is sold within one year of completion, the owner-builder will hav®.the-la~lm~ proving that he
or she did not build or improve for the purpose of sale). .........
[ as owner of the property, am exclusively contracting with iicensed cnntractors to construct the project (See. 7044-B~essions Code:
The Contractor~ License Law does not apply to an owner of property who builds or improves thereon and who contmct~. ~.fZa~c~ h project with a
contractor{s) licensed pursuant to the Contractor License Law~. _ _ _,. :..
! am exempt under Sec. B.&.P,C. for this re~un
Owner Signature Date;
WORKERS COMPENSATION DECLARATION '
i hereby affirm that under penalty, of perjury, one of the followm~ declarations:
[ have and will maintaio a certificate oi' consent to self-insure rbr workers' compensation, az provided for by Section J700 o£ tim Labor Code, for
the performance of the work for which this permit is issued. ' '
I have and will maintain work ers' compensation insurance, as reqmred h? Section 3700 of the Labor Code. for the performance o-f the work for which
this permit i.s issued. ~ly workeff¥ compensation insurance catv. er and policy number are:
Cart/er .- ~" F 67
I certify that in the performance of the work for ~vhich this permit is issued. I sh',dl not employ any person in any manner ~oar to become subject
to the workers' compensation laws or' Cah£ornia. and a~ree that it' i should become subject to the workers' compensation provisions of Section 3700
of the Labor Code. I shail £orth~th comply with those prnvisions.
~,f ."__.,d ! /'
WARNING: FAILURE TO SECURE WORKERS' CO.MPEN~ATI¢)N COVERAGE IS UNLAWFUL, AND SHALL SUBJECTAN EMPLOYER TO
CRIMINAL PENALTIES AND CIVIL FINES UP TO ()NE HL'NDBED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000) IN ADDITION TO THE COST OF
COMPENSATION. DAMAGES AS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 3706 OF THE LABOR CODE, LNTEREST, AND A'r~OBNlgY°S FEES.
CONSTRUCTION LENDING AGENCY
I her,:by affirm that there is a construction lcndin~ a~encv ,'or the perti)rmance of the work for which this permit is issued (Sec. 3097 Civ. C.).
Lenders Name
Lenders Address
I certify tha~ l hare tead this application and state that the irttb~:,; rum contained herein is correct. I agree to compl~ ~ith alle'tt~jtwdlsmt~ and ~tate laws
relatm~ to building construction and hereb.g4mthorize represqntanr~'s of the city to enter the above-mentioned ~ fO¢~.,' -
· . : .... ,
5ignatUre of Applicant or A.ent ~~ . .'.:"'
APPROVED BUILDING DIRECTOR By ,, . '~'"'~'-' ,
Guidelines for:
I I Ill Ill ....
Suggested Safety and
Operating Procedures
When Making
Ammonia Refrigeration
Plant Tie-ins
· International Institute of
Ammonia Refrigeration
326 0576;# 21 4
ASugges!ed Safety and Operating Procedures for Making
mmon aRefdgeration Plant Tie-tns ..
This bulletin is prepared as the result of recommendations made by members ot the Interne.
tional Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration.
It is intended to be used as a guide for suggested safety procedUres for making ammonia
refrigeration plant tie-ins,
We also refer you to Bulletin No. 106 that relates to human safety factors, knowing thai any
work in and around ammonia systems is subject to certain hazards of human misjudgment
possibly related to equipment, design, installation and maintenance.
In addition, the IlAR also has published other design, operating and installation standards.
We invite your further inquiry relative to obtaining these materials for your use throughout
plant locations.
A) VALUE ENGINEERING FOR FUTURE EXPANSION,IN ORIGINAL DESIGN
1) Approximate size and locations of extra valves for future growth.
2) Size dead-end valves on main line stubs to which future connections are to be made.
The size of the valve should be at least one size larger than the maximum tonnage
indicates. Reduction in pipe size can always be made when new equipment is in
stalled: Consider the direction of flow when installing valves. These dead-end valves
should always be plugged or blank-flanged until put to use.
3) It is difficult to determine or anticipate all of the proper location of valves for future use. It
is far better to have too many than not enough valved stubs.
B) PLANNING INDIVIDUAL LOAD ADDITIONS
1 ) Check existing mains to be sure that they will handle the add~onal planned Ioad, as well
as future loads in the same area. Be certain they are connected to lines of ample capac-
ity, or that required capacity can be added.
2) Determine cut-off valve locations and valve sizes for the planned load.
3) Set in and install all new equipment and piping on additions to point of fie-in to the old
system. Be sure all valves are in proper position for tests. Use dry air pressure, soap
solution test and a 24 hour vacuum hold test. Nitrogen may also be used for pressure
testing. Never use an ammonia compressor in the system for the purpose of building up
air pressure for testing. Remember that all welds and tests should be made in accor-
dance with national, state and local codes.
4) Coordinate with plant operations for time of cut into old system.
5)
S)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
Une up equipment and ins'~Jct personnel for pump out procedures. Be certain the safety
equipment, such as gas masks, water hose, fire extinguisher, safety goggles, and other ~
necessities are readily,available- - ..
Shut off valves in old system. Pump out part of the old system affected, and hold a
vacuum long enough to check that all valves are holding. Use tags to indicate all valves
that are dosed for the tie. in.
Vent old system lines that are to be cut to the atmosphere. Make certain this vent will not
affect persons or property in the vicinity.
Make all cu~-ins. Be certain, when cutting into existing lines, that the pressure is not in a
deep vacuum. This will pull air into the cut pipe to form an explosive mixture with the
internal oil vaporized by the heat of the cutting torch. Use nitrogen to flush any oil vapors
before making fie-in welds. Use a floor fan to direct vapors away from the person doing
the welding. Pressure tapping services are available in some areas, if a pump out is
impossible.
Introduce a small amount of ammonia gas into the system and test for leaks with litmus
paper or a sulphur stick.
If tests are satisfactory, open the suction line valves to wide open positions and test
again as above.
Slowly return valves to normal positions for automatic operation. Apply all necessary
insulation before starting to refrigerate.
Branch lines should be opened in sequence to prevent over-loading the compressors.
Test and balance the controls for each new section.
Lower the temperature, in rooms where work has been pertormed, very slowly to prevent
wall stress or equipment damage. Be sure that air pressure within the room can equal-
ize with that outside.
Return the remainder of the system to normal operations. Remove tags from valves
when they are reopened.
SE~T BY.'
a-17-87
; 3:23P~ ;
ASSOCIATION
805 326 0576;# 4/ 4
This publication contains advisory information.
only. IlAR disclaims liability for the use,
application or adaptation of the information
contained herein.
For additional copies or information of related
interest, contact:
International Institute of
Ammonia Refrigeration
Washington, DC
(202) 857-1110
r~Mar-17:g7 12:53 Kern Bakersfield ECC 805-833-4950 ' P.01
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D,..C-F:'INF:'O E9 C:ARAC'..A,"/:/~,~AI;:F<:[,q "- OF:'S
_~Mar-17-97 12:55 Kern Bakersfield ECC 805-833-4950 P.02
B A- K E- R S F .I E,~ L D
FIRE DEPARTMENT
r
M.E M ORA N D U M
DATE:·
March 17, 1997
TO: Ralph Huey, Hazardous Materials Coordinator
FROM: Howar~d H. Wines, Hazardous Materials,Technician
SUBJECT: US Cold Storage
During the first Week in December, 1996, I talked and met with Ron Whisenant and Victor Arnett
regarding the plant expansion.
r
The topic of our conversation was basically that since the plant modification would extend into
after January 1, 1997, the modified RMPP would have to conform to the federal RMP under
California law effective after January 1, 1997 (letter of December 2, 1996 attached).
US Cold Storage does have procedures to manage the proposed modification, pursuant to 29
CFR 1910.119 OSHA's Process Safety Management rules and Section 25543.2 (a) (2) California
Health and Safety Code (CH&SC) requirement for the notification of the administering agency
that those procedures have been established. The PSM documentation was submitted with the
1993 RMPP (copies attached). I have marked the specific reference to making ammonia "tie-ins'~
in their safety review checklist. ,An accident investigation should review if these procedures were
being followed.
US Cold Storage now has 60 days to submit a completed federal R_MP, pursuant to Section
25543.2 (b) CH&SC). I will draft a letter to that effect today.
HHW/dlm
601 MISCELLANEOUS
, existing state threshold * * * quantifies that are used as of subsection (r) o Section 112 of the Clean Air Act (42
~ f
the standards for registration and RMP compliance. U.S.C. Sec. 7412(r)(3)).
(b) A petition submitted pursuant to subdivision (a) (5) The likelihood of the substance being handled in
shall be accompanied by a'submission fee, to be this state. " -
established by the.office, in consultation with the Office (6) The accident fiistorY of the substance.
of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment.. The fee .
shall be in an amount that is sufficient to pay for the (h) Upon receipt of a recommendation made pursu-
reasonable costs incurred by the office and the Office of ant to subdivision (f), the office may add or remove a
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment necessary to substance or change an existing stat_...~e threshold quantity
carry out this section. Upon the receipt of the petition as a requirement for this article.
and fee, the office shall transmit to the Office of (i) In reviewing a petition under this section, the
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment funds suffi- office shall consider the views of administering, agencies
cient to pay for the reasonable costs incurred by the that have indicated support or opposition to the peri-
Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment to tion. (Added by Stats. 1994, c. 618 (,4.B.3263), § 2.
carry out this section. Amended by Stats. 1996, c. 715 (S.B. 1889),. § 35.)
(c) An owner or operator of a stationary source shall § 255.43.~._ Mo?ification of facility which may result in
not delay implementation of this article in anticipation s~gnmeant increase in amount of regulated sub.
of a ruling on a petition to delist a * * * regulated stances handled, or in sitmificantly increased riska
substance or to change a state threshold quantity., requirements ~
(d) The office shall notify administering agencies of (a) A * * * stationary source that intends to modify
petitions for adding or delisting * * * regulated sub- a facility which may result either in a significant increase
stances or for changing * * * state threshold quantities
i,n thee a...mount of * * * regulated substances handled by
and shall take comments from * * * administering ne tac~l~ty or in a significantly increased risk in handlin~
agencies on the petitions. All comments shall be ~ * * a regulated substance, as compared to the
responded to in writing, amount of substances and the amount of risk identified
(e) The office shall notify the public of petitions t'or in the facility's RMP relating to the covered process
adding or delisting * * * regulated substances or for proposed for modification, shall do all the following,
changing * * * state threshold quantities and shall take prior to operating the modified facility:
public comment on the petitions. All comments shall (I) Where reasonably possible, notify the administer-
be responded to in writing, ing agency in writing of the * * * stationary source's
(f)(l) The office shall request the Office of Environ- intent to modify the facility at least five calendar days
mental Health Hazard Assessment to review the peri- before implementing any modifications. As part of tile
tions and make recommendations to the office regard- notification process, the * * * stationary source shall
ing the petitions, consult with the administering agency when determining
whether the * * * RMP should be reviewed and
(2) Each recommendation made pursuant to para- rexfsed. Where prenotification is not reasonably possi-
graph {I) shall be based on current scientific knowledge big. 'the · * * stationary source shall provide written
and a sound and open scientific review and shall contain notice to the administering agency no later than 48
a finding whether a substance should be added to. or hours following the modification.
deleted from. the regulated substance list. or whether
the state threshold quantity for a regulated substance (2) Establish procedures to manage the proposed
should be revised, modification, which shall be substantially similar to the
(g) The petition review bv the Office of Environmen-
tal Health Hazard Assessment shall take into consider-
ation all of the following factors:
(1) The severity, of any acute adverse health effect
associated with an accidental release of the substance.
(2) The likelihood of an accidental release of the
substance.
(3) The potential magnitude of human exposure to
an accidental release of the substance.
(4) The results of other preexisting evaluations of the
substances potential risks which take into account the
factors specified in paragraphs (1). (2), and (3), includ-
ing, but not limited to. studies or research undertaken
by, or on behalf of. the Environmental Protection
Agency. for the purpose of complying with paragraph (3)
§ 25543.3
procedures specified in Section 1910.1E3 of Title 29 of
the Code of Federal Regulations pertaining to process
safe .ty management, and notify the administering agency
that the procedures have heed established. '
(b) The * * * stationary source shall revise the
appropriate documents, as required pursuant to subdivi-
sion (a), expeditiously, but not later than 60 days from
the date of the facility modification. (Added by Stats.
1994. c. 618 (A.B. 3263), § 3. Amended by Stats. 1996, c.
715 (S.B. 1889)~ § 36. t
§ 25543.3. Determinations and regulations; regular.
ed substances list; threshold quantities; deadline
On or before June 30, 1998, the office, in consultation
with the Office of Environmental Health Hazard As-
sessment, shall do all of the following:
(a) Review each regulated substance on the list
established pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph
B A K E R S F I'E L D
FIRE DEPARTMENT
December 2, 1996
MICHAEL R. KELLY
-~)MINISII~/E SEI~/ICES
2101 'H' Street
Bak~,sfletd. CA 93301
(805) 3263941
FAX (805) 395-1349
SU~N SERVICES
2101 'H' Street
Bake~f~k~, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (805) 395-1349
PIt~/ENIION SERVlCF~
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 933[]1
(805) 326-3951
FAX (805) 326-0576
EHVlI~ONMENTAL SERVlCE~
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3979
FAX (805) 326-0576
TI~AJNING DIVISION
5642 Victor Street
Bakersfield, CA 93308
(805) 399-4697
FAX (805) 399-5763
Mr. Ron Whisenant
United States Cold Storage
6501 District Blvd.
Bakersfield, CA 93313
RE: New Federal RMP in California
Dear Ron:
Enclosed is a summary Factsheet and legislation that effectively adopts the
federal RMP as replacement for RMPP's in California. The State Office of
Emergency Services is to develop regulations to implement the federal RMP by
mid 1998. However, these regulations will not affect the existing federal rules, if
anything, California will probably include additional materials to be regulated
and/or lower the regulatory thresholds to include more facilities than does the
federal rule.
We should at least make RETA members aware of this change in law. The
RMP also involves the integration of PSM and emergency response planning into a
single RMP document. I have some particular information in this area that I can
share with your membership as well. Let's start thinking about a joint effort RMP
workshop event for 1997.
Sincerely,
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Materials Technician
HHW/dlm
enclosure ,
FIGURE 1
United States Cold Storage
Management of Change' PrOcedure
CHANGE FOItM SUBMITTED
MINOR
l~ooREsS RECOMMENOATiON~
United States Cold Storage; Inc.
Risk Management Program
Ammonia Refrigeration Facility
Management of Change Form (MCF)
MCF Number
This number is to be assigned by the Site Maintenance Supervisor and is to be referred
to in all documentation.
Listing of key personnel inv°lved with the change:
Originator
(please print)
Site Maintenance Supervisor
(please print)
Regional Engineer
(please print)
Management of Change Form (MCF)
Section 1: Initiation of Mann ement of Chan e Form
Section 1 is to be completed by individual originating the MCF and forwarded to the Site
Maintenance Supervisor.
Initiated by:
Description of modification:
Date: / t
Reason/Rationale for modification:
' Is the change: _ Permanent?
If the change is temporary, note duration here:
_Temporary?
Necessary time pedod for the change:
Management of Change Form (MCF)
Sectian 2: Screening af Mnnngement of Chnnae Farm
Sections 2 is to be completed by the Site Maintenance Supervisor and then a copy of the MCF
is to be forwarded to the Regional Engineer. If the requested modification' constitutes a
change, Sections 2-6 must be completed.
Reviewed by: Date: / /
Classification of Change
The modification as described in Section 1 is classified as:
Duration Classification Next Action
Permanent Replacement in kind Modification not part of MOC
procedure.
Temporary Minor change Complete safety review checklist.
Major change Conduct process hazard analySis..
Temporary Change
No temporary change shall be granted more than five one week extensions or be allowed to
extend beyond six weeks, including any extensions. The table on the next page should be
used to track temporary changes.
Management of Change Form (MCF)
ScheduleforTem ora Chan e.~:,-~.. ~-:.:
~ · · Authorization
Initial request
Extension #1
Extension ~2
Extension ~3
_xtension ~
Extension ff.5 ~=.====~======= ~ ~
UI3da[ing Process Safety Information~ Procedures~ and Documentation
Identify the drawings, procedures, and documentation whiCh need to be revised as a result of
this change.
Process flow diagrams
Electrical one-line drawings
Ammonia equipment lists
Criteria for design and operation
Preventive maintenance procedures
Accident investigation procedures
Piping and instrumentation diagrams
Fire water and sewer system drawings
Ammonia instrumentation lists
Standard operating procedures
Operator training procedures
Emergency response procedures
.. Audit program
Other (describe):
Management of Change Form
Section 3: Preliminary Enaineerin-
Preliminary design reviewed by:
· Date: / /
Section 4: Process Hazards Analysis
Date Hazard Analysis Completed / /
Does the process hazards analysis address the impact of change on safety and health?
Yes. No
Hazard analysis report reviewed by:
Date:
Section 5,: Safety Review Checklist
Date Safety Review Completed / t
Does the safety review checklist address the impact of change on safety and health?
~Yes ~ No
· Safety Review checklist reviewed by: Date: / /
Mnnngement of Change Form (MCF)
Section 6: Review of Pre-Startu Safe RevlewiAuthor~.zfiowto~Stz~-'l~l:"!~"~:.~:~:
Date' Pre-Startup Safety Review Completed / I
Has the modification be constructed in accordance with specifications?
Yes . No ' '
Have all applicable drawings, procedures, and documentation noted in Section 2 been revised
Yes . No
accordingly? ...
Have all appropriate operators, maintenance personnel, and contractors been informed of and
Yes No
trained in the change? -
Have ail, if any, recommendations from the preliminary engineering design review been
implemented? , Yes No
For major changes, have ail, if any, recommendations from the process hazards analysis been
resolved? Yes , No
For minor changes, have all, if any, recommendations from the safety review been resolved?
Yes No
Authorization may be given to accept this change and proceed with final design, procurement,
installation, and implementation of the modification if and only if the answers to all of the above
questions is "Yes".
Authorization for change and start-up is given by:
Site Maintenance Supervisor:
Date: / /
Regional Engineer:
Date: / /
APPENDIX B
M~n~gement of Change Forms Log
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Management of Change Forms (MCF) Log
MCF Humber Date MCF Date of Initial Date Initial Date Hazard Date Safety Date Pre-Startup :)ate for ~art-Up Date
Initiated Review Engineering Analysis Review Safety Review Autholtzatlon of
ComFieted Completed Completed Completed Change
APPENDIX C
Safety Review Checklist
Session 1 for USCOLDSR
Company: United States Cold Storage Inc.
I,ocation: Milford, DE '
Fac~.lity: Ammonia Refrigeration Facility
SessJ. on Date: 08-]7-92
Leader:
Scribe:
Team:
Name
Phone number
Location
Comments:
AUDIT-PC 1.51 Worksheet
Company: United States Cold Storage,Inc.
Facility: Ammonia Refrigeration Facility
Session: 1 08-17-92 Revision: 0 08-17-92
Primatech Inc.
System: 1
Page: 1
System: 1 Safety Review Checklist Dwg#:
QUESTION A REMARKS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
1. List the codes and
standards to which the
modified equipment has been
designed (record in Remarks
column). Does the
modification meet the same
codes and standards?
2. Does the modification meet
the requirements of~ANSI/IIAR-
2-19847
3. Does the modification meet
the requirements of
ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 15-19897
4. If the modification
involves pressure relief
valves, have the requirements
of ~IIAR BUlletin #105-1976
been followed?
5. Have the standard operating
procedures (SOPs) been
modified to reflect the
equipment change?
6. Do the SOPs reflect the
requirements of IIAR Bulletin
#107-1977 regarding operating
procedures 'when making ammonia
AUDIT-PC 1.51 Worksheet
Company: United States Cold Storage,Inc.
Facility: Ammonia Refrigeration Facility
Session: 1 08-17-92 Revision: 0 08-17-92
Primatech Inc.
System: 1
Page: 2
SYstem: 1 Safety Review Checklist Dwg#:
QUESTION A REMARKS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
plant tie-ins?
7. Does the design reflect the
requirements of IIAR #108-1986
regarding water contamination
of ammonia refrigeration
systems?
8. Do the SOPs reflect the
requirements of IIAR Bulletin
#108-1986 regarding water
contamination?
9. Do the SOPs reflect the
requirements of IIAR Bulletin
#109-1988 regarding minimum
safety criteria for safe
ammonia refrigeration systems?
10. Do the SOPs reflect the
requirements of IIAR Bulletin
#110-1988 regarding startup of
ammonia mechanical
refrigeration systems?
11. Do the SOPs reflect the
guidance provided in IIAR
Safety Guide: A Guide to Good
Practices for the Operation of
an Ammonia Refrigeration.
System?
AUDIT-Pc 1.51
Company: United States Cold Storage,Inc.
Facility: Ammonia Refrigeration Facility
Session: 1 08-17-92 System:
Worksheet
Revision: 0 08-17-92
__1 Safety Review Checklist
QUESTION
REMARKS
12. Do the preventive.
maintenance procedures reflect
the requirements of IIAR
Bulletin #110-1988 regarding
inspection and maintenance
procedures of.ammonia
mechanical refrigeration
systems?
13. Does the modification
change the normal permitted
discharges to the air or
water of the facility?
14. Does the modification
require that the onsite
~nventory of ammonia be
increased?
15. Does the modification
require that ammonia be stored
or operated at higher ~
temperatures or pressures than
the current configuration?
16. Does the modification
bypass any existing control
interlock or safety feature?
If so, describe in the Remarks
Column what compensating
Dwg#:
RECOMMENDATIONS
Primatech Inc.
System: 1
Page: 3
COMMENTS
AUDIT-PC 1.51
Worksheet
Company: United States Cold Storage,Inc.
Facility: Ammonia Refrigeration Facility
Session: 1 08-17-92 Revision: 0 08-17-92
System: 1 Safety Review Checklist
Dwg#:
QUESTION
22. Has the change been
reviewed and approved by the
appropriate engineering
management?
23. Has the change been
reviewed and approved by
appropriate operations
management (including
maintenance)?
24. Has the change been
reviewed and approved by
Health, Safety, and
Environmental representatives
(or equivalent groups)?
REMARKS
RECOMMENDATIONS
25. Has the change been
reviewed and approved by
appropriate facility
management?
Primatech Inc.
System: 1
Page:.5
COMMENTS
AUDIT-Pc 1.51
C°mDany: United'States Cold Storage,Inc.
Facility: Ammonia Refrigeration Facility
Session: 1 08-17-92
Revision: 0 08-17-92
System: 1 Safety Review Checklist
QUESTION
- REMARKS
features have been provided to
preserve the same level of
protection.
Worksheet
17. Does the modification
require that~ammonia detector
placements be altered or
additional detectors be
installed?
18. Are the J~ndications and
alarms in the ex,.sting plant
adequate for the modified
plant?
19. Does the modification
require additional operator
protection measures (eg. PPE)?
20. Have'the modifications
created any additional
vulnerabilities to external
events which did not exist
before (vehicle traffic,
fire,water accumulation high
wind~~ etc)?' ,
21. Is electrical power and
other services (eg. cooling
water) adequate to meet the
demands of the modified plant?
Dwg#:
RECOMMENDATIONS
Primatech Inc.
System: 1
Page: 4
COMMENTS
· -O--*~T~-- ~.~. GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF
' EMERGENCY SERVICES
Hazardous Mater~als Spffl'Repo~
1. ~ON NO~G GO~OR'S ~: J 97-1087
~ NAME: b. AGENCY: a PHO~: · E~ ~ ~A~:
~s ~~~ ~805-861-25~
2. RESPONSIBLE PARTY:
P.1/~
a. NAME: b. AGENCY:
c. PHONF~: d. EXT.:
d. INCIDENT LOCATION: 5301 Caracas Avenu~ - US Cold Storage
e.,CITY: f. COUNTY: ~, :zrp
Bakersfield Kern County
h. MAIL ADDRESS; L CITY: j. STATE:
3., SUBSTANCE
a. SlYa,STANCl~: a.__...~TX:___>. < A~a~ ,~e~s~, c. TYPIC: ~L OTHER:
1. amonia = 150 kbs. VAPOR
=
e. DESCRIPTION: Circumstances of release still under investigation. The Fire Dept on s~ene, the vapor is being
allowed to dissipate into the atmosphere.
f. CONTAINED: g. WATER INVOLVED: h. WATERWAY:
Yes No
4. INCIDENT SUMMARY:
n. DATE: 03115/97 TIME IMi/;earvl: 1915 b. SITE: Industrial Plant
c. INJURIES// d. FATALS #: e. EVAC5 #: f, CLEANUP BY:
0 0 0 No cleanup
5. NO'tiI~ICATION INFORMATION:
a. NRC#:
c. OTHER ON SCENE:
e, ADMIN. AGENCY:
b. ON SCENE:
Fire Dept.. Police Dept.
d. OTHER NOTIFIED:
f, SEC. AGENCY:
MAR 15 '97 ~08:$8PM OES HQ
SACRAMEHTO
EMERGENCY SERVICES
Hazardous Materia/ Spill Update, .
P.2/2
CONTROL#:
97-1087
DATEtTIblE: 03/15/97 RECEIVED BY:
/ 1939 Laurie Smith
CITY/Op. AREA.,
Bakersfield/Kern Courtly
PERSON CALLING OES: Barbara Camps
AGENCY: Kern Co Communication
SUBSTA~CE TYPE:
PAGER #(CELLPHONE):
PHONY~: 8o5-861-2500 · Ext:
SUBSTANCE:
~ .amonia
3.
4.
c TYPE:
VAPOR
d,
SITUATION UPDATE: 2000 3/15/97 Ron Whienant, US Cold Storage
The corn~ location of release was 6501 Disra'ict Blvd, Bakcrsfield. 'The caum was a problem with the
tic-in [o an'exlx~sion. The source has be. ch stopl~l, No cleanup done i£ was a rel~ to atmosphere.
FAX NOTIFICATION LIS'T:
R',,V'(~B. SFM, US EP.~ USI~V$ AA/CUP.a.. AIR RESOURCES BD. DFG-OSPR. DTSC,
ADHERING AGENCY:
OTHER
Created by: Warning Center on: 03/15/97 08:32:13 PM Lest Modified by: Warning Center on: 03115/97 08:30:13 PM
" ~ " " ° ' ' " '~ " "' ' EndotForm "
.%,
Session i for BAKERFLD ...........................
Session Date: 07-13-93
Leader: victor Arnett0 USCS Sac.
Scribe: Raul Ragunton, USCS Sac.
Team: James Marrella, USCS Lyons
Larry Jones, USCS, Tracy
· Matt Kohler, USCS Bakersfld
Car/ L. Willis, USCS Bakers
Bruce Chandler, Stellar
Barbara Brenner, Bakers, FD
Ralph Nodal, USCS, Tulare
Phone number
916~391-7829
916~391-7829
708/442-6660
209 f835-COLD
805 1832-COLD
805 I832-COLD
904 ~260-2900
805~326-3979
209'686-1110'
Location
Comments: Sac.- Sacramento, CA. Stellar = The Stellar Group Bakersfld =
Bakersfield, CA
HAZOP-PC '3.02 by Primatech Inc.
UNITED STATES COLD STOR,,46E '
C,4LIFORNI,4 p,antAddress: 1~501 District [31vd.,, Bakersfield, CA 93313
OF
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 4~ 000 · Bakersfield, C~A 03384
Phone: 805 / 832-C~OL.D (21~53) · Fax: 805 / 832-584(~
May 21, 1997
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Material Technicians
1751 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
Dear Mr. Wines, ~.
Pursuant to our letter to you dated March 19, 1997, we would like to inform you that we
have completed 85% of our RMP.
The following programs are in place with procedures:
California Risk Management & Prevention Plan revised and recertified on
June 19, 1996.
CaI-OSHA's Process Safety Managemem Program.
USCS's Respiratory Protection Program.
USCS's Lockout/Tagout Program
USCS's PSM Pre-Start-up Safety Review.
All refrigeration alarms, ammonia detection monitoring and automatic
controls system in place and operating.
Due to time constraints we are requesting a 60 day extension on our RMP.
Please feel free to comact me if you need any further information. I appreciate your help
in this matter and look forward to your response.
Sincerely,
Carl L. Willis
General Manager
~ Swire Group
RECORD OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
Location:
Business Name:
Contact Name:
Business Phone:
Inspector's Name:
Time of Call: Date:
Type of Call:
Content of Call:
InComing [~
Time:
Outgoing [ ]
# Min:
Returned [ ]
Actions Required:
Time Required to Complete Activity
# Min: / ~ /¢'~rb
UNITED STATE5 COLD STORAGE'
OF CALIFORNIA Plant Address: 6501 District Blvd.. Bakersfield, CA 93313
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 41000 .. Bakersfield, CA 93384
Phone: 805 / 832-COLD (2653) · Fax: 805 / 832-5846
April 4, 1997
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Material Technicians
1751 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
Dear Mr. Wines,
This letter is to inform you that we will be performing a tie-in to our refrigeration system
on Saturday April 5, 1997. ·
If you have any questions, please call me.
Sincerely,
lion whisenant j~. - ' ~,~ '
Chief E~gineei- ..... -
USCS Bakersfield
RW/ma
xc: C. Willis
R. Noll
J. Man'ella
V. Arnett
C. Toogood
[~ Swire Group
RECORD OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
Location:
ID#
Business Name:
Contact Name:
Business Phone:
InspeCtor's Name:
Time of Call: Date:
Type of Call:
~/"'g~'t/~ ? Time: !
Incoming [ ] Outgoing
Content of Call:
# Min:
Returned
Actions Required:
Time Required to Complete Activity # Min:
March 21, 1997
.
THE STELLAR'GnOUP
Ralph Huey
Hazardous Material Coordinator
Hazardous Material Division
2130 "G" St.
Bakersfield, Ca 93301
Reference: Ammonia Release
United States Cold Storage
Incident Report
Dear Mr. Huey,
:: - ._ 5;-f' :7828~Soi. ith:Maol~, Eresno, CA93725 · -[elepbo_ne (...209) 834-5945
r
This letter is a.fol!0w up summary of our discussion on Tuesday, March 19, 1997 in regards to
the arnmorila i:~l~sei~ UsCS' 0n'.Disti'ict.Avenue on Saturday, March 17, 1997.
_ . I~ ;;-..- ~ :.._.. .
scs and' The Stenar'Orai~iS-Prei~ared a:.detailed :incident :repOrt ar~,d.i{ has'
usc'S to'.~r'd~part~'&~'i~i~arhtely:. 'It details the-eyents &d will not
letter. ' ':'": ;: :5':" ~';':~' :: '":' 'i-':';;'.....: .-. ; '.;..': ..... i .......
As we discussed and is detailed in the'incident rep.on, human error on the part of our
SuperintendentS'David Glazebro0k, was the cause of the release.
You expressed three specific concerns about The Stellar Group an~d our attitude toward Rules and
Regulations that might have contributed to-the event. The three concerns, as we understood them
are as follows: ,--' ~ .~ - ~' -~!-- ...... -.-~
1. After someone from the fuel provider talked to your office ab;'ut permits for a fuel tank on
site, you found a fuel tank on site without a permitl You feel this represented a blatant
disregard On our part for the Bakersfield permit process.. ......... . .
2.: ~..-T. he se.c. ti.op. !gl t. he permit application requesting information about the status of hazardous
".'51 ~'fi~/t~/-i~l~' o~/the;propo~ed ~sit~,Was not. completed. :when the permit was filled, out, .resulting
' Y°U[ depai-t'fii~'ri{ h~l~nb~;ing that USCS Was'goin'g:.to:haue ~'hazhrdous n~aterial'ofi si~'. in
You felt this might have been a deliberate attempi on our part tb 'd~c~i¢~"~he'~¢~{~'h~
'bfficlhi~ ~b'~-~he ifit~nt 0fthe.pr0ject-. . .... . . ..: :,..~..~ ;~: .....-. .... ·
· FAx (209)-834-22-07
You felt the pump out and tie-in procedures as defined and documented by USCS was
dangerous to the community. You felt that if we followed those procedures, we would have
acted irresponsibly.
Response - General
The Stellar Group is one of the largest ammonia refrigeration contractors in this country. We
work with municipalities, government agencies, and customers from coast to coast. As a leader
in this industry, there is nothing that takes priority over our responsibility for the safety of our
communities, customers and employees. Having a safety modifier rate of 0.8 clearly indicates
~ that we are well above the industry average in safety. We have had numerous OSHA inspections
~i around the country and have an excellent record with no serious violations. We have a safety
,__~ director, Phil Hinrichs, who is responsible for our entire safety program and I encourage you to
..... talk_to_him_at our_corporate, headquarters~(800-~4_88~-29_0.0)._ A..vJsit~to_the_j,ob_site_will.clearly~
demonstrate that our commitment to safety is far superior to most contractors that work in this
community and the industry as a whole.
Response - Item itl
It was clearly our intent to get a permit to have a fuel tank on site. Every request by your
department on how to install the fuel tank was completed. We met with your department to
understand what they wanted because we have every intention of meeting your requirements.
We had a site supervisor who was doing the permit investigation and the contract negotiations
with the fuel service suppliers. He resigned during the process and another supervisor resumed
the effort. In the changeover, the new site supervisor failed to confirm the fuel supplier had
actually obtained the permit. We have removed the tank from the job. To prevent this from
happening again we have instituted a company policy, nation wide, not to allow fuel tanks on
any site.
Response - Item
During the permit process, we worked hard to address every request made by the building
officials. We were also under an enormous time constraint to meet the needs of your customer
and mine, USCS. When the permit was finally ready we sent our most available employee to
meet with the City.and-he-filled-out each-sectionof-the.permit_that~the permit office told him he_
needed to fill out. The hazardous material compliance section, which must to be filled out and
signed by the owner or owner's agent, was not brought to our attention and we were given the
permit without having completed that section. The drawings that were submitted, clearly show
our intent to use anhydrous ammonia and throughout our review process we discussed it with the
City of Bakersfield in great length. I understand that this was some type of trigger for your
department and for that we apologize. To prevent this in the future we have implement a policy
that the project manager responsible for getting the permit, be responsible for making sure every
detail of the permit is filled out correctly and completely, and we will not rely on the owner or
the City to insure complete execution of the permit form.
In addition, we, in conjunction with USCS, made a concerted effort to inform your department
specifically. We agreed that USCS, Ron Wisenaunt, would call your department and inform you
of our intent. Mr. Wisenaunt called Howard Wines of your department before the project began
and informed him of our plans and asked if there was anything else that needed to be filled out.
Mr. Wines instructed him that the phone call was sufficient.
Response-Item #3
It is The Stellar Group's written policy that our employees will not purposefully release
ammonia to atmosphere at any time, including during a pumpdown. Attached please find The
Stellar Group's general pumpdown procedures. To prevent this in the future I have already had a
meeting with the four personnel of our company whom are permitted and qualified to do
pumpdowns. In that meeting I reconfirmed our policy that we will not, under any circumstance,
purposefully release ammonia to atmosphere. I reiterated our responsibility and liability to our
community, customers, and employees. I explained to them that intentional release of anhydrous
ammonia to atmosphere was grounds for disciplinary action including dismissal.
The Stellar Group regrets the events that led up to the release and have taken aggressive steps to
prevent it from happening again. We welcome any suggestions that you have to make us a better
company and remain available for questions or comments.
Sincerely,
Charles R. Taylor, P.E.
Vice President
Ralph Huey
Ammonia release at USCS
3/21/97
Date:
To:
From:
Subject:
April 25, 1996
All ammonia refrigeration service technicians and superintendent
Charles R. Taylor, P. E.
Ammonia pump down procedure - general
These procedures are general guidelines and policies for pumping down live ammonia
· refrigeration systems. Only employees who have completed training and are certified in pump-
out procedures, lock out tag procedures, hazardous materials first responder course and
authorized by a Principle of this company is permitted to pump down a system. Any other
employee doing so without proper authorization is grounds for disciplinary action including
termination.
Every effort will be made to prevent release of anhydrous ammonia to atmosphere. Purposeful
releases are not authorized and are grounds for disciplinary action including termination.
One person will be the responsible party for the pump down procedure. This person will be
known as the Pump Down Supervisor, or PDS. The PDS has total responsibility for the site
during a pump down and the full authority to direct every Stellar employee as needed to facilitate
the safe evacuation of the system. The PDS has total responsibility for the safety and welfare of
every person on the site and to the community.
If the owner wishes to be responsible for the pump down, it is the responsibility of our PDS to
follow the owner's representative's instructions unless the PDS feels the instructions jeopardize
the safety of the p_ump down. _It~is_the_PDS~'s resgon_s.ibility_t~o~confirm eve~ step_ th_at the
owner's personnel makes to confirm it is done correctly.
The PDS is resPonsible for developing the sequence of events, delegating and managing the
personnel around him as needed and to confirm all procedures and actions are followed c0rrectlyl
As each valve is closed the valves are to be tagged out according to The Stellar Group's standard
lock out tag out procedures.
Each plant and facility is different and must be evaluated individually. Some basic guidelines are
as follows:
Evaluate the system to determine how the part of the system to be modified can be pumped out
to other parts of the system. This is the safest means of pumping a system out and should be the
first method explored. The PDS is to develop the plan and review it with all of the personnel on
site prior to pump down.
Before any system is opened up to atmosphere, the PDS should have a clear signal from each
personnel involved. Any personnel involved in a pumpdown has the authority to prevent the
system from being opened up to atmosphere.
In the event that the charge can not be pumped to a different part of the system and has to be bled
it is to be discharged to water. The best method is to bleed the system through a water venture.
The water venture pulls the ammonia charge out of the system, (it can actually pull a deep
vacuum on the system) and mixes and neutralizes the ammonia for easy disposal. If the venture
is not viable the ammonia must be bled to a container of water. Water should be available in'
_quantities~o£one_gallon of water for eachpoundof ammonia
It is important to remember that when isolating a header or pipe to be pumped down, every line
that is attached to it must be traced down and valved off with a solid isolation valve. Solenoids
or checl~ valves are not acceptable. During the isolation process, be carefully not to lock liquid
between valves that could hydrostatically expand.
Specific situations:
Suction Lines_: All suction lines should be bled down either through the system or through a
water source. Suction lines many times have liquid laying in the headers, especially at traps. If
necessary, the PDS is authorized to remove insulation at low spots to check for frosting, which is
a good indicator that liquid is present. Before a suction line is cut open, a valve should be
opened to atmosphere and allowed to breathe for a minimum often minutes. Because oil will
hold ammonia and cause it to "smell" for a long time, connect a vacuum hose to the suction
header up stream of the cut in point and discharge it to water to minimize vapors at the cut in
point.
Hot gas lines: Hot gas lines are usually the easiest to pump out. The same constraints and
precautions apply that apply to suction lines apply to hot gas lines.
High-pressur~ liquid l'ine~s: I~i-~l~'pr~essure liquid lines are extremely dangerous because they carry
so much ammonia in a liquid form and at a high pressure. Make absolutely sure the source of the
high-pressure liquid (receiver) is valved off. The ammonia should be bled off to other parts of
the system. As the pressure is relieved into another part of the system, check the liquid line for
frosting, especially at low points. Carefully apply heat to the frosted areas until the pipe is
completely empty.
Recirculated liquid lines: Recirculated liquid lines are the most difficult and dangerous pipes to
pump down. Because the liquid lines are usually insulated, it is difficult to tell if all of the liquid
is gone even when the header is pumped down to atmospheric pressure. The best way to pump
one down is to bleed it off to another part of the system at the lowest part of the liquid header. A
properly designed header will slope back to the low point and a bleed valve will be installed
there. Bleed from this point until the bleed line is no longer frosted. Carefully open the bleed
line to atmosphere after all of the frost is gone and the pipe is at atmospheric pressure for a
minimum of ten minutes. If a bleed valve is not available, the PDS is authorized to remove
insulation at the low spot to add heat to the pipe to boil off the liquid.
UNITED .STATES COLD
OF
E. ALIFORNIA ,a,ing Address: RO. Box 41000 Bakersfield, 93384
· C:A
Phone:.805 / 832-COLD (2'653) · Fax: 805 / 832-5846
March 19, 1997
Howard H. Wines III
· Hazardous Material Technician
Hazardous Material Division
1715 Chester Avenue
Bakersfield, CA. 93301
Dear Mr. Wines:
This letter is to inform you that USCS is planning to start the temperature Pull-down in
phase II of the Bakersfield facility on Sunday, MarCh 23, 1997, in order to have proper
temperature requirements met for our customers beginning April 1, 1997. This will
require the charging of the equipment with anhydrous ammonia and the operating of the
new refrigeration equipment for phase II.
The following safety programs and procedures are in place:
California's Risk Management & Prevemion Plan revised and recertified on
June 19, 1996.
Cal-OSHA's Process Safety Management Program.
USCS's Respiratory Protection Progratn.
USCS's Lockout/Tagout Program.
HAZOP study on the modification with all recommendations in place for
the 'glycol heat exchanger ......
USCS's PSM Pre-Start-up Safety Review.
All refrigeration alarms, ammonia detection, monitoring and automatic
controls systems in place and operating.
Also pursuant to your letter dated March 17, 1997, it is our intern to complete and submit
to your office no latter then May 16, 1997, the RMP under 40 CFR Part 68.
Sincerely,
Cari L. Willis
'General Manager
~] Swire Group
page1
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
'Incident, Investigation Form
. Incident Report
Facility Bakersfield C/S
Date o1' Incident: 3/t5/97
J Case Number 07-2-3-15 I Dar6 3/17/9~
I Time 6: 45pm I Department Refrigeration I Locat,on Roof
Employee Involved with the Incident
Ron Whisenant
Employee's Usual Occupation:
Chief Engineer
Employee Supervisor
Ca'ri Willis
Occupation at time of Inoident:
Same
Length' of Employment:
[ ] Less than 1 Month
I 1-5 Months
[ ] 6 Months to 5Years
[XJ More than 5 years
IEmployment Category
Regular, Full-time
Regular, Part-time
[ ] Nonemployee.
[ ] Tempormy
[ ] Seasonal
TEAM MEMBERs
I Vtct6r Arnett ."
I '~i!e~' i. Marrella
Ron Whisenant
David Glazebrook
Chuck Taylor "
Cari Willis
SIGNATURE
TITIF/POSITION
Western Regional Eng.
EPA/OSHA Coordinator
Chief Engineer
The Stellar Group
Conor~l Sunerintendent
The Stella~ Group
Divi~±on Manager
Plant Manager
INCIDENT TYPE: (Check any that Apply)
[X ] Refrigeration System [ ] Other (Building) Others:
[ ] Near-Miss IX l Vapor Release
[ ] Property Damage ~ ] Liquid Spill
[ ]Refrigeration Piping/Fork Lift [ ] Fire
PRIMARY SOURCE OF REFRIGERANT
RELEASE {Check One)
Oil Drain Line
Compressor
Condenser/Desuperheater
Evaporator
[ ] Pump
[ ] Pressure Vessel
[xl Piping
[ ] Hand Valve
[ ] Pressure Relief Valve
[ ] Automatic Control Valve
[ ] Charging Connection/Source
[ ] Other
Revised ! 0/5/g4
page 2
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Incident Investigation Form
Incident Report
is CONTRIBUTING TO A RELEAI ,~ t.,necK an tlmt I
Human Factors [ ] Equipment Defect/Malfunction
[ ! Design Flaw ,
[ ] Misapplied Equipment
[ ] Power Failure
[ ] Corrosion
[ ] Inadequate Maintenance
Natural Disaster
[ ] Improper InstallaUon
[ ] Mechanical Damage
[ ] Hydrostatic Expansion
[ ] Hydraulic Shock
· [ ] Inadequate Administrative
Control Failure.
Process Upset
System Change
Maintenance Activity
Inadequate Labeling
Other ,
RESULTS OF INCIDENT
CIRCUMSTANCE LEADING UP TO THE INCIDENT
for new 1997~lant expansion
EVENTS AND ACTIONS ASINCIDENT OCCURRED
heet A endix A
ro er um out of ii uid line
· "PSM-II0! AP-A
Revised l 0~b't, g4
..'
page 3
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Incident Investigation Form
Incident Report -'
ASSESSMENT OF ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSES:
Failure of the contractor to realize the danger of an improper pump out.
Failure of USCS to monitor and control contractors pump out procedures.
ACTION~~S WHICH HELPED TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF THE INCIDENT
Due to the short duration of the release there was no mitigating a'ction taken.
CIRCUMSTANCE COVERED UNDER PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS? ' YES NO ' '
Global System. pages 13 - 14, guide word - human error, deviation - human error
Loss of containment, cause #12, failure to properly pump-out refrigeration equipment.
... See Appendix "B"
PROPOSED CHANGE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE REQUIRED? Yes. No
Reinforce the policy ~tated An our psm mannua] under Section 5. Contractors Screening
as it pertains to the Chief Engineers responsibility during line opening operators.
See Appendix
Copy Distribution Team Members
R.G. Noll
Team Leader
P.W. Fitzpatrick
C.A. Toogood
~Ra-~ph--HueM '
l__Hpward H. Wines. III?
_Case Number 07-2-3-]5 Manager Signature
'" "~ NOTE: All employees have the right to review all documents and to attend all meetings relating to this Incident, See
'. Team Leader or Team Member for more information,
PSM-II01 AP-A
· . '~:, Revised I 0/5/g4
MAR-17-199? . 1~:01 P.OI
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Freezer Addition, Bakersfield, CA
Calendar of Events
Maroh 15, '1997
Approximately 1:00 p.m.
· Closed L,T.K.L. line at pumps.
· Hooked hose from L.T.R.L. to L.T. rccitculator.
· Closed all L.T.ILL. and H.G. valves to Coils.
· Did this process twice because trucks were going to be unloading all day.
Approximately 2:45 p.m. · Closed remaining valves to coils.
· H.T.R.L. - H.T.R.S. - L.T.R.S. - bypass tt.T.K.L, at pump.
Approximately 3:00 p.m. · Bled of H.O. into L.T.R.S. which was in a vacuum.
Shut down L.T.R.S. main on roof.
· Opened LT.R.S. main to atmosphere; no release.
Approximately 3:16 p.m. . Cut L.T.I~S. line.
· Tied in L.T.R.S. line.
Approximately 4:00 p.m. · Pulled H.'F.R.S. line into vacuum.
· Shut H,T.R.S. main valve.
· Opened to atmosphere; no release.
Approximately 4:10 p.m. · Shut L.T.R.L.drain valve off.
· Opened L.T.R.L. tluew crossover to L.T.R.S..
· Bled air out at new crossover point.
Approximately 4:30 p.m.
· · .' Cut H.T.R.S.
* Tied in H.T.R.S. line
MAR-I?-lg~ 14:01
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Bakersfield, CA
F~eczer Addition
Celcnd~ of Events
March tS, 1997
Approximately 4:45 p.m. · Cut L.T.R.L. line.
· Tied in L.T.\R.L. line.
Approximately 5:00 p~m,
· P.at.hose on H.T.R.L. to L.T. recirculator.
· Opened H.T.R.L. through crossover to H.T.R.S.
· Bled air oat at new crossover point.
Approximately 6:00 p.m. · Closcci pump-out valve on tt.T.R.L.
· Opened H.T.R.L. line off to atmosphere; no release.
Approximately 6:30 p.m.
· . Cut H.T.R.L. line.
Approximately 6:40 P.m.
., Flash of ammonia out of H.T.R.D. line.
· *' I was downstairs; went upstairs. Ammonia downwind pretty bad.
Checked line, no ammonia coming out.
· Fire truck shows up about 7:00 p.m. Told them we had a release. We were almost
finished and release had stopped. Offered to show them.
· As soon as they left, we had another larger release; went upstairs to make sure
everyone was okay.
· Went downstairs; checked valves.
a ' Turned valve on pump dischtuge i/2 turn more.
· Opened pamp-out line e~d turned compressors on.
· While finishing tie in, Fire Department was back in a few minutes and took them ~o
the roof'.
Approximately 7:45 p.m. · Fittished tie-in.
Approximately 8:30 p.m. · · Started plant.
TOTAL P.o2
· ess~= ~ 07-~3-93 R~s~on: 0
~e: :2 G~oba~ S~s~
~a~gs: ~FS~
~=ion= ~le=e facili=y.
~ ~j~ E~or ~ss 6. S~ered l~e, ~C ~ 13. aele~e of re~ig~c121. Pip~g is l~ced ~ [3[1ll J3. ~ew pries Co IBC
~ for~if~ opera=o~.
l all pl~c ~racors ~
J
12s. He,sAc o~ ~e d~
J~ea ~zes
i . Irec~lacor o~ ~c Ico ~g~e ~ ~ea I I I Jrec~lacors o~1 ~c I~ I I J
! I I III I I I'll
131313 ~?. ~LdeF p~p~g H ~ ~C 2 2
Page: 14
Ico engine room area
{enclosed area).
ilO. Releue of
Irefrigeranc co =he
atmosphere.
10. Su~ficien= safeguards
eXLSC
I Cai-OSHA, s Process Safety
I (PSMP) and Risk
J Menagemenc Prevention
J32. ~r C=a~g of
Jall pl~= ~era=ors ~
J~l-~' s ~ess
I
133. ~a dec~o~ ~
J~ea ~ al~ ~e
J c~ce~ ~d ~
34. V~ctlagion ~ ~e
sec co ~ o~f ~
~a dece~o~.
35. S~ c~
'MeChanicalJMechantcal Failure113. ~echan/cal failure of
Failure ]Loss of [ammonia pump,
[Con=ainmenc iaea1 lailure.
[ [14/ Leak from a. P. 11. Release of
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
ProceSs Safety Management Manual
PURPOSE:
SCOPE:
United States Cold Storage, Inc. (USCS) is
committed to the safe operation of our facilities to
protect our workers, the public, and the
environment. This is accomplished to a great
extent by a well developed and implemented
Process Safety Management Program (PSMP).
One of the elements of our PSMP is "Contractor
Screening". This element covers contractors
performing maintenance or repair, turnaround,
major renovation, or specialty work on or adjacent
to an ammonia refrigeration system. It does not
apply to contractors providing incidental, services
which do not influence process safety, such as
janitorial work, food and drink services, laundry,
delivery or other supply services.
The intent of this section is to help all USCS
facilities to hire and use Contractors who
accomplish the desired job task without
oompromising the safety and health of any
employees. Contract employees must perform their
work safely. Considering that contractors often
perform very specialized and potentially hazardous
tasks, such as nOnroutine repairs, their work must
be controlled while they are on or near our
refrigeration system.
The Contractor Safety Program includes the
following elements:
Initial Contractor Screening;
Contractor Employee Training; and '
Contractor Safety Performance
Monitoring.
It will be the responsibility of the Chief Engineer to
be the overall coordinator of the facility Contractor
Screening Program (CSP) acting as the
representative of the Vice President and General
Manager of the facility, who has the overall
responsibility for the success of this program.
The Contractor Screening Program (CSP) involves
responsibilities on the part of USCS relating to
Contractor Screening: Page 1 ~' Revised: Sept. 1993
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Process Safety Management Manual
CONTRACTOR
SCREENING
PROGRAM:
INITIAL CONTRACTOR
SCREENING:
contractors and their employees performing
maintenance or repair, turnaround, major
renovation, or specialty work on or adjacent to a
covered process. The responsibilities include
informing them of known hazards related to their
jobs, training them to our work practices when
necessary to safely perform their jobs and ~'
informing them of any applicable safety rules of the
facility. In addition, the Contractor Safety Program
involves responsibilities on the part of Contractors
who perform the applicable work. The Contractor'S
responsibilities are training employees in safe work
practices, hazards related to their assigned job and
the site's emergency action plan. In addition, the
Contractor will maintain documentation relating to
training of each contractor employee and assume
that any unique hazards Presented or found during
their work are.reported to USCS.
The Contractor Screening Program includes the
following elements:
Initial Contractor Screening;
Contractor Employee Training;
Contractor Safety Performance
Monitoring; and
Contractor Employee Injury/Illness Log.
The Chief Engineer shall designate 'all processes
that are covered by the OSHA PSM regulations. All
Contractors who will work on covered processes will
have to be screened, to Insure compliance with this
section.
The chief engineer of the facility that is seeking to
engage a contract employer shall be responsible
for ensuring that the contract employer is informed
of this requirement. At the earliest possible point, a
request for employee safety information should be
sent to the contract employer (see Appendix A).
This request is designed to determine the details of
the Contractor's 'safety program and information on
their past performance.
Contractor Screening: Page 2 ~ Revised: Sept. 1993
EVENTS PRIOR TO AMMONIA LEAK
SATURDAY MARCH 15, 1997
(1) 1:30 p.m. Ronarrived at plant.
a) David G~ was already in th0Engine Room.
b) Started pump down process onlow temp 10" suction.
c) pUmp isolation valves were shut off liquid to low stage accUmulator.
(2) Started liquid removal low temp liquid.
a) Hot gas was used to pressurize liquid line to remove liquid.
· b) Ron handled Engine Room, David handled roofvalving.
c) Ron used hose to remove liquid to low stage system by oil out.
(3)- Low suction was cut into and opened Ron was never consulted prior to opening line.
a) ~The high temp. suction and low temp. liquid feed was handled in the same manner
(4) 5:00 Pm started high temp liquid pump out.
a) !20# on system.
b) Ron hooked up hose to.liquid.drain leg to oil out.
c) Pressure was dropping slowly (100 drop per I/2 hr.)
d) Ron checked #1 pump suction valve to make sure it was seated. David observed.
(5) 6:00 p.m. David left tO check on welders.
a) David called Ron on the radio and asked what the pressure was on the system.
b) Ron responded the pressure was at 40# PSIG.
c) Ron heard gas hissing and flowing through line.
c) Approximately 10 minutes later David called for'another pressure reading.
d) Ron responded that the System pressure was at 25# PSIG.
e) Approximately 20 minutes later the system was down to 0#.
(6) 6:30 p..m. Ron went up to the roof to find out what was going on, could smell ammonia.
a) One of the welders told Ron that a flame had come out ora pipe and ammonia had.
sprayed out.
b) Ron went to the lower dock roof and saw a small puddle of NH~ on roof.
(7) 6:45 p.m. Fire Department pulled into plant. Ron went to call C. Willis. David talked to
Fire Department, they already left by the time Ron got off the phone with C. Willis.
(8) 7:00 p.m. Ron tried to go back on the roof, the ammonia was too strong, Ray and David
'came running down.
(9) David and Ron went to the Engine Room to check the system.
a) Ron started high side compressor to pull suction into a vacuum.
b) 4-6# PSIG on gauge.
c) David questioned Ron about the #1 high temp pump valve and stated that it was open
a 1/2 turn.
d) Ron told David that he had seated the valve and that David was there at the time.
e) Ron called Cari to return to the plant.
United States Cold Storage, Inc. InCident Investigation Form
TEAM MEMBERS
T.~ iNATURE
INCIDENT TYPE: (Check
j J Refrigeration System [ ] Other (Building)
[ J Near-Miss
( J Vapor Release
[ J Property Damage [ J Liquid Spill -
[ /:lefrigeration Piping/Fork Lilt [ J Fire
PRIMARY SOURCE OF REFRIGERAN ·
[ J Oil Drain Line -'
[ J Pump
[ ] Compressor [ ] Pressure Rellef Valve
[ J Pressure Vessel [ J Automatic ControIValve i
... [ J C°ndenser/Desuperheeter [ J Piping
(" ~[ ] Evaporator [ J Hand Valve [ j Charging Conne'cflon/Source
'".. Revised 10/5/94
page 2
United States Cold Storage, Inc.
Incident Investigation Forrn~
Incident Report
_CAUSE(s) CONTRIBUTING TO A RELEA
~ J Human I~actors~ ~
[ J Design Flaw
[ ] Misapplied Equipment
[ J Power Failure
[ ] Corrosion
[ J Inadequate MaintenanCe
Equipment Defect/Malfunction
[ ] Improper Installation
[ J Mechanical Damage
[ J Hydrostatic Expansion
[ J Hydraulic Shock
Control Failure -
Process Upset
System Change
Maintenance Activity
a~.[,.[=,~~~[~~ '[] ~oadequateAdministralive II ~t~de7uateLabeling
CIR~ADING UP TO THE INCIDENT _ .
ASSESSMENT OF ROOT CAUSE OF INCIDENT:
PSM-II01 AP-A
Revised f 01~g4
/~nited States Cold Storage, Inc.
Incident Investigation Form
Incident Report
page3
Copy Distribution
~-as~umber
NOTE: All employees have the right to
Team Leader
Signature
Date
Name
Title
Manager Signature Date
review all documents and to attend all meetings relating to this incident. See
Team Leader or Team Member.for more information.
PSM-IIOI AP-A
Revised I 0/5/94
Mar'- 17-97 12:53 Kef
? Bakersfield ECC
~ .: 83314~50
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805-833-4950
P '02
JOHN JOHN g.', F~ F.'. Ii!: 'F ,':; 0 N
B A K E R S F I E L D
FIRE DEPARTMENT
M E M O RA.N D U M
DATE: March 17, 1997
TO: Ralph Huey, Hazardous Materials Coordinator
FROM: ~ Howard H. Wines, Hazardous Materials Technician
SUBJECT: US Cold Storage
During the first week in December, 1996, I talked and met with Ron Whisenant and Victor Arnett
regarding the plant expansion.
The topic of our conversation was basically that since the pla~t modification would extend into
after January 1, 1997, the modified RMPP would have to conform to the federal RMP under
California law effective after January 1, 1997 (letter of December 2, 1996 attached).
US Cold Storage does have procedures to manage the proposed modification, pursuant to 29
CFR 1910.119 OSHA's Process Safety Management rules and Section 25543.2 (a) (2) California
Health and Safety Code (CH&SC) requirement for the notification of the administering agency
that those procedures have been established. The PSM documentation was submitted with the
1993 RMPP (copies attached). I have marked the specific reference to making ammonia "tie-ins"
in their safety review checklist. An accident investigation should review if these procedures were
being followed.
US Cold Storage now has 60 days to submit a completed federal RMP, pursuant to Section
554~.2 (b) CH&SC). I will draft a letter to that effect today.
HHW/dlm
THE STELLAR GROUP
November 25, 1996
Mr. Steven Ewing
1715 Chester Avenue
BakersfieM, CA 93301
RE: USCS. Bakersfield
Project//7601-005
Mr. Ewmg:
.~!~e emergent, ,r-monia discharge system and the machine room ventilation system
of the Un/ged States Cold Storage of California, Bakers/ield facilit_w was designed and
~smlled in 1993 for the proposed build out of 400%.
Sincerely,
THE STELLAR GROUP
Director of Refrigeration Engineering
XC:
Chris Palumbo
Tom Diekroegcr
Chuck Taylor
Bob Henriksen
File
/jmr
O05/docs/lmprOl.doc
2900 Hartley Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32257 · Telephone (904) 260-2900
cold ~='~~.. den~ of ~e ~a-~..
on ~e~
the~*cloud
MRR 15 '97 1~::3~:~ OES HQ SR~TO P.l/2
JDA'I?E,z 03115197
TEvi£._
JRECEBrED BY:
Laurlc Smith
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY SERVICES
Hazardous .Mater/als-Spffl'Report
97-I08'7
1939
1. PERSON NOTIFYING GOVERNOR'S OF, S:
a. NAME: b. AGENCY;
c. PHONE#: d. Ext'. e. P, AG/CELL:
Camps
{Kern Co C,o~t~on
NAME: b. AGENCY:
c. PHONF.~: d. EXT.:
d. ]2~ICIDENT LOCATION: 5301 Caracas Avenue - US Cold Stoca;e
e., CITY: £ COUNTY:
Bakersfidd [(em County
h. MAIL ADDRESS; L CITY:
j. STATE:
CA
3., SUBSTANCE TY*PE:
a. SUBSTANCE: b. Ql~: >-< ~ Me~m~ c. TYPE: · OTH~I~
1. ~o~a - 150 ~s.
2.
e. DESCRIPTION: Circumsiancas of release still under investigation. The Fire Dept on sc~ne, lhe vapor is being
allowed to dissipate into the atmosphere.
f. CONTAINED: g, WATER INVOLVED: h. WATERWAY:
Yes No
4, INCIDENT SUMMARY:
· . DATE: 03/15/97 ~ IM/l/t=rvl: 1915
c. INJURI~S# d. FATALS #: e. EVACS #:
0 0 0
b. SITE: Indua-~rial Plant
£ CLEANUP BY:
No cleanup
5. NOTIFICATION INFORMATION:
a. NRC#:
c. OTHER ON SCENE:
b. ON SCENE:
Fire Dept.. Polic~ Dept.
d. OTHER NOTIFIED:
e. ADMJ. N. AGENCY:
£ SEC. AGENCY:
~ NOTII~ICATION LIST: DOG Urdt:
MAR 15 ~97 08:38PM OES H~ SACRAMEMTO
GOVERNOR 'S OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY SERVICES
Hazardous Material Spii! Update?..
CONTROL#:
97-1087
DATE/TIME.- 03/15/97 RECEIVED BY:
I 1939 Laude Smith
CITY/OP. AREA:
]~lkersfield~ Count~
PERSON CALLING OES: Barbaxa Camps
AGENCY: Kern Co Communication
PAGER #(CELLPHONE):
PHONF~: 805-861-2500 Ext:
~ UBST~,J,{CE TYPE:
.. SUBSTANCE: b. QYY: c TYPE: d. OTIS. R;
Amo~ M~
m .~no~a 1 ~ ~s. V~OR
SITUATION UPDATE: 2000 3/15/97 Ron WhienanL US Cold Storage
The correct locatiou of r~lease was 6501 Disuict Blvd, Bakersfield. The cause was a problem with the system
tic-in [o an expansion. Tile sourco h~$ becn stopped. No cleanup done it was a relea_.~ to ~Im~s~here.
FAX NOTIFICATION LIST: AA/CUPA, AIR RESOURCF~ BI), DFG-OSPR, DISC,
RWQCB, SFM, US EPA. U/IFWS
ADMINISTERING AGENCY:
SECONDARY ACE1VC'Y:
OTI:[ER
Created by: Warning Center on: 03/1 ~;197 08:32:13 PM Last Modified by: Wamirtg Center on: 03115/97 08:30:13 PM
· ' * ' ° ' ' " " ' ', · ' End of Form
CITY OF-BAKERS~LD
1715 CHESTER*AVEIq"UE
BAKERSFIELD, CA 93301
B U i LDI N GDE PARTM ENT.
PERMIT INFO
Permit No..: 96-05224
Permit Type: COMN
Type.. ...... :NEW
Status ..... : READY
LOCATION
Job Address: 6501 DISTRICT BLVD
Location...:
.Description: FREEZER EXPANSION ~'
Tr/No/Lot..~ TR
Zone ....... : M2
School Dist: 1. PANAMA
Cond Sq Ft.: 52414
CONSTRUCTION
Occ Class..: S-3
Type Const.: V-N
Fire Sprlk.: Y
PEOPLE
Owner ....... :UNITED STATES COLD
Applicant..: TOOGOOD CHUCK A
Arch/Engr..:
Contractor.:
FLORIDA STELLAR GROUP,
Cont Lic No: 565349
Cont Addr..: 2900 HARTLEY
FEES
Plan Check.: 3,382.
Building...: 3,529.
Mechanical.: 845.
Plumbing...: 1,388
Electrical.: 1,294
Fire Sprlk.:
Bond ....... :
School Fee.: 15,724
Park Fee...:
Habitat Fee:
Special Ins:
Additional.:
Double Fee.:
S.M.I. Fee.: 265
P.W. Fees..: 9,991
Applied..:
'ApproVed.:
Completed:.
To Expire:
10/28/1996
Parcel...:
SPR No...:
Park Dist:
385~014-08-001
.Occ NO...: .0025
Code ..... : 1994 UBC
020
STORGPhoneANo.:
Phone No.:
Phone No.:
IPhone No.:
Exp Date.:
(904')260-2900
32257
84 Total Sq Ft...: 52414
01 Bldg Valuation: 1,257,936.00
71 Mech Valuation: 875,400.00
64 Plmg Valuation: 560.00
67 Elec Valuation: 202,000.00
00 Fire Sprlk Val: .00
00 Bond Valuation: .00
20 Tot Valuation.: 2,335,896.00
00 Tot. Calc Fee..: 36,421.07
00 Additonal Fee.: .00
00 Tot Permit Fee: 36,421.07
00 Payments ...... : - 3,382.84'
00 Balance Due...: 33,038.23
00
00
CALL FOR INSPECTION
24 Hour Recorder Number (805) 326-3728
Please state the Permit Number, the Job Address, and the
Type of Inspection. Request for inspections should be
made at least twenty-four hours in advance.
Inspectors office hours are:
8:00 - 8:30 AM and 1:00 - 1:30 PM
DECLARATIONS
Permit is issue0 in accordance with all applicable Federal, State and Local
Ordinances. The permittee has 0roperly signed and dated the reverse side
of this form.
This permit expires after 180 daye of Inactivity. :
have reviewed .t/h~b0ve/~ppli,o~tion, and find it to be correct/complete:
~AI~. OUS MATERIALS STATEMENT' ..c~ ' · - '
__Yes ----.No Will the applicant or ~ture oc_ll~nt.handle, hazardous material or a mixture contai'~ ~n~ hazardous material equ~.t~;b~Ygruater
than the amounts specified'on,the list of extremely:hazardous substances? See checklist for guidelines.
Yes ~No Will the proposed building or modified facility be within 1000 feet of the outer boundary of a school?
__yes --'~o Will the intended use of the building by the applicant or future. b'uilding OCcuPant require a permit for eonatrncti~,~~~'°n.
from the Kern CountyA~r PollutiunControiDistriet:(KCAPCD);or~fiX~ya. the City:ofBak.:FireDept~;~:eJa~kliat~~.
~Yes ~No I have read the Hazardous Material Guide and KCAPCD Permitting Checklist. I understand mL 2L'~?:~'~"-c
y ~luu~men~:unoer'xne 't~aliL
: ~_.., H..ealth and.$afcty:C, odeSee. 6.95 and Ca]if, Govt. See. 65550 and the req .uffeme~ts o£ the. Cit,.of Bak~-Fi~-Dept regarding
Owner or Authorized Agent Phone No "'~
DECLARATIONS: The declarations below are mandated by the State of CalifOrnia under Section 1 §8~5 of the Health and:~ifetY Code.
LICENSED CONTRACTORS DECLARATION ........
I hereby affirm under penalty of perjury that I am licensed under provisions of Chapter..O-(commencing with Seetioa~700D}:~of ~e'Division 3
'N~ of the Business and Professions Cede and my license is in full force ~,effect. ~~. ~~.,~y,...~ ~'~;' ':.:, "'..~-~k c .... :~:=c.:;:~::~k]~:..
OWNER-BUILDER DECLARATION
I hereby affirm that under penalty of perjury that i am exempt £rom the Contractors License Law f0~'~he '~llA~id~, '_'
and Professions Code. Any city or county which reqmres a permit to construct, alter, improve, demolish, or rep~Y's~~ to its issuance
also requires the applicant for s~och permi~ to file a signed statemdnt that he or she is licensed pursuant to the provis~O'ns office ~rs License Law
(Chapter 9 commencing with Section 7000 of Division 3 or the Business and Professions Code) or that he or sh~i~.ei~ill~J~~md the basis
for the alleged exemption. Any violation of Section 7031.5 bv any applicant for a permit subjects theapl~icant to a ~~. t more than five
hundred dollars ($500)): '
I/as o, wr}.er of the property, or my employees with ~vages as their sole compensation, will do the work and the strnetu~
rot sine (Sec. 7044 Business and Professions Code. The Contractors License Law does ~* ~l ........ ' __ _r~]]~_::~;.'--'~
· . : .. -,? -~to,y ......... ~r u~ prop~'tT:wno:i:fuiid$ o~ imprnves
thereon and who does such work himself or herself through h~s or her own employees, prowded that soch improvements am~aotz{~e~ded'or offered
for sale. If. however; the building or improvement is sold within one year of completion, the owner-builder will have:the-bi--linch'proving that he
or she did not build or improve for the purpose Of sa]e). _ ..." ..
I as owner of the property., am exclusively contracting with licensed contractors to construct the project (See. 7044Bi~ina~m~lt~ofessions Code:
The Contractors License Law does not apply to an owner of property who builds or improves thereon 'and who contract,...,fi~D~uc., h project with a
contractor(s) licensed pursuant to the Contractor License Law).
I am exempt under Sec. B.&.P.C. for this reason
Owner Si~:nature
WORKERS COMPENSATION DECLARATION
I hereby affirm that under penalty, of perjury, one of the following declarations:
I have and will maintain a certificate of consent to seif-inst,re £or workers' compensation, as provided for bv Section 37~0 d~'tho Labor Code, for
the performance of the work for which this permit is issued. ' ..........
I have and will maintain workers' compensation insurance, tis required by Section 3700 of the Labor Code, for the performance o-f the work for which
this pe~s~y workers' compensation insurance carrier ann policy number are:
Carrier
.~ ~ - Policv No.:
I certify that in the performance of the work for which this permit is issued, I shall not employ any person in any manner so ~ to become subject
to the workers' compensation laws of California. and agree that if I shou]d become subject to the workers' compensati®n provisions of Section 3700
of the Labor Code. I shall forthwith comply with those prnvisions. .
WARNING: FAILURE TO SECURE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COVERAGE IS UNLAWFUL, AND SHALL SUBJECT AN EMPLOYER TO
CRIMINAL PENALTIES AND CIVIL FINES UP TO ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLS, RS ($100,000) IN ADDITION TO THE COST OF
COMPENSATION. DAMAGES AS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 3706 OF THE LABOR CODE, LNTEREST, AND A'I~ORNEY'S FEES;
CONSTRUCTION LENDING AGENCY
I here, by affirm that there is a construction lcuding agency fbr the perfi)rmance of the work for which this permit is issued (See. 3097 Civ. C.).
Lenders Name Lenders Address
certify that I hacc read this application and state that the iqtbrw: :i tion contained herein is correct; 'I agree to comply with all ct~j:o~gt~rw~ and ~a~ laws
relattn~ to building construction and hereb~,ymthorize represqntativcs qf the city to enter the above-mentkmed IyroI:~j.~ ~.,, .... .
Sign,ture of Applican' or Agent
APPROVED BUILDING DIRECTOR By
THE STELLAR GROUP
November 25, 1996
Mr. Steven Ewing
1715 Chester Avenue
BakersfieM, CA 93301
RE: USCS - Bakersfield
Projec~ #7601-005
Mr. Ewing.
.~!~e emergent, ~monia discharge system and the machine room ventilation system
of the umr~d States Cold Storage of California, Bakersfield fadlit.~- was designed and
mst~tled in 1993 for the proposed build out of 400%.
Sincerely,
THE STEIXAR GROUP
Director of Refrigeration Engineering
XC:
Chris Palumbo
Tom Diekroegcr
Chuck Taylor
Bob Hennksen
File
/jmr
005/docs/lmprOl.dcc
2900 Hartley Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32257 * Telephone (904) 260-29O0
SENT BY: g-17-87 ; ~:22P~ ;
Post-it* Fax Note
ASSOCIATION
805 326 0~76;# 1/ 4
Guidelines for'.
Suggested Safety and
Operating Procedures
When Making
Ammonia Refrigeration
Plant Tie-ins
I
International Institute of
Ammonia Refrigeration
SENT BY: 3-17-B7 ; 3:22P~ ; ASSOCIATION itI~RS-* 805 326 0576;# 2/ 4
Suggested Safety and Operating-Procedures for Making
Ammonia Refrigeration Plant Tie-Ins
This bulletin is prepared as the result of recommendations made by members of the Interna-
tional Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration.
It is intended to be used as a guide for suggested safety procedures for making ammonia
refrigeration plant tie-ins,
We also refer you to Bulletin No, 106 that relates to human safety factors? knowing that any
work in and around ammonia systems is subject to certain hazards of human misjudgment
possibly related to equipment, design, installation and maintenance.
In addition, the IlAR also has published other design, operating and installation standards.
We invite your further inquiry relative to obtaining these materials for your use throughout
plant locations.
A) VALUE ENGINEERING FOR FUTURE EXPANSION IN ORIGINAL DESIGN
1) Approximate size and locations of extra valves for future growth.
2)
Size dead-end valves on main line stubs to which future connections are to be made.
The size of the vane should be at least one size larger than the maximum tonnage
indicates, Reduction in pipe size can always be made when new equipment is in
stalled. Consider the direction of flow when installing valves, These dead-end valves
should always be plugged or blank-flanged until put to use.
3) It is difficult to determine or anticipate all of the proper location of valves for future use. It
is far better to have too many than not enough valved stubs,
B) PLANNING INDIVIDUAL LOAD ADDITIONS
1)
Check existing mains to be sure that they will handle the additional planned load, as well
as future loads in the same area. Be certain they are connected to lines of ample capac-
ity, or that required capacity can be added.
2) Determine cut-off valve locations and valve' sizes for the planned load.
3)
Set in and install all new equipment and piping on additions to point of tie-in to the old
system. Be sure all valves are in proper position for tests. Use dry air pressure, soap
solution test and a 24 hour vacuum hold test. Nitrogen may also be used for pressure
testing. Never use an ammonia compressor in the system for the purpose of building up
air pressure for testing. Remember that all welds and tests should be made in accor-
dance with national, state and local codes.
4) Coordinate with plant operations for time of cut into old system.
SENT BY: ~-17-87 · 8:2~PM ; ASSOCIATION HI)ORS~ 805 82~ 057§;#
3/ 4
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
Line up equipment and instruct personnel for pump out procedures. Be certain the safety
equipment, such as gas masks, water hose, fire extinguisher, safetY goggles, and other
necessities are readily available.
Shut off valves in old system. Pump out part of the old system affected, and hold a
vacuum long enough to check that all vaJves are holding. Use tags to indicate all valves
that are doSed for the tie-in.
Vent old system lines that are to be cut to the atmosphere. Make certain this vent will not
affect persons or property in the vicinity.
Make all cut-ins, Be certain, when cutting into existing lines, that the pressure is not in a
deep vacuum. This will pull air into the cut pipe to form an explosive mixture with the
internal oil vaporized by the heat of the cutting torch. Use nitrogen to flush any oil vapors
before making tie-in welds. Use a floor fan to direct vapors away from the person doing
the welding. Pressure tapping services are available in some areas, if a pump out is
impossible,
Introduce a Small amount of ammonia gas into the system and test for leaks with litmus
paper or a sulphur stick.
If tests are satisfactory, open the suction line valves to wide open positions and test
again as above.
11) Slowly return valves to normal positions for automatic operation. Apply all necessary
insulation before starting to refrigerate.
12) Branch lines should be opened in sequence to prevent over-loading the COmpressors.
13) Test and balance the controls for each new section.
14) Lower the temperature, in rooms where work has been performed, very slowly to prevent
wall stress or equipment damage. Be sure that air pressure within the room can equal-
ize with that outside.
15)
Return the remainder of the system to normal operations. Remove tags from valves
when they are reopened.
SENT BY: ,3-17-87 ; ,3:2,3P~1 ; ASSOCIATION I-IDORS--,
805 826 05?6;#
This publication contains advisory information
only, IlAR disclaims liability for the use,
application or adaptation of the information
contained herein.
For additional copies or information of related
interest, contact:
International Institute of
Ammonia Refrigeration
Washington, DC
(202) 857-1110
BAKERSFIELD
FIRE DEPARTMENT
December 2, 1996
FII~ CHIEF
MICHAEL R. KELLY
ADMINISTRAI~E SERVICES
2101 'H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (805) 395-1349
SUFI~ESSION SERVICES
2101 'H" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3941
FAX (805) 395-1349
PREVENllON SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3951
FAX (805) 326-0576
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
(805) 326-3979
FAX (805) 326-0576 ·
TRAINING DIVISION
5642 Victor Street
Bakersfield, CA 93308
(805) 399-4697
FAX (805) 399-5763
Mr. Ron Whisenant
United States Cold Storage
6501 District Blvd.
Bakersfield, CA 93313
RE: New Federal RMP in California
Dear Ron:'
Enclosed is a summary Factsheet and legislation that effectively adopts the
federal RMP as replacement for RMPP's in California. The State Office of
Emergency Services is to develop regulations to implement the federal RMP by
mid 1998. However, these regulations will not affect the existing federal rules, if
anything, California will probably include additional materials to be regulated
and/or lower the regulatory thresholds to include more facilities than does the
federal rule.
We should at least make RETA members aware of this change in law. The
RMP also involves the integration of PSM and emergency response planning into
single RMP document. I have some particular information in this area that I can
share with your membership as well. Let's start thinking about a joint effort RMP
workshop event for 1997.
Sincerely,
Howard H. Wines, Ill
Hazardous Materials Technician
HHW/dlm
enclosure
Plant Address:
6501 District Blvd.
Bakersfield, California 93313
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE OF CALIFORNIA
Phone: 805 / 832-COLD (2653) · Fax: 805 / 832-5846
Mailing Address:
P.O. Box 41000
Bakersfield, California 93384
June 19, 1996
HoWard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Material Technicians
1751 Chester Ave.
Bakersfield, CA 93301
Dear Howard,
We have reviewed our RMPP Manual and found a few minor changes necessary. Most of
the changes involve personnel. The rest are inspection forms for equipment. The package
we sent you has locations of the forms. Please insert them into the proper location and
discard the old ones. Note that some are two sided forms. I have also included a letter
stating the number of accidents involving acutely hazardous material.
If you have any questions or need any further assistance please call me at 832-2653.
Sincerely,
Ron Whisenant
Chief Engineer
USCS Bakersfield
R.E. HUEY
HAZ-MAT COORDINAI'OR
(805) 326-3979
Ron Whisenant, Chief Engineer.
United States Gold Storage
6501 District Blvd.'
Bakersfield, CA 93313
· CITI~of B~4'KERSFIELD'~FIRE DEPARTMENT
:FIRE'SAFETY SERVICES & OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL sERvICES
1715 CHESTER AVE. · BAKERSFIELD, CA · 9330'1 '
April 3, 1996
NOTICE OF RECERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
for the
RISK MANAGEMENT and PREVENTION PLAN
R.B. TOI~IAS,
FIRE MARSHAL
(805) 326-3951
Certified Mail
Dear Mr. Whisenant:
"Self-Certification Process"
Approximately three to five years ago, you or someone under direction from your facility
submitted a Risk Management and prevention Plan (RMPP) document tOthis office.
State law requires that your business review the RMPP every three to five years and make
necessary revisions. Our records indicate that it is now time for your business to conduct a review
of the RMPP document, make any necessary revisions, and submit the "Self-Certification" checklist
along' with any neceSsary RMPP changes to this office no later than 30 days after receipt of this
letter.
To assist you in the review process, the following guidance documents are enclosed: .
· A brief summary of the current RMPP strategies for your facility. This is only for yoUr
convenience, a thorough review of the entire RMPP document is also required.
"Self-Certification" checklist to be signed and returned along with any 'RMPP revisions.
If you have any' questions regarding the RMPP'review process,' preparation guidelines, or
required elements, please call Howard Wines at 326-3979.
Sincerely,
HHW/dlm
enclosureS
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Materials Technician
SELF-CERTIFICATION
[]
The RMPP originally consisted of either eliminating, substituting, or else reducing the type and quantity of acutely
hazardous materials below the threshold planning quantities, and this is still in effect. (If yes, please check this box
and sign the Certification Statement below and return this form).
Pleaee submit updatee and changee for any of the following elements:
Check as Reviewed
~]
The RMPP shall identify, by title, all personnel at the business who are responsible for carrying c~ut the specific elements
of the RMPP, and their respective responsibilities.
A detailed training program to ensure that those persons specified in the RMPP are able to implement the RMPP.
A description of each accident involving acutely hazardous materials since the RMPP was prepared, together with a
description of the underlying causes of the accident and the measures taken, if any, to avoid a recurrence of a similar
accident.
A report specifying the nature, age, and condition of the equipment used to handle acutely hazardous materials at the
facility and any schedules for testing and maintenance.
Design, operating, and maintenance controls which minimize the risk of an accident involving acutely hazardous
materials.
Detection, monitoring, or automatic control systems to minimize potential acutely hazardous materials accident risks.
The implementation of additional steps to be taken to reduce the risk of an accident involving acutely hazardous
materials. These actions may include any of the following:
· Installation of alarm, detection, monitoring, or automatic control devices.
· Equipment modifications, repairs, or additions.
· Changes in the operations, procedures, maintenance schedules, or facility design..
Auditing and inspection programs designed to confirm that the RMPP is effectively carried out.
. Recordkeeping procedures for the RMPP.
A clearly prepared map noting the location of the facility which shows schools, residential areas, hospitals, health care
facilities and child day care facilities and the zones of vulnerability, including the levels of expected exposure in each
zone. If no such map was prepared originally, one is now required. Please call 328-3979 for more details.
CERTIFICATION STATEMENT
I, Ron ~J. 14-h:l. senanl: ,.]'r. hereby cert!fy that I have reviewed the existing Risk Management
(Name of Facility Operator)
and Prevention Plan (RMPP) for un,_tea Sl:al:es Co]c] Sl:or~:e, and that it, along with any
Bakersfield (Name of Facility)
corrections or additions submitted herewith, constitutes a current and complete RMPP according to
/
(Slgn~ureT (Dat/e)- -
Please mall this "Self-Certification" form along with any corrections and additional RMPP information to:
Bakersfield Fire Department, Office of Environmental Services 1715 Chester Av. 3rd Floor Bakersfield, CA 93301
RMPP FIVE YEAR REVIEW
BUSINESS NAME:
LOCATION:
pRIMARY RMPP CONTACT:
PHONE NUMBER~'
United States Cold Storage of California
6501 District Blvd.
Ron Whisenant, Chief Engineer
(805) 832-2653
RMPP IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES:
Ammonia leak detectors·
Ammonia 'diffusion system.
Ammonia pressure relief valves piped to absorption tank.
Training program for employees.
Automatic shut-offs.
Ammonia 20,968.78 lbs.
· revised 6/18/96
Complete items :~ ~ ,~,u,~ z Tor addition
Print ,,~- v, ~nu ~a & b al Services.
e Um this Card to - ddress on the r
Attach this for~Y+°,u' e-vrse of this form so
Write "Re,- '~ a"Ptece, or on tho k . ·
]'he Retur;;U~rn r~e. ceipt Requested,, on .L ~ ~ ~ac~ ,f Space
detiver~.~ ,,ecelpt wilt show ~ ...~ "me mmlPiece.b~,o ,
~ -~ whom the artic~'e%,---..w, the article number.
3. A r~ .... oe/,vered a~
I ~a. Arth
I also Wish to receive the '!
following services (for an extra ~
fee):
~' /~ Addressee's Address ~1I
2. ~ Restricted Delivery ~.!
~' ~er for fee '~
le Nu~
~ ~ CO~ S~O~ ~ ~egistered ~ ~sure~
B~RSF~ n ~. ~ Certified ~
z~ ~x~ress Mad ~ Return Recei-- -
r :~~ 18. ~ _ .
~ ~ V I I ~ A ~ s ~_,~,
r ~ ·
- "]~'~J~ DOMESTIC RETU~ ~ECEIPT
P
Sent to
_RON I~ISENANT, CHIEF
S t . _
~f~'~,-C~ 93313
Postage
- $ .3;
Certified Fee
S~ecial DeJ~very Fee 1.
Restricted Delivery Fee -
Return Receipt Showing
to Whom & Date Delivered
1.1(
Return Receipt Show~ng to Whom,
Date, and Addressee's Address
TOTAL Postage
Postmark or Date
390 214 538
Receipt or
Certified~Mai~ ·
No Insurance Coverage Provided
Do not use for International Mail
(See Reverse)
R.E. HUEY
HAZ-MAT COORDINATOR
(805) 326-3979
CITY of BA KERSFIELD FIRE DEPARTMENT
FIRE SAFETY SERVICES & OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
1715 CHESTER AVE. * BAKERSFIELD, CA * 93301
April 3, 1996
R.B. TOBIAS,
FIRE MARSHAL
(805) 326-3951
Ron Whisenant, Chief Engineer
United States Cold Storage
6501 District Blvd.
Bakersfield, CA 93313
NOTICE OF RECERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
for the
RISK MANAGEMENT and PREVENTION PLAN
"Self. Certification Process"
Dear Mr. Whisenant:
Certified Mail
Approximately three to five years ago, you or someone under direction from your facility
submitted a Risk Management and Prevention Plan (RMPP) document to this office.
State law requires that your business review the RMPP every three to five years and make
necessary revisions. Our records indicate that it is now time for your business to conduct a review
of the RMPP document, make any necessary revisions, and submit the "Self-Certification" checklist
along with any necessary RMPP changes to this office no later than 30 days after receipt of this
letter.
To assist you in the review process, the following guidance documents are enclosed:-
A brief summary of the current RMPP strategies for your facility. This is only for your
convenience, a thorough review of the entire RMPP document is also required.
· "Self-Certification" checklist to be signed and returned along with any RMPP revisions.
If you have any questions regarding the RMPP review process, preparation guidelines, or
required elements, please call Howard Wines at 326-3979.
Sincerely,
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Materials Technician
HHW/dlm
enclosures
BUSINESS NAME:
LOCATION:
PRIMARY RMPP CONTACT:
PHONE NUMBER:
RMPP FIVE YEAR REVIEW
United States Cold Storage of California
6501 District Blvd.
Ron Whisenant, Chief Engineer
(805) 832-2653
RMPP MATERIAL & QUANTITY:
Ammonia: 399,620 cu.ft.
RMPP IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES:
Ammonia leak detectors
Ammonia diffusion system.
Ammonia pressure relief valves piped to absorption tank.
Training program for employees.
Automatic shut-offs.
SELF-CERTIFICATION
[]
The RMPP originally consisted of either eliminating, substituting, or else reducing the type and' quantity of acutely
hazardous materials below the threshold planning quantities, and this is still in effect. (If yes, please check this box
and sign the Certification Statement below and return this form).
Please submit updatse and changse for any of the following elements:
Check as Reviewed
[]
[]
[]
The RMPP shall identify, by title, ail personnel at the business who are responsible for carrying out the specific elements
of the RMPP, and their respective responsibilities.
A detailed training program to ensure that those persons specified in the RMPP are able 1:o implement the RMPP.
A description of each accident involving acutely hazardous materials since the RMPP was prepared, together with a
description of the underlying causes of the accident and the measures taken, if any, to avoid a recurrence of a similar
accident.
[]
A report specifying the nature, age, and condition of the equipment used to handle acutely hazardous materials at the
facility and any schedules for testing and maintenance.
[]
Design, operating, and maintenance controls which minimize the dsk of an accident involving acutely hazardous
materials.
[]
[]
[1
[1
Detection, monitoring, or automatic control systems to minimize potential acutely hazardous materials accident risks.
The implementation of additional steps to be taken to reduce the risk of an accident involving acutely hazardous
materials. These actions may include any of the following:
· Installation of alarm, detection, monitoring, or automatic control devices.
· Equipment modifications, repairs, or additions.
· Changes in the operations, procedures, maintenance schedules, or facility design.
Auditing and inspection programs designed to confirm that the RMPP is effectively carried out.
Recordkeeping procedures for the RMPP.
[]
A clearly prepared map noting the location of the facility which shows schools, residential areas, hospitals, health care
facilities and child day care facilities and the zones of vulnerability, including the levels of expected exposure in each
zone. If no such map was prepared originally, one is now required. Please call 326-3979 for more details.
CERTIFICATION STATEMENT
I, hereby certify that I have reviewed the existing Risk Management
(Ne, me of Facility Operator)
and Prevention Plan (RMPP) for and that it, along with any
(Name of Facility)
corrections or additions submitted herewith, constitutes a current and complete RMpp according to
the checklist above.
(Signature) (Date)
Please mail this "Self-Certification" form along with any corrections and additional RMPP information to:
Bakersfield Fire Department, Office of Environmental Services 1715 Chester Ay. 3rd Floor Bakersfield, CA 93301
6oo0
FiRE DEPARTMENT
S. D. JOHNSON
FIRE CHIEF
CITY of BAKERSFIELD
"WE CARE"
December 6, 1993
2101HSTREET
BAKERSFIELD, 93301
326-3911
Victor D. Arnett
Regional Engineer
U.S. Cold Storage of California
3100 52nd Avenue
Sacramento, CA 95832
Dear Victor:
Bakersfield Fire finds the risk management and prevention plan (RMPP) prepared
by you and your RMPP team regarding the handling of ammonia at 6501 District Blvd.,
to be complete in scope and content. The Bakersfield Fire Department will conduct
follow up inspections to verify compliance with the risk management measures described
in this plan.
Notice of completion of this RMPP will be published in the Bakersfield Californian.
The RMPP will then be subject to a 45 day review period during which the Bakersfield
Fi?e Dept. will consider all public comments regarding the adequacy of this RMPP.
Please call me if I can provide any further assistance or clarification regarding the risk
management plan.
Sincerely, ,!
Ralph.Huey
Hazardous Materials Coordinator
cc: Matt Kohler, Bakersfield Plant
REPORI ~ME: "
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address
BAKERSFIELD CA 93301
PROOF OF PUBLICATION
state of California -ss
County of Kern ~
I am a citiZen of the United
States and a resident of the
County aforesaid: I am over
the age of 18 years, and not
a party to or interested in
the above entitled matter. I
am the assistant principal
clerk of the printer of The
"-B~kersfield Californian, a
newspaper of general circula-
tion, printed and published
daily in the City of
Bakersfield, county of Kern,
and which newspaper has been
adjudged a newspaper of
general circulation by the
Superior Court of the County
of Kern, State of California,
under date of February 5,
1952,_Case Number 57610; that
the'n~tice, of which the
annexed is a printed copy,
has been published in each
regular and entire issue of
said newspaper and not in any
supplement thereof on the
following dates, to wit:
Proof of Publication of:
9182
rmpp
all in the year 1993
I certify (or declare) under
penalty of perjury that the
foregoing is true and corr-
ect.
', Si-gfiature
Dated at Bakersfield, Ca
December 13, 1993.
Michelle McPhetridge
PROOF OF PUBLICATION
~ccoun~ J~S3979CET Class 5~0
~.JTPUT. TE~T
7
9
~0
17
Bahe~sfiel~ CA 9330~o Con-
Ralph E. Huey fo~ info~a-
MEMORAN'DUM
"WE CA RE"
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
Ralph Huey, Coordinator, HazMat Division
L. Graham, Battalion Chief, lB ~, ~.
ectlon
Thank you for your efforts in organizing the recent RMPP inspection of U.S.'Cold
Storage. Your efforts combined with Mr. Victor Arnett's instruction provided, I
believe, the best information yet received during these informative periods.
22/93
15:41
'~805 326 0576
BFD HAZ. MAT DIV
ACTIVITY REPORT ***
~ool
TRANSMISSION OK
TX/RX NO.
'CONNECTION TEL
CONNECTION ID
START TIME
USAGE TIME
PAGES
'RESULT
1180
09/22 15:40
00'56
2
OK
8325846
5:AX
COVER
CITY OF BAKERSFIELD
FItUg DEPART~LENT - ]~Z&RDOUS MATERIALS DrV-ISION
2130 "G" Street
Bakersfield, Ca. 93301
Fax Phone (805)326-0576
Office (805)326-3979
PLEASE ROUTE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO:
Name: ....
--.~
Company/Organization:_
Fax No. Sending Message to:
]:AX
COVER
SHEET
CITY OF BAKERSFIELD
FIRE DEP:kRTNLENT - J:tAZAJ~OUS ~[A. TERIALS DlW"ISION
2130 "G" Street
Bakersfield, Ca. 93301
Fax Phone (805)326-0576
Office (805)326-3979
PLEASE ROUTE AS SOON AS
Name: ~~f~C ti
Company/Organization:
POSSIBLE TO:
Fax No. Sending Message to:'
Contact Person:·
Number of Pages
, FROM:
(including cover sheet): · .¢--~
Description
of Materials
Sent/Special Instructions:
CITY of BAKERSFIELD
"WE CARE"
FIRE DEPARTMENT
S. D. JOHNSON
FIRE CHIEF
Victor Arnett
California Regional Engineer
U. S. Cold Storage
3100 52nd Ave.
Sacramento; CA 95832
August 16, 1993
~ 2101 H STREET
BAKERSFIELD, 93301
326-3911
Victor,
I have reviewed the draft hazard & operability analysis and ammonia dispersion
modeling for your new Bakersfield plant. Following are my comments and questions
regarding the materials submitted' so far.
DISPERSION MODELS
The seal leak in the engine room and 3/4" liquid line break are'acceptable
scenarios for preparation of the. offsite consequence analysis. The seal leak
should be referred to in the text as the "most likely" incident and the 3/4" line
break as the 'Worst credible" incident. In the offsite consequence analysis text,
you should include the explanation of why the 3/4" line is' more likely to break
than is a larger liquid line.
Page 3 of the Bakersfield Fire RMPP preparation guidelines specifies that the
vapor dispersion modeling must be completed using the IDLH and 1/10 IDLH
values as the levels of concern. Your plume diagrams were prepared using 50
ppm and 250 ppm ammonia. The'IDLH for ammonia is 500 ppm. However,
since the cameo printouts give the downwind distances for the IDLH, I will accept
the diagrams at the alternate value of 250 ppm. OUr guidelines also require
inclusion of the expected concentration of ammonia at the facility property line.
A key needs to be provided with the plume diagrams to indicate the ammonia
concentration in each shaded area/
o
The offsite consequence vulnerability maps must show the locations of sensitive
populations sUch. as schools and health care facilities. (See pg. 5 Bakersfield
RMPP preparation guidelines)
The text of the Consequence analysis should include a discussion of ALOHA's
termination of the scenario at one hour. It needs to be clear that the releases
may actually last longer.
HAZARD & OPERABILITY ANALYSIS
On pg. 3, Safeguard 26 it is noted that "control is shut down by ammonia .detector.
in alarm area" in the event of high flow from the high pressure receiver. Does the
aestivation of an ammonia detector cause the king valve or any other valves
controlling liquid ammonia feed to close?
On pg. 3, Cause 11, you may want to re-rank the_ risk following the
implementation of the recommendation to drain oil to collectors.
On pg. 15, Node 4 the consequences, safeguards and risk ranking seem to be
missing for item 1. Is this just be an alignment problem or is information missing?
There are several places in the document where consequences, safeguards and'
risk ranking data seem to be missing. This is understandable where the fault
leads only to an. operational problem.. Please review the haz op format to make
certain that. all of the infOrmation is in the right location and provide some
explanation of the format. Pg. ! 9, Node 5 provides another example of thiS
situation.
On pg. 3, Node 2 Global I am not 'certain why the severity of the releases from the
oil out pots Would be reduced by the relocation of the pots and the installation of
pressure gauges. It is understandable that likelihood is decreased, but would the
size of the release be reduced if the event Occurred after, their relocation?
Item 15, Node 2-Global (pg.4) relates to leaks from the high pressure-receiver
sight glass. Can the sight glass be easily isolated to control a leak?
Are safeguards 39 and 40 of Node 2-Global (pg.5) automatically controlled by the
computer or are they dependant upon operator training?
7~
Please explain why the worst case release 3/4~.' liquid line break, is given a
severity rating of 2.
8. The operator training program portion of the RMpP should be carefully detailed
due to the number of locations in the Haz/Op where operator training is listed as
a safeguard.
Please get. copies of the completed hazard analysis, and a schedule for
completion of the RMPP to me as' soon as possible.
Sincerely,
Barbara Brenner
Hazardous Materials Planning Technician
cc: Ralph Huey
MEMORANDUM
THE STELLAR GROUP
2900 HARTLEY ROAD
JACKSONVILLEv FL 3225?
(904) 260-2900
RECEIVED
TO: The File
,JUL 2 7
FROM:
Bruce
HAZ. MAT. DIV.
DATE: Jul][ 19, 1993
CU~-~CT .: ....... 'U~.-S-.-- ~vOLD ---~ T~P~E-- .--~---%~'=~ERSF-I-E~D ;~ C-~-~
A meeting was held in Bakersfield, California on July 13, 14 & 15,
1993 for' the purpose of conducting a HAZOP study for their new
facility under construction there. My notes from this meeting are
as follows:
1. Meeting AttendeeS:
· Victor Arnett -
· Raul Ragunton -
· Matt Kohler -
· Cari Willis -
· Ralph Nodal -
· Jim Marella -
· Larry Jones -
· Barbara Brenner -
· Bruce Chandler -
USCS Sacramento
USCS Sacramento
USCS Bakersfield
USCS Bakersfield
USCS Tulare
USCS Lyons
USCS Tracy
Bakersfield City FD
Stellar
2. The oil drain from the hig~hpr__e~sure receiver should be
............... ~6hne~ct-~d--~o--the~-i~~6very system. We should d---°~h-~
same in Tracy as soon as possible·
I was told by Jim Marella that per Dave Murphy of Frick
Company, training films are available for Frick
equipment. If they are, we should get what is available
and make them available to USCS in Bakersfield and Tracy.
The inert gas purger should be piped to the freezer
suction. We should leave it piped to the high stage as
it is now, but simply tie into that line with a valve and
go to the low stage.
MEMO TO FILE
USCS - Bakersfield
July 19, 1993
Page 2
5. I am to review the booster compressor discharge cooling
piping and system. Changes should be reflected on
revised drawings.
'6. Liquid lines to the plant will require a relief from
liquid to suction to prevent against possible hydraulic
expansion during a shutdown.
'7/-~-rThe ammonia sensOr~i~--~h~ vent ~i~~6~i~d-be~a~d~-wirea'
in series with the emergency stop buttOn to effect a
plant 'shutdown when ammonia is detected in this line.
Condensers should remain on line.
8. Barbara Brenner said it was acceptable to locate
emergency stop, ventilation fan controls, etc., inside
the ammonia diffusion cabinet. This is in response to
Item #14 of Aaron Kaczorowski's memo of July 11, 1993.
9. I am'to review consequences of intermediate pumps being
off with respect to booster discharge cooling and high
stage suction superheat and oil cooling.
10. In Tracy, when a compressor is started in manual, other
compressors on that suction level shut down. Ron Nesler
to correct, or explain logic.
11. We need to include a low suction pressure alarm in our
system.
12. Have we assigned a specific output for the ammonia
.... diffu~ion._panel_alarm~- USCS~ould.__like_to_b~able-~o
identify this alarm which may have a different response.
than others.
13. The inside valve on the ammonia charging line should be
a combination stop check valve.
14. Our drawings and design need to be revised to show
penetrating the roof at each air unit on the truck and
rail docks with suction and liquid piping, not at the
control group with piping routed inside the dock to air
units.
MEMO TO FILE
USCS - Bakersfield
July 19, 1993
Page 3
15. The oil removal pots on the recirculators at Bakersfield
need to be relocated to where the drawings show them in
front of the vessels. They are not accessible enough in
their present location behind the vessels.
16. Pressure gauges need to be installed on each oil pot so
pressure can be monitored during oil draining procedures.
(TN~e~ ~T~i~--~houl~--b~a--S't-~il~--~t~n~da~d~ .................
17. The new Tracy control program should'include a pump down
time (adjustable) after the unit satisfies on temperature
same as Bakersfield.
18. Bruce Chandler is to provide information on seismic
sensing switch to Victor Arnett.
19. Make sure that tamper switch with alarm is .included on
the ammonia diffusion cabinet.
cc:
Meeting Attendees
Chuck Toogood, USCS
Bobby Cothren, TSG
George Albertelli, TSG
Aaron Kaczorowski, TSG
Ron Nesler, TSG
Frank Sharpe, TSG
Lamar Cothren, TSG
Mike Netting, TSG
· ;il~'- TraCy, California . ;' -" "/." ~.?:.;:~ ? 12/0F~2 ~
CAUSE OF DEVIATION - HOW CCXJLD
AR, mE
GUIDE WORD~ o
FROM OPERATING.
COND~ON~
a F~t~e to routinely ~ o,
a Suction check valve faih on screw
compressor suction when
compn~sor is sU~:.~d and oU
pun~ is running - example during
startu~ ~ shqt~_oWll
b Booster compressors o~l
second stage oil return fails
Supply failure from power pl~
Equipmenl: failure trips main
Mechanical failure
a Ammo.in pump seal failure
a Di~user valves are accessible to
oulside snd could b~ opened
( R~FER TO O.tA~TA)
' 'COI~EGUENCE OF DEVIAllON PROTECTION OR PROTECTIVE DE~qCE~ 'RI,~K RAHKII~
Loss or reduction of refiigeration
Loss of seCOnd stage
I Proper murine oil removal
2 Rolltillg m~nt~nsnce & operatioilal
PAGE 80FIt · · ':
RECOMMENDED ACTION, NOTE8 OR ~IE~ION8
N -NGT~
Q - QLJ~'TIO~
- We have found most suction and
screw compressors fail to
properly - send a message to
No hazardous consequence
of toxic material
1' Preventive maintcnance
2 Ammonia sensors
Emergency response procedures
5 Door lock and alarm on ammonia
S-~icient protection e~
(L) t.~
3 · UNI.~<~.y
4 · EX'I~.y UNIJ~Ly
FROM OPtiNG ' · ~E
c ~ ~t - e~q~e
, N - ~s sc~ ~o~ p~'s~
H~ ~ /
~ f~ (s~) ~s ~ low
~ ~r o~
~ ~s~
· . .... .. Tracy, C4difor~.:" ~ . ..... .: '
12/01/92 Through 12/02/~2
NODE. EQUIPMENT ' GUIDE WORDS - DEV1AllOg GAUSEoF DEVIA~--~-- HOW GOULD DEVIATION
'.::' i. ~!. ~:~ 'i ~i..i ,ii' ,.: ~' ~ou OP£P,A'nN~ .. :::.., · . ....:
:' ':' 'CONDI"rlON$. ' ;' . .: ... ,: : . : :
HAZOP STUDY SHEET
CONSEQUENCE OF Db'V~TION
a Second stage compressors fail off of toxic m~__~ial
boosters congnu~ to run
a Ele~caI
b Hot work
c Smoki
d F-]ectricai hz~dlin~ equil~nem
possible release
Release of toxic material - high pressure
duc to extemM heat (fire)
· !'f-; :i '...: : [ ,: ,' ,
PROTECTION OR PROTECTIV~ DE'V~CE~ . "RI&'K RANK/NG
a Compressor suction control
failure
Hunum cxror
a Machine left on manual operation
No hazardous consequence
Fire protection equipment
Sprinkler system inspection
interlock and cutouI
5 htermediate suciion syst~n high
pressure ~larm
SPRV on reciru/hter set at 250
PSIG nd on oil pot set at 300
PSIG
9 Smoke detectors installed in office
11 Emc~gem3, respome procedures and
1 Low Pressure alarm & cutouls on
scow compressors md ~ on
system suction
ovc om monitor
FROM OPERATING
CONDI*T1Ot~
DATE~ OF 6'I'UDY: ~ "
~' ': ~2/o~/~ T~o~ ~2/o2/~ .
· ' ARISE
a Elc~cal
b Hot wo&
c Smoking
Mechanic, al failure
a Fe~Ivaivefails open
a Loss of ammonia f~l
b Valve or comrol faii~
HAZOP STUDY SHEET
~.ond stage compl~sor
of ~ox, lc matcr~aJ, high pressure
duc ro extcz~ heat (fire)
No hazardous consequence
compressor dama~
'RISK RANKING
1 Low level float alarm and pump shut
Sight 1~! column
PA, GE
SLd~cicnt prot~don exisls
placement and lype of
,minguish~, ~.)
( REIrER TO C~da.,rr e )
FACILIT~Y:: _UI~.IJXI ,.~UiIC~ ¢~Ojd ~l;orag¢
Tracy, Ca]Eomia
NODE - EQUIPMENT
I~'RUt~r. vALvE.
OF THAT NOOE
Tcml~*mul-c
r (,MI I.ow
GUIDE WORD~. l
FROM OPERATING
CONDITIONS
NIGH FLOW. LOW FLOW. NO
~ ~ COefrAt, ll,~TlO~
Low Pressure
Tcmpm'atm-e
C.~E OF DEVIATION - HOVV COULD DEVIATION
ARISE ·
L~cr ( E~'m~JA~.ArLOOO. TO+~mADO. ~u~NE CR~SH.
ETC.).
DATES OF &'TUDY:
Compressor suction control
Temperature
Fh-c - caused by
a Electrical
b Hot work
c Smo~ng
d Elee~eal handliag equipment
Mechanical ~
a Compressor su~on cor.~ ul
failure
Mcdumic~ faUure
a Fccd valve fidis open
Sudden prcssu~ reduction caused by
ex~ntml or hurmm error.
a Loss of ammonia feed
b Valv~ or comrol failm-c
Loss ofrcfiigem~ tlxrough murine
and shaft seal l~q~q~ (fugitive
emissions)
· HAZOPSTUDySi.IEET Vi , ,roosood, r.m ':'i '
J
PROTECT~ OR PROTECTIVE DE"V$CE~ 'RISK RANKING
UST A/d- fM6q~lO PROI~ql~ '~4~T O0ULD fq~VB~T O~
]~lc~e ofto~c mat_~eTia] - high pre~sllro 1
~ to cxtc'mal heat (fire)
3
No hazardous consequence
I Low pressure alarm & cmoms on
2
conlzollcr ~ hi~ level alal-m
2 ~ 1~ fl~ ~s~ ~
3 V~ ~ m~
1 Low lew~l flo~ ahem ~nd pump shut
down
$- UNt3~.y
( Iq~rER TO C~U~'T 8 )
PA{DE t0 OFll '
RECOMMENDED ACTION. NOTES OR QUESTI~-'---
Sufficient prolgcfion exists
the/irc suppression policy (cleaning
placemem and lype of
etc.)
Sm~dent protection exists
Snmeiem lvrot~ion exists
Sufficient pioie~don exist
NODE - EQUIPMENq' GUIDE WORDS * DEVIATIO~
FROM OPERATING
CoNomoN$
~w T~ ~oa ~
of Power
DATEs OF gTUDY:
a Failure to rotatne]~ draia off
a Sucfioa check valve fails on,
compress~ suction when
compressor is stopped and oil
pump is rtu:u~ng - c,umple
Supply failure from power plant
C~'ound ~ interaction trips main
Loss or reduction of rcfiigemfion
No hazardous consequence
TEAM MEMBERS: Victor Amett, Chuck Toogood, J'un
PROTE~flON OR PROTECTIVE DEVICES
~ ( S*~E~ ) v~S. ~ PR~e-CTtO~ Eoup~-.hrr.
~M~I~CE. OPERA';tOaAL. ETC.).'rI~W¢ N~O
1 Proper murine off removal
:2 Rouline ~ & Olm-alio~
a Ammonia pump seal failure
F. xteraal ~
a Eanhquake
Sabotage
a Diffuser valves are accessible to
oulside and could be open~l
Release of toxic material
Ammonia sensors
Door lock and alarm on ammonia
diffm~r valve box
PAGE 11 OF11
RECOMMENDED .aCTION. NOTES OR QUESTIONS
# -NOT~
found most suction and
discha~e valves on screw compressors fail lo
or seal properly - send a message to m~
Su~c~ent protection exisls
( ~ire~ TO C~W~r A )
(L) UI~OOD
1 · 1"O(31dLy I..~y
~'.. L~¥
4" ~XTT~M~.Y UNL.I~L¥
( I~gFLq~ TO (::~,dAFTr ! )
(Alii,ow
/ No Flow
Severed Freezer. suction line (2 PSIG to
5 P$IG) or pump liquid feed Nne (40
PSIG to 43 PSIG)
a Liquid feed solenoid ~ closed
b T~qu{d ~ pump ~
a Screw compressor sucgon check
b Ammonia pump check valve
f~Ime
a Diffuser h/~h to low CrOss over
valve opened
Unic mau:r/~
Oil conlmninagon
o£rcfr/gcration
Increase ~ssel liquid lcv~
BLdlcl~ &~Q~ned ~a~.c to
seismic zone 4
4 lh'essm'e gauges
1 Lowlcvelfloaialarm&pump shut
off
Dsly opcrafional monitoring
I Suction check vatve
pump check valves
· Door lock ami alarm on the
Loss of rcfr/geration - possible rdcase
Comptuson fail off- ptmips ~nd of toxic m~t _~ial
Release of'toxic mmn'8 - high PreSsure
due to external hea~ (fire)
Fire protection equipmem
Sprinkler system/nspecfion
Infrared Impec~on of elec~ic~d
~luipmcm
SPR.V on low tcmp migulator s~t
at 250 PSIG and on o/1 pot set at
300 PSIG
-30W suction sYSU~n ~ pressure
No smoking policy
Smok~ &'t~cton in office m
Suflickm pm~t/on exist
Sufficient pmu~ction cxis~
Sufl~dmt protection ex/sis
disconmct~ baU~ry,.placcm~ and type of
etc.)
E-I. P. Rccdvor (Tom] of power
GUIDE WORD.9- DEVIATION
· ~ FROM OPERATING:~:~ ~*:
CONDITION,9 '. ?"~!~!;ii'
HIGH JR,.OW, LOW M~.OW, N~: ';
WAT~ CONT.~A.TION ~
CAUSE OF DEVIATION- HOW COULD DEVIATION
E'r~ ).
1 SupplY ~ ~xom power company
2 Ground ~mdt intam-up6on trips main
3 Eqllipmc~ ~ trips ms, ln
Severed his, h p~eisure liquid or hot gas
a I-Iaman error - line damased b~
foddifl
bulls eye
HAZoP ·STUDY,SHEET
· CONSEQUENCE OF DEVtATION PRO~ECTION OR PROTECTIVE DEVIC~.~
-RIStC TKING
No consequence (~ plant
shutdown)
Toxic ~ rdease:
a Interred - i--~ide buildi~
b External, on roof
c Down floor drain
Ammonia detection system
game as I41~ Flow
~mL'~gcncy response procedm-es &
REOOMIIENDED ACTION. NOTE8 OR
~ - C. ATA~tRCXo~C
( R~ TO C~C,~,TA)
P. ~ crot~
P. P~ ~.n~t~m)
Odd
GUIDE WORD8
i.: FROM OPERATING
·, CONDmoN~
LOW ~
WA"I~ CONTAMNATION
ARISE : .... , COI~EGUENCE OF DEVIATION
~. ). ( Enm)¢CW~S. FU~O. TO~Y~O. FtME C~,~. m'"um<w~. ~ ~E .~NO ~.
l~le~se o£toxic ~ imo
caused by conlrol
defrost capad~,
Electrical
Hot work
Release of toxic ~ into
(L)
$ · HIGHLYI.~y
I Main H. P. alarm on discharge set
190 PSI W ADT - ValL*y Alarm
2 Compressor I-Z P. ~ and Unlond
· t 2OO PSI
3 Scrcwcompm~sor~L p. cutoutsct
at 21~ PSI
4 SPRV's set a~ 250 PSI on
s/pbon vcssd, receiver, and
~PRV's ~et at 300 P~IG on -~crew
Tr~ a~d monitoriag
C-4~pre~or di~ low pressure
Co,~mer co.~ comrol
Fire protc~ioncquipm~mt (spria]d~
SPRV's set ~ 250
cqmpmcm every two years
ot~-r .nc/l~
a prs-stmup 6~ck Iist of new
S.fflcient protection exists
prol~
work
4 e EXT~Y UNL~y
( RE~L~ TO C~AA, T B )
11N°DIE vv~m= ~E~
131='E~A'110~ OF'II,lA? NO0~
HL P. Recdv~ (Total
' ' ' ' ". FROM OPERATING DEVIATION- HOW COULD DEVIATIO~
·" "" ' CO~D/T1ON$ ' ' AR~E . ': ·
drah proc u
a Earlhqu~. s~el~d I-I_ P. Iicl,ld
b Sabotage - ~'.E va~ ~
~ va]'vcs ~ accessible
from omsi& ~nd co~d bc ol:~I
Toxic material rdcasc:
3 Down the dra~ in the engine ~
Hm~u~ Ol~etvafion
sasmlc zone 4
5 Eme~,~zy response procedures &
l~a iu ~ op~-~on~ chazgi~
- Ins~al] a ~ vaive i~ c.~ ti~.
puce operation~ oil drain~ '
oil drain vuss~l and nm
to it from oil d,-~ on H P recdvur
so-eve compucssor shell and uibe h~at
room drains to a sump wilh
~ zoom ammo.ia
Altermtive - plug orlay a-,~; over floor
- removable only wh~ clca~t~ thc
No Flow
~OW
Over ~ing caus~ by control
failure
Equipmen~ fa/lure - electric king
solenoid valve or reeiteuhtor intereooler
5quid feed solenoid v~lve fi61s dosed
Several com:k~er liquid rcmm Line
No consequence
Toxic material release:
2 F---__~'unl - om~idc
3 Down thc drains in thc engine room
I Low p~cssm'c aim-ms
Low prcssurc compressor Cutom
Ammcmia pump low level alarm &
2 Human Observation
sem~mc zone 4
lock and alarm on ammouia
box ouisidc - pul a lock oul
- Pm emergency response nnd trainin~ in
Eufurce discip~n _,,fy Action Safety Policy
#SB198
Pm ~ response ~nd trsin~ns in
may when eleaming the floor
RECEIVED
HAZ. ~.4AT. DIV.
UNITED STATES COLD sTORAGE OF CALIFORNIA ' '
810 E. Continental Avenue · RO. Box 120 · Tulare, CalifOrnia 93275 · 209/686-1110 · FAX 209/686-3827
~-July 20, 1993
Ms. Barbara Brenner
Bakersfield City Fire Department
2130 "G" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
Dear Barbara:
Thank you for making yourself available to attend our Hazop study
last week. We appreciate your attendance and input and hope that
we were able to enlighten you as to the type of operation and
system we will have in Bakersfield.
Our Hazop study and RMPp should be forthcoming the first week of
August directly from Victor Arnett.
Again, thank you for the time you Spent with us last week.
Very truly yours,
Carl L. Willis
Operations Manager
clw
cc:
R.G. Noll, Exeter/Tulare/Bakersfield
P.W. Fitzpatrick, Fresno
V.D. Arnett, Sacramento
M. Kohler, Bakersfield
FIRE DEPARTMENT'
S. D. JOHNSON
FIRE CHIEF
CITY of BAKERSFIELD
"WE CARE"
July 6, 1993-
2101 H STREET
BAKERSFIELD, 93301
326-3911 ·
Victor Arnett
California Regional Engineer
U.S. Cold Storage
3100 52nd Ave.
Sacramento, CA 95823
Victor:
Thank yOu for sending the source information for the risk matrix. Use of the
severity and likelihood definitions and risk matrix from the AICHE's GuidelineS for Hazard
Evaluation procedures, 2nd Edition will be acceptable. I look forward to sitting in on the
Haz Op. Please call me if I can be of any assistance. Otherwise, I will see you at the
Red Lion at 0800 on July 13.
Sincerely, ~
Barbara Brenner
Hazardous Materials Planning Technician
Rallafi. Ruev .... .. ~
UNITED STATES COLD sToRAGE OF CALIFORNIA
3100 52nd Avenue · Sacramento, California 95823 · 916/392-9160 · FAX 916/392-5012
June 29, 1993
Barbara Brenner
Hazardous Material Planning Technician
Bakersfield City Fire Department
2130 "G" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
Dear Barbara Brenner:
This letter is in answer to your question "Please provide the name of the source of the severity
and likelihood classifications and risk ranking matrix..."
We received the above information from a ~ousultant named Abroad Shafaghi who has a
company called Unisafe. He is one of the consultants that worked on the California RMPP
Technical Advisory Committee. His qualifications are' included in this package. U. S. Cold
Storage obtained his services to give all our California Facility Engineers training in thc Risk
Management and Prevention Program. The Course Outline is included in this package.
Abroad Shafaghi's severity, likelihood, and risk ranking follow very close to those set forth in the
"HANDBOOK OF CHEMICAL HAZARD ANALYSIS PROCEDURES". I included copies
from that book that cover fltis subject.
In our last HAZOP study, the team thought we should Update our severity, likelihood, and risk
ranking to conform to the information put forth" in the..Second Edition of the ,,oUIDELIlqES
FOR HAZARD EVALUATION PROCEDURES": bYAICHE. I'included copies of pages from
that book with pertinent information. We'thoUght the newer analysis methodology is more
tstie The methodology we have used to'now refers'to thousands of years, etc. We agreed
real' ' · ...... :,:,_..2~..ia be no'-°*eater than one hundred years. If OK
the life expectancy et a cola storage ~acmty wu,,,~,.. ,.~
with you, we will probably use this second method.
Sincerely,
Victor D. ,Mnett
California Regional Engineer
GUIDELINF_~ FOR
Hazard Evaluation
Procedures
Second Edition with Worked Examples
CENTER FOR CI4F. MICAL PROCESS SAFETY
".of the
Ama:an l~litut~ of Chemical Engineers
345 l~t~t 47th Sl~eet, New York, NY 10017
'lhblc 7.7
1
2
3
4
1
2'
3
4
Noinju~orhcaltheffccta '~: '~;~' ~'~? ~: 1
Minor injury or minor health effects ! '. r~' . ~ ~: ' ~''~ ?; ·2
Injury or moderate health effects :': , '"::.: ,' ' ': _ ,..' ' 3
Death or severe health effeels
Producfio~ IAu
Lc~s than one week
Between one week and one month
Between one and six months
More than six months
No injury or occupational saf¢~' impact
Minor injury or minor occupational illness
Injury or moderate occupational Hiness'
Death or severe occupational illness
Less than 0.1
Between 0.1 and 1
Between 1 and 10
Above 10
JBF Associate, Inc., Knoxville, TN.
1
2
3
4
Not expected to occur during the facility lifetime
F-xt~ed to occur no more than once during the facility lifetime
F_.xpe~ed to occur several timea during the facility lifetime
~ed to occur more than once in a year'
Source: 'JBF Associates, Inc., Knoxville, TN.
w3
1 2 3 4
Consequence category
Increasing Severity
Figure 7.1 Example risk matrix.
~hble 7.9 Example Risk Ranking Categories
I Unacceptable
li Undesirable
III Acceptable with
controls
IV Acceptable. as is
Should be mitigated with engineering and/or
administrative controls to a risk ranking of HI or
le~ within a specified time period such as six
months
Should be mitigated with engineering and/or
administrative controls to a risk ranking of Iff or
less within a specified time period such as 12
months
Should be verified that procedures or controls are
in place
No mitigation required
Source: Stone and WeMter Engineering Corporation, Houston, TX.
State of California
Guidance for the Preparation
of a Risk Management and
Prevention Program
OES
CALIFORNIA
CabTornia Office of
Em ergen cj~ Servicev
Prepared by
California Office Of Emergency Services
Hazardous Material Division
Gerald R. $chimke, Chief
Dr. Frederick A. Lercari
Principal Author
William M. Medigovich
Director
November 1989
MPP TE L D
The Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP) requires a high level of coordination,
communication and cooperation between industry and local government. To e.nsure that this co.ncept
~'~sultants ~o provide input to the development ot me necessaxy ~u.~,~,..,~,o. O ,~ _ P
the assistance of the review committee. Members of the committee included:
Richard Anderson
Dick Barnes
Elaine Bild
Jacquelin Bogard
Raymond Boykin
Dick Davis
Paul Dona_hue
Jon Elliott
Lee Esqnibel
Robert Haney
SylVan Hersh
John Janzen
George Jarr~ im
Cheryl Karpowicz
Brian P. Kolodji
Frederick Lereari
Robert Leonard
Tunothy Marker
Patrick Hoy
Stephen Murrill
Peter Olinger
Mark Piersante
Suzanne Phinney
Richard Procunier
~_.~ Shafaghi
Mauriee Sherb~
Ted Smith
Evelyn Wachtel
AFFILIATION
Los Angeles City Fire Dept.
Dow Chemical
University of California
Santa Clara Mfg. Gp.
California State University
at Chico
Chemical Industry Council
of California
State Senate
INTEREG, Inc.
Santa Clara County.
Arthur D. Little, Inc.
Orange County Fire Dept.
Los Angeles County Fire Dept.
Chevron Corporation
Ecology and Environment
American Institute of
Chemical Engineers (AICHE)
Office of Emergency Services
Air Resources Board
International Business Machines
San Diego County Health Dept.
State Assembly
Lockheed
Chevron Chemical
Aerojet General
Environmental Protection Agency
Battelle Corporation
'Hazard Control Systems Inc.
Toxics Coalition
Environmental Protection Agency
REPRESENTATION
Administering Agency
Industry
Academia
Industry
Academia
Industry
Senator Keene
Consultant
Administering Agency
Consultant
Administering Agency
Administering Agency
Industry
Consultant
Chemical Engineers
State Government
State Government
Industry
Administering Agency
Assemblywoman LaFollette
Industry
Industry
Industry
Federal Government
Consultant
ConsUltant
Environmental
Federal Government
ii
TO 19163925012
F', 04
E%oi-eering Risk
Management Services
Education
Postgraduate'Diploma, Chemical Engh
M.S., Chemical Rn~cering, Lougbbo~
Ph.D., Chemical Englneer~ Loughb~
Thais ~Vlodel/ag for System Safety Au
Continuing ~:lucation Courses (AICh~
Hazardous Waste Incineration, 198~
Lo~ prevention in the Process Industr
1982
Q~_m. flflcations
Dr. Shafaghi has over 12 years experi~
manasement this experience is founde~
TeMaa, Iran, 1970
Aston University, England, 1977
University, England, 1978
Unive~ty, England, 1982
under Professor Frank P.Lees
Indushial Toxicology and Industrial
(Loughborough University, England),
· in the field of industrial risk
on six yca~ indus~al experience in the
refinery,, o~ and gas, and eh.emi? inch tries. He has led and managed
numerous projects for industry m the a ~ls of Risk Management and Prevention
'Program (R_M~P), Hazard and Operab: ity (HAZOP) study, Quantitative Risk
Assessments, Safety .Audit, Hazard ~.Eme_r_gency Response Planing,
Environmental Impact Assessment, aallr~e~eat waste Management,
Before founding UniSafe, he mana~J~ttelle's Process Risl~ Management in
Califorah for about two years, and to that, he was Director of Industr/al
Risk' Management Se~ ia C, aliforni for NUS for e~hteen months.
Previously, he was a Senior Hazard An
for Technica, Inc., and System Ellglnee~
As Technleal Director, Dr. Shafaghi is
leading projects, and developing and in
of industrial and environmental risk m~
b/st for Rohm and Haas, Senior Engineer
· rincipal Research scientist for Battelle.
~le for develop/ag businezs,
flementiag technology in the broad field
~ement for the process industries.
la~.-2.4-199~ la'7: lagPl"l FROP1 !N I SAFE- ,,+,,,~<,~ot<,~<,~<,~<,~ TO 0 191639:vSF-II~'~"
Relevant Experience
Risk Management and Prevention ~pro~mm (RMp. p~ Led and managed several
projects involving development and rev[~ of RMPPs for facflifies handling
hydrogen fluoride, am oma, acid, sulfur dioxide, hydrogen
sulfide, and nitrous oxide. The includes a nitrogen product agriculture
plant, an hydrogen fluoride alkylation~ a large oil and gas treatment facu~ity,
Quantitative Risk Assessmeslt. Conduo~d quantitative ri~ assessment studies for
various plant~ and operations, these in~ude;a fluidized bed coating unlt,a pulp
plant, an ethylene oxide handling and r~or facility, a butadiene reactor and ~
storage unite, a cross country natural "pipelinc, a styrene storage and handling
facility, and an ammonia $~l:m~ and dt~ plant. Farther, he was a member
of technical team which developed 'Guliteline for chemical Process Quantitative
Risk Analysis"' for the Center for Chum
Institute of Chemical Engineers.
Process Safety (CC~S) of American
'. Led numerous HAZOP studies for the
off-shore platform production .nit,
, FCC, LPG, ammonia storage and ' '
m-shore o~ and gas treatment facilities,
ility, oleum production plant, styrene
dry chemicals manufacturing facilities.
Fmvironmental Impact ~ent.. In~ ~PoOrt~ of an Environmental Impact
Assessment for a chemical facility in mia, he played an insW~m_.ental role in
the development of scenarios for accidi
atmosphere.
S~t[e _~, Audits. Project leader for a eom
review of two industrial parks in Taiwa
dal release of a hazardous material into
rehensive hamrd evaluation and safety
consisting of twenty nine plants
manufacturing various petr°chemicaloP~XlUCts'f~pr The review included planning,
conduct of safety audit'development ocess hazard ranking technique for
the follow up studies of hazard evaluati~ and quantitative risk assessment.
Advisory and Expert Review. Served as
Advisory Committee for the State of O
responsible for the development oFRM
for RMPPs review developed for facRiti
as "Qualified Person" for an oil and gas
reviewed several HAZOP studies and
a member of the RMPP Technical
~ornia's Office of Engineering(OES);
~P Guidance". Provided technical expert
s handling hydrogen fluoride and acted
treatment ~ RMPP. In addition,
major quantitativ~ risk asses~ent study.
.'. F'. P J5
Ahmad Shafa~hi (cont.)
Dr. Shafaghi has published and presen'
management"Risk Management in the
AIChE National me, ting. August 199(1
q)ifficulties ill the Implementation of
Prevention progr .am?(Co-authored)Pr~
August 1990, San Diego, C. alifom~
~Jsk, Public, and Reguhtion~(Co-auth
Meeting, March 19~0, Orlando FIo~__~
~Hazard Evaluation of two Large Indm
C~ina'(co-authored). Presented in Inte
Prevention ia the ohem/0al and oil pro
Singapore.
TO
i9163'925012 ,F'.¢7
gl. sixteen articles in the fields of risk
Process Industfi~s~Presented ia the
te California Risk Management and
nted ia the AIChE National Meeting,
red), presented in the AIChE Annual
~1 Parks in Taiwan, Republic of
national Conference on Safety and Loss
~siag Indus~x/es, October 1989,
Um~sf~
[Reliability Analysis", paper presented at
1, ,gan Francisco, C~)~foraia. '
Conference Presentation
"Risk Management for the Oil Refinery Indus., several presentation to
Chinese Petroleum Corporation, March .989. Taiwan.
"Qualified Person Review of gisk Man~ement and Prevention Program".
December 1988. Office of .~mergenoy ~ State of California.
'~Modeling of Prove~ Plants for Risk m
AICh~ ~Annual Meetillg, November lg
"Risk Management and Prevention Prqgram in the State of Calffornia~preSented
ia HAZMAT International, 1~1989,
November Sau Francisco,
"An Application of Hazard and Operat liP/Study to Safety Analysis of
Absorption Heat Pump"(co-authored), a IEEE Tran~ct/ons on
Rel/abillty:Spedal Issue Devoted to A~ ,licafion of Reliab/I/ty, Safety, and
D/scipl/nes /It the Des'/gn and 0perafio of Chemical Process System.~ Vol.37,
No.2, June 1988.
"A Palrwise Statistics! Test for Dec~'ox Making", Americau Journal of
Mathematical and Management Scien~, publication pending.
"Structural Modeling o~ Process b~t~m for Risk and Reliability. Analysis",in
F~n~neering Risk and Hazard Assessm, ~t,A~del and F~vni, eds~, CRC
Press, 1986.
'Hechnlque of Hazard and Operability~$tudy~, 'ia Proceedings of 1984
Metal Congress, Process Control andl~~' Analysis Technical Session, 1986.
"Hazard .an~ Operability Study: A t~le Technique for Process systems Safety
~nd ~eliabfli~y Ana~"(co-~u~horea), [U Chemi~ Process Hazed ~eview,
J~Ioffman and D.C.Mazer, edr~ 1
Eo~neeriag Research and Design, Vol ~, 1984.
~R~UNISA~E-
Abroad Shafaghi (cont.)
Nuclear Waste Management .Sys~ms
nuclear waste management system co~
environment and regulatory ~ D
of accep.~_hle areas/or nuclear waste
en~neering management plan(SEMP),
(SRD) and a confi~ouration manageme!
%~.eeri-_,, Involved/n the design of a
~a'n!.n_g techn~d, ~odo-po]itica],
veloped a statisti~ model for the rankl, g
pository. Also developed a systems
a system requirements and description
procedure.
~oh~l ia the anal~is of the aux~iary feed
power plan~. Also rev/ewed of the
structure of several PR.As developed ici BWR and reactors in the USA. The
review included the organization of thdiinformaticra flow, and methodology used
in each PRA. An area empha~ was oJ
in the PRAs.
malting tool based ~ ~~ ~]
pro~am~ ~ding site ~oa f~ i~
devel~ment of a ~~g~ PC
e~a~on pr~dur~.
Process Emdneerin~. Assisted in the de
Human Reliability approaches adopted
computer-based muttiattn'bute design
Proce~. This system was used in several
level nuclear waste. Also, assisted in
x)de for the selection of hazard
ign of gas transmission pipeline as part
of an oil recovery project by injecting g[s
of ga~ gathering and treatment faoilitie~
commi~ioning and startup of a new ret
Involved particularly in the operation o
columns, vlsbreaker phut, a lube cai p~
manufacturing englneerjnvolved in the
compounds for manufacturin~ of tires.
into the wei~ Also included the design
/ia refinery engineer, participated in the
aery with 100,000 BPD throughout.
vacuum and atmospherk: d/stillafion
mt and an LPG unit As a tire
tesign and maintenance of rubber
Professional Affiliation
Member of AIChE
F'.
TO ~1916~9~501~
Abroad Shafaghi (cont.)
"T~cbnlques of Hazard and
Congress, Process Control and
Detroit, Michigan.
~l-Iazard and Operability Study;.
National meeting of American
Risk and Reliability Analysis for
University, 1984.
~Fault Tree Synthesis: A New
Califo~ 1982, Lo~ Angeles,
Risk Managcmcnt and Prevention
Two-day course for the southern
February 1990
Prevention and Management of
As part of certificate in air qa .atity
University of California, Riverside
November - December 1991
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP)
Two-day course for Kennedy/Jenl~s
Dcccmber 18 & 19, 1991
UalSa~
Study% paper presented at Metal
Analysis Program, September 1984,
Tool", paper presented at 187th
Society, April 1984, StLouise, MissourL
plans", paper presented at Ohio State
paper presented at University of
admlnlstmting agencies
Air Erosions
Staff
Pedemale~
P/peOnes and
HS&P
Fac-Oity
(Unoca~
Refrigerant
HCFC-22
g plnnt
( AI~ed
Signsrs
Fatty)
H~ ~'yla~on
Pla~o£~
(~_lda
Platform
Production
Fac~ty)
07:12P~
FRO~_.UNIS~FE-
from tank car to a reactor
-Chemicah hs~dle~k HF
-'Djpe of Project: Rev/ew of RMMI"
-Operatk~ hduded: l-IF storage
-Individual Involved:/LShafaghi (Pt
-'13~ of Project: HAZOP Study
-Operatio~m Included: OR~ gas, ami'
-C'hemh?.als handed: Hydrogen ~
Oiox/da, and Hydrocarbom
-h~v/dual lnvolv~ A. Sh-_.esglli
-Tfpe of Project R~ew or
w/th Article 80 of the Un/form
Evaluation)
-Operat/ox~ In~ud~ Various off
TO
1918392501:2
eand
consultant
San Diego
F'n-e
Department
V'mce Noble
(6~)
322-4311
xt363
Unocal
North
American
O~ and Gas
Divis/on
Barbara
County Ftre
Department
Departmem 781-7034
&
Richard
Nalmey
618-2973
Bruce
Sumton
65O-2447
Ryan Hill
681-5524
F'.IO
FRE
JN ! SRFE-.
LIST OF REC~ PRO~
FACHATY
Waste water
Treatment
Hydrofluoric
Acid Storage
and I-l~cl~g
Facility
~)
Unit
LPO S~orage
rgo~yr Dl~-~a-rl
- Operations included: Storage am
-THae of project: ~
-Operatioas ia~ded: Sun'age aad
-Chemicals Handle~ 49% Hydrofl~
-~ o[ vroj~ z~AzoP
-C~emicals hnndled: Petroleum
and Handlln2
Facility, and
Petroleum
P~odu~t
Pipeline
Sulfuric .Acid
mkyletiou
Plant
Nitrogen
Producu
(We~t
8ao'amento
Haut)
-Ty~ of Project: HAZOP Study
,.Operations included: LPG Slorage
· Chem/cals hnndi~l: LPG- and ecu
TO
UONDUCTI~ BY UNISAH~
,, I
Kennedy/
Ashland
Chemical's
:-Iandling Newark
xio .A.cM. Facility
Hawaiian
Refinery
Ch~'vI'OH~S
Refinery
Ch~%'l-Oil*8
Hawaiian
Refinery
Leader)
aad
~a~g, tnick &
z~ium Nitrate
injection
:1. 9:L 639;75EJ12
Pol~ Kohl
¢o~)
¢14)
889-3O49
M~k
H~pb~a
(8O8)
Mark
'Robert Bell
tg~2-22~2
Robert
Waddell
(714)
~29- 2151
F'. 09
G u/~O
O?:i3RM
FRO
TO
19163925012
FACnZI~
-Type ot Project: O..aned Person
BMM~ demloped for the whole
-Of~ations included: O~ nnd gss
cOgen plant
and Hydrocarbons
T~eatment
Facnity
Santo
pwduction
Facility)
l~act'lity
~.~emicsl's
-ladMdnal Invo~ve~ A. ~
M~nagement plan md
Asr~sm~nt d~veloped f~ the
~the
Barbara
County
HeMth
&
Cae~rc~
~ama
Barbara
County
Resource
Maaa~e-
merit
Departmm~
Torrance
Law/B~hop
AA)
xt 169
&
Robert
56Z36~1
Der Vrat
568-25~4
Ricl~d
618-2973
Robe~
Un~d~
TOTAL P.ll
HANDBOOK
OF
CHEMICAL HAZARD-..ANALYSIS
PROCEDURES
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
13.0 FORMULATION OF A PLANNING BASIS
13.1 ·INTRODUCTION
Chapter 10 of this guide provides guidance pertaining to the identification and
characterization of those activities or operations within a specific community or jurisdictiOn
that involve the use, storage, or transportation of hazardous materials and which therefore
pose some degree of hazard or risk to the public. Chapter 11 of the guide provides the data,
methods, and procedures necessary to estimate the probability of an accident associated with
each of these activities or operations. In addition, the chapter provides an opportunity in
many cases to assess the probabilities associated with different levels of accident severity and
discusses how to analyze scenarios with consequence analysis procedures. Chapter 12
continues with a discussion of the ARCHIE program and its individual models that may be
used to evaluate many of the specific consequences of a spill, discharge, f'm~, or explosion
involving hazardous materials.
Planning personnel who apply the Procedures presented in the referenced chapters will
obtain a great deal of knowledge and insight into the specific threats facing their jurisdiction
from hazardous materials. Some may wish to use this knowledge directly in an attempt to
plan for all possible scenarios, and are not discouraged from doing so if the time and
resources available are sufficient for this endeavor. For all intents and purposes, the entire
set of accident scenarios identified and considered during the hazard analysis will in
aggregate become the basis for their planning effort and they may proceed to Chapter 14.
Those who do not have the resources available to plan for every possible contingency,
or who have other threats competing for attention, may wish.to limit th~fforts for
hazardous materials~ on the most im~..m._.~t situations. This can be accomplished
bY':"'-~ning accident scenarios to identify those that h~'-a~--ve a reasonable likelihood of
occurrence in the foreseeable future and/or which may have significant c~._.gJlae, qae. nce.q.ja.J, he
absence of an organized, rapid, and effective response effort. It is th~_f__urpose of Chapter 13~
to assist these latterl~c~rm, nne1 in su~ch a_ screening effo ' · ·
Th~set of scenarios th ,,,,~:_ _,,.__ :Tx.----~ er~t._o_rt___vi~a_a, s~!fied risk anal si --
jurisdiction, at re,..,.., attcr mis process will then ~'r"~,~.~-7'Z_Tz_'--
· r -,-.,.,,~ ,, psannmg vasis tbr their
13.2 DEFINITION OF ANNUAL ACCIDENT PROBABILITY CATEGORIES
Each. of the accident scenarios identified during prior efforts should fin'st be classified
into five categories based on the annual probability determined for the scenario using the
methods described in Chapter 11 of this guide. The categories of interest include:
· Common accidents,
· Likely accidents,
· Reasonably likely accidents,
· Unlikely accidents, and
· Very unlikely accidents
.... Common accidents are defined herein as events expected to occur one or more _times
each year on average. Such incidents have occurred in the locality of concern in the past and
are likely to reoccur with some regularity.
~ accidents are defined herein as events expected to occ._.~ur at least once every 1_0
years on average according to available statistics. Given the rapid increase in production and
--fisag~-f hazardous materials in the last 10 to 20 years, this type of accident is not one that
has necessarily occurred in the past in any given community, yet there is a 10% or greater
chance that it can occur in any given future year based on current levels of activity.
]g~asonably likely accidents are events predicted to occur between once
and once every 100 years on avera_g~e. There is somewhere between a 1% and 10% chance of
such an even(OCCurring in-the locality of concern in anY given year for the identified
scenario. In that similar scenarios involving different materials may also occur, the overall
likelihood of an event requiring a certain type of emergency response could be much higher.
(Note: This is equally tree for the other categories.)
~ accidents are events predicted to occur between once every 1..00 years
once every 1000 e~ig_~__q_~Y-~~c locale. They are unlikely to occur within the
~umre or during the life_nme of current inhabitants. Chances of them oceurnng m
any given future year are less than 1% and possibly as low as 0.1% for each specific
scenario.
~ accidents are events predicted to occur less than once in 1000 ye_ars. The
odds are at least 100 to 1 against such an event occurring in the next 10 yea~. in a specific
locale. The ch~'~es ~of one occurring in any particular future year are less than one in a
thousand.
If one is onl evaluating releases qualitatively, common and ~ accidents may be
equated to Y ' - ' ~, '
"high", ~ likely and ~ accidents to mediu , and v~ry_
cidents ~ ~i~w" probability catego_on..fi? ~ ................
13-2
13.3 DEFINITION OF ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORIES
It is also necessary to classify accident scenarios according to their severity as del'reed
via application of consequence analysis procedures. To assist in this effort, accident
consequences are classified into the four categories defined below, these being:
* Minor accidents,
· Accidents of moderate severity,
· Major accidents, and
· Catastrophic accidents
.Minor accidents are specified herein as those with the potential to have ~ m°r~of
the fOllo~__~g features: -- ~
Low potential for serious human injuries.
No potential for human fatalities.
No need for a formal evacuation, although the public may be cleared from
thc immediate area of the spill or discharge.
Localized, non-severe contamination of the environment which does not
require costly cleanup and recovery efforts.
No need for resources beyond those normally and currently available to
local response forces.
Accidents are specified herein as of ~ severity when they have the potential to
haveL-?ie--ormorc~f the
~ ~ following, features:
· Up to 10 potential human fatalities.
Up to 100 potential human injuries requiring mexlical treatment or observa-
tion.
· Evacuation of up to 2000 people.
Localized contamination of the environment requiring a formal but quickly
accomplished cleanup effort. ~
· Possible'assistance needed from county and state authorities.
13-3
· Only limited need for specialized equipment, services, or materials for a
rapid and effective response.
.Major accidents are specified herein as those with the potential to have~'or~~ the
following features:
· Up to 100 potential human fatalities.
· Up to several hundred potential human injuries requiring medical treatment
or observation.
· Evacuation of up to 20,000 people.
· Significant contamination of the environment requiring a formal and
somewhat prolonged cleanup effort.
· 'Assistance needed from county, state, and possibly federal authorities.
· Significant need for specialized equipment, services, or materials for a
rapid and effective response.
Catastrophi~ accidents are defined as those having the potential to have ~
of
the following features:
· Morc than 100 potential human fatalities.
· More than 300 potential human injuries requiring formal medical treatment.
· Evacuation of more than 20,000 people.
· Significant contamination of the environment requiring a formal, pro-
longed, and expensive cleanup effort to protect human health and the
environment.
· Assistance needed from county, state, and federal authorities.
· -Significant need for specialized equipment, services, or materials for a
rapid and effective response.
considering
Which category a given scenario falls into can be determined by
consequence analysis results along with local map__s .and population data.
13-4
There are two points to be made about the accident severity categories defined above.
The fast is that they do not represent hard and fast rules. What Some people may perceive as
a minor or routine incident may seem to be a major event to others. Do not hesitate,
therefore, to make any changes to the procedure if some point or another makes you
uncomfortable. After all, the authorities in a major city are likely to deal with loss of life and
serious injuries due to various "non-natural" causes on almost a daily basis. It is understand-
able that they may have a different perspective on such events than the authorities of a small
and quiet town in a rural part of the country.
The second point to be made is that the accident severity categories above are partially
defined in terms of potential deaths and injuries. It must be realiz~ that cons u~l_g~ce
analysis procedures essenfiaJly_provide estimates of the ar...__.__ea or zone that ma_y~.l.~..s~sub_j~ted to
~1 leveJs of airborne contaminants, thermal radiation, ---" '-
and/or explosion overpressure.
Although~)-'-ex~ple ~an are~ will have a definite potential to be k/lied or injured, a
large fraction may actually escape unharmed. Reasons for this are varied and complex, but
think about how mo_ny times the evening news has shown a community devastated by a
tornado, with dozens of buildings and homes knocked flat, and only reported a death or two
(if any) and a handful of injuries.
13.4 APPLICATION OF SCREENING GUiDELiNEs
Figure 13.1 presents a matrix of accident probability categories versus accident severity
classes. Each block of the matrix suggests a planning approach to. be taken for accident
groups that meet criteria associated with the block. These approaches are only suggesn'ons
and should be treated as such. Special circumstances may require spec/al cons/derat/on on a
case by case basis. Specific guidelines should be worked out by each locale to best represent
the resources and relationships between organizadons applicable to'that community.
The matrix should be applied only at the level of government or industry that identified'
and analyzed the planning basis scenarios for a particular locale or jurisdiction. The reason
for this stems from the fact that levels of authority above the local level typically have
responsibility .for several individual jurisdictions. Since there is a higher probability that-~
particular type of accident will take place within a large jurisdiction than in a specific smaller
one within its borders (e.g., a county vs. a town), a higher level of authority may find it
necessary to plan for accidents that are too rare to worry about at a lower level This does not
mean, however, that all jurisdictions should not work together in coordinating their response
to rare events. Rather, it means that the higher level authority should probably take a
leadership role in such instances.
13-5
FIGURE 13.1
ACCIDENT FREQUENCY/SEVERITY SCREENING
Common
Likely
Reasonably
Likely
Unlikely
Very
Unlikely
Severity
Minor Moderat~ Major Catas-
~ ,...~.~.~,.~ trophie
MATRIX
Comprehensive planning and preparedness are essentially
mandatory at the appropriate levels of government or industry.
Comprehensive planning is optional and does not necessarily
warrant any major efforts or costs. Give consideration to
sharing any necessary special response resources on a regional
basis..
Comprehensive planning may be unwarranted and unnecessary.
13-6
Risk Management and preVention Program (RMPP)
Course Outline
'Topic
8:00 AM - 9.~)0 AM
9:00 AM - 10:30 AM
10:~0 AM - ):48 AM
0:48 AM - 12.'00 PM
12:00 PM - 1:00 PM
1:0O PM - 3:00 PM
3:15 PM - 5:00 PM
In-'--n-n~on to Risk Management end PrevenUon Program (RMPP)
Lm~ and Ils requirements
RMPP TeChnical TaSks, g~'tione 25534 (d) (1)&(2) of Chapter 6.05 of
~dllbmla Health and Safety COde
Break
Managemant Programs required by the Chaplet 8.95 of California Health
and Safety Code
Lunch
Hazards Identllic~on Techniques, an overview of the book "Guidelines
for Hazard Evaluauon procedures, by AIChE
8:00 AM - 12:00 PM
1.130 AM - 5:0O PM
8tuClenb Will be grOuped Into 4 to 5 pemon ~eams and conduct a
HAZOP Study eupewleed by Dr. 8hafaghl. The obJe~'tlve ie to
train the etudenb to lead and parUcipate In the company's future
HAZOP StUdies
8.~0 AM - 12:00 PM
1.~0 AM - 5:0O PM
Dispemlon Amdysls Workshop
FIRE .DEPARTMENT
S. D, JOHNSON
FIRE CHIEF
CITY of BAKERSFIELD
"WE CARE"
June 28,1993
2101 H STREET
BAKERSFIELD, 93301
326-3911
Mr. Victor Arnett
California Regional Engineer
U.S. Cold Storage
3100 52nd Ave.
Sacramento, CA 95823
Victor:
We have completed review of the qualifications of the team proposed for the
hazard and operability study / RMPP preparation for your Bakersfield facility. The
proposed team, the hazard and operability format and the use of the CAMEO vapor
dispersion model are. approved for use on this project by the Bakersfield Fire
Department, Hazardous Materials DivisiOn. Please provide the name. of the source of the
severity and likelihood classifications and risk ranking matrix as soon as possible. Upon
receipt of this information, we will complete the review of the proposed risk analysis
methodology.
I accept your invitation to attend the haz op study sessions and will plan to meet
you at 0800 on July 13th at the Red Lion unless otherwise instructed. Please call me
at (805) 326-3979 if I can be of assistance. You may fax the additional information to me
at (805) 326-0576.
Sincerely,
Barbara Brenner
Hazardous Materials Planning
cc: Ralph Huey
TAX
COVER.
CITY OF BAKERSFIELD
FIt~ DEPzkRTMENT - HAZARDOUS MATERIALS DIxFiSION
2130 "G" Street
Bakersfield, Ca. 93301
Fax Phone (805)326-0576
Office (805)326-3979.
Date:
PLEASE ROUTE AS
SO. ON AS POSSIBLE TO:
FROM:
Number of Pages (including cover sheet):__
Description 9f Ma,.terials Sent/~pecial Instructions:
RECEIVED
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE OF CALIFORNIA
3100 52nd Avenue · Sacramento, California 95823 · 916/392-9160 · FAX 916/392-5012
June 16, 1993
Hazardous Material Planning Technician
Bakersfield City Fire Department
~0 "G" Street
B a~ldr, CA-9~33ffl----'----"' ·
Dear Barbara Brenner:
This letter is a summary addressing the qualifications of the hazard analysis team and the general
layout of our HAZOP study for our new Bakersfield cold storage facility. We will attempt to
provide answers to all the questions posed on your form FI) 1595 titled "RECOIVLMENDED
QUALIFICATIONS FOR COMPLETION OF: HAZARD, RISK AND CONSEQUENCE
ANALYSES AND CERTIFICATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT & PREVENTION
PROGRAMS"
1. The members of the hazard analysis study team:
* Victor Arnett - U. S. Cold Storage - California Regional Engineer - Team leader
James Marrella -U. S. Cold Storage - OSHA, EPA Coordinator, Lions, Ill
Ralph Nodal - U. S. Cold Storage - Chief Engineer, Ttflare, CA
[,any Jones - U. S. Cold Storage - Chief Engineer, Tracy, CA
· Matt Kohler - U. S. Cold Storage - Appointed Chief Engineer, Bakersfield, CA
· Raul Ragunton - U. S. Cold Storage - Regional Engineer Assistant - HAZOP Secretary
· Bruce Chandler - Stellar Group (contractor) - Refrigeration Design - Jacksonville, FL
· Ronald Nesler - Stellar Group (contractor) - Refrigeration Control Design - Jacksonville
Enclosed in this package are detailed information on each team member. All team members
have been on a previous HAZOP study team, All but two members have been through some
hazard analysis training.
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE OF CALIFORNIA
3100 52nd Avenue · Sacramento, California 95823 · 916/392-9160 · FAX 916/392-5012
The U.S. Cold Storage Bakersfield facility is essentially a duplicate of our facility in T~acy,
California. Enclosed is a copy of our Tracy HAZOP study with notes. We use a "guide word"
HAZOP study, which we believe covered equipment failure, human error (operating error), and
probabilities by following this type of study. The team uses the charts on Severity Classification
(Chart A), Likelihood Classification (Chart B), and Risk Ranking Matrix (Chart C).
As a team, we decide what will be the worst case most likely release scenario to base the cloud
plume model on. We have both ARCHIE and ALOHA cloud plume computer models. We plan
to use the ALOHA model.
For external events, other than earthquakes, we will look at sabotage (vandalism). If you have
other suggestions that are feasible for this location we will be glad to include them.
At this time, we plan to have our HAZOP study in the Bakersfield Red Lion Inn, July 13th - 15th,
1993, starting at 8:00 AM. You, or any others inyour department, are welcome to attend. If you
have any questions please call. My number is (916) 391-7829.
Sincerely,
Victor D. Amett
California Regional Engineer
Severity Classification
Chart ^
TARGET
HAZARD
PUBLIC
( Prime Target)
OPERATORS
ENVIRONMENT
FACILITY
CATASTROPHIC
(1)
Multiple Exposure
Irreversible Injuries, may
Include Fatality
Or
Several Exposure with
Irreversible Injuries
Or
Extensive Spill of
Hazardous Materials into
Surface Water or
Contaminating Ground
Water
Or
Major Damage Resulting
in the Downtime of the
Facility for over 60 Days
SEVERITY CLASS
EXTENSIVE
(2)
Multiple exposure with ar
Irreversible or Several
Reversible injuries
( no Fatalities )
MODERATE
(3)
Multiple Exposure with
Reversible Injuries
Or
Or
Multiple Exposure with
Irreversible Injuries
Multiple Exposure with
Irreversible Injuries
Or
Or
Large Spill of Hazardous
Materials into Surface
Water or Contaminating
Ground Water
Spill of. Hazardous
Materials into a
Containment
Or
Loss of Containment
Or
Major Equipment Damage
Leading to Minimum one
Month Facility Downtime
OPERATIONAL
(4)
None
None
None
Equipment Damage
Leading to Several Days
of Facility Downtime
Likelihood Classification
HIGHLY LIKELY
(1)
Event has occurred at the
facility or other similar
facilities several times, or
it is expected to occur in
the lifetime of the facility
several times.
Frequency Possibility
Between
0 to
1 in 10 years
LIKELY
(2)
Event may have occurred
in a similar facility in the
past, or it is possible to
occur in the lifetime of the
facility, at least once.
Frequency Possibility
Between
1 in 10 years to
I in 100 years
UNLIKELY
(3)
Event is deemed not to
occur in the lifetime of
the facility.
Frequency Possibility
Between
I in 100 years to
I in 1000 years
EXTREMELY UNLIKELY
(4)
Event may never occur
at this or any other similar
facility.
Frequency Possibility
Between
I in 1000 years or
Greater
Risk Ranking Matrix
LIKELIHOOD
Highly Likely ...................................................................................... 1
(1)
u~y':"e'-
(2)
Unlikely ~[~[~~[~~ 4 3 2
E~reme ................................................................................... 4 4 3
Operational Mod~rat~ ~n~iv~
(a) (a) '(~) (~)
Hazards 1-.4
Operational ...........................
Problems ~'-: ~ :.i ~ ~ ~.~i.'::i:i ~ -~!:~!:
FACILITY:
NAME
ADDRESS
CITY, STATE ZIP
(ooo) 000-o00
COMPONENTS:
TEXT
O~TING CONDITIONS:
DESIGN S~ECIFICATIONS:
INSTRUMENTATION:
TEXT
HAZOP STUDY NODE:
TEXT
DATE: oo/oo/oo
PROTECTIVE DEVICES:
FACILITY: DATES OF STUDY: '; TEAM MEMBERS:
HAZOP STUDY SHEET .,,GE
NODE - EQUIPMENT GUIDE WORDS - ~,.a/JSE OF DEVIATION - HOW COULD DEVIATION CONSEQUENCE OF DEVIATION PRO'rECTION OR PROTECTIVE DEVICES 'RISK RANKING RECOMMENDED ACTION, NOTES OR
DEVIATION FROM ARISE
OPERATING CONDITIONS
TNE NO~ WILL BE ONE ;T.~i~, ~LIGGr'~¥eua: IDENTIFY *N.L CAU ~$ OF DEVIATION'~ I~ENTFY At,L. CON SEQUEflCES OF DEVIATION. I.~ALL E~S'FING PROTEG"TION TNAT COULD laREV~NT OR 8 L R
OR PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. TNE HIGH FLOVV, I. OW FLOW, NO ; MrrIGATE ( L,~ ) THE CON~EQU~ICE.
· rUDY OF THAT NODE WI.L FLOW, REV~ FLOW, HIQH EXAMat'E~
TAK~ ~ ACCOUNT ANY I~b~..IRE, LOW laF~S~UI~, L085 OF COOL.IN(~. I~ IN VALVe, HUMAN ERROR, FI~. I~ OF TO~¢ MA'I'~R~ INTO ATMOb'~ ER~. PLANT EXAMPLES: N · NOTES
!~ISTRUMENT, VAL¥~, l=fl=qN G OE HIGH TEMPERATURE. LOW EQUIPMENT FALuI~E, CONTROL FALURE. AND EXi. ERNAL ~.IUTDOV~,~I, EQUIPMENT DAMAGE, AND N O CONSEQUENCE. .,tLARM~. iN~ AND SHUTD OWN b-"f&'T~, lal~.E~ RE
OPERATIONEQUIPMENT TNAT AFFEC"r~ TH E OF THAT NODE 'r~TuRE, HIGH I,.g~ LOW LEVEL CONT~TION ETC.E~/~NT ( EARTHQUAKe, FLOOD, TORNADO, PLANE CRABH .). , ) REi~ ( ~.FETY ) VALVES, F1RE pI~:YI'ECTION EQUlaMENT. Q. QuEgTION$
WITN AR, CONTAMINATION LF.N( D~S, laRO(3EDURES ( EMERGENCY,
wrrH WAI"E~. CONTAMINATION i ~ANCE. OPERATIONN.. ETC. ),TRA~ING AND
WITH OIL, LO~ OF POWER, AND OPBqATIONAL MONITOR~O. ~'VERfTY ~ R~K
· ~ RANKING ( $ ) 8EI~,~RITY (L) t,~BJHOOD ( R ) RISK OF CONSEQUENCE
1 - CATASTROPHIC 1 a HIGHLY I~Y · 1 - V~R'Y SIGNIFY, ACTION RC-QU~, IMPLEMENTATION aEGINa IMblEOIATELY
2 · EXT"EN ~"VE 2 · ~Y 2 · 6~3NI~'IC, ANT: ~ I~G(~.II~ED:, ~MPLEME~ITATION BEGINS IN THREE
3- MODERATE 3 -UN~Y $ - NOTVERY SIGNIFIC. ANT, ACTION AT Rt~3UIREO: IIAaLEMENTATION BEgINS VVITI'IIN A YF.A~
S - NO RISC BUT OPERATIONALPRO~I,.EM: ACTION SCRETI~I OF HAZOPT-=AM: iMPI.~IENTATION EVALUATED BYDE~IGN TEAM ( R~'ERTO Cl..IART¢)
Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP)
Course Outline
~,~y One:
8:00 AM - 9:00 .~..u. Introdu~on to ~sk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP)
Law and Its requirements
9:00 AM. 10:30 AM RMPP Technical Tasks, 8ections 25534 (d) (1)&(2) of Chapter 6.95 of
California Health and Safety Code
10:30 AM - 10:45 AM Break
10:45 AM - 12.~X) PM Maneiaen-~n~ Programs required by the Chapter 8.95 of California Health
and Safety COde
12.'~ pM - 1:00 PM Lunch
1 .~0 PM - 3:00 PM H~-zGs Ideii[;?,=atlon Techniques, an overview of the book 'Guidelines
for Hazard Evaluation Procedures' by AIChE
3:00 PM- 3:15 PM Bre~k
3:15 PM - 5:00 PM ;,;mducflon to Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Sludy
Oa~' Two:
8:00 AM - 12:00 PM HAZOPStudy Workshop
t :130 AM - 5:00 pM b~tudents Will be grouped Into 4 to
HAZOP s(udy supewlsecl by Dr.' ghafaghl. The obJe~ve Is to
train the students to lead and pmticlpate In the company's future
HAZOP etud
8.~0 AM - 12:00 PM DIspersion Analysis
1:00 AM - 5:00 PM Students will be Presented & demonstration of ~IPII ! R_ and
DEGADI8 oompUtet Programs through worked examples. The~e '
are two well respected programs that have become etendards and
been accepted by the Administering Agancles and EPA. The
. worked examples Will concern the release of flashing liquid and
vapor ammonia.
HAZARD coM]VKJNICATION & EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL
TRAINING FOR AMIVIO~ REFRIGERATION
The training is a tolal of eight hours. The first day has four hours in the aftemooa The second
day has four hours in the morning. The afternoon of the second day has mask fitting for aH
employees involved in the ammonia spill response team. Following, is a brief overview of the
information that is included in the training:
1. THE FEDERAL HAZARD COMMUNICATION STANDARD.
2. 1910.20 - ACCESS TO EMPLOYEE EXPOSURE AND MEDICAL RECORDS..
3. US. COLD STORAGE HAZARD COMMUNICATION POLICY.
4. OVERAII. COORDINATOR RESPONSIBN.1TY.
5. US. COLD STORAGE LOCKOUT/rAGOUT OF HAZARDOUS ENERGY
POLICY.
6. HOW TO ACQUIRE AND INTERPRET MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS
0VISDS).
7. LABF. I.INO.
8. PROPER HANDI.ING OF HAZARIX)US C'v/~-'MICAL.
9. PERSONAL PROTECTION EQUIPMENT.
10. AMMONIA FIRST AID.
11. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES.
RESUME OF QUALIFICATIONS
VICTOR D. ARNETT
4056 Louganis Way
Sacramento, CA. 95823
(916) 427-6906
I have no college degrees as such. My basic refrigeration came from the Navy class "A"
machinist mate school. The school covered steam propulsion, electrical generation, elevators,
and basic refrigeration. I worked three years in the engine room of a Navy Destroyer operating
the main propulsion system and power generating equipment.
When discharged from thc Navy, I married and settled in Philadelphia. I took a test and
got a class "A" operating cnginecrs license from the City of Philadelphia. At that time, thc
license was the top operating license that covered boilers, steam power plants, and refrigeration.
I worked a short time in boilers then went into construction type of work. I worked four years as
a mechanic for a mechanical contractor. We installed piping and machine .fy for churches,
schools, and light industry. During that time I attended evening school at the Philadelphia
College of the Bible for two years. The schools purpose was to prepare leaders and teachers to
work in the local churches. For the past 21 years I have been nsing that training as a teacher and
leader in the churches that I have attended. That training and experience has been a help to me
in leaching of technical types of classes also.
In 1964 1 went to work as an operating engineer with the US. Cold Storage when they
opened their facility in Philadelphia. At the same time I attended night school at Spring Garden
Institute for Industrial Instrumentation. That was a two year certificate course on automatic
instruments and controls.
US. Cold Storage moved me to Peoria, Illinois as Chief Engineer. I was there for four
years. I enrolled at Illinois Central College and attended four years at half time. I completed
about two years ofeollege credits. I had not completed high school but obtained a G.E.D.
(General Education Development) ceflificate through testing in the Navy. In Junior College I
was working for an associate degree in Mechanical Engineering, but many of my classes were
subjects, such as math, I should have completed in high school.
The company moved mc to Kansas City as Chief Engineer for four years, then to Fresno as
assistant to a Valley Regional Engineer. I was in Fresno about five and halfyears then left the
company around 1980. I went to Seattle as ChiefEngineer'for Rainier Ice and Cold Storage for
about four years. I came back to US. Cold Storage about 1984 as on sight inspector for New
Construction and a couple year later as California Regional Engineer.
Most of my training in the ammonia refrigerating field has come from seminars, training
material, reading technical manuals and books, and trade organizations such as HAR and RETA.
Enclosed are copies of such training certificates.
S P1KI ~G. GA_P~D EN-IN S TITUTE
TI-IlS- C Et~T!~'IE$ · TI-I.~T ·
VICTOR. D. AR~'ETT
i-i.-kS - S ~A_TI S F. iC TO KILY. C Oz~LETED - T~E- P~S C RIB'ED- C O UKS E. IN
~'DUST~. ~'STRUMENTATION
~%-D- ~-I~- G- P.~SS ED .... T~Z. NEC ES S~Y
DIPLOM~k
.kS · E%"ID E'N-C E. O F' ~N'OWLED GE -.<N' D '.kB ILITY
AT · PHILADELPHIA. JUNE · !S · 1967.
.~lg.vt B gR- O ~'. THZ. D lVI~ I O N. O F- TF. C ?IN IC.~r.- iN STITUTZ~
.~btF. Rl C,~.,'W - $ O C ~g'IW- FO R- F.N G i N F. gR. IN G- F.D U C.~T! O N
THE REFRIGERATION REsEARcH':' '~'"? "'''' ":
· FOUNDATION
~ard~ a~ .he Univer=i=7 o[ O~laho.~ Cencer flor Concinu/n~ Educac±on, Januar~ L97~
Execu~ve D=ec:cr
VICTOR D, ARNE'FT
MARCH 24, 1982
WASHINGTON #1 CHAPTER
UNIVERSI OF CALIFORNIA
UNIVERSITY- £XTENSION ON THE DAVIS CAMPUS
IN RECOGNITION THAT
VICTOR D, ARNEi'F
HAS ATTENDED Tile FOLLOWING PROGRAM
iNDUS~IAL ,R~:RIG~-'R~TION !~]RKSHC~
M~RC:W 21-24~ !988
DAT~
States Co.~d Storage~ Inc.
Th/~/s/o c~ that
INDtLS~. KEFRZG~ON
a~' CO LD STORAGE woRKShOp
Marc~ 5-9, 1989
Let it be known that
has completed.$ hours of Refresher Tr~_ing
Addrexsing SARA ~ IIl/~ 2~-1910.120 requirements
'And ANSI/NFPA 471 & 472 Standards & Recommended Practices
[; ..1~Il' ;,/ ' z,:
~ew c,',-,e~,~'~ -. - .' Jtily 19, 1991
/n-County/O~a~merson
C'ert-ifi c, ate
jaih~es C. Marrella~ CAief Engineer
February 4, 1992
'Attendance
- Vic~rD,~tt
Management ~rl tYeventio~ Program (R~t')
Tnti~g Cmn'se, 24 Hours
3.prt7 20-22, 1992
Proteet 'o
RECOGNIZES
VictorArnett
as a member in good standing, entitled to all fights
and privileges of membership.
NFPA®
~M~, , 1992
Date of ~ssa~
I~~'':'-----~¥~--~. :,~'~-'~":'-~'-" '" ::'~-.."i .~ ~'~"...:::' --~ ~.:;~:,..~':?-- ~.~'(' :-~ ,%"~:..~ "'~ .~'~ .t~57~." ..&~-.':? :~._~'.:.,,~:b ,). _.~ ~. ~':.: '~;
CALIFORNIA FIRE SERVICE
~:~ TRAIN ' '
ING ~ND EDUCATION SYSTEM
I.~
This i~to c~rtify, mat :
VICTOR' ~..: _~~. ETT
a : ' '~-' <t'~-'~' '"'"'::' :?'[ ' ' ' .... ':-'Z,fi.%T?q;._.'~ .~(::i:
trended .~,e;i.~fe F~.e.~arshal~ _.at~p[~ed course
Hazardo~:'~~aiS Em ~rg~ R~i WO r~hop
"~e Con~uing Cha~e~e.'"
September 9 - I], I992
RON~JSCOLE~N. Chief
California State Fire Marshal
International
lnmttute of
Ammoni~ Retrigeration
.P.I .e~a~.. Remit Payment Immediately
MaKe Your Check Payable to: IlAR
Wasl~ i ng't'on, DC 2004:2--~).S8
Ur~itm~t S*aTH CoLd Storage Company
~acrammnio, C~ ~J82J
FOR YOUR BEARDS
' PLease_ t~ake Name/,qddr~,'ss
~:orr~:t i OhS h~r~:
,J fly i,' i'~'~ - .Jtin~. 50, t. cT~:~ Assoc late M~-~mber t:50.O
Ba LaT~C~ I:or:~ard
J
t'or J
IUNITED STATES COLD STORAGE
8424 West 47th Street
Lyons, Illinois 60534-1760
While comPleting his formal education and afterwards, James C. Marrella was employed for nine years at Continental Freezer
of Illin°is in Chicago as defroster, maintenance man and operating engineer. In 1976 he made a shift to UNITED STATES
COLD STORAGE in Lyons, Illinois as Chief Engineer. Among other duties of Chief Engineer, Jim has serVed as manager of
construction for United States Cold Storage's Arlington, Texas facility.
Jim has been active for many years in the leadership of the refrigeration industry. Having serVed as president of the Chicago
chapter of the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers, (ASH RAE) and the Refrigerating
Engineers and Technicians Association (RETA). Jim has serVed at both the national and local levels. He Ilas worked on
several research project dealing with hot gas defrost and frost build-up on cooling coils in ammonia refrigeration systems.
He wrote, photographed and produced the RETA sound slide program on Engine Room Safety, (also in video format) and
authored the RETA wall chart containing 25 specific suggestions for saving energy in ammonia refrigeration engine room. He
has contributed to the American Frozen Food Institute, (AFFI) Appendix H, Energy Conservation in Refrigerated
Warehouses, the International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses, (IARW) operation manual and co~autl~ored RETA's
Industrial Refrigeration Study Course IV, Plant Operation and Safety. He is also a OSHA trained instructor in regulations.
His current committee activities include serving as chairman of RETA's Health and Environment Committee, member of the
Education and Safety committees for the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (ILAR) and consulted to ASHRAE's
Ad Hoc Committee to Study Refrigerant-Related Code Changes.
TRAINING/SPEAKING EXPERIENCE:
United States Cold Storage, Inc. Chief Engineer Training Program, Advanced Refrigeration, Operating Engineering and
Maintenance in Warehousing, 1/81,2 week course. Topics: Principals of Flooded Ammonia Systems, Electrical Power Rates
Planning and scheduling of Maintenance, Insulating Refrigeration Piping and Engine Room Logs.
United Stales Cold Storage, Inc. Managers Training Program, 1980, 81,82 & 86, topics: Engine Room Operations, Preventive
Maintenance and Safety, Industrial Storage Batteries, Scheduling of Maintenance, Basic Refrigeration, Setting Up and
Starting a Disaster Plan.
International I'h~iitute of Ammonia Refrigeration/Refrigerating Engineers and Technicians Association, iiar/RETA Industrial
Refrigeration School For Operators, 3 days, total of 16 schools, 1985-1992, topics: Engine Room Logs and Preventive
Maintenance, Troubleshooting, Safety Regulations and Training, Emergency Response, and Ammonia Spills and Clean-up.
;Jnited States Cold Storage, Inc. Industrial Refrigeration Cold Storage Workshop, 3/89, topics: Engine Room Logs &
Operating Conditions, Hot Gas Defrost, Safety.
Carnation Corporation, Ammonia R.efrigeration and Maintenance Training, 3 day workshop, September, 1989, and a 5 days
workshop, May, 1991.
Village of Skokie, Illinois Fire Department, Refrigerant Training Program 1/2 day, January 1991.
Grand Metropolitan, Ammonia Training Program panel, 2 days, W. V. Richards, R. A. Cole, W. F. Stoecker and with
Pillsbury/Green Giant engineers, 9/91.
South Holland Food Processors, Ammonia Safety, May, 1991 and June 1992.
Listed on ASHRAE's list of Preferred Speakers.
PUBLISHED ARTICLES:
How to Insulate Industrial Refrigeration Piping, 7/82, Contracting Business.
Saving Energy for Refrigeration System, 2/82, Contracting Business
The True Meaning of Water Treatment, 12/90, RETA's Technical Report.
Troubleshooting Ammonia Refrigeration System,. 2/90, Heating/Pipini~/'Air Conditioning.
Questions and Answers column in the RETA Breeze along with various short Subjects, i.e. codes and regulations.
FORMALTRAINING, YEA 1968-1992:
1) International Union Operating Engineers, training course, 2 years, 1968 and 1969.
2) Steam Plant Operation, evening extension course, 1 year, obtained stationary engineers license. License # EN57010
3) Washburn Trade School (citY of Chicago evening extension course) 1971, Basic Refrigeration.
4) Washburn Trade School (City of Chicago evening extension course)..1972, Advanced Refrigeration.
5) Retrigerating Engineers and Technicians Association (RETA) Industrial Refrigeration Course I, 1974.
6) Washburn Trade School (City of Chicago evening extension course) 1974, Basic Electricity.
7) Washburn Trade School (City of Chicago evening extension course) 1975, Controls and Circuitry.
9) Washburn Trade School (City of Chicago evening extension course) 1975, Basic ElectricitY.
9) Refrigerating Engineers and Technicians Association (RETA) Ir~dustrial Refrigeration Course II, 1975.
10) Sullair Corporation, Operation and Maintenance of Sullair Gas Compressors, 1977
11) Night School, R. J. Daley College, Business Law, Drafting, Accounting, 1977-1979.
12) United States Cold Storage/-I'rans Canada Freezers, Advanced Refrigeration, Operating, Engineering & Maintenance in
Warehousing (2 week course) 1981.
13) The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. (AsH RAE) Chicago Chapter, 1 day
seminar. "The Real World of Refrigeration for Architects and Engineers", 1982.
14) The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. (ASH RAE) Chicago Chapter, 1 day
seminar. "The Real World of Refrigeration-Part I1", 1983.
15) Raymond Corporation, handling equipment, 3 day course, "Primary Technical Instruction", 1986.
16) The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-COnditioning Engineers, Inc. (ASHRAE) Chicago Chapter, 1 day
seminar. "Design & Retro-Fit of Refrigeration Systems to Lower Utility Costs, 1986.
17) Refrigerating Engineers and Technicians Association (RETA) Industrial Refrigeration Course III, 1987.
18) United States Cold Storage, Inc. Industri~.l Refrigeration & Cold Storage Workshop, 3 day seminar, 1989.
19) The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. (ASHRAE), Refrigerating Engineers
and Technicians Association (RETA) Chicago Chapters, and the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (ilar), 1 day
seminar "Ammonia Satety", 1989.
20) United States Cold Storage, "Hazard Communication", 1990, 1992.
21) The American Society of Heating, Retrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. (ASH RAE), R6frigerating Engineers
and Technicians Association (RETA) Chicago Chapters, and the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (ilar), 1 day
seminar "Ammonia Safety", 1990
22) United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 5 day course, "Voluntary
Compliance in Safety and Health", 1991 and 1992.
23) Refrigerating Engineers and TeChnicians Association (RETA) certification Test, Level A (Chiel Engineer), 1992.
24) UniSafe, 3 day co.urse, Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP), April, 1992.
25) United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 5 day course, "Voluntary
3ompliance in SafetY and Health", 1992.
'un~ted
States Department of Labor
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTE
JAMES
MABBELLA
UPDATE FOR VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE
OUTREACH TRAINERS
SEPTI~MBER 11, 1.995
DIREC~0R
®'Ccnpationa!
09111/1992
James Marreila
UPD,4 YE FOR VOLUNT,4RY COMPLI,4NCE OUTRE,4 CH TR,4INERS
CEU'S ,4 warded: 1.9
10/11/1991
James Marrella
A GU/DE TO VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE IN SAFETY & HEAL TH
CEU'S Awarded: 2.5
CH'S Awarded: 30.0
Attendance
James C.~ Marrella
~ ~-Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP)
Training Course, 24 Hours
Apt~ 20-22, '1992
UnlSage
Certificate No: 295218-22
Eert/fi?#te vf
" /ssued b[/the
Department o[ Buildings
a/the ~'t~ a/Eh/casa
STATIONARY ENGINEER'S LICENSE
The Undersigned, ~~~ o~ ~Se~d~e~t a~ /'3,~d~q~, aud~ la ~ ~ ~
~ t~ ~it~ ~ ~, ~ t~ JAMES MARRELLA Liceme Nmnber EN57010
~ ~ ~d ~ ~, ~t~ September 21st, 1995.
_Pi~n~ed la ~ gaealed at U.S. COLD STORAGE
In Witness Whereof .P /t. ae,e /m,mxoda ~ ~ Ac,~d t/t~ 07o~4t/~ ~a~ ~ $~~ 1991.
Olt~tor of t~nsmg. Reglsffation a Building ~nl~oner
~ef.rlgeratlng' '
Technicians Association
~ hereby certifies
j ~~_~s c.
Has satisfactorily completed all testing required by the Refrigerating Engineers and Technicians Association
as a level A
Industrial Refrigeration
Plant Operator
Date Januarq 25, ! 992
- * :Natto~ Board M~mb~r ,-'.~
· : JUNmlS-93 TU~ 10:42 P, 02
LARRY F. JONES
UNITED STATE8 COLD STORAGE
TRAGY, CA
WORK EXPERIENCE:
U,C Milk Co,
Madisonville, KY
4 years in Refrigeration Department
Campbell Sdup Co,
Modesto, CA
2 years Refrigeration Engineer
Tulle Lewis
Stockton, CA
2 years High Pressure Boiler Operator
Pa[-terson Frozen Foods
Patterson, CA
15 years Refrigeration Supervisor and Rerrigeration Engineer
United States Cold Storage
Dinuba, CA
Tracy, CA
18 Months
Refrigeration Engineer
EDUCATION.'
University of Evansville
Evansville, Indiana
Diploma Refrigeration land Refrigeration 11-
School o.f Industrial Electricity.
Madisbn, KY
Diploma .1970
(In 15 years only '5t2 people have actually graduated from this institution.
In the East, it is considered quite a prestigious diploma.)
University of California-Davis
Davis, CA
TUE 10' 4B
P, 03
Davis, CA
Freezing Technology Course '! 989
Ammonia Refrigeration Emergency
'1988~ 1989, 1990
I took this course three times
Tri County Hazardous Material Council in Conjunction with RETA
Refresher Training 1991
Zenger Miller
San Jose, CA
Supervision Courses
Sponsored by Patterson Frozen Foods 1985-1991
(Affiliated with: RETA)
International institute of Refrigeration F75017
Paris, France
California League of Food Processors
In addition I have taught courses in basic refrigeration to operators at Patterson Frozen
Foods, And boiler operation and safety procedures. I aisc taught basic weekly safety
courses. Parts of the above training was required and funded by the state of California
PATTERSON FROZEN
FOI~ S, INC.
P O 8OX
PHONE 209 $9~ 26~ I
PATTERSON. CALIF. 95363 O1 ta
· FAX 209 892 5209
NOTICE
We would like to announce the pro'orion of Larry Jonea to the po~i%ion of
Ref~igeratlon Superintendent. In his new role, Larry will be responsible
for the operation of the Plant's refri~eratlon department including the
boilers, engine room operation, belt freezer operation~ plate freezer
operation, and ~upervlsion of the associated refrigeration ~taff.
As a result of this move, Sam Parker joins the Engineering staff as our
Refrigeration Project Engineer repo=ting to Bob Wear. Sam has
responsibilit~ for refrigeration on special proje~t~ overall warehouse
defrosting and other refrigeration related construction ~ctivitiem.
Please join with me in congratulating both Sam and Larry on their new
assignments.
-, JUN~15-93 TUE 10:47
:~ATTERSON FROZEN FOODS, INC.
P.O. 8OX 1'14 ,
PHONI~ 209 892 2611
P,O~
PATTERSON, CALIF. 95363 O! I,~
FAX 209-892 520~
March 10, 1992
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
I have been asked to write a letter of reference for Larry Jones.
Larry has worked for Patterson Frozen Foods for 1§ years,
During this time, Larry has risen from Refrigeration Hechanic to
Hourly Supervisor and, finallY, to his present position cf
Refrigeration Supervisor, Wi~h each promotion, Larry's level of'
responsibility and our corresponding expectations of his
performance have risen.
Larry's curren[ position makes him responsible for the
supe['vision of 13 mechanics along with the safe¥ efficient and
produchive use of our large ~wo-~age ammonia ~¥s~em. His
knowledge of I.~.F. bell freezers, blast [unnels, product
chillers, pla~e freezers and cold storage warehouses is relied
upon daily. Larry has successfully met the challenge of his job
and will be missed by all of
Should you have a question about Larry or his responsibilities
here at Patterson Frozen Foods, please call me at (209)89.2-2611.
Sincerely,
A~, Ielmini
iden~
JAI:gs
/reference.
S.tanislaus County
Fire Training Officers' Assodat~
~2~ Oakdale Road - ~edesto, C~litarnia ~5355
Certificate of Completion
This is to certify that
LARRY JONES
has successfully completed
A~I~ONIA P.F_FRIGER~TION. EHERGENCIFS
Given this TN!RD _ day of
~)E~EMI~ER
19 ~.8
LARRY. F. JONES
has satisfactorily and with'honor eoraplet~ the prese~bed Co.rse of st. dy in
T~.~_-ORETICAL AND APPLIED. INDUS~~L EL~CITY
and is hereby declared .a
GRADUATE OF THE SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL ELECTRICITY
and is awarded this Diploma in testimony of this o~¢ornplishment.
I1~I gini'HI, SS gI-I]gl~l~Ol~, we have hereur~to afl. ed o~r
has completed 8 hours of Refresher Trainin~
_ Addressing SARA TITLE III/CFR 29-1910.120 reqt~ements
Larry Jones
February
13-16.
1989
' Dat~: ..... ~ ~/ogram ~Bi~ cto~ ~'
Ralph Nodal
United States Cold Storage
Tulare, CA
.Work'Experience:
United States Cold Storage ...................
Chief Engineer ........................................................ 1990-Present
San Joaquin Valley College ...........................................................
HVAC & Refrigeration Advisory Board Member ............... 1993
Zacky Farms ..........
Refrigeration Supe~/i~ .................................. 1987-1990
Safety Committee Member
J.R. & Sons ...............................
Owner- HVAC & Refrfgeration .................................................................... 1984-1987
PG&E ........
Service Department - HVAC & Absorption Systems ........ 1972-1985
Safety Chairman - 1980-1982
Education:
Risk Management Prevention Program training course ........... 1992
HAZ-OP team member- U.S. Cold Storage: Union City, CA
Central Valley Chapter ....................................... ' · Since
......................................... 1984
Refrigeration Engineers and Technicians Association (RETA) - First V.P.
RETA Chapter Sponsored ............................................................................ 1990-1
RETA Courses - Revised I, II, III, Elec. 991
Ammonia Safety Training Seminar ..........
Tulare, CA ......................................................
1992
Control wiring &troubleshooting.: .....
Seven weeks - Savco Elec. ' .................................. ~ ........................ 1990
College of the Sequoias
Visalia, CA
Ammonia Refrigeration ................................. : ............................................... 1991
Advanced Ammonia Refrigeration ................................................................ 1992
International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration (ILAR) ......................... 1991-1992
Annual National Conference Sessions
Refrigeration Engineers and Technicians Association (RETA) .............. 1991-1992
Annual National Conference Sessions
Ralph Nodal
United States Cold Storage
Tulare, CA
Education: (continued)
Refrigeration Engineers and Technicians Association (RETA) .............. 1988-1992
Annual Regional Conference Sessions
Ammonia Safety Seminar ........................... : ................................................. 1987
Watsonville, CA
RETA Courses I, II, & III ................................................................................ 1985
Ammonia Refrigeration
San Joaquin Valley College ........................................................................... 1985
HVAC & Refrigeration
Matt Kohler
United States Cold Storag®
Tulare, CA
Work Experience:
United States Cold Storage .......................................................................... 1992-Present
Tulare, CA
Plant Engineer
Foster Farms ................................................................................................ 1990-1992
Fresno, CA
Refrigeration
Zacky Farms .................................................................................................. 1987-1990
Dinuba, CA
Refrigeration Department
Control Cold Refrigeration ............................................................................. 1984-1986
Orosi, CA
Service Technician - HVAC
Safety Committee member @ U.S. Cold Storage, Foster Farms, & Zacky Farms
HAZ-OP team member- U.S. Cold Storage, Tulare
Education:
College of the Sequoias ............................................ ~ .................................... 1990-1991
Visalia, CA
4 Semesters - HVAC
1 Semester- Ammonia Refrigeration - 1993
Refrigeration Engineers and Technicians Association (RETA) ................ 1989-1993
Annual Regional Conference Sessions
RETA Ammonia Safety Seminar ..................................................................... 1992
Tulare, CA
RETA Courses ......................... ~ ...................................................................... 1992-1993
Ammonia Refrigeration I, II
Compressor Safety Seminar ............................................................................ 1990-1991
Active RETA member ..................................................................................... Since 1989
RAUL RAGUNTON
CUrrent A d~ss
1710 24th Street
Sacramento, CA 95816-7115
(916) 448-7342
Objective: To attain a position an Engineering Office Assistant.
Permanent Addregv
1250 Denver AvenUe
Stockton, CA 95206
(209) 948-9068
Education:
Bachelor of Science, Mechanical Engineering(January 1992)
Califbrnia State University, Sacramento
GPA: 3.02 (Overall CSUS), 3.04 (Major CSUS)
Deans Honor List
Related Courses
Prqject Engineering
Thermodynamics
Heat Transfer
Machine Design
Senior Project:
Computer Applic. (Basic-FORTRAN)
Product Design Comp-Aided Mt~.
Heating & Air Conditioning Systems
Interpersonal Communication
Intro. Finite Element Analysis
Numerical Control Program
Management 81 (Intro. Supervision)
Intro. Mechanical Propert Mtrls
Designed and assembled a motorized steering system tbr the 'Lateral Guidance Vehicle'. This CSUS-
CalTrans research project included library research, extensive vendor contact tbr the motor drive, Bi-
monthly memos, weekly meetings with all disciplines involved, and the definite process of design,
working drawings, and a tinal technical report.
Work Experience:
Student A~istant
CSU, Sacramento
Duties:
Assisted in the design and fabrication of a motorized steering.
system tbr the 'Lateral Guidance Vehicle". 2/91-12/91
Auto-CAD Operator
ValleY Manufacturing
and Engineering Co
Rancho Cordova, CA
Transferred hand drawings of dies and punches to Auto-CAD
computer system. Occasionally assisted in design of some
dies, punches, and cutters. 6/90 - 8/90
Cad Operator/CO-OP
STV/Lyon Associates
McLean, Virginia
Input of architectural drawings onto a Prime mainframe
computer system. 8~88 - 12/88
Program Coordinator
Anderspn Y Center
Stockton, CA
Data Entry
Continental Engraving Co.
Stockton, CA
Planned and implemented Partners In Education program
Southeast Asian youths, organized educational activities,
tutored 15 youths, conducted group activities, planned and
coordinated field trips, and counseled youths. 2/88 - 6/88
8/86 - 5/87
Skills and Interests:
Computers - Experience in using IBM-PC systems.(DOS,Basic,ACAD,WordPerfect, Windows)
Communication - Experience in oral and written communication through group projects, work
experience, and college courses.
Activities:
Member of' the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Member of the International Students Association
(References Upon Reques0
THE
STELLAR GROUP
November 2, 1992
Mr. Victor D. Arnett
Chief Engineer
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE
OF CALIFORNIA
3100 52nd Avenue
Sacramento, CA 95823
Dear Mr. Arnett~
Please find enclosed information per request of Mr. Chuck Toogood.
We hope this infOrmation is helpful to you. If you have any
questions, please don't hesitate to call.
Cordially,
THE STELLAR GROUP
Vice. President
BMC~dld
Enclosures
2'900 Hartle¥ Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32257 · Telephone (904) 260-2900 · FAX (904) 260-2088
Bruce M. Chandler
Vice President
Education
Bachelor of Science-Commerce and Engineering
Drexel University
Qualifications &
Responsibilities
Bruce has more than sixteen years experience in
refrigeration equipment sales and systems design.
He is responsible for the development and
implementation of refrigeration systems design
and installation for all low-temperature
applications. He directs projects installation and
serves the owners as the primary contact for
refrigeration systems projects.
Representative
Project
Experience
Pepsi Cola, Jacksonville, Florida
Design and installation of carbo coolers
ice builders utilizing a central station single stage ammonia system, located in
Jacksonville, Florida.
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., Nassau, Bahamas
Design and installation of a -20° ice cream freezer, +28° meat freezer and +35°
produce cooler utilizing two stage central station recirculated ammonia system,
located in Nassau, Bahamas.
Associated Grocei's, Miami, Florida
Design, construction, refrigeration, and renovation of a grocery distribution Center
including the installation of a halocarbon refrigeration system, located in Miami,
Florida.
United States Cold Storage, Cherry Hill, New Jersey
Complete central station recirculated ammonia refrigeration system for a 95,000 SF
-20° freezer facility with computer controls, monitoring and energy management
programs, located in Laredo, Texas.
Americold, Inc., Portland, Oregon
Expansion of an existing central station recirculated ammonia refrigeration system for
a 110,000 SF addition to over 500,000 SF of -20°F low-temperature distribution
center, located in Fogelsville, Pennsylvania.
Oscar Mayer Foods, Madison, Wisconsin
Design, construction, and refrigeration of an 80,000 SF convertible cooler/freezer
with -20°F capability throughout. A central station ammonia system with energy
management controls refrigerates this distribution center, located in Stockton,
California.
Registrations
Affiliations &
Associations
Licensed Mechanical Contractor: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia
Member Refrigeration Engineers and Technicians Association
Member International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration
Prim
This certificate is awarded to
BRUCE CHANDLER
in recognition of attendance at
the Training Course
IMPLEMENTATION OF PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT
THE STELLAR GROUP
Jacksonville, Florida
August 14, 1992
Awarded this
14th day ~f Au_&~_t~_ , ,1992.
Co~se Instructor
The above participant has been awarded 0..._~6 continuing education units (CEUs) for this progra~
Ronald H. Nesler
Manager of Refrigeration Controls
Education
Career Studies Center
Electronics Technical School
Hagerstown, Maryland
Advanced Electronics
Hagerstown Junior College
Qualifications &
Responsibilities
Nesler has eleven years of machine automation
experience in microprocessor and computer
control. He has four years experience in the
refrigeration control field including the design
and programming of refrigeration computer
control systems for complete automation of
low-temperature food storage facilities.
Representative
Project
Experience
United Refrigeration Services, Atlanta, Georgia.
Designed and programmed entire computer control system for automation of
eleven zones of liquid control and defrost; four screw compressors; a two fan
condenser; two pump re. circulator packages; and level control and alarms.
Oscar Mayer Distribution, New Castle, Delaware.
Designed and programmed entire computer control system for automation of the
following: Ten zones of liquid control and defrost; three screw compressors; a two fan
condenser; two pump recirculator packages; and level control and alarms.
Piggly Wiggly, Vidalia, Georgia.
Designed and programmed entire computer control system for automation of the
following: Seven zones of liquid control and defrost; three screw compressors; one,
two fan condenser; two, two pump recirculator packages; and level control and alarms.
United States Cold Storage, Laredo, Texas.
Design and installation of a central station ammonia refrigeration system with
controls for a 117,000 SF warehouse and distribution center with -20°F storage and
-40°F blast freezing capability, located in Lumberton, North Carolina.
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., Jacksonville, Florida.
Design and installation of a -20°F ice cream freezer, +28°F meat freezer and +35°F
produce cooler utilizing a two stage central station recirculated ammonia system,
located in Nassau, Bahamas.
Registrations
Affiliations &
Associations
Member of International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE
TRACY, CA. HAZOP STUDY NOTES
page I
TUESDAY - DECEMBER 1, 1992
8:30 AM
Start of Tracy HAZOP study. Present are: Victor Arnett, USCS
Regional Engineer and team leader, Chuck Toogood, USCS, V.P.
Engineering, Jim Marrella, USCS, Chief Engineer and HAZOP Study
Secretary, Stan Moya, USCS, Manager Sacramento, Larry Jones,
USCS, Tracy,. CA. Chief Engineer, and Bruce Chandler Stellar Group
(contractor)
Introduction to HAZOP Study Node led by Victor Arnett, included
an overview of the direction of the HAZOP study and a definition
of the "Guide Words"; terms used.
)
8~55 AH
General discussion. Victor covered some concerns he had on
Tracy's refrigeration system before starting our first HAZOP
Study Node. Following are the results of his conversation with
the HAZOP team.
COMMENTS:
Safety relief on the oil =ooler (thermosyphon) is piped to
the atmosphere; need to repipe to the suction side of the
intercooler.
Need to determine safety relief valves settings, 250 psi or
300 psi,'on all FriCk equipment. ' '
Charging ~ine tie-in, need ~o relocate the downstream of
'"King Solenoid'' valve.
Instpll check valve on cha~ging line, close to tie-in point
at kang valve to prevent backflOw.and chemical spill of the
plant's refrigerant during charging operation.
Need to examine possible use of hot gas downstream pressure
regulator in main' hot gas line.
9:30 AM "
Start first Study Node, High Pressure Receiver including all high
pressure piping and equipment.
9:50 AM Coffee break.
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE
TRACY, CA. HAZOP STUDY NOTES
page '2
TUESDAY.- DECEMBER 1, 1992, continue
10:00 AM
HAZOP Study ~ontinues with~the study node for the High Pressure
Receiver:
Joining the HAZOP team are Arthur Bentley, Jr. and Jim Robertson
of the San Joaquin County Office of Emergency Services. Victor
Arnett review with A. Bentley and J. Robertson the progress.of
the meeting. ?
10:15 AM COMMENTS:
We need to determine if the "Emergency Stop Button: can be
installed inside the "Fire Department Emergency Cabinet"
Need to include temperature sensor on the condensate return
line from the evaporative condenser and a wet bulb and dry
bulb sensor to determine the ambient conditions.
General discussion. If possible, Victor Arnett would like to have
the "System Computer" be able to receive data from a mini weather
station located on the roof. The objective is to collect accurate
weather information for developing cloud plume studies. Victor
stated that there are no national (major airport) weather
stations near the location of theTracy facility.
Victor would iike to have the system computer programmed so that
the high pressure alarm is broken down into 2 levels. The first
alarm would be considered a "Pre-alarm" and that alarm would be
set at 190 psig. The second alarm would shut down the compressors
at 200 psig which is 80 percent of the high pressure relief valve
setting.
COMMENTS:
Need to check relief valve setting on the purger.
Need to address oil removal'from the screw compressor
packages (thermosyphon) tube and shell oil cooler.
General discussion.'The present setup for oil removal from the
thermosyphon.oil cooler is piped directly to atmosphere. It was
agreed that this was not the proper way to remove oil from a high
pressure vessel. It was also agreed that the thermosyphon oil
cooler (refrigerant side) should be piped to a central "oil out"
vessel, where it can be removed by a lower pressure.
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE
TRACY, CA. HAZOP STUDY NOTES
page 3
TUESDAY - DECEMBER 1, .1992, continue
General discussion. Chuck Toogood asked everyone if they have
seen the article in the November 2,' 1992, issue of (Appendix C)
The ~ir Conditioning and Refrigeration N~S titled, "A New
Approach to Gas Cooling". This was a reprint of a paper by Ron
Cole, P.E., presented at the 1992, International Refrigeration
Conference at Purdue University.
A few members of the team responded that they did and all were in
agreement that it was a good idea. Chuck requested if at all
feasible to use this design in Tracy.
11:30 AM
Finished Study node parameters sheet. 'Victor Arnett took a few
minutes to explain the next step in our HAZOP study and explained
the HAZOP studyNode sheet.
11:50 AM
Break for lunch
1:05 PM
Continued with our HAZOP study, all members were present. A ~
question was raised as to what seismic zone Tracy was designed.
Bruce Chandler of the Stellar Group was assigned to get the
answer. (See appendix A, page 3, CAP 22)
NOTE: Screw compressor,s oil cooler and separator reliefs
are set for 300 psig, all other reliefs are set for 250
psig.
2:55 PM Coffee break.
3:20 PM Continue with study.
NOTE: A question was raised as to what location were'the
smoke detectors going to be placed. Bruce Chandler of the
Stellar Group was assigned to check the location of all
smoke detectors.
4:00 PM
ArtBentley and Jim Robertson of the San Jaoquin County OES
returned to their office.
NOTE: It was agreed to investigate the posslble installation
of an ammonia'sensor in the relief vent lines which may be
tied into our emergency shut down cabinet, if feasible.
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE
TRACY, CA. HAZOP STUDY NOTES
page 4
TUESDAY - DECEMBER 1, 1992, continue.
4:00 PM continue
NOTE, continued. Also discussed was the possibility of a
sectional containment or shutdown triggered by an ammonia
sensor. Discussion was on what lines should be shut off and
when. The following are recommendations from the Tulare CA.
HAZOP study on November 18, 1992.
1. Shut off the.liq~/id and hot gas feed valves to
evaporators and glycol system heat exchanger only in
the area '(room or dock) where the signal was received
from; a particular ammonia sensing point.
2. Shut off suction valve and fans in that same area
after a set period of time (like a defrost pump down).
5:20 PM
Completed HAZOP study node for'the High pressure receiver.
Meeting adjourned.
WEDNESDAY - DECEMBER 2, 1992.
8:10 AM
Victor Arnett called the meeting to order. Present were Victor
Arnett, Chuck Toogood, Larry Jones Stan Moya, of United States
Cold Storage, Bruce Chandler and Ron Nesler of the. Stellar Group
and Jim Marrella of United States Cold storage, HAZOP Study
Secretary.
Victor Arnett covered with the Stellar Group'people, the
information required on the Tracy P&ID (See appendix A, Page
5,MPR/ 4). Victor also explained the next study node and the
guide word system for HAZOP study.
8:20 AM
Started HAZOP study node parameters sheet for the High'.
Temperature Recirculator/Intercooler. It was determine and agreed.
to use the nomenclature used on Stellar flow diagram.
NOTE: A question raised about the bypass (CV-10 .& CV-16)
feed on the liquid lines_feeding the high temperature~
recirculator/intercooler and the low temperature
recirculator. It was agreed by the team that they were not.
required and the Stellar Group people were' asked to remove
them from the job. (See Appendix A, page 5, MPR 6 & 7.)
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE
TRACY, CA. HAZOP STUDY NOTES
page 5
Wednesday, December 2, 1992, continue.
9:20 AM
The Stellar Group people were asked for the electrical
classification of the Tracy facility and also the piping system
pressure test requirements. See appendix A, page 6, .CAP 11. It
was also agreed to check the existing standards i.e.~, ASHRAE 15
and the IIAR-2 and to check all design standards for piping,
vessel, compressors and control valves. Victor Arnett to follow
up on all these areas.
NOTE: Control valves, Parker Hannifin Corporation,'
Refrigerating Specialties Division, as all ammonia
manufacturers of control valves, do not have a design
specification in their industry. However, R/S valves meet
all the Canadian requirements,
9:34 AM
Jim Robertson of the San Jaoquin County, OES, joined our meeting.
10:39 AM
Finished HAZOP study node parameters sheet for the High
Temperature Recirculator/Intercooler. Coffee break.
11:00 AM
Started with HAZOP study node sheet for the High Temperature.
Recirculator/Intercooler; everyone in attendance. Victor Arnett
started the study with an introduction of the study node and the
guide word methodology.
11~15 AM
Questions raised about the recirculator/intercooler during low
level alarm.
1. Do the pumps shut off?.
2. Do we need to shut off liquid solenoid feed to the
low temperature recirculator. (2" IPL).
Victor Arnett to follow up with Bruce Chandler, of the Stellar
Group.
11:24 AM
During the "High flow" node the question was raised about.fork
lift operator training. Chuck Toogood stated that.all the
equipment was purchased with a complete training program. Ail
operators will be trained by the manufacturer and~will receive an
operating Permit.
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE
TRACY, CA. HAZOP STUDY NOTES
page 6
Wednesday, December 2, 1992, continue.
11:40 AM
Victor Arnett suggested that if at all possible, the
refrigeration lines on the rail and truck docks be relocated to
sit on the roof. Also, for future projects, to study the
possibility of using pent-house design for the evaporators on all
the dock areas.
11:47 AM
Break for lunch.
1:08 PM ~
Continued with our HAZOP study node for the high temperature
recirculator/intercooler; all members were present, except Stan
Moya. Stan returned to the plant and thanked everyone for coming
and felt that this time was well spent.
1:35 PM
Stellar will add high/low pressure alarm to the high and low
temperature suctions and have it operator-adjustable.
2:30 PM
NOTE: Fire department box will have an alarm on the door,
will be wired to the local alarm company, i.e., ADT.
2:50 PM
Completed HAZOP study node for the high temperature
recirculator/intercooler. Started HAZOP study node parameters
sheet for the Low Temperature Recirculator. Everyone in
attendance.
3=05 PM
Stellar will install a cross connection from the low temperature
to the high temperature suction for start-up uses only.
3:11 PM ~
Questions were raised on vessel pressure rating (See Appendix A,
page 2, MPR/ 12 and Appendix B) and system specification.
NOTE: Low temperature vessel is a dual stamped vessel,
Maximum work pressure is 250 PSIG at -20°F to +200°F and 100
PSIG at -40.F to 100QF.
Stellar will get back to Victor Arnett on specification for
system design.
3:26 PM
Finished HAZOP study node parameters sheet for the Low
Temperature Recirculator
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE
TRAC¥, CA. HAZOP 'STUDY NOTES
page 7
Wednesday, December 2, 1992, continue.
3:26 PM Continued
Jim Robertson returned to his office. The team took a. coffee
break before starting the next node.
3:36 PM .
Start HAZOP study node for the Low Temperature Recirculator
3:55 PM
The team is working off the Tulare and Union City study nodes,
since the plants are designed for industrial ammonia
refrigeration and the process is the same, the team felt that
this will enhance the HAZOP study.
NOT~: Need to add reverse flow to intercooler node. If high
pressure liquid by-pass t° low temperature recirculator, is
opened you could get reverse flow through the 2" IPL and
cause high level in the high temperature recirculator.
Stellar will study the possibility of installing a ch'ec~
valve down stream of the hand valve. (See Appendix A, page
6, MPR 18)
4:25 PM '
Victor Arnett will correct Tulare node for ,,Contamination with
oil" under mechanical failure page 9 of 10 and page 6 of 10 for
the low level node. Also spelling error ,,sigh" to sight, level"
4:45 PM
Completed HAZOP study node for the Low Temperature Recirculat°r'
continue with general discussion on the HAZOP study and the
assignments of research material. Meeting adjourned at 5:10 PM.
MEMORANDUM
THE STELLAR GROUP
2900 Hartley Road
Jacksonville, Florida 32257
(904) 260-2900
TO, The File
FROM: Bruce Chandl .~.
DATE, December 8, 1992
SUBJECT: .USCS - TRACY,' CALIFORNIh
A meeting was held in Sacramento, California on December i and 2,
1992 for the purpose of conducting a HAZOP study for USCS new
facility in Tracy, .California.~ Present 'at the meeting were,
Victor Arnett - USCS, California.
Chuck Toogood - USCS, Cherry Hill
Larry Jones - USCS, California
Stan Moya - USCS, California.
Jim Morella - USCS, Chicago
Bruce Chandler - Stellar r'~
Ron Nesler - Stellar ~ . .~.,,-
Art Bentley - San Jaoquin County. OES
Jim Robertson - San Jaoquin County. OES.~
My notes and comments from that meeting, which may or may not be
directly related to the HAZOP.~'Study are as 'follows:
Pay One, December 1, 1992:
Resp,.
MPR 1.
'MPR 2 .~
The relief valve ~schedule'...~on. our drawings needs to
include safety relief valves furnished by Frick on their
· packages, relief onr. Hansen~ purger' their'settings and
''capacities.
Relief valves shown.'~for. Frick packages including relief
on tube side of thermosyphonheat exchanger need to be
MEMO B. CHANDLER TO FILE
USCS - Tracy, California
December 8. 1992
Page 2
MPR 3.
MPR 4.
Can relief valves on oil side (shell) of thermosyphon
heat exchanger be piped to the high temperature wet
suction to avoid release of oil to the environment.
REPLY~ Yes.
All relief valves and their settings need to be shown on
flow diagram with set pressure to more closely comply
with P&ID raqutrements ·
}4PR/ 5. Various instruments need to be shown on flow diagram with
RHN their purpose noted. (See Frick compressor P&ID in IOM
manual for typical.).
MPR 6. We need to include a pumpout line. from the high stage
compressors to the low side to minimize ammonia release
during servicing.
HPR. 7. ~ ~Ammonia charging line should be relocated to down stream
of King solenoid valve. A check valve should be
installed in charging line close to King valve to avoid
inadvertent release of ammonia.
HPR 8. A direct vertical up .'release 'of ammonia is Preferred to
conventional horizontal, release,if a satisfactory method
: of excluding rain can be '~found. This allows better
dispersion of ammonia if a relief pops.
}{PR/ 9. The main hot gas Solenoid.should be open only during
RHN 'defrost if this works with our piping'scheme for the
under f I b0 r' i'h~t--' ~x~hange f.,---~
PAK/ 1~. Where does ammonia :diffusion system dump toy
MDN ·
REPLY~ Will advise, not Yet':re.solved.,
MPR 11. The normal ammonia charge for each piece of equipment
should be included on our equipment schedules including
thermosyphon heat' exchangers:
MPR/ 12.. Questions were raised:as to'what vessel pressure ratings
PAK were. at what temperatures, and what AS~E code was
appli~able. All of this information should be in our
drawings, possibly, on the vessel 'detail 'sheets. Vendor
supplied vessels ~such--'as oX1 separators should also be
shown or scheduled.
MEMO B. CHANDLER TO FILE
USCS - Tracy. California
December 8. 1992
Page 3
RHN 13.
RHN 14.
MPR 15.
RHN 16.
RHN 17,
RHN 18.
MPR/ 19.
PAK. .~
MPR/ 20
PAK
RHN 21.
CAP 22.
It was decided that the low level float.on the receiver
should deenergize the -. liquid feed valve on the
intercooler to minimize problems with hydraulic shock.
This low level condition should also initial on alarm.
USCS requested that the'following temperature sensors be
included in the control~system.·
~ condenser drain line temp
~ ambient dry bulb temp
~ ambient.wet bulb temp ....... ~ ..... ~ ..... ~ ...... ~ ......
What codes and particularly..what are test pressures for
high.side and iow side piping.
REPLY: ANSI B31.5 & Uniform Mechanical Code with
California ammendments. This code requires 300 PSI on
the high side and 150'psi on the low side.
The control system communications program should include
a password and call back feature to.minimize any chance
of unauthorized access.
Control system should include a high and low pressure
alarm on all suction levels.
Is the high discharge pressure cutout adjustable on Frick
compressors? ·
REPLY: Yes, but only below 225 psig.
USCS has requested a central.oil removal vessel. The'
following shouid'be~'connected-to.this vessel:
~ each tube side of!.thermosyphon.oil coolers
~ high pressure'receiver.~drain~. ~
A brief discussion of intercooler design brought up the
question as to whether, modifications could be made. I
was .advised that vessel~,fabricatiOn was nearly complete
and modification was not possible. Chuck Toogood advised
of a preferable design for future projects which will be
shared within Stellarz..,i'~ ' '
A door alarm switch- on, the ammonia diffuser cabinet
should be included in the' control system with alarm
company notification capability', '~
What seizmic zone are we designing for?
REPLY: Zone 3.
MEMO B. CHANDLER TO FILE
USCS -'Tracy. California
December 8. 1992
Page ¢
GJA/ 23.
MDN
GJA/ 24.
MDN
Floor drains on docks are not'desirable. Chuck Toogood
to contract GeOrge Albertelli~ or Mike Netting if they
should be eliminated.~.' , ~ -
Can a sump be added to shop and machine room drain system
with a sump pump deenergized.by ammonia detector system
to minimize chance of ammonia discharge to'sanitary sewer
system.
GJA/ 25.
HDN
MDN 26.
RHN 27.
PAK 28.
There are no provisions for materrial handling equipment
clean up. 0il and grease from clean up can not go to
sanitary.sewer or storm drainage. USCS would like to
investigate an oil and~grease trap for selected floor
An acid. trap exists for the battery charging floor drains
but no one present knew. how~it worked or of any required
maintenance. I promised that'Mike Netting would forward
information to Chuck Toogood. .~'
The control system should include'provisions to unload
.compressors if condensing' pressure reaches 190 psig.
We need to develop, a pre-startup safety checklist and
complete same.
RHN
RHN
MDN
MPR/ '32.
RHN
PAK 33.
29. The .control' system 'should include a low discharge
pressure alarm.
,.~,.~ . ..
35..-The col~trol s~stem'shou'ld:-inCiude duai"setpoints for.the.
condensing pre.ssure ::which will allow head pressure to.
fall if no defrosts:are~ scheduled for the upcoming 30
minutes (adjustable).
-, .$ ~ ~.. . .~ -'..; ~ :
31..' Victor Arnett wants':to.review the control.wiring for the' · .'dry. sprinkler,:systemas, most:California fire protection
contractors have timited!:.exPerience with dry systems.
An ammonia sensor should, beincluded in the relief vent
line which would alarm and~cause a plant shutdown with
the exception of condenser'?fans:and pumps.'-
~,: i' ~i-' ~ i .! ~,
Does the Hansen purger have. a provision for alarm if it
fails?
REPLY: No.
MEMO B. CHANDLER TO FILE
USCS - Tracy. California
December 8. 1992
Page §
RHN 34.
MPR 35.
Can weather information from'a station furnished by USCS
be downloaded to Our control system via 422 or 232 for
the purpose of confirming ammonia plume studies.
The design of the dock hot gas defrost control
needs to be reviewed.
system
Day Two, December 2, 1992:
Resp.
MPR 1.
The USDA room unit cooler is shown as recirculated. We
need to confirm that.this is acceptable given high back
pressure regulator setting and recirculator pump
pressure.
MPR 2.
Are all oil pots rated at 300 psig?
scheduled at 250 psig. '~' ~
Relief valves are
HPR/ 3.
RHN
MPR/ 4.
RHN
MpR 5.
REPLY~ Oil pots are rated at 300 psig. Relief valves
will be 300 psig.
Pressure transducers for the control system-should be
shown on the flow diagram. ~"~' ~
Compressor safeties with setpoints should be shown on
flow diagram. See P&ID~drawing on page 71 of IOM.
Do standard legends f0r'P&kDs~exist in ASHRAE documents?
MPR
REPLY: Will advise.
'6 ~BYpass line around"liqUid feed sOlenoids on vessels needs
to be eliminated on this and future designs.
PAK
We should supply a r~C0mmended spare parts list to USCS
'~for things like rebuild kits'to liquid feed solenoids to
vessels.
MPR
MPR
What is line shown between ammonia pump suction to
suction vent line.
REPLY.. Drawing error.
Our high pressure receiver show~ a Hansen Leveltrol and
the low level float too high. This should be corrected.
MEMO B. CHANDLER TO FILE
USCS - Tracy, California
December 8. 1992
Page 6'
MPR 10.
What is temperature rating~on oil pots?
REPLY: -20°F to 300°F,
CAP '11.
What 'is electrical claSsification~of this building?
REPLY: The NEC does not classify a building unless it is
a hazardous location.
PAK 12 What does UG-20 on.vesSel .ASME stamp mean?
MPR 13.
REPLY: This is a section of the ASME code that addresses
design temperatures... Vessels are designed accordingly.
What are piping specifi'Cations for this job? They need
"t° be issued with specifications.
MPR
MPR
RHN
14. What is the location of. the .underfloor heat exchanger?
It needs to be inside~',the..machine room and shown on
machine room plan.
15. We need a crossover between freezer and intermediate
suction for startup.
16. What is maximum discharge pressure cutout setting for RDB
booster compressor's?~
REPLY~ 115 psig .alarm/.i25.psig cutout.
MPR. 17.
.MPR 18.
MPR 19.
Check valves need to,be..~dded, to. freezer defrost relief
lines.
A CK-4A needs to be installed in the intercooler bypass
· liquid feed line .to avoid a reverse flow into the
intercooler. .., .,~,: ~ .... .:. ~,~.,
USCS would like a color.~coded and laminated flow diagram
fOr posting in the~machine: rOom. ,Is our CAD system
capable?
BMC:dld
USCS Attendees
Ron Nesler
Mark Roxburgh
Ge0rge,Albertelli
~ , 'Mike Netting
Chris Palumbo
'BObby c'othren
· ..,..;,.Aaron Kaczorowski
Mi.chael Sandoval
· ~: .~ Chuck ..Taylor
~.......?,Nell Horn
FACILITY:
United States Cold Storage
1400 N. Mac. Arthur Drive
Tracy, CA. 95376
(209) 835-2563 FAX (209) 835-4117
HAZOP STUDY NODE:
H. P. RECEIVER (Total High Pressure Piping System)
DATE: 12/Ol/92
COMPONENTS: "H. P. Receiver; Condenser; 5 oil coolers; 1 Shell & Tube Under Floor Heat Exchanger; Thermal Siphon vessel; Balance Tank; 2
High Stage Screw Compressor Discharges with Oil Sump and Separator; Air Purger; H.P. Liquid Line form H. P. Receiver (with Hand and Solenoid
Valves), to High Temperature Recirculator Intercooler, to Purger, to normally closed bypass, to Iow temperature recirculator and to outside charging valve;
Receiver Oil Out Line and Valve; High Stage Compressor Discharge Line to Condensers; Liquid Return Line from Condensers through Balance Tank
through Thermal Siphon Vessel, to Screw Compressor Oil Coolers, to H. P. Receiver; Hot Gas Line (with Hot Gas King Valve, Hot Gas Solenoid & Hand
Valves), to all room Evaporators & Underfloor Heat Exchanger; Purge Line from Condensers, Balance Tank and Thermo Siphon Tank to Purger; H.P.
Gas Equalizing Line on HP Receive, Balance tank, and Thermo Siphon Vessel; and Diffuser Line from top of the High Pressure Receiver to outside
Ammonia Diffuser System.
OPERATING CONDITIONS: Operating Pressure at 110 PSIG to 160 PSIG; Liquid Return at 60°F to 88°F; Compressor Discharge Temperature
160°F; and Liquid Level in H. P. Receiver 35% to65% ....
DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS: H. P. Receiver - maximum of 250 PSIG at 300°F; minimum of -20°F at 250 PSIG. ' Screw Compressor Oil Separators
maximum working pressure 250 PSIG at 650°F and a minimum working
Tank 250 PSIG; and Piping 250 PSIG. All Ammonia Vessels designed temperature at -20°F at 250 PSIG; H.P. Receiver size is 66" X 14'-0". Balance_
according to ASME section 8 Division 1 dated 1989 & by UG - 20. All ~r~moni~-
Refrigeration Piping designed according to American National Standard for equipment, design, and installation of ammonia mechanical refrigeration
systems - ANSI / IlAR 74-2, 1978 & ANSI / liAR 2, 1984. All Refrigeration Piping installed according to ASME / ANSI B31.5, 1987 with addenda ASME /
ANSI B31.5b, 1991. Uniform Building, Mechanical, and Fire Code with California addenda.
INSTRUMENTATION: Each Frick High Stage Compressor panel monitors its own pressures and temperatures. The Computer control system uses
a transducer with pressure gauge to monitor and control the discharge condensing pressure. The Refrigeration Central Control Panel has hard
wired safety's such as high float emergency shutoff etc. Sigh level coiumn with Iow level alarm and liquid feed valve shutoff.
PROTECTIVE DEVICES: H. P. Receiver Low Level Float alarm and closes feed Solenoid valve to High Temp. Recirculator / Intercooler; H.P. Syst
Alarm set at 180 PSIG; Second Stage Compressor Discharge Pressure Alarm set at 190 PSIG and Cutout set at 200 PSIG, temperature alarm set at 194e°r~
and cut out at 210 °F, high oil temperature alarm set at.158OF and cutout at 1'67°F; High Side SPRV's on Receiver, Condenser, balance tank,
thermosiphon tank, purger, and glycol heat exchanger are set at 250 PSIG; SPRV's on compressor oil cooler s and oil separators are set at 300 PSIG;
Compressor unloads at motor full load amps; Ammonia Detection Alarms in Docks, Refrigerated Room Penthouses and Engine Room; Electric King
Valve; Purging System; and Pressure Gauges.
FACILITY:
United States Cold Storage
1400 N. Mar, Arthur Drive
Tracy CA. 95376
(209) 835-2563 FAX (209) 835-4117
HAZOP STUDY NODE:
HIGH TEMPERATURE RECIRULATOR / INTERCOOLER VESSEL
(Total Intermediate Pressure piping system)
DATE: 12/o2/92
COMPONENTS: High Temperature Recirculator/IntercoolerVessel with Relief & Hand Valves; High Temperature Recirculator Suction Piping (30
PSIG to 35 PSIG) from Evaporators on Truck & Rail Docks, USDA Room, all Storage Rooms, Glycol System Heat Exchanger and Air Purger; High Stage
Suction Piping from Recirculator/Intercooler Vessel to High Stage Screw Compressors; Booster Discharge Piping from Booster Compressors to
Recirculator / Intercooler Vessel; Intermediate Pressure Liquid Piping (30 PSIG) from Recirculator / Intercooler, to Low Temperature Recirculator, with
hand and elect control valves; Ammonia Pumps with Hand and Check Valves, Vent and Bleed Lines; High Temperature Recirculating Liquid Feed Line
from Vessel through Ammonia Pump, to all evaporators; Recirculator / Intercooler Oil Pot with Relief and Vent Lines; Air Purger; Line from High
Temperature Recirculator / Intercooler Vessel to Ammonia Diffuser with Valves and Gauge; High Pressure Liquid Ammonia Feed Line to Recirculator /
Intercooler Vessel with Solenoid & Hand Valves.
OPERATING CONDITIONS: Operating Pressure at 30 PSIG to 35 PSIG; Liquid Temperature at 17°F to-22°F; Pump Feed Pressure 60 PSIG to 65
PSIG; Operating Liquid Level in High Temperature Recirculator / Intercooler Vessel is 4'-4" high from bottom of vessel, adjustable with Hansen level
control); Booster Compressor Discharge Temperature 140 °F to 160°F; Suction Temperature to High Side Screw Compressors is 25°F to 30°F.
DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS: Vertical Vessel 5' X 12'-0"; maximum working pressure 250 PSIG at -20°F to 200°F; Oil Pot maximum working
pressure 300 PSIG; All Intermediate Pressure Piping tested to 250 PSIG; All Piping is A-53 Grade A or B - ERW for 2" and up and A-106 Schedule 80
seamless for smaller than 2"; All Ammonia Vessels designed according to ASME section 8 Division 1 dated 1989 & by UG - 20. All Ammonia
Refrigeration Piping designed according to American National Standard for equipment, design, and installation of ammonia mechanical refrigeration
systems - ANSI / IlAR 74-2, 1978 & ANSI / liAR 2, 1984. All Refrigeration Piping installed according to ASME 1 ANSI B31.5, 1987 with addenda ASME /
ANSI B31.5b, 1991; Uniform Building, Mechanical, and Fire Code with California addenda.
INSTRUMENTATION: Each Frick Compressor microprocessor panel monitors and controls it's own pressure and temperature with pressure
transducers and temperature sensors with safety valves for high pressure back up. The Stellar computer control system uses a pressure transducer with
pressure gauge to monitor Intercooler suction; Sight level column, Iow level float switch with alarm and Ammonia Pump shut off, Liquid detection probe for
operating level and high level alarm: High level compressor cut out float switch.
PROTECTIVE DEVICES: SPRV's on High Temperature Recirculator / Intercooler set at 250 PSIG; SPRV on Oil Pot and Booster Compressor's Oil
Separators set at 300 PSIG; Ammonia P~mp Discharge combination check and stop valves; Booster Compressor Discharge Check Valves; High Side
Compressor Suction Check Valve; Line, Valves, & Gauge to Diffuser; Ammonia Pump Low LeVel Alarm and Cut off; Ammonia Pumps have permissible
Intermediate pressure pump start set at 40 PSIG; Booster Compressor Interlock; When all compressors are off the Ammonia Pump shuts off;
Emergency Stop and Manual Reset.
FACILITY:
United States Cold Storage
1400 N. Mac, Arthur Drive
Tracy, CA. 95376
(209) 834- 2563 FAX (209) 835- 4117
HAZOP STUDY NODE:
LOW TEMPERATURE RECIRCULATOR VESSEL
(Total Low Temperature Piping System)
DATE: 12/02/92
COMPONENTS: Low Temperature Recirculator Vessel wifl3 Relief & Hanc Valves; Low Temperature Recirculator Suction Piping (2 PSIG to 5 PSIG)
from Storage Room Evaporators (not Rail & Truck Docks or USDA Room); Low Stage Suction from Low Temperature Recirculator Vessel to Booster
Screw Compressor; Ammonia Pumps with Vent and Bleed Lines & Valves; Oil Pot with Relief Valve, Vent Lines & Valves; Line from L°w Temperature
Recirculator Vessel to Diffuser with valves and gauge; Liquid Feed Line to Low Temperature Recirculator Vessel from High Temperature Recirculator /
Intercooler Vessel and Start Up By Pass Line from H.P. Receivers with Solenoid & Hand Valves; Pumped Liquid Line from Low Temperature Recirculator
Vessel through Pumps to all Storage Room Evaporators, (not Rail & Truck Docks or USDA Room).
OPERATING CONDITIONS: Operating Pressure at 2 PSIG to 5 PSIG; Pump Feed at 40 PSIG to 45 PSIG; Liquid Temperature at-25°F to -16°F;
Operating Liquid Level in Low Temperature Recirculator Vessel is 4'-4" high from bottom of vessel, adjustable with Hansen level control.
DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS: Vertical Vessel 5' X 12'-0"; maximum working pressure 250 PSIG at -20°F to 200°F; Oil Pot maximum working
pressure 300 PSIG; All Low Pressure Piping tested to 150 PSIG; All Piping is A-53 Grade A or B - ERW for 2" and up and A-106 Schedule 80 seamless
for smaller than 2"; All Ammonia Vessels designed according to ASME section 8 Division 1 dated 1989 & by UG - 20. All Ammonia Refrigeration Piping
designed according to American National Standard for equipment, design, and instellation of ammonia mechanical refrigeration systems - ANSI / IlAR 74-2,
1978 & ANSI / IlAR 2, 1984. All Refrigeration Piping installed according to ASME / ANSI B31.5, 1987 with addenda ASME / ANSI B31.5b, 1991' Uniform
Building, Mechanical, and Fire Code with California addenda. ,
INSTRUMENTATION: Each Frick Compressor microprocessor panel monitors and controls it's own pressure and temperature with pressure
transducers and temperature sensors with safety valves for high pressure back up. The Stellar computer control system uses a pressure transducer with
~ressure gauge to monitor Intercooler suction; Sight level column, Iow level float switch with alarm and Ammonia Pump shut off, Liquid detection probe for
operating level and high level alarm: High level compressor cut out float switch.
PROTECTIVE DEVICES: SPRV's Low Temperature Recirculator Vessel set at 250 PSIG; SPRY' s on Oil Pot set at 300 PSIG; Ammonia Pump
Discharge Combination Check and Shut Off Valves; Check Valves on Booster Screw Compressor Suction; Line, Valves, & Gauge to Diffuser; Pump ~'
Safety Interlock (shuts down if Booster Compressors are not running); Vessel High Float Alarms & Stops all Machinery;, Ammonia Pumps have permissible
Suction pressure pump start; Booster Compressor Interlock; When all compressors are off the Ammonia Pump shuts off;, Emergency Stop and Manual
Reset.
CITY of BA '
KERSFIELD
"WE CA RE"
FIRE DEPARTMENT
S. D. JOHNSON
FIRE CHIEF
May 25, 1993
Mr. Victor Arnett
Chief Engineer
U.S. Cold Storage of California
3100 52nd St.
Sacramento, CA 95823
2101 H STREET
BAKERSFIELD, 93301
326-3911
Victor:
Enclosed is a copy of the RMPP document for Pestritto Foods, now known as
Heinz Bakeries. While you are welcome to review this RMPP, please do not consider
it to be a model for your own RMPP. The Bakersfield Fire RMPP Preparation Guidelines
is a much more important reference. We developed thoSe guidelines to address
questions and problems which occurred during the preparation of several RMPPs.
Please call me at (805)326-3979 if you have any questions regarding this RMpp.
Sincerely,
Barbara Brenner
Hazardous Materials Planning Technician
cc: Ralph Huey
David Lyman
FiRE DEPARTMENT
S. D. JOHNSON
FIRE CHIEF
'CITY of BAKERSFIELD
"WE CARE"
danuaw 13,1993
2101 H STREET
BAKERSFIELD, 93301
326-3911
Mr. Victor Arnett
U.S. Ice & Cold Storage
Sacramento, CA
Mr. Arnett: :
Your business, U.S. Ice & Cold Storage, has expressed the intent to construct a cold
storage facility utilizing an anhydrous ammonia refrigeration system at the corner of Ashe
Rd. and District Blvd. in Bakersfield. Pursuant to Sections 25534 and '25535(d) of the
California Health and Safety Code., U.S. Ice & Cold Storage will be required to complete
a Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP) for the use and handling of
anhydrous ammonia prior to the start of operations at the proposed facility.
The RMPP shall be based upon a risk assessment which shall consider all of the
following:
THE RESULTS OF A HAZARD ANALYSIS WHICH IDENTIFIES THE HAZARDS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE HANDLING OF THE ACUTELY HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
DUE TO OPERATING ERROR, EQUIPMENT FAILURE AND EXTERNAL EVENTS
WHICH MAY PRESENT AN ACUTELY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ACCIDENT RISK.
FOR THE HAZARDS IDENTIFIED IN THE HAZARD ANALYSIS, AN OFFSITE
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS WHICH ASSUMES PESSIMISTIC AIR DISPERSION
AND OTHER ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS.
The RMPP shall include the following elements:
A REPORT SPECIFYING THE NATURE, AGE AND CONDITION OF THE
EQUIPMENT USED TO HANDLE ACUTELY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AT THE
FACILITY. INCLUDE SCHEDULES FOR TESTING AND MAINTENANCE OF THIS
EQUIPMENT.
A DESCRIPTION OF DESIGN, OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE CONTROLS
WHICH MINIMIZE THE RISK OF AN ACCIDENT" INVOLVING ACUTELY
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS.
IDENTIFICATION OF DETECTION, MONITORING OR AUTOMATIC CONTROL
SYSTEMS WHICH MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL RISI~S POSED BY ACUTELY
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ACCIDENTS.
IN RESPONSE TO THE FINDINGS OF THE RISK ANALYSIS, DEFINE & PROVIDE
A SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL STEPS TO BE TAKEN
BY THE BUSINESS IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE RISK OF AN ACCIDENT
· INVOLVING ACUTELY THE HAZARDOUS MATERIALS. THESE ACTIONS MAY
INCLUDE ANY OF THE FOLLOWING: -'
INSTALLATION OF ALARM, DETECTION, MONITORING OR AUTOMATIC
CONTROL DEVICES.
EQUIPMENT MODIFICATIONS, REPAIRS OR ADDITIONS.
CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONS, PROCEDURES, MAINTENANCE
SCHEDULES OR FACILITY DESIGN.
IDENTIFICATION, BY TITLE, ALL PERSONNEL AT' THE BUSINESS WHO ARE
RESPONSIBLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE RMPP
AND A DESCRIPTION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES.
A DETAILED TRAINING PROGRAM TO INSURE THAT THE RESPONSIBLE
PERSONS ARE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT THE RMPP.
A DESCRIPTION OF AUDITING AND INSPECTION PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO
ALLOW THE HANDLER TO CONFIRM THAT THE RISK MANAGEMENT AND
PREVENTION PROGRAM IS EFFECTIVELY CARRIED OUT.
A RECORD.. KEEPING PROCEDURE FOR THE RISK MANAGEMENT AND
PREVENTION PROGRAM.
The Risk Management and Prevention Program shall be certified as complete by a
qualified person and the facility operator. The RMPP must be completed and submitted
prior to operation of the refrigeration system. The attached questionnaire regarding the
qualifications of the RMPP preparer ~hould be submitted to this Agency prior to
beginning work on the RMPP.
All submittals regarding this RMPP shall be made to:'
The Bakersfield Fire Department
2130 G Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
If I can be of any assistance please feel free to call.
Sincerely,
Barbara Brenner
Hazardous Materials Planning Technician
I can be reached at 326-3979.
cc: Ralph Huey
Risk Ranking Matrix
SEVERITY
Operational Low Medium High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extremely Unlikely 1 I 1 2
(1)
L
I
K Unlikely 1 I·'~ 2 3
E (2) ' '
L
I
H Likely 1 2 3 4
o (3)
O
D
Highly Likely 1 3 4 4
(4)
Revised July 7, 1993
US Cold Storage
I - Acceptable as is; No mitigation required.
2 - Acceptable with controls; Should be vedfied that procedures or controls are in place.
3 - Undesirable; Should be mitigated with engineering and/or administrative controls to a dsk ranking of 2 or less within a specified time pedod such as 12 months.
4 - Unacceptable; Should be mitigated with engineering and/or administrative controls to a risk rankJngof 2 or less within a specified time period such as six months.
Frequency (Likelihood) Classification
Chart
EXTREMELY UNLIKELY
(1)
Not expected to occur during
the facility lifetime
UNLIKELY
(2)
Expected to occur no more
than once during the
facility lifetime.
LIKELY
'[3)
Expected to occur several times
during the facility lifetime.
HIGHLY LIKELY
(4)
Expected to occur more
than once in a year.
Revised July 7, 1993
US Cold Storage
Consequence (Severity) Classification
Chart A
SEVERITY CLASS
TARGET
HAZARD OPERATIONAL LOW MEDIUM HIGH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Safety No injury or health effects Minor injury or minor Injury or moderate health Death or severe health
(Prime Target) health effects effects, effects.
Employee (Operator) No injury or occupationalMinor injury or minor Injury or moderate Death or severe
Safety safety impact, occupational illness, occupational illness, occupational illness
Environment None Spill of hazardous Large spill of hazardousExtensive spill of
materials into a materials into surface hazardous materials into
containment, water or contaminating surface water or
ground water, contaminating ground
water.
Facility/Equipment Less than one week. Between one week and Between one and six More than six months.
Downtime one month, months.
Revised Jt~y 7, 1993
US Cold Storage
III. HAZOP STUDY
A. HAZOP STUDY OVERVIEW
B. H.P. RECEIVER NODE
C. THERMOSYPHON SYSTEM NODE
D. INTERCOOLER NODE
E. L.P. PUMP RECEIVER NODE
F. GLOBAL SYSTEM NODE
G. SAFETY EQUIPMENT NODE
H. MINUTES FROM HAZOP STUDY
I. RISK REDUCTION AND CHANGE
PROCEDURES
A. HAZOP STUDY OVERVIEW
B. H.P. RECEIVER NODE
Company:
Location:
Facility:
Session I for BAKERFLD
United States Cold Storage of California
Bakersfield, CA.
Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session Date: 07-13-93
Drawing No.: FSI
Leader:
Scribe:
Tesm:
Name
Victor Arnett, USCS
Raul Ragunton, USCS
James Harrella, USCS
Larry Jones, USCS
Hart Kohler, USCS
* Cars L. Willis, USUS
Bruce Chandler, Stellar
*Barbara Brenner, Fire Dept0
Ralph Nodal, USCS
Phone number
916/391-7829
916/391-7829
?08/442-6660
209/835-COLD
805/832-COLD
805/832-COLD
904/260-2900
805/326-3979.
209/686-1110
Location
Sacramento, CA.
Sacramento, CA.
Lyons, IL.
Tracy, CA.
'Bakers£ield, CA.
Bakersfield, CA.
Jacksonville, FL.
Bakersfield, CA.
Tulare, CA.
Comments: Stellar : The Stellar Group, · = Guest (Hote: Guests are
invited to participate in the HAZOP Study.
HA~P-P~ 2.12
Company: United States Cold of California
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Worksheet
Page :. I
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-05-93 Dwg#: FSl
Node: 1 lltgh Pressure Receiver
Parameter: Flow Intention: Storage vessel, ammonia refrigerant
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R RECOMMENDATIONS BY
No No Flow 1. ttechanical 1 iligh level in 1. Operational monitoring I 3 I .. Sufficient
failure, King H P. Receiver. and (Process Safety safeguards exist.
Solenoid Valve Hanagement Program)
(KSV) or feed operator's training.
valve for
intercooler fails 2. Operational monitoring
to open. and preventive
maintenance program.
3, Safety relief on Ii. P.[
Receiver set at 250 PSI.
4. Scrub tank (water
tank) air scrubber.
2. High discharge 5. High discharge 2 1 1 2. Sufficient
(Head) pressure, pressure cutout/alarm on safeguards exist.
potential release high stage compressors.
of refrigerant
into atmosphere 6. Pressure Safety Valve
due to over on H.P. Receiver.
pressurization.
7, Scrub tank (water
tank) air scrubber.
3. Component 8. Compressor are 4 I 2 3. Sufficient
£ailnre due to equipped with Pressure safeguards exist
over Safety Valves (PS¥).
pressurization.
Release of 9. Ammonia detector in
refrigerant to engine room.
engine room area
(enclosed area). 10. Scrub tank (water
tank) and air scrubber.
4. Cannot maintain Il, Operational 1 3 I 4. Sufficient
levels in system nonitoring of vessel safeguards exist.
vessels, level (Sight Glass). All
alarms are monitored by a
alarm company and
computer controls.
12. Compressor equipped
with Low Suction Pressure
cutout/alarm.
13. Ammonia Pump equipped
with low float
Company: United States Cold of California
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07=13-93 Revision: 0 07=05=§3 Dwg~: FS1
Node: 1 High Pressure Receiver
...... Parameter: Flow Intention: Storage vessel, ammonia refrigerant
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES sAFEGuARDS S L R RECOH~ENDATIONS BY
cutout/alarm.
14. Proper training of
all plant operators and.
Cal-OSHA's Process Safety
Management Program.
(PSMP) and Kisk
Management Prevention~
Program (RMPP).
..
5. Cannot maintain 15. Operational' problem
proper storage no hazard.
temperatures.
2. Power failure. 6. Plant shutdown 16. Operational problem
no consequences, only, no hazard.
3. Coil on 7. Same as numbers 17. Same as numbers 1-10. li3;1 5. Suf£icient
solenoid valve 1-5, safeguards exist.
fails.
4. Ho power to 8. Same as numbers 18. Same. as numbers 1-10. I 3 1 6. Sufficient
coil on KSV or 1-5. ~' safeguards exist.[
tntercooler feed.;
5. Manual King 9. Same as numbers 19. Same as numbers 1-10. 2 2 I .7. Sufficient
Valve closed. 1-5. [ safeguards exist.
20. Proper training of
all plant operators and
Cal-OSHA's Process Safety
Management Program,
(PSMP) and Risk
Hanagement Prevention
~ Program (RHPP).
6. Liquid 10. Same as valve 21. Same as valve failure 2 2 I 8. Sufficient
strainer plugged, failure, safeguards exist.
7. Control 11. Same as valve 22. Same as valve failure 2 3 2 9. Sufficient
failure, failure, safeguards exist,
liigh High Flow 8. Severed H.P. 12. Release of 23. Proper training of 3 I 1 10. Sufficient
liquid line-lluman refrigerant to forklift Operators. safeguards exist.
error, hit by warehouse area
handling (enclosed area). 24. Various warehouse
equipment, rules pertaining to 'the
proper operation of
handling, equipment.
Page: 2
HAgOP-PC 2.12
Company: United States Cold of California
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
~orksheet
Page: 3
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-05-93 Dwg#: FSl
Node: 1 High Pressure Receiver
Parameter: Flow Intention: Storage vessel, ammonia refrigerant'
2s. 'A--onia detector in
~C~·~ ' . ~i,26. Control shut. down by
.,monia detector in alarm
9. Leak [rom II.P. 13. Release o[' 27. Proper training of 3 I 1 11. Sufficient
Receiver, sight refrigerant to all plant operators and safeguards exist.
glass broken or engine room area Cal-OSHA's Process Safety
blown out. (enclosed area). Hanagement Program,
(PSHP) and Risk
Hanagement Prevention
Progr~ (RHPP).
28. Operational
monitoring and preventive
maintena~ce program,
29, A~onla detector in
engine room'area.
30. A~onia detector
area which alarms the
computer and Alarm
Company (A.D.T.).
31. Scrub tank (water
tank) air scrubber.
10. Severed H.P. 14. Release of 32. Proper training of 3 1 1 12. Sufficient
liquid line in refrigerant to all plant operators and safeguards exist.
engine room area. engine room area Cal-OSHA's Process Safety
(enclosed area). Hanagement Program,
(PSHP) and Risk .:
Hanagement P.revention
Progr~ (RHPP).
monitoring and preventive
maintenance program.
34. ~onia detector in
engine room area.
11. Draining oil 15. S~e as n~ber 35, Proper training of 3 3 3 13. Pipe II.P. VA
~from H.P. 14. ali plant operators and Receiver oil
liAZOP-['< 2.12
Company: United States Cold St~ of California
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Worksheet
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-05-93 Dwg#: FSI
Node: I Illth Pressure Receiver
Parameter: Flow Intention: Storage veSael~ ammonia refrigerant'
Session: 1 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-07-93 Dwg#: FSI
Node: I High Pressure, Receiver
Parameter: Temperature Intention:
Page:
G~ DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R RECOU~ENDATIONS BY
IHlgb IHlgb !1. High 1. No'safety or 1. No consequences, no
Temperature condensing environmental aafeguards required.
pressure, consequences
(operability
issue)
2. Fire (Covered
under Global)
GW DEVIATION CAUSES .CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R RECOHHENDATIONS !BY
Receiver, human Cal-OSHA's Process Safety drain to Oil
error or valve Hanagement Program, collector
failure. (PSHP) and Risk
Management Prevention
Program (RHPp).
12. Severed 16. Release of
charging line. refrigerant to
(Covered under engine room area
Charging Node.) or atmosphere.
13. Vandalism
with diffusing
system. (Covered
under Sabotage)
Reverse Reverse 14. Severed line
Flow from the
evaporative
condenser on tile
roof. (Covered
under Global) ,~
15. Severed
equalizer line,
on roof. (Covered
under Global)
Low Low Flow 16. Light load 17. No safety or
conditions, environmental
consequences
(operability
issue)
Company: United States Cold of California
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-07-93
Node: I High Pressure Receiver
Parameter: Temperature Intention:
Dwg#: Fsi ·
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUANDS SiL R RECOHHENDATIONS BY
r
Low Low 3. Excessive ' 2. No safety or 2. No consequences, no
Temperature cooling due to environmental safeguards required.
control failure, coasequences
i.e., condenser (operability
fans stay on all issue)
the time.
Session: 1 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-07-93 Dwg#: FSI
Node: 1 High Pressure Receiver
Parameter: Pressure Intention:
Page: 5
CW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUANDS ! S L R RECOMMENDATIONS BY
Iligb Iligh 1. Human error, 1. Release of 1. Proper training of all 2 I I 1. Sufficient
Pressure failure to refrigerant plant operators and Cml- safeguards exist.
properly pump out through Safety OSHA's Process Safety
H.P. Receiver Relief Valve to Management Program,
before isolating scrubber tank. (PSHP) and Risk
from system (trap IManagement Prevention
liquid). Program (RMPP).
2. Pressure gauges are
installed for operator's
visual.inspection.
3. Pressure Safety Valve
on B.P. Receiver.
2, Fire (Cover
under Global)
3. Loss of 2. Release of 2 2 1 2. Sufficient
cooling; control refrigerant safeguards exist.
power failure, through Safety
condenser water Relief Valve to
pumps, fans and scrubber tank.
water supply.
4, Non- 3. Same as 1 and 2 4.~Automatic Purger
condensable
gases. 5. Operational monitoring
and operator's training.
6. System parameters will
be logged once every
hour, highlighting all
pre-alarms and alarm~.
iIAZoP- pC 2.12
Company: United States Cold of California
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Worksheet
Session: .1 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-07-93 Dwg{: FS1
Node: 1 High Pressure Receiver
Parameter: Pressure Intention:
Page: 6
DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCEs SAFEGUARDS [S[L{R [ RECOHHENDATIONS BY
Log is'monitored dally.
~, 5. lluman error 4. Same as l, 2, 7. Compressor equipped
improper safety and 3. !with high discharge
control set pressure cut°u~t/alarm'
points,
Wrong Pressure 8. pressure Safety Valve
Safety Valves on H.P. Receiver, set at {
installed. ' 250~PSI'
9. Scrub tank (water
tank) air scrubber.
10. Ammonia detector in {
area which alarms the /
computer and Alarm {
,Company (A.D.T.).
11. Operational and {
Emerge~lcy Respolme
· training.
12. Pressure gauges are /
installed for operator's
visual inspection.
i13. System parameters J
'will be logged once every{
hour, highlighting all
pre-alarms and alarms.
Log is monitored daily. {
,All alarms are monitored {
by an alarm company,
l.e.~ ADT~ Wells Fargo.
14. Proper training of {]
all plant operators and
Cal-OSllA's Process Safety[ {
Hanagement Program, '
~ (PSHP) and Risk
Hanagement Prevention
Program (RHPP).
15. Automatic Purger
16. Operational
monitoring and operator'sJ { .
training,
~Company: Un'ited States Cold Sd of California.
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Page:
Session: 1 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-07-93 Dwg#: FS1
Node: 1 Rlgh Pressure Receiver
Parameter: Pressure Intention:
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R RECOHHENDATIONS BY
ilT, System parameters
Will be logged once every
hour, hSgbllghting all
pre-alarms and alarm~.
Log is monitored daily.
6, Compressor
safety failure,
(Covered under
High Stage
Compressor Node),
Low Low 7. Excessive 5. No safety or 18. No consequences, no
Pressure cooling due to environmental safeguards required.
control failure, consequences
i,e,, fans stay (operability
on, issue)
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-07-93 Dwg#: FSI
Node: ! Iligh Pressure Receiver
Parameter: Level Intention:
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS [ S{ L{R -~ECOHHENDATIOHS } BY
Iligh High Level 1. Hechanlcal 1. Iligh pressure k 1,'Proper training of all 2 3 2 1, Sufficient
failure of King in Il, P. Receiver. plant operators and Cai- safeguards exist.
Solenoid Valve Release of OSHA's Process Safety
(KSV) fails to refrigerant Management Program,
open feed to through Safety (PSHP) and Risk
the intercooler, Relief Valve to Hanagement Prevention
scrubber tank, Program (RHPP),
2, Pressure Sa£ety Valve
{on H,P, Receiver,
3, Cross over in
diffusion system to
mquali'ze pressure.
4, Operational monitoring
and preventive
maintengnce program,
5, High discharge
pressure cutout/alarm on
high stage compressors,
C~mpany: United States Cold Stej of California
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: 1'07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-07-93 Dwg#: FSI ·
Node: I Iligh Pressure Receiver
Parameter: Level Intention:
Page:
]6. Operational monitoring
of vessel level (Sight
Class).
2. Cannot maintain 7, Operational monitoring{j
levels in system of vessel level (Sight
vessels. Loss of Glass).
refrigeration.
· 8. Compressor equipped
with Low Suction Pressure{
[cutout/alarm.
9~ ·Ammonia Pump equipped [
.- / with differential {
cutout/alarm.
· 10.- Compressor equipped {
with Low Suction Pressure{
cutout/alarm. ]
2. lluman error 3. Same as 1 and 2 11. Same as 1 thru 10. 12]
over charged
system.
3. Coil King
on 4. Same as numbers 12, -Same as numbers 1-10.{2
Solenoid Valve 1-3, '
(RSV) fails.
4. No power to 5. Same as numbers 13, Same as numbers 1-10.
5. Hanual King 6. Same as numbers 14. Same as numbers 1-10.
Low Low Level 6. Low inventory 7. Cannot maintain 15. Operational
of re£rigerant proper level in monitoring of vessel ,
due to routine refrigeration level (Sight Class).
maintenance, system vessels.
losses through ' ' 16. Proper trainiog of [{
[valve packing and all plant operators and
shaft seal Cal-OSNl's Process Safety[[
leakage Management Program,
(Fugitive (PSHP) and Risk
emissions). Management Prevention
Program (RMPP).
7. Blocked or no 8. Loss of 17. Same as number 15.
air flow on !refrigeration.
IIAZOP-PC~. 2.12 ~
Company: United States Cold St~ of California
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Yorksheet
Page:
Sesslon: 1 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-07-93 Dwg~: FSI
Node! I Iligh Pressure Receiver
Parameterl Level Intention:
C~ DEVIATION CAUSES COHSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R RECOMMENDATIONS BY
{evaporator(s).
[8, Fe~d valves
[failed opened
fort vessels
(Covered under
vessel Nodes).
No
C. THERMOSYPHON NODE
Company: United States Cold S , e of California
Facility: Ammonia refrigeraut facility.
Session: I 07-~3-93
Node: 4 ThermosYphon
Parameter: Flow
DEVIATION
CAUSES
No Flow
Flow
Flow
Session: I 07-13-93
Node: 4 Thermosypbon
Parameter: Pressure
DEVIATION
CAUSES
lligh
Pressure
· Revision: 0 07-13-93 Dwg#: FSI
Intention: O11 cooling of the screw compressors.
CONsEQuENcEs SAFEGUARDS
'1.. No safety or
environmental
consequences
(operability
issue)
2. No safety or
envirOnmental
consequences
(operability
3. Operability
issue, no safety
or envirorunental
consequences.
Revisiou: 0 07-13-93 Dwg#: FSI'
Inteution: Cooling otl f~r the Screw compressors.
CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS
10. Haman
failure to
properly pump out
thermosypbone
otl cooler
before, isolating
from system (trap
liquid).
2. Same as causes 1. Release of
on IIigh Pressure refrigerant
Receiver Node. through Safety
Relief Valve to
scrubber tank.
1. Pressure Safety Valves
on Thermosypon System Se~
at 250 and 300 PSI.
2. Scrub tank (water
tank) air scrubber.
3. All safeguards for the
therm°syPhon system is
the same as the Il. p.~
Receiver Node.
Page: 15
RECOItHENDATIONS
1. Sufficient
safeguards exist.
HAZOP-PC 2.12
Company: United States Cold Storage of Callfornia
Facility: AmmOnia refrigerant facility.
Worksheet
Primatech Inc.
Page:' 16
Session: 1 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-13-93 Dwg#: FSI ,
Node: 4 Thermosyphon
Parameter: Level Intention:
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS ' S L R RECOHHENDATIONS BY
/
High High Level 1. Same as High
Level in High -,
Pressure Receiver
Node.
Low Low Level 1. Loss of oil 2. No safety or
cooling, environmental
consequences~
~operabiltty
conditions high
compressor oil
temperature.
D. INTERCOOLER NODE
Company: United States Cold Sto~a~e o£ California
Facility: Ammonia re£rigerant £acility,
Session: 1 07-13-93
Node: 5 Intercooler
Parameter: Flow
Revision: 0 07-13-93 Dwg#: FSI
Intention: Intermitted System
Page: 17
GN DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R RECO~UtENDATIONS BY
Reverse Reverse 2. Hechanical
Flow 'failure.
·3. a. Booster
screw compressor
discharge check
valve failure.
4. b. Ammonia ~
pump check valve
failure,
5. c. Hanual 3. No safety or 6. Booster compressor
valve opeued in environmental discharge check valves,
liquid feed and consequences, ammonia pump check valves
suction crossover,operability and the liquid feed line
line, (Valves are conditions, check valve.
used on start up
only),
6. Bu~an 4. No safety or 7. Proper training of all!
error manual environmental plant operators and Cai-
change over valve consequences OSHA's Process Safety
on evaporator (operability Management Program,
suction control · issue) (PSHP) and Risk
station, high/low Hanagement Prevention
opened at the Program (RHPP)..
same time,
Session: i 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-14-93 Dwg#: FSI
Node: 5 Intercooler
Parameter: Temperature Intention: Intermitted system.
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R RECOHHENDATIONS BY
High High 1, Failure of the 1, No safety or 1,. Compressor equipped 1 3 I 1, Sufficient
Temperature booster discharge environmental with High Oil Temperature safeguard~ exist,
desupe~heating consequences, cutout/alarm,
system, operability
a. Pump failure conditions. 2. Compressor equipped
shut down. Possible high with High discharge
b, Clogged stage over heating temperature cutout/alarm.
stralner,
c, Pump bleed;
expansion valve
adjustment,
2. Fire, cover
Company: United States Cold Storn -,f California
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: 1 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-14-93
Node: 5 Intercooler
~--Varameter: Temperature
Dwg~:
Intention: intermitted system.
Session: 1 07-13-93
Node: 5 Intercooler
Parameter: pressure
DEVIATION
Nigh
)ressure
CAUSES
ruder Global.
CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
2. No safety or
environmental
consequences~
operability
conditions.
Revision: 0 07-14-93
Intention:
CONSEQUENCES
sAFEGuARDS
Loss of one or
more high stage
compressor(S)
i.e., control
failure,.
2, slide valve
(load/Unload)
working on
compressor.
3. His-matched
compressors,
Dwg#: FSi
SAFEGUARDS
1. Loss of
refrigeration.
2. Possible
release of
refrigerant
through Safety
telie£ Valve'to
:crubber tank.
1. Pressure Safety Valve
on Intercooler set at
250 PSI.
2. Booster compressor
equipped with high
discharge pressure
cutout/alarm and
~rlock. '
3. Scrub tank (water
tank) air scrubber.
4. Ammonia detector in
vent line which alarms
the computer for
emergency shut down and
the local alarm companY.
Page: 18
RECOMMENDAT IONS
RECOtlHENDATIONS
1. Review ammonie
detector control
logic for vent
line.
4. Fire, 6overed
Company: United States Cold St of California
Facillty: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Page: 19
Session: 1 07-13-93
Node: 5 Intercooler
Parameter: Pressure
Revision: 0 07-14-93 Dwg#: FSI . .
Intentxou:
flW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R RECOHMENDATIONS BY
under Global.
LOW LOW 5. Mechanical /
Pressure failure,
compressor
suction control
failure.
6. Human error 3. No safety or 5. Local iow pressure I 3 I 2. Sufficient
compressor set to environmental alarm and cutout, safeguards exist.
manual run~ consequences,
operability 6. Operator visually
conditions, inspects all operatiug
conditions.
7. System parameters will.
be logged once every '
ihour, highlighting all
[pre-alarms and alsrmn.
Log is monitored dally.
8. Ail alarms are
monitored by an alarm
companY, i.e., ADT, Wells
Fargo,
Session: 1 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-14-93 Dwg#:.FSl
Node: 5 Intercooler ~
Parameter: Level Intention:
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R RECOMMENDATIONS BY
High High Level 1. Mechanical
failure, level
control. '.
, 2. Mechanical
failure of liquid
make-up solenoid
valve, failed
opened.
3. Boil over,
sudden reduction
of pressure in
the vessel.
4. Compressor
IIAZOP-pC 2.12
Company: United States Cold Storage of California
Facility.: Ammonia refrigerant facility,
Revision: 0 07-14-93
Intention:
Session: I 07-13-93
Node: 5 Intercooler
Parameter: Level
Worksheet
FSI
DEVIATION
CAUSES
load/unload
control failure,
swing too great.
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
, Feed valve,
TXV or level
control on the
!glycol heat
exchanger
failure.
6. High side,
evaporators
defrost problems
hot gas valve,
blow by.
7~ Human error,
manual valve
opened in liquid
Ifeed crossover
line, (Valve iS
used on start up
only),
Lo Possible high
side compressor
damage,
· Operability Issue, no
Safety or environmental
consequences. Compressor
equipped with motor
overload cutout,
2. Compressors are
protected by a high level
alarm and cutout.
3. Operational mouttortng
of vessel level (Sight
Glass).
2ow Level
8. Mechanical
failure.
(a.) Loss of
Ilevel control.
(b.) Feed valve
failure.
4. Prpper training of al
plant operators and Cal-
OSRA's Process Safety
Management Program,
(PSMP) and Risk
Management Preventiou
Program (RHPP).
9. Ruman error,
improper
-Page: 20
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Sufficient
safeguards exist.
Norksheet
United States Cold Storag~~of California
Ammonia refrigerant facility.
,~ssion: 1 07-13-93
Node: 5 Intercooler
lrameter: Level
--t
~ DEVIATION
Revision: 0 07-14-93 Dwg{: FS1
Intention:
CAUSES
adjustment of
hand expansion
valve.
10. Low inventor~
of refrigerant
due to routine
maintenance, ..
losses through
valve packings
and sha£t seals
leakage.
(Fugitive
emissions.)
CONSEQUENCES
2. No safety or
environmental
consequences
(operability
issue) Loss o£
refrigeration.
SAFEGUARDS
5, Low level float alarm
and pump shut down.'
6. Operational monitorial
of vessel level (sight
Class).
· Ammonia detector in
area which alarms the
computer and Alarm
Company~i~;Relating to
small £ugitive emissions.
18. Proper training of all
plant operators and Cal-
OSHA's Process Safety
Management Program,
(PSMP) and Risk
Management Prevention
Program (RMPP).
Primatech Inc.
Page: 21
RECOHHENDATIONS
Sessioa:, 1 07-13-93 U 07-13-93 Dwg#: F$1
'~Node: 5 Intercooler
Parameter: Flow Inteutiou: Iutermitted System
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L E RECOHHENDATIONS BY
Low/No Low/No Flow I, Hechauica! 1. No safety or i, Low level float alarm I 3 I 1, Sufficient
failure; environmental and pump shut off, safeguards exist.
a, Liquid feed consequences
solenoid closed (operability 2. Ammonia pump failure.
b, Liquid King issue) Loss of alarm.
Solenoid failed refrigeration.
closed. 3. System parameters will
c. Liquid feed ibc logged once every
pump failure, hour, highlighting all
pre-alarms and alarms,
Log is monitored daily,
4. All alarms are
monitored'by an alarm
company.
5,. Operational monitoring
and preventive
~ maintenance program,
High Iligh Flow -~ 2. No safety or
environmental
I consequences. High
t flow deals with
severed pipe. Will
address this
scenario under .,,
~lobal Node.
E. L.P. PUMP RECEIVER NODE
Session: 1 07-15-93 ision: 0 07-14-93 Dwg#: FS1
"~ Node: 6 Low Temperature Pump ,~[irculator
Parameter: Flow ;Intention: Low sta~e, system,
G~ DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R RECOHHENDATIONS BY
High fligh Flow 1. No safety or
environmental
consequences. High
flow deals with
severed pipe, will,
[address this
scenario under
Global Node.
Low/No Low/No Flow 1. Hechanical
{
failure of liquid
make-up, solenoid,
failed closed.
2. Ammonia pump 2. No safety or 1. Low level float alarm I 4 1 I. Sufficient'
not running due environmental and pump shut off. safeguards exist.
P' to mechanical [consequences
Company: United States Cold Stors
Facility: Ammonia refrigerantfaciiity.
California
Session: 1 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-14-93 Dwg#: FSI
Node: 6 Low Temperature Pump Recirculator
Parameter: Flow Intention: Low stage system.
Page: 22
DEVIATION CAUSES COHSEQUEHCES sAFEGUARDS S L R RECOHHENDATIONS BY
failure, (operability 2, Ammonia pump fail~re
issue) Loss of alarm.
refrigeration.
3. Operational monitoring
and operator's trainiug.
4. Operational monitoring
and preventive
maintenance program.
5. Proper training of all
plant operators and Cai-
OSHA'a Process Safety
[Hanagement Program,
{(PSHP) and Risk
Hanagement Prevention
Program (RHPP).
Reverse Reverse 3, Emergenc~'
Flow Ammonia Diffusion,
System, manual
cross-over valve
opened.
4. Ammonia pump
check valve
failure.
5. Screw 3. Oil
compressor contamination
suction and
discharge check 4. Loss Of
valve failure. !refrigeration.
5. Increase vessel 6. Screw compressor and I 4 I 2. Sufficient
liquid level, ammonia pump cheqk valves safeguards exist.
[7. High level alarm and
shut down.
8. Door lock and alarm on
Ammonia Diffusion System.
9, Operational monitoring
and preventive
maintenance program.
ilAZUi'-PU 2.1Z
Compaay: United States Cold Storage o£ California
'Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility,
Worksheet
Page: 23
Session: 1 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-14-93 Dwg~: FS1
Node: 6 Low Temperature Pump Recirculator
Parameter:.Temperature - Intention:
GN .DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS SL R RECOMMENDATIONS BY
High High 1. Fire, cover
Temperature under Global Node
Low Low 1. Operability
Temperature issue, no safety
or enviroumental :
consequences.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revisiou: 0 07-14-93 Dwg#: FSI
Node: 6 Low Temperature Pump Ilecirculator
Parameter: Pressure Intention: Low stage, system.
GW ' DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S[L R RECOMMENDATIONS BY
llig[I High I. Mechanical .. No safety or 1. Suction, bigb pressure 1 3 I 1. Sufficient
Pressure failure, euviroumental alarm, safeguards exist.
~ compressors o££ cousequences,
pumps aud operability
evapora tots cond i t ions.
continue to run.
2. Fire; cover
under Global Node
Low Low 3. Slide valve
Pressure (load/Unload) not
working on ,~
I compressor,
4. lluman error 2. No safety or 2. Compressor equipped 1 3 1 2. Sufficient
compressor set to environmental with low suction pressure safeguards exist
manual run. consequences cutout/alarm.
(operability
issue) 3. Operational monitoring
and operator's training.
14. Proper training of all
,plant operators and Cai-
[OSHA's Process Safety
Management Program,
(PSMP) and Risk
Management Preventiou
Program (RMPP).
ltAZOP-PC 2.12
Company: United Stat~s Cold Storage of California
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Worksheet
Session: 1 07-13~93 Revision: 0 07-14-93 Dwg#: PSl
Node: 6 Low Temperature Pump Recirculator :
Parameter: Level Intention:
PrimaL. eob
Page: 24
OW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEuUARD~
High lligh Level 1. Hecbanical
feed valve failed
opened.
2. Sudden
pressure
reduction caused
control or human
error.
3. iluman error,
{cross feed of
{ liquid feed; from
high stage to low
stage pressure
vessels.
manual opened 'environmental indicator, controller
}the feed consequences, high level alarm.
solenoid and operability
failed to conditions. 2. High level float shut
monlt0r the Possible down.
level, compressor damage.
3. Operational monitoring
of vessel level (Sight
4. Proper training of all[{
plant operators and Cal-
OSHA's Process Safety
Management Program,
Hanagement Prevent iou
Progr~ (RHPP). '
iS u
Low Low Level 5 Mechanical
failure. (a,)
Loss o~ level
control. (b.)
Feed valve
[[ai lure,
6 II.an error,
improper
Corflpany: United States Cold sro
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
California
Session: 1 07-13-93
Revision: 0 07-14-93
Node: 6'Low Temperature Pump Recirculator
Parameter: L~vel
Intention:
DEVIATION
CAUSES
adjustment of
hand expansion
valve.
CONSEQUENCES
7. Low inventory
of refrigerant
due to routine
maintenance,
~loases through
valve packings
and shaft seals
leakage.
emissions.)
~. No Safety or
environmental
consequences
(operability
issue) Loss of
refrigeration.
DwB#: FS1
SAFEGUARDS
6. Low level float alarm
and ammonia pump slmt
down.
7. Operational monitoring
of vessel level (Sight
Class).
8, Ammonia detector
area which alarms the
computer and Alarm
ComPany
Page: 25
2. Sufficient.
safeguards exist
F. GLOBAL SYSTEM NODE
Company: United States Cold Storage alifornia
Facility: Am~onla refrigerant facility,
Page: I
Session: i 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-14-93 Dwg~! Fa1
Node: 2 Clobal System
'~....rameter: Loss of Containment Intention: Complete facility,
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R RECOH~ENDATIONS BY S L R
Fire Fire Loss 1, Electrical
of
Containment 2. Hot Work
3. Smoking
4. Electrical, 1. Release of 1. Fire protection 3 1 1 1. Suf£icient
Material Handling refrigerant equipment: safeguards exist.
Equipment through Safety
Relief Valve to 2. Sprinkler system
scrubber tank due inspection.
to high pressure
in'vessels. 3. Infrared inspection of
all major electrical
equipment.
4. No Smoking policy.
S. Fire drill and
ievacuation procedures.
6. Smoke and heat
"" detectors in office and
ancillary areas.
7. Scrub tank (water
tank) air scrubber.
8. Ammonia Diffusion
System.
9. Hot Work Permit
Policy.
10, Proper traini{~8 of'
\ all plant operators and
CaI-OSHA's Process Safety
Hanagement Program,
(PSHP) and Risk
Management Prevention
{ Program (RHPP).
]' 11. Proper training of
I ~ forklift operators,
{ Various warehouse rules
{ pertaining to the proper
' operation and maintenance
of handling, equipment.
ti^ZUP-pC
COmpany: United States Cold Storage Of California
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: 1 07-13-93
Node: 2 Clobal System
"rarameter: Loss of Containment
DEVIATION
CAUSES
Horkshee t
Hevision: 0 07-14-93 Dwg#: FS1
Intention: Complete facility.
CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS
12. ,Operational and
Emergency Response
training.
13. All alarms are
monitored by an alarm
company, with automatic
dispatch to Fire and
Police Departmest.
/ ;. Diffusion
Sabotage System mounted to
Loss of the exterior of
C°ntainmentlthe building.
6. Charging valve ~. Release of
is mounted to the refrigerant
exterior of the (ammonia) to the
building, atmosphere.
14. Ammonia detector
area which alarms the
computer and Alarm
Company.
15. Property fencing.
16. Door lock and alarm
on ammonia diffusion
I[lUman Error 7. Severed line,
Release of
7. Ammonia Diffusion
System is monitored by
the computer and Alarm
Company, i.e., A.D.T..
Check valve on the
system charging line.
19. Operational and
Emergency Response
training.
20. Proper training of
all plant operators and
CaI-OSHA's Process Safety
Hanagement Program~
(PSHP) and Risk
Hanagement Prevention
Program (RHPP).'
21. Piping is located on
RECOHHERDATIONS
2. Consider
replacing check
valve on System
Charging Line to
a combination
stop/check valve
3. Review prints
Page: 2
IIAZOP-PC 2.12 ~orksheet
Company: United states Cold Storage-Of California
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility.
Session: I 07-13-93 Revision: 0 07-14-93 Dsg#: FS1
Node: 2 Clobal System
'~'~ara~eter: Loss of Containment Intention: Complete facility.
Page: 3
C~ DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 'SAFEGUARDS S L R RECOttItENDATIONS BY S L R
Error Loss of hit by fork lift. refrigerant to roof, minimizes potential to determine
Containment warehouse area for external man made proper location
(enclosed area), events, i.e., fork lift of piping for the
impact, rail and truck
dock.
22. Proper training of'
forkli£t operators.
23. Various warehouse
rules, pertaining to the
proper operation of
handling, equipment.
24. Proper training of
all plant operators and
Cal-OSltA's Process Safety
Hanagement Program,
(PSHP) and Risk
Hanagement Prevention
Program (RHPP).
25~.' Height of the dock
area minimizes potential
for external man made
events, i.e., fork lift '
impact..A /
8. Failure to 26. Proper training of
folios proper oil all plant operators and~_ ~
removal Cal-OSHA's Process Safety:
(PSHP) and Risk
Hanagement Prevention '
Program (RHPP). / ---.
9. Poor location ~ 3 3 4. Consider BO ~ ~} 1
Of recirculator ~ relocating
oil out pots. , , , , recirculators oil
out pots
BC ~2 1
10. No pressure ~2 3 5. Consider
gauges supplied installing ' ')
on oil out pots. pressure gauges
!on all'oil out
pot,
11. No oil 4. Release of 3 3 3 pipingG 'Considerll.p~ [IKBC 2 2
out pot for the refrigerant to
t)l, isa Lec|l
GW )EVIAT!ON CAUSES CONSEQUENCgS SAFEGUARDS [ i RECOHHENDAT1OBS BY R
R6celver oil
H. P. Receiver. engine room area ~drain valve to
(enclosed area). ~central oil.
, ollector.
12. lluman error, 5. Release of
failure to refrigerant to
properly pump out engine room area
· ~ammonla pump (enclosed area).
before isolating
from system (trap
liquid).
~ ~{7, Sufficient
13. Failure to 6. Release of
properly pump out refrigeraut to · {safeguards exist.
refrigeration ,engine room area ~
,equipment for ,(enclosed area).
repair.
7. Release of 27. Proper training of {~
, ' i operators and | I
refrigerant to the all plan~
atmosphere. Cai-OSHA s Process Sa£et~|
Management Program,
[ i (PSHP) and Risk
Management Prevention
, ~' Program (RMPP).
{ ' i 28. Ammonia detector ill/
area which alarms the
computer and Alarm
Company (A.D,T.).
r . ' 29. Ventilation fans are }
set to run off the |
I I ammonia detector.
30. Scrub tank (water {
tank) air scrubber.
Mechani Mechanical 14. Mechanical
cal Failure ~ failure of
{FailurelLoss o£ ammonia pump,
I Containment mechanical seal
I failure.
15. Leak from 8. Release of 31. Operator visually | 8. Sufficient
H.P, Receiver, re£rigerant to inspects. } Ilsafeguards exist.
· sight glass engine room area
.... } broken or blown (enclosed area). 32. Operational and
liAZOP-PC 2.12 worksheet
Company: United States Cold Storag California Page: 4
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility?
Session: 1 07-13-93 Revisiou: 0 07-14-93 Dwg#: FS1
Node: 2 Global System
.... l'e, of Containment 'Intention: Complete facility.
ComPany: United States Cold Storage California
Facility: A~unonia re£rigera'nt facility.
Page: 5
Session: 1. 07-13-93 RevisiOn: 0 07-14-93 Dwg~: FSI
Node: 2 Global System ·
'~..~ameter: Loss of Containment Intentio.: Complete facility.
DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R RECOMMENDATIONS BY S L
out. Emergency Response
monitoring and preventive
maintenance progr~.
34. Proper training o[
all plant operators and
Cai-OSSA's Process Safety
Hanagement Progr~,
(PS,P) and Risk
Hanagement Prevention
Program (R~PP).
35, ~monia detector in
area ~hich alarms the
computer and Alarm
Company (A.D.T.).
~6. Ventilation fans are
set to run OfF the
~onia detector.
37. Scrub tank (water
tank) air scrubber.
16. Liquid hammer 9. Release o[ ~8. Operational and 3 1 1 9. Sufficient
refrigerant to the Emergency Response safeguards exist.
atmosphere, training.
' 30. ~rop~r control of
~( and liquid ,eed solenoid. _
41. Operational
monitoring and preventive
maintenance progr~.
42. Proper training o[
all plant operators and
Cal-OSHi's Process Safety
Hanagement Program,
(PSHP) and Risk
Hanagement Prevention
Progr~ (RHPP).
Comp Y: United States Cold Storage, alifornia
Facility: Ammonia refrigerant facility,
Sesstou: I 07-13-93
Node: 2 Global System
,.,
earameter: Loss of Containment
DEVIATION 'CAUSES
~orkslieet
Revision: 0 07-14-93 Dwg#: FS1
Intention: Complete facility.
CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS
Page: G
RECOHHENDATIONS
Earthquake 17. Severed H.P. 10. Release of
Loss of liquid line, to refrigerant to th,
Containment the USDA room, atmosphere.
3/4" liquid line.
43. Building, vessels,
and piping constructed
Seismic Zone 4
requirements.
44. All piping is
welded joints and all
welders are certified
on site.
45. Proper training of
all plant operators and
Cai-OSllA's Procesa Safety
Hanagement Program,
(PSHP) and Risk
Hanagement Prevention
Program
46. Operational and
Emergency Respons~
training and drill.
10. Seismic trip
switch wired into
the controli:
~ystem.
G. SAFETY EQUIPMENT NODE
H. MINUTES FROM HAZOP STUDY
BAKERSFIELD HAZOP STUDY
RED LYON INN
'SIERRA ROOM'
: ~ BAKERSFIELD, CA
JULY 13, 1993
8:00am .
The first day ora plm~ned three day HAZ ,O,p STUDY ~oSthe new Bakersfield, CA Plant. ~
meeting is convening at the Red Lion hm Sierra Rotan in Bakersfield, CA. This HAZOI 'he
STUDY is unique because the study will include the preliminary use of a new HAZOP' computer
program bought by Jim Marrella: The goal of tiffs new computer program is to speed up future
HAZOP STUDIES.
The team members and guests encouraged to attend are as follows:
I. tAZOP team memberx
VICTOR ARNETTiVA], CALIFORNIA REGIONAL ENGINEER, SACRAMENTO, CA;
BRUCE CHANDLER[BC], REFRIGERATION DESIGN, JACKSONVILLE, FL;
LARRY JONES[L J], CHIEF ENGINEER, TRACY, CA;
MATT KOLHER[MK], APPOINTED CHIEF ENGINEER, BAKERSFIELD, CA;
JAMES MARRELLA[JM], OSHA & EPA COORDINATOR, LYONS, IL;
RALPH NODAL[RIq], CHIEF ENGINEER, TULARE, CA;
RAUL RAGUNTON[RR], Pd~GIONAL ENGINEER ASSISTANT, SACRAMENTO, CA;
Guests
BARBARA BRENNER[I]B], HAZARDOUS MATERIAL PLANNING SPECIALIST,
BAKERSFIELD, CA;
CAR1 WLLLIS[CW], OPERATIONS MANAGER, BAKERSFIELD, CA; '
8.'llam
VA reviews the changes of the Consequence Classification, FreqUency Classilication, and Risk
Ranldng Matt/×.
VA introduces the "Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures" and talks about the
statistics of probabilities of death. (i.e. lighting, heart attack, etc.)
VA refers to the "Fire,nan Training Manual", specifically to the article regarding am~nonia
accidents and/or fatalities around the world. '
VA refers to the "Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis" regarding the Consequence
Classification chart.
8:29am
JiM discusses the new HAZOP program.(i.e, multiple nodes - more than 20). '
HAZOP STUDY MINUTES
BAKERSFIELD, CA
PAGE
8:34am
JM reviews the nodes on the new HAZOP program.
(tape recording of discussion of nodes for Bakersfield)
BB suggests the inclusion the other s~cialized safe .ty equipment,
8:38am
JM begins with the HP Receiver, NODE 1.
Initial charging at the 7'herrnosyphon line. Rest of charging at the receiver line.
-NO FLOW review. The CAUSES of no flow.
-Agreement to keep Mechanical failure of solenoid valve(//1).
-Added liquid strainer plugged(#7), r
-Added control failure (#8).
-CONSEQUENCES review( no changes ).
-SAFEGUARDS review.
-VA & BC: Temperature cutout/alarm deleted.
-Added safety relief valve set at 250psig(#3).
-Added scrub ta~fl< and air scrubber(#7).
·-Edit the Ammonia Pump equipment w/th low float cutout/alarm(# 10). .
RN: Suggestion to rephrase #8 to reflect that a computer also monitors the vessel level.
Dual safeguards.
SM: edit #4 of CAUSES with 'or intercooler feed'.
-Edit #5 of CAUSES to 'Manual King valve closed'.
-Add # 10 of CONSEQUENCES 'Same as valve failure'. Same for SAFEGUARDS
for #17.
-Add # 11 of SAFEGUARDS 'Same as valve failure'..Same for SAFEGUARDS # 18.
9:30am
-HIGH FLOW reviews CAUSES for high flow.
-Add # 11 as 'Draining oil from HI' Receiver'.
-Add # 12 as 'Severed charging line'.
PaN: suggestion that just draining oil from HI' Receiver will cause high flow. Edit # l I by
adding 'human error or valve failure'.
-CONSEQUENCES review.
[VA: Question regarding the .cloud plume study as to what case scenario.should be Used.]
[BB: Use worst credible case for thc cloud plume study for Bakersficld.]
-refer to CAUSES by adding # 13 'vandal/sm'.
HAZOP STUDY MINUTES
BAKERSFIELD, CA
PAGE, 2
[JM: To CW that USCS has purchased training for the forklift drivers and that they must be
trained once handling equipment arrives in Bakersfield. Must make time for training before they
start.]
JM reviews SAFEGUARDS )
-Add #13 as 'Control shutdown by ammonia detector in alarm area'.
-Add #26 as 'Scrub tank(water tank) air scrubber'.
BREAK AT 9:55AM
RESUME AT 10:20AM
JM: Return to NO FLOW m~d HIGH FLOW to add Severity, Likelihood, and Risk
Ranking(Recording the ranking and rCcom~nendations made-labeled July 13 BAHAZOP).
-Add # 14 under SAFEGUARDS for NO FLOW.
CAR[ LEAVES AT .10:59AM
-Edit # 12 under RECOMMENDATIONS for HIGH FLOW to 'Pipe ItP Receiver oil
drain to oil collector.
-Edit # 12 under CAusEs for HIGH FLOW by adding '(Covered under Charging Node)'.
-Edit # 14 under RECOMMENDATIONS for HIGH FLOW by adding '(Covered under
Global)'.
-Edit #15 under RECOMMENDATIONS for HIGH FLOW adding '(Covered under
Global)'. ~
JM: HIGH TEMPERATURE and LOW TEMPERATURE parameters. -No ranking involved.
JM: HIGH PRESSURE parameter.
-Add #2 under CAUSES as 'Fire (Cover under Global)'.
-Add #3 under CAUSES as 'Loss of cooling; control power failure, condenser water
pumps, fans, and water supply'.
-Add//4 under CAUSES as 'Non-condensables'.
-Add #5 under CAUSES as 'Human error improper safety control set points, i.e. pressure
safety valves'.
-Add #6 under CAUSES as 'Compressor safety failure. (Covered m~der High Stage
Compressor Node)'.
-Edit # 1 .under CAUSES as 'Human error, failure to properly pump out HP
Receiver before isolating
-Add//2 under CONSEQUENCES as 'Release of refrigerant through relief valves to
scrubber tank'.(Recorded Scrubber Discussion- side I of July 13 BAHAZOP)
-Add # 1 under SAFEGUARDS as 'Compressor equipped wifl~ high discharge
pressure cutout/alarm'.
-Add #3 under SAFEGUARDS as 'Scrub tank (water tank) air scrubber'.
-Add #2p
HAZOP STUDY MiNUTES
BAKERSFIELD, CA
PAGE 3
[look at HAZOP program sheet- added # 1 through #3 recommendations]
[VA: Suggestion to have the choices for CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND SAFEGUARDS
· printed out so the team can help look for solutions.]
LUNCH AT ll:45PM
RESUME AT hl0PM
-Continue HIGH PRESSURE for lip Receiver
JM: Edit # 1 under CONSEQUENCES as 'Release of refrigerant through Safety Relief
'Valve to scrubber tank'.
-Begin Risk Ranking
-Add #3 under CONSEQUENCES as 'Same as 1 and 2'.
-Add # 12 under RECOMMENDATIONS as 'Automatic Purger'.
-Add #13 under RECOMMENDATIONS as 'Operational monitoring and operator's
training'.
BB RETURNS AT l:301'M'
- LOW PRESSURE review.
-No edits involved.
-HIGH LEVEL review.
-Add # 1 under CAUSES as 'Mechanical failure of King Solenoid Valve(KSV)...'.
-Human Error #2
-Edit #6 under CAUSES by '...(Fugitive Emissions)'.
-Add #7 under CAUSES as 'Blocked or no air flow on evaporators'.
-Add #1 under CONSEQUENCES as 'High Pressure ins HP Receiver. Release of
material through safety relief valve to scrubber tank'.
-Add # 1 under SAFEGUARDS as 'Proper Raining of all .... '.
-Add #2 under SAFEGUARDS as 'Pressure safety valve on }IP Receiver'..
-Add #3 under SAFEGUARDS as 'Cross over in defusing system to equalize
pressure'.
-Add #4 under SAFEGUARDS as 'Operational monitoring m~d preventive maintenance
program'. ..
2:20pm.
[VD: Begins questioning on points to speed up THIS HAZOp:]
[BB: Satisfied with the work that we are doing and knows that we are thorough.]
[JM: As long as the local Hazardous Representatives are satisfied is all that matters.
Discussion begins about ways to quicken the HAZOP STUDY.]
-NO LEVEL review, vote to drop this all together.
HAZOP STUDY MINUTES
BAKERSFIELD, CA
PAGE 4
[JM: Not going to continue with his ~nassive mount ofn0des and suggests that the team noxv
heads towards the m'ethod used by VA so that the study can move' at a quicker pace.]
[VA: (Recording on end of side I July 13 BAHAZOP)Suggests we review the nodes JM created
for this HAZOP STUDY.]
BREAK AT 2.'45PM
RESUME AT 2:55PM
[JM: Suggests that VA trace our reference point of the Hp Receiver un the blueprints.]
VA orange traces the oil coolers of the compressors to the thermosyphon. Uses green marker roi'
the pressure relief valves. Uses brown for the oil drain for the refrigerant side.
JM creates the TItEILMOSYPltON NODE.
3:35pm
[VA: Note: The main hazardous consequence comes from over pressurization when considering
the Thermosyphon Node.]
[VA: The oil drain system of tile thertnosyphon loop has no hazardous consequence. Reference
frotn the last HAZOP is noxv addressed and corrected through the design process.]
-LOW PRESSURE was agreed to omit.
-HIGH LEVEL is stone as HP Receiver Node.
-LOW LEVEL review.
-Add # 1 under CAUSES as 'Loss of oil cooling'.
4:00pm
JM creates the INTERMEDIATE SYSTEM for the Intercooler. VA uses tile Tracy HAZOP as a
reference to address the different deviations.
-NO FLOW omitted and covered under LOW/NO FLOW.
-LOW/NO FLOW review.
-HIGH FLOW review.
-REVERSE FLOW review.
[VA: Asks BC to Note: Revise blueprints to reflect piPing change in the ltigh Temp.
Recirculator pump bleed line.]
4:45pm
ADJOURN FOR JULY 13, 1993
HAZOP STUDY MINUTES
BAKERSFIELD, CA
PAGE 5
BAKERSFIELD HAZOP STUDY
RED LION INN
'SIERRA ROOM'
BAKERSFIELD, CA
JULY 14, 1993
8:lSam
Second day of a planned three day HAZOP STUDY of the new Bakersfield, CA plant. Thc
meeting is convening at the Red Lion Inn 'Sierra Room' in Bakersfield, CA. The team members
and guests in attendance are as follows:
HAZOP team members
VICTOR ARNETT[VA], CALIFORNIA REGIONAL ENGINEER, SACRAMENTO, CA;
'~BRUCE CHANDLER[BC], REFRIGERATION DESIGN, JACKSONVILLE, FL;
LARRY JONES[I.J], CHIEF ENGINEER, TRACY, CA;
MATT KOLHER[MK], APpoiNTED CHIEF ENGINEER, BAKERSFIELD, CA;
JAMES MARRELLA[JM], OSHA & EPA COORDINATOR, LYONS, IL;
RALPH NoDAL[RN], CHIEF ENGINEER, TULARE, CA;
RAUL RAGUNTON[RR], REGIONAL ENGINEER ASSISTANT, sACRAMENTO, CA;
Guests encouraged to participate, .
BARBARA BRENNER[BB], HAZARDOUS MATERIAL pLANNING SPECIALIST,
BAKERSFIELD, CA;
CAR1 wILLIs[CW], OPERATIONS MANAGER, BAKERSFIELDi CA;
Resume INTERMEDIATE SYSTEM at the HIGH TEMPERATURE parameter.
Discussion of High Temperature causes.( Mainly about the pumps )
8'.40am
'Moving on from pump discussion.
8:50am
-LOW TEMPERATURE review. No hazardous consequences.
-HIGH PRESSURE review.
-Discussion of CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, and SAFEGUARDS.
IBC: Handout of memorandum regarding Tulare, CA meeting about computer controls in
Bakersfield, CA.]
_Consideration of RISK RANKING and RECOMMENDATIONS.
BREAK AT 9:09AM
RESUME AT 9:27AM
HAZOP STUDY MINU'YES
BAKERSFIELD, CA
PAGE 6
-LOW PRESSURE revieTM'
-Discussion of' CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, and SAFEGUARDS~
-Consideration of RISK RANKING and RECOMMENDATIONS.
9:34am
-HIGH LEVEL review.
-Discussion of CAUSES, CONSEQUENCEs, and sAFEGuARDs.
-Co,sideration of RISK RANKING and RECOMMENDATIONS.
[Short recording of discussion reg~ding CAUSES on side I tape labeled - July 14 BAHAZOP]
BB LEAVES AT 10:05AM
10:06am
-LOW LEVEL review.
-DiscUssion of CAUSES, CONSEQUENCESi and sAFEGUARI)S.
10:28am
-Consideration of RISK RANKING and RECOMMENDATIONS.
[VA: Note: What happens to booster discharge cooling when pumps go off?]
lO:34am
JM creates the LOW TEMPERATURE PUMP RECIRCULATOR INODE, Low Stage
System.
-HIGH FLOW and LOW/NO FLOW review.
-Discussion of CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, and SAFEGUAIIDS.
10:49am
-Consideration of RISK RANKING and RECOMMENDATIONS.
-REVERSE FLOW review.
-Discussion of CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, and SAFEGUARDS.
-Consideration of RISK RANKING and RECOMMENDATIONS.
BREAK FOR LUNCH AT 11:15AM
RESUME AT 12:55PM
Resume LOW TEMPERATURE PUMP RECIRCULATOR, Low Stage system, at HIGH
PRESSURE parameter.
-ItlGH PRESSURE review.
-Discussion of CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, and SAFEGUARDS.
[Went back to Intercooler Node and edited REVERSE FLOW parameters under
CONSEQUENCES]
HAZOP STUDY M/NUTES
BAKERSFIELD, CA
PAGE 7
l:lSpm '
-Consideration of RISK RANKING and RECOMKSENDATIONS.
1:20@m
-LOW PRESSURE review.
-Discussion of CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, and SAFEGUARDS.
l:25pm
-Consideration of RISK RANKING and RECOMMENDATIONS.
l'.26pm
-HIGH TEMPERATURE review.(CoVered under Global)
-LOW TEMPERATURE review.(Same as low level)
l:33pm
-HIGH LEVEL review.
-Discussion of CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, and SAFEGUARDS.
l:41pm ..
-Consideration of RISK RANK1NG and RECOMMENDATIONs.
l:42pm
-LOW LEVEL review.
-Discussion o£CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, and SAFEGUARDS.
-Consideration of RISK RANKING and RECOMMENDATIONS.
l:SSpm
JM creates GLOBAL SYSTEM NODE.
BREAK AT 2:00PM
RESUME AT 2:15PM
Continue GLOBAL SYSTEM NODE.
-FIRE review. Loss of Containment.
-Discussion of CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, and SAFEGUARDS.
[Recording on side 1 labeled July 14 BAHAZOP]
2:37pm
-Consideration of RISK RANKING and RECOMMENDATIONS.
2:47pm '-
-SABOTAGE/VANDALIsM review. Loss of Containment.
[JM creates GLOBAL NODE guide words, i.e. Fire, Sabotage/Vandalism, etc.]
HAZOP STUDY MINUTES
BAKERSFIELD, CA
PAGE 8 '
-Discussion of CAUSES, cONSEQUENCES, and SAFEGUARDS.
BREAK AT 3:30PM
RESUME AT 3:55PM
-Consideration of R1SK RANKING and RECOMMENDATIONS.
[JM: Who is responsible for following up on the listed recommendations?]
[Recorded discussion on who is responsible. Labeled July 14 BAHAZOP]
[JM enters BC as listed as the accOuntable person.]
4.'lSpm
ADJOURN FOR JULY 14, 1993
HAZOP'STUDY MINUTES
BAKERSFIELD, CA
PAGE 9
BAKERSFIELD HAZOP STUDl,
RED LYON INN
'LAKE ISABELLA ROOM'
BAKERSFIELD, CA
8:lSnm JULY 15, 1993
Third and last day of a planned three day HAZOP STUDY of thc new 13akcrsficld, CA plant.
The meeting is convening at the Red Lion Inn q_.ake Isabella Room' in Bakersfield, CA. Thc
team members and guests in attendance arc as follows:
H,4ZOP team members
VICTOR ARNETT[VA] ,CALIFORNIA REGIONAL ENGINEER, SACRAMENTO, CA;
BRUCE CHANDLER[BC], REFRIGERATION DESIGN, JACKSONVILLE, FL;
LARRY JONES[L J], CHIEF ENGINEER, TRACY, CA;
MATT KOLHER[MK], APPOINTED CHI17.F ENGINEER, BAKERSFIELD, CA;
JAMES MARRELLA[JM], OSHA& EPA COORDINATOR, LYONS, IL;
RALPH NODAL[RN], CHIEF ENGINEER, TULARE, CA;
RAUL RAGUNTON[RR]' REGIONAL ENGINEER ASSISTANT, SACRAMENTOi CA:
Guests encoura£ed to tmrtlcipate_
BARBARA BRENNER[BB], HAZAP, DOUS MATERIAL PLANNING SPECIALIST,
BAKERSFIELD, CA;
CAm WILLIS[CW], OPERATIONS MANAGER, BAKERSFIELD, CA;
Continuation of the GLOBA, L NODE. The Parameter is HUMAN ERROR.
-HUMAN ERROR review. Loss ofconlainmcnt.
[BC: Question on the piping of the.truck and rail docks on Bakersfield plant, l Iow are they
piped? Recommendation to place all p/ping on the roof, except for penetration through the roof
directly to air units.]
-Discussion of CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, and SAFEGUARDS.
-Consideration oFRISK RANKING and REcoMMENDATiONS.
[VA: Recommendation to pipe HP Receiver to oil collection pots. Tile oil pots currently do not
have pressure, gauges.]
[VA: Looked at the Glycol SHELL AND 'IIJBE HEATER for oil removal. We believe that all
oil will return through tile Phillips float. In regards to the drain valve on the bottom, we will
leave it for pmnp out of the vessel.]
BREAK AT 9:05AM
RESUME AT 9:23AM
HAZOP STUDY MINUTES
BAKERSFIELD, CA
PAGE'I0
[VA: Asks BB if our earthquake scenario, 3/4" HP feedline to USDA ri)om evaporator severing,
would be suffi¢ient for our cloud plume.]
~B~ Would like us to look at two scenarios involving ammonia line involving the exterior of
the building or what would happen if the engine room equipment fails.]
[BB: Authorization to occupy by the planned startup date maybe acceptable without completed
RMPP before startup. Must at least submit a rough draft.ofthe HAZOP study with notes and
show file RMPP is in the process of being completed. All tiffs depends what BB's superviso.r
ascertains.]
[BB: Backup generator is not needed. She says that there is a "glitch" in the fire code. For
storage of ammonia, it requires standby power and for use in dispensing, it reqnires emergency
power. She says that the Bakersfield Fire Department has gone toward the lesser of the two and
require standby power, supplying power wired in ahead of the main breaker.]
[BB: Wants a HAZOP study performed on new designs. Concerned with new designs made by
Stellar and compared to other USCS plants. She specifically requires us to look at the
compressor room air scrubber and emergency release tank to the sanitary sewer with all relating
fans and controls. She needs to make sure that the waste water people will buy off(accept)
Stellar emergency equipment design.] .
[BB: Will address the pH levels for an emergency release to sanitary sewer ASAP. She stated
the it is OK, on an emergency basis, to dump large volumes of ammonia saturated water iuto the
sanitary sewer because it would be diluted with the large water flow existing in their sanitary
sewer syste~n. The waste water people are more concerned with low ptl thau high pH.]
[BB: Suggests that the gauges on the ammonia diffuser system have clear set pressure levels, i.e.
red marks at pressure settings.]
[BB: Suggests that VA's fireman's trai~fing is kept very simple.]
[BB: Emergency Broadcast System will be part of~ommunity emergency notification]
[BB will look into Public Notification list, Map of Bakersfield, What is needs to be in place at
startup]
[MK: What is the nearest Fire Station?]
[BB: station 13, City of Bakersfield]
BB LEAVES AT 2:45PM
BREAK AT 2:50PM
RESUME AT 3:05PM
3:25pm
ADJOURN FOR JULY 15, 1993
HAZOP STUDY MINUTES
BAKERSFIELD, CA
PAGE 12
FOLLOW UP TO
BAKERSFIELD HAZOP STUDY
JULY 21, 1993
12:00pm .
Barbara Brenner, Hazardous Materials Planning Technician, called Victor Arnett to clarify the
Bakersfield plant start up conditions. She requires that the safety ammonia diffusion system and
fl~e treatment system for vapors off engine room are in place before mmnonia goes in.
HAZOP STUDY MINUTES
BAKERSFIELD, CA
PAGE 13
M MOIqANDUM
THE STELLAR GROUP
2900 HARTLEY ROAD
JACKSONVILLE, FL 32257
(904) 260--2900
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
TheFile
Bruce Chandler~~ ~
July 19, 1993
U.S. CgL'D~TOP~.~E'._.BAKERS~IELD' CA
A meeting was held in Bakersfield, California on July 13, 14 &~15,
1993 for the purpose of conducting a HAZOP study for their new
facility under construction there. My notes from this meeting are
as follows:
Meeting Attendees:
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
Victor Arnett
Raul Ragunton
Matt Kohler
Carl Willis
·Ralph·Nodal
Jim Marella
Larry Jones
Barbara Brenner
Bruce Chandler
USCS Sacramento
USCS Sacramento
USCS Bakersfield
USCS Bakersfield
USCS Tulare -'
USCS Lyons
USCS Tracy
Bakersfield City FD
Stellar
The oil drain from the high pressure receiver should be
c~nnected to. the oil recovery system. We ~hould do the
same in Tracy as soon as possible.· ,.. ·
I was told by Jim Marella that per Dave'Murphy of Frick
Company, training films are. available for Frick
equipment. If they are, we should get what is available
and make them available to USCS in Bakersfield and Tracy.
The inert gas purger should be piped to the freezer
suction.' We should leave it Piped'to the high Stage as
it is now, but simply tie into that line with a valve and
go to the low stage.
MEMO TO FILE
USCS - Bakersfield
'July 19, 1993
Page 2
Se
10.
11.
12.
13.
I am to review the booster compressor discharge cooling
'piping and system. Changes should be reflected on
revised drawings.
Liquid lines to the plant will ~require a relief from
liquid to suction to prevent against possible hydraulic
expansion during a shutdown.
The ammonia sensor.in t~e yent ~ine should be hard wired
in series with the emergency stop button to effect a
plant shutdown when ammonia is detected in this line.
Condensers should remain on line.
Barbara Brenner said it was acceptable to locate
emergency stop, ventilation fan controls, etc., ~inside
the ammonia diffusion cabinet. This is in response to
Item #14 of Aaron'Kaczorowski's memo of July 11, 1993.
I~ am to review consequences of intermediate pumps being
off with respect to booster discharge cooling and high
stage suction superheat and oil cooling.
In Tracy, when a compressor is.started in manual, other'
compressors on that suction level shut down. Ron Nesler
to correct, or explain logic. '
We need to include a low suction pressure alarm in our
system.
Have we assigned a specific output for the ammonia
diffusion panel alarm? USCS would like to be able to
identify this alarm which may have a different response
than others.
The inside valve on the ammonia charging line'should be
a combination stop check valve.
14.
Our drawings and design need to be revised to show
penetrating the roof at each air unit on the truck and
rail docks with suction and liquid piping, not at the
control group with piping routed inside the dock to air
units.
MEMO TO FILE
USCS - Bakersfield
July 19, 1993
Page 3
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
cc:
The oil removal pots on the recirculators at Bakersfield
need to be relocated to where the drawings show them in
front of the vessels. They are not accessible enough in
their present location behind the vesselS.
Pressure gauges need to be installed on each oil pot so
pressure can be monitored during oil draining procedures.
.(Note: This should be a Stellar standard)
The.new Tracy control program should include a pump down
time (adjustable) after the unit satisfies on temperature
same as Bakersfield.
Bruce Chandler is to provide information on seismic
sensing switch to Victor Arnett.
Make sure that tamper switch with alarm is included on
the ammonia diffusion cabinet.
Meeting Attendees
Chuck Toogood~ USCS
Bobby Cothren, TSG
George Albertelli, TSG
Aaron Kaczorowski, TSG.
Ron Nesler, TSG
Frank Sharpe, TSG
Lamar Cothren, TSG
Mike Netting, TSG
I. RISK REDUCTION AND CHANGE PROCEDURES
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE, INC.
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
RISK REDUCTION CHANGE PROCEDURES RECOMMENDATIONS
TAKEN FROM BAKERSFIELD HAZOP STUDY
1. Consider replacing check valve on System Charging Line Bruce Chandler Complete
to a combination stop/check valve. -
2. Review pdnts to determine proper location of piping forBruce Chandler Prints Revised As
· the rail and truck dock. Matt Kohler Recommended
3. Consider relocating recirculators oil out pots. Bruce Chandler Complete
Matt Kohler
4. Consider installing pressure gauges on all oil out pots. Bruce Chandler Will Be Done
Matt Kohler Pdnts Revised
5. Consider piping H.P. Receiver oil drain valve to central oil Bruce Chandler Will Be Done
collector. Matt Kohler Pdnts Revised
6. Consider installing a seismic trip switch wired into the Approved By Victor Switch Delivery
controls system to stop compressors, ammonia pumps, Bruce Chandler $1'000.00Amett. To Be is 5 Days
and ammonia King Valve. Installed
7. Review ammonia detector control logic for vent' line. Victor Arnett
8. Review booster discharge cooling safeguards when High Stage Will
ammonia circulating pumps cutoff. Bruce Chandler Shutdown on High
Oil Temp or High
Discharge Temp
MEMORANDUM
January 25, 1993
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Ralph Huey
Barbara Brenner
U.S. Cold Storage
Following is a list of the Article 80 code sections which do not appear to be
addressed by the Stellar Group in the plans submitted for the U.S. Cold Storage
warehouse located in Tracy.
80.401 (c)3A - Piping and tubing utilized for the transmission of toxic gases shall have
welded or brazed connections throughout. ( This is probably ok, but I did not see the
specification on the plans.)
80.401 (c)3C - Excess flow control shall be provided where piping originates form within
a hazardous material storage room or area. The excess flow control shall be located
within the storage room or area.
80.401 (c)3D - Readily accessible manual or automatic remotely activated fail-safe
emergency shutoff valves shall be installed on supply piping at the bulk source. (I
cannot determine the accessibility of the king valve from the mechanical drawings. They
do have shut off valves on the high pressure receiver.)
80.401 (I) - Mechanical ventilation, treatment systems, alarms etc. required by Article 80,
Division 4 must be connected to a source-of standby power.
80.402(a) - The amount of Corrosive/toxic compressed gas in the system exceeds the
exempt quantity. Therefore, at least the engine room should be built in accordance with
the UBC requirements for a H7 occupancy.
80.402(b)G - Tanks utilized in use of a toxic Compressed gas shall be within a ventilated
separate gas storage room or placed within an exhausted enclosure. They show a
emergency vent to atmosphere adjacent to the ammonia water diffusion station which
would also need to be scrubbed if left in the plans.
I. have given page R-13 to Larry Toler for his review of the ammonia diffusion
system, per Article 63. He knows that we need his comments by Thursday morning at
the latest. David Lyman called to find out if We have received the plans. He indicated
that. U.S. Cold Storage would like our response faxed to Chuck Togood at (609) 354-
8199. The letter should be copied to John Umps.
THE STELLAR GROUP
2900 HARTLEY ROAD
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA 32257
904-260-2900
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
DATE~
Hazardous Materials Planning Technician
blEW COLD STORAGE BUILDING
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE OF
, erials Division CALIFORNIA
II Hazardous Mat . Bakersfield, California
II Bakersfield City Fire Departmem
/Ila~0ei's Enclosed ~Cover ______
Project Specifications ------- ed as Noted
Shop Drawings _____ Resubmit
- . -- - ~mit _______
t~ct Literature ______ Not Accepted '
The Stellar Group
2 R-13 8/2/93 Ammonia Diffusion System Detail
1 _ 8/3/93 Ammonia Loss Prevention System Schedule The Stellar Group
Sorry these didn't get attached to the 7/29/93 transmittal to Ralph. Also, please note the short
interval schedule for the components of the Ammonia Loss Prevention System, attached hereto.
The capacity of the largest tank is 2,500 gal. ~ ~ t~ \% I~fVD :' /'Z~2~ \~[x.
You should have received the electrical drawings (shown on the 7/29/93 transmittal to Ralph) hand delivered by
David Stewart today. Please hand carry one set of everything to the city for their approval as you suggested
today. Thanks' again for all your help.
THE STELLAR GROUP
GEORGE J. ALBERTELLI, P.E.
Senior Vice President
xc w/encl: Chuck Toogood, Victor Arnett, Mike Netting, Bruce Chandler
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE OF CALIFORNIA
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
August 3, 1993
AMMONIA LOSS PREVENTION SYSTEM
Schedule
Scope Completion Date
Submit drawings for final review and approval 7/29/93
Installation of diffusion panel 8/10/93
Installation of water tank 8/13/93
Charge refrigeration system with ammonia
Complete water and sanitary piping
Complete standby power
Install exhaust duct system 8/27/93
Complete electrical controls/RCP 8/27/93
System test 9/3/93
8/18/93
8/20/93
8/20/93
The Stellar Group
2900 Hartley Road
Jacksonville, Florida 32257
FIRE DEP,CRYMEI\ T
S D. JOHNSON
FiRE CHIEF
CITY of BAKERSFIELD
"I,P~ CA RE"
SITE PLAN ,q_EVIEW/PLAN CHECK
Re: U.S. Cold Sto¢age of California Inc
District & Ashe
BAKffRSFiELD. 93307
326-391 i
Fire Department lock boxes shall be installed at main entrances to facility.
Contact the Fire Marshal at (805) 326-3951 to acquire application for lock box and
proper location.
Fire extinguishers (in cabinets, if outdoors)
One 2-A10BC extinguisher per 3,000 square
feet of floor area not to exceed 75 feet travel
distance.
Check occupant load calculations.
Conditions on ammonia diffuSer outlined earlier still need to be addressed.
Date Typed: 4/21/93'
Typed By: dlf
cc: Greg Yates/City Fire Department
WDPRFPLANSCHEC K: USCOLDST. 1
07×22×93
16:17
'~9e426o2e88
STELLAR
6ROUP
~001
July 22, 1993
Ms. Barbara Brenner
Hazardous Materials Planning Technician
.Bakersfield City Fire Department
2130 "O' Street
Bakersfield, CA · 93301
FAX TRANSM~~ INFORMATION
7o:
Department
NEW COLD STORAGE BUILDING
UNITED STAiTES COLD STORAGE OF CALIFORNIA
Bakersfield, California
Project//5872
Dear Barbara: ~
I am in receipt of your July 21, 1993 letter and offer the following:
1. It is true that only aqueous ammonia will discharge from the water storage tank.
proposed, ail releases from the tank wilI be diluted by a minimm of two gallons As
per pound
· 3.
of ammonia,' which it is my understanding would create a solution with less than 250 ppm
which should be approvable by the Wastewater Division.
When I stated .'~...liquid ammonia will be discharged, undiluted, 'to the sanitary sewer
SYstem,' I meant that the liquid from a major break (e.g. a rupture of the liquid line into the
high pressure receiver) would go directly to the sanitary sewer. This liquid would be
anhydrous ammonia and the largest single tank will hold approximately 3000 lbs, I thought
that in our June 23, I993 meeting we discuss~ the possibility of Wastewater accepting
anhydrous ammonia since it was such a small charge considering the size of the wastewater
system, in Bakersfield. On this basis, I am proposing to discharge any liquid into the floor
drains.
We will not install monitors to indicate the concentration of ammonia since no discharge from
the water Storage tank will ex_ceed 250 ppm.
The water ~torage tank will be continuously replenished with fresh water since the standard
Operation of the evaporative condensers will drain the bleed water through the tank 'and
thereby dilute any ammonia in the baseline storage (1,000 gallons).
Although we did state in Item "B" that the condensers will shut down, we were showing that
a relief va/ye discharge could be handled with the refrigeration system still in operation for
period of time. In the event of an ammonia release in the engine room, the condenser would,
as would the ventilation tans, be started automatically by tee refrigeration control panel
which, of course, is connected to the standby electrical system.' '
{:)7×22×93
16':18 '~9042602088
STELLAR'(~ROUP
[~ 0{)2
Ms. Barbara Brenner
~ 6. AS stated above, the maximum capacity of the largest single tank is aPpro×imately 3000 lbs. · which can be easily be treated in under 240 minutes.
7. The water supply is a three-inch Ii. no which is capable of the 120 gpm necessary and will not
/.,,. require assistance from the fire department. There will also be a fire department connection
on the diffusion panel.
8. We believe that a vent is required from the ammonia diffusion pan'el in accordance with lIAR
.~. ? which detailed the requirements of the panel, supposedly in accordance with Article 63 of the
UFC. We will check these codes and, if necessary, either delete the vent or Pipe it into the
relief valve venting system, so
9. Upon your acceptance of the additional information included this letter, we .will provide you
}~'--' with drawings-qamlxxl hya profe.ssional engineer.
I0. We will provide a lock box, KNOX-BOX//3200, surface mounted. We do .not have a copy
of Chief Toler's letter of April 21, 1993 but would appreCiate a copy if further information is
germane to this discUSsion. Obviously, we would like to know where Chief Toler would like
the lock box mounted.
.1 I. We understand that you are requiring the diffusion system and the vapor treatment System,
along with all fire code safety equipment, to be installed prior to charging the system with
ammonia. As you know, we have tried to develop a system which would encompass all of.
your requirements, and be logical and practical for all of us. Since United States Cold
Storage has scheduled opening the facility on September 1, 1993 it will be impossible to attain
the operational temperatures without Charging the system as outlined in my previous
~. correspondence. Since we will be worlolg with the system through September I5. 1993 and
,.,~- since .other.systems we have done iii California and elsewhere in the country have not
~,~¢;v - experienced an7 discharges and/or spills when first starting and operating them, we ask that .0 .o~.n0' you ask Ralph to allow us to charge the system prior to this ui
L?,.~5~ 'j.V" understandin,, that i, .,m ~.~ .. ....... r-_ . ecl pment being operational,
~.~.~- ~ ~'-. ~ -wr, uom~ cerore we leave the project. . '
~"/~ ,. yOu know that we have worked closely with You on this
~ ( we will continue to stand hind i~m,.~-,:-- '-~ - . .matter and you have my protmse that
,,,~e- authority would You ,,l,-,o~h;~;'~'2~'.-'~t:~'-auvn cna[ .we give you. If Ralph is not the ultimate
him/her .~ v ,~,~ ~;~'~ mc mar ~mn~e so mat I might ask this same question of
Sincerely yours, ,
THE STELLAR GROUP
G~elli, P.E.
Vice President
GJA/edw
vChUck Toogood
jctor Arnett
FIRE DEPARTMENT
S. O. JOHNSON
FIRE CHIEF
CITY of BAKERSFIELD
"WE CARE"
January 28, 1993
2101H STREET
BAKERSFIELD, 93301
326-3911
Mr. C. Toogood
U.S. Cold Storage Inc.
P. O. Box 5460
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-5460
Fax. (609) 354-8199
Dear Mr. Toogood:
We have been requested to review the drawings of the ammonia refrigeration plant in
Tracy California, for 'compliance with the current State of California, Uniform Fire Code.
The following comments apply specifically to Articles 63 and 80 of this code.,
1) I couldn't locate specifications on the plans for welded or brazed piping and
tubing connectors. These connections will have to be w?.-':ided or brazed throughout.
2) Excess flow control must be provided where piping originates within a hazardous
Materials Storage Room or area and shall be located within the storage room or area.
3) It is difficult to determine the locations and accessibility of the king valve from th'e
mechanical drawings. The code 'requires readily accessible manual or autordatic
remotely activated fail-safe emergency shutoff valves shall be installed on supply piping
at the bulk source.
4) The engine-room construction shall meet the requirements of the Uniform Building
Code for a H-7 occupancy.
5) Tanks utilized for compressed ammonia storage shall be withifi a ventilated
separate gas storage room or placed within an exhausted enclosure and the exhaust
treated so as to dilute, adsorb, absorb, contain, neutralize, burn or otherwise process
the entire contents of the largest single tank of material reducing the maximum allowable
discharge concentration of the gas to one half IDLH at the point of discharge.
6) All vents and pressure relief valves must be vented to a treatment system as
described above.
7) The mechanical ventilation, treatment systems, alarms etc. must be connected to
a source of standby power. ..
· 'cations for the mixing valve as well as calculations
8) We would also need the. sp.ecff~ .... , ....... I,~ be sufficient to prowde two
by a mechanical engineer confirming me water suppw v,,,~,,,-, .
gallons of water per pound of ammonia.
As a final Comment~the drawings we reviewed show a planned future expansion' of
approximately 150% of the initial refrigeration system. I would recommend that any
exhaust treatment system be evaluated for future expansion at the time of initial
installation. ~ hope these comments are of some help, please feel free to contact David
Lyman if you have any'further questions.
Sincerely yours, ,
~alph .~ "ator
t~-a~_ardous Materials Coordm
REH/ed
CC:
O. Lyman
M. Kelly
J. Umps
G. AlberteJli
July 15, 1993
THE STELLAR GROUP
Ms. Barbara Brenner
Hazardous Materials Planning Technician
Bakersfield City Fire Department
2130 "G" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
RE:
NEW COLD STORAGE BUILDING
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE OF CALIFORNIA
Bakersfield, California
Project//5872
Dear Barbara:
Thank you for the time you and Ralph spent with Chuck Toogood, Victor Arnett' and myself on June
23, 1993. In accordance with that meeting, this letter and its attachments are our submittal for your
approval of our Ammonia Loss Prevention System in accordance with the reqUirements of UFC,
Article 80.
~t~~no,~ ,mr meetin~ we have not only added the solution for a major gas leak but have fine-tuned some
g~'~a~t we discussed on the 23rd of June. This fine tuning generally simplifies the system in that
less mechanical/electrical control is required Also as you requested, we have included manual
control of the exhaust fans in the diffusion panel, and the king valve will be accessible from the ilo_or.
~,-~' ,,,,----~,,"~,~,,'~'ew attac'~hed'---n~ease find our Summary2/(mmonia~oss Management System, dated July
15, 1993. This document presents the key elements of the system and indicates by calculation how
/~.,.o~~fic requirements are met. You should note that with a major gas leak it is assumed that the
x'i~(ii~i~ammonia will be discharged, undiluted, to the sanitary sewer system. At our meeting, we
~ssed the possibility of the wast~e~lL~'~people accepting th~s d~scharge s~nce ~t would be an
emergency. You suggested that you could talk to them about this potential solution since it would be
an emergency, situation and the occurrence is quite rare.
Also a.ttached for your review and use are two copies each of the following drawings:
DRAWING # DATE TITLE
C-1 $/20/93 Site and Utilities Plan
R-1 6/21/93 Refrigeration Floor Plan
R-2 5/28/93 ' Refrigeration Floor Plan
2900 Hartley Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32257 · Telephone (904) 260-2900 · FAX (904) 260-2088
Ms. Barbara Brenner
July 15, 1993
Page 2
R-3
R-4
Ro5
' R-6
R-7
R-9
R-10
R-11
R-12
R-13
R-14
R-16
DATE
6/21/93
6/21/93
6/21/93
5/6/93
6/21/93
6/21/93
6/21/93
6/21/93
6/21/93
5/28/93
5/6/93
6/21/93
7/2/93
TITLE
Machine Room, Floor, Roof and
Foundation Plan
Machine Control Groups
Machine Room Section
;sel Details and Equipment Schedules
Vessel Piping and Details
Refrigeration Details
Refrigeration Schedule
Underfloor Glycol Heat
Machine Room Isometrics
Machine Room Isometrics
Ammonia Diffusion System Detail
Pipe Stands
(Untitled)
Plumbing, ventilation and electrical (stand-by power to the refrigeration control panel, the evaporative
condenser and the exhaust fans) requirements for the system to operate properly will be added to
those appropriate disciplines and submitted separately for approval.
We expect to place ammonia in the system during the week of August 9, 1993. Recognizing that this
system along with other owner-provided documentation must be approved prior to charging, we ask
that you give this review the highest possible priority. Please provide your approva1 by Tuesday, July
20, 1993. so that we can proceed with the purchase and installation of the necessary components.
Thank you again for your continued support and assistance.
Sincerely yours,
THE STELLAR GROUP
G~li, P.E.
ni~r Vice President
GJA/edw
Enclosures
xc W/end (~xcept drawings):
ChuCk Toogood
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE
NEW COLD STORAGE FACILITY
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
SUMMARY - AMMONIA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The above facility employs an ammonia mechanical refrigeration system and as such, is
subject to national, state and local codes governing such systems. The following paragraphs
refer specifically to the management of ammonia loss from the system. ..
A) EMERGENCY REFRIGERATION CONTROL BOX/DIFFUSION SYSTEM
Ref UMC 1518
UFC 63.108
System has two (2) Iow pressure sides and one (1) high pressure side.
Main vessels at each pressure level have 3/4" inlet pressure relief valves,
therefore 1" pipe used for emergency discharge lines {UFO 63.108 (a) 4. &
UMC 1518 (b)}.
Drawing R-13 attached indicates diffusion control box in accordance with UFC
63.108 (a) 5, UMC 1518 (c) and IlAR interpretation thereof.
Maximum release rate through 1" line at 250 psig = (approx.) 30 lbs./min. (ref
ANSI/ASHRAE 15-1992, pp B15).
Design water flow at 2 gallon water / 1 lb ammonia: 60 gpm therefore 3" line
used is more than sufficient to provide this flow. Mixing valve is IlAR approved
manufacturer and model for this application. See mixing valve flow rate
confirmation letter from Penberthy Inc., dated 7/12/93, copy attached hereto.
B) PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE PIPING & DISCHARGE TERMINATION
Ref UMC 1516 & 1517
Relief valve discharge piping is sized and routed in accordance with UMC 1515
through 1517.
Relief valve discharge shall be to a 2000 gal water tank. Largest relief valve is
rated at 60 lbs. ammonia/minute. Permanent buffer capacity of tank = 1000
gallons to insure coverage of relief valve outlet. With reference to
ANSI/ASHRAE 15 - 1992 pp 10.4.8.2, for 2 gallons water/1 lb ammonia, initial
absorption period =-16.7 minutes. This time period allows for coincident
operation of the refrigeration system with-pressure relief management and far
exceeds the normally expected relief time of 1 minute.
Beyond this Period, system will shut down, water flow to condensers will stop
and water will be fed to and drained from the tank at a rate of 130,gpm. (i.e.
>2 gpm/1 Ib/min).
water tank design is with reference to ANSI-ASHRAE 15 - 1992 pp 10~ 4. 8. 2.
VENTILATION OF MACHINE ROOM
For ammonia leaks result!ng in a concentration in the machine room of over
250 ppm, the ventilation system will be activated by an ammonia detector,
'drawing air from the machine room and directing it to the evaporative
condenser air intake. This ventilation 'system is' designed in accordance with
IlAR Bulletin 111, 10/91 which will limit machine room ammonia concentrations
to 25% of the lower explosive limit (160,000 .pp, m) per NFPA adopted
guidelines.
Thus, although the exhaust system beComes activated at 250 ppm to avoid
ammonia/air mixtures drifting out of the machine room, the system will move
enough air to limit the concentration'to 40,000 ppm max.
The worst case that the condenser will 'receive at its air inlet .coUld therefore be
40,000 ppm, with the best case being 250 ppm.
The exhaust air flow rate is 35,340 cfm.
35,340 cfm x 40,000 ppm -- 14i4 cfm ammonia
@ 70°F and 0 psig, ammonia vapor specific volume = 23.8 ft3/Ib
Therefore, ammonia flow rate = 1414/23.8 = 59 Ib/min ~-~ ~
Condenser capacity = 3,547,500 Btuh l ~rlO,~¢, '~r
Water evaporation rate = 3,547,500 Btu + 950 .Btu
= 7.5 gpm hr. lb
Bleed rate required = 50% of evaporation rate = 3.75 gpm
Therefore,
Total required water feed rate
= 11 gpm (approximately)
Total water supplied
= 45 gpm
Refrigeration system is designed to expand to 400% of current capacity and
therefore at emergency ammonia discharge, any other condenser (other than
#1) will be locked out by the control circuit, but will continue to bleed water.
Therefore, total water supply available to condenser #1
45 gpm - (3 x 3.75 gpm) = 35 gpm
35 gpm -- 292/bs/min
At 80°F water temperature, (see attached graph) the solubility of ammonia in
water is 30%, therefore, the amount of water required to fully absorb a
vaporous ammonia stream of 59 Ib/min
= 197 Ib/min < 292 Ib/min
This provides for an ammonia concentration of well below the solubility limit at
proposed operating temperatures.
Initiation of ammonia absorption mode releases solenoid valves on auxiliary
supply and waste lines to condenser #1 to provide full flow at design capacity.
With 35 gpm water flowing into the evaporative condenser, the vaporous
ammonia is absorbed sufficiently, but full dilution occurs in the water tank,
where the remaining 85 gpm is introduced in order to make the required
solution (i.e. 2 gal water/1 lb ammonia).
This is drained continuously from the tank as it is during a pressure relief valve
discharge.
PENBERIHY, INC.
320 Locust Street
Prophetstown, Illinois 61277-1147
TEL: (815) 537-2311 FAX: (815) 537-5764
July 12, 1993
Mark Roxburgh
Stellar Group
2900 Hartley Rd
Jacksonville, FL 32257
Dear Mr. Roxburgh:
In response to your inquiry about using the Steam Ring Heater (SPd-I) as an ammonia evacuation
device, Penberthy has comprised the following information.
As you may be aware, the SRH was originally designed for heating liquid in-line. Steam enters
the liquid flow stream through an internal annular orifice. The steam collapses in to the water and
releases its latent heat. Since its introduction, the SRH has proVen to be an effective device for
evacuating ammonia vessels. A large volume of water flow absorbs pressurized ammonia before
it escapes to surrounding air.
Ammonia has a high affinity for water. The solubility limit of ammonia in water is 89.9 grams of
ammonia 0qI-I3) per 100 cc cool water (Physical Constants of Inorganic Compounds, 73rd
Edition, CRC Handbook [pg 4-37]). In other words, 100 grams of water can absorb 89.9 grams
of ammonia.
A water flow rate of 120 GPM represents a flow rate of 999.6 #/min. An ammonia flow rate of
60 #/min is small in comparison to the flow rate of water (6% by weight)i Considering that the
solubility limit is 89.9# ammonia per 100# of water (89% by weight), the potential for vaporous
ammonia to exit the SRH is highly unlikely.
I hope this information is useful. If you have questions or concerns about the information
· contained in this letter, you can contact Penberthy for further qualification.
David Rupert
Process Flow Product Manager
CURVE 1
1oo
90
85
80
75
7O
65
6O
:~ 55
~ so
40
35
3O
25
20
15
10
-20
2O
4O
60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
TEMPERATURE - FAHRENHEIT "
SOLUBILITY CURVE FOR AMMONIA IN WATER
220
THE STELLAR GROUP
March 3, 1993
Mr. Ralph E. Huey
Hazardous Materials Coordinator
Hazardous Materials Division
Bakersfield City Fire .Department
2130 "G" Street
Bakersfield, CA 93301
NEW COLD STORAGE BUILDING
UNITED STATES COLD STORAGE OF CALIFORNIA
Bakersfield, California
Project//5872
Dear Ralph:
Thank you for the time Barbara and you spent with Mike Netting and I reviewing your January 28,
1993 letter to Chuck Toogood of United States Cold Storage. Mike and I both felt that the "face to
face" meeting was beneficial to us in our understanding of your reasoning for the referenced letter.
United States Cold Storage has closed on the property and The Stellar Group has been chosen as the
design/builder. A project, of this type can only be accomplished by a team dedicated to the public's
welfare and to the interest of Bakersfield's new corporate citizen -- United States Cold Storage (our
client). We hope you feel the same; we look forward to our partnership with you and your
organization for this and future projects.
In light of the above, I thought it would be good to confirm the salient points of our meeting (and of
the further telephone conversation between you, me and Bruce Chandler of our refrigeration
organization on the afternoon of February 3, 1993). The issues listed below are referenced to the
original numbering system of your January 28, 1993 letter.
A. Item #1.
B. Item #2.
Piping will be welded, except for flanged connections as appropriate
for certain pipe sizes.
The engine room, where the receiver(s) and accumulator(s) are located
(for useage and circulation of ammonia), is a hazardous materials
storage room. Excess flow in case of an accident, or otherwise, will
be controlled by closure of the king valve through the computer
system which monitors the ammonia detectors as one of its
multitudinous functions and activates the king valve. The king valve
is normally energized open.
2900 Hartley Road, Jacksonville~ Florida 32257 · Telephone (904) 260-2900 · FAX (904) 260-2088
Mr. Ralph E. Huey
March 3, 1993
Page 2
C. Item #3.
The king valve on the Tracy drawings (which you received-as a
"prototype" for Bakersfield) is located in the Engine Room. It is
normally located here. This valve will satisfy the requirement for
remotely activated, fail-safe emergency shut-off of the supply piping at
the 'bulk source.
D. Item #4.
The engine room will be constructed to meet an H-7 occupancy.
E. Item #5.
You and I have agreed that the engine room is the separate gas storage
room for this facility. The engine room will be exhausted and the
exhaust will be treated by one of the methods outlined. The largest
single tank will be connected to a manual diffusion system so that the
concentration at discharge to the sanitary sewer will be ~/~IDLH. The
required IDLH is 500 ppm.
The diffusion system will include city water supply in sufficient
quantity to provide the necessary dilution. The diffusion system will
also include a connection for manual water feed from the fire
department.
The maximum time for relief of the largest tank is 240 minutes.
F. Item #6.
Vents and pressure relief valves will be piped to the exhaust system
for treatment.
G. Item #7.
The exhaust system, the exhaust treatment system, the ammonia
detectors and the computer control system shall be permanently
connected to a standby power source through a standby power panel
connected to the secondary power supply at the transformer (ahead of
the main).
H. Item #8.
Of course, the specifications for the mixing valve at the diffusion
system, ,, along with the mechanical engineer's calculations to support
usage of the selected valve, would be included in our plan check
documentation.
As you suggested, we will review the capacity of the systems to be
installed in Phase I against the requirements of the future phases. Our
experience shows that upgraded requirements for future phases .are
generally rejected by Owners unless they are very inexpensive since
each phase has to satisfy its own pro forma. But, we will make the
appropriate choices available to the owner. Thank you for the
suggestion.
Hopefully, the above is an accurate testament to our meeting. Please call me with any future
comments and/or questions, or with any corrections. My toll-free phone number is 800-488-2900.
Mrl Ralph E. Huey
March 3, 1993
Page 3
Again, thank you for your continued support and assistance.
Sincerely yours,
THE STELLAR GROUP
sGeen°r~
GA/edw
xc: Mike Netting
Bruce Chandler
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