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Home My WebLink AboutHAZARDOUS WASTE4800 Easton Drive, Suite 114 Bakersfield, California 93309 Post Office Box 9217 Bakersfield, California 93389 805-326-1112 805-326-0191 FAX 83 East Shaw Avenue, Suite 250 Fresno, California'93710 209-222-1667 209-222-2630 FAX HAZARDS ANALYSIS PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY 'Bakersfield, California August 1991 Revised December 1991 Revised April 1992 Submitted to the Hazardous Materials Division of the Bakersfield City Fire Department Prepared by WZI Inc. 4800 Easton Drive, Suite 114 Bakersfield, California 93309 1619.0010.007 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Summary 2.1 2.2 Anhydrous Ammonia Sulfuric Acid 3.0 Hazards Identification 3.1 Anhydrous Ammonia 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 Chemical Identity of Acutely Hazardous Materials Location of Acutely Hazardous Materials Quantity of Acutely Hazardous Materials Nature of Hazard 3.2 Sulfuric Acid 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.4 Chemical Identity of Acutely Hazardous Materials Location of Acutely Hazardous Materials Quantity of Acutely Hazardous Materials Nature of Hazards 4.0 Hazard and Operability Study Results 4.1 Anhydrous Ammonia 4.1.1 4.1.2 4.1.3 4.1.4 4.1.5 Summary Release Scenarios On-Site Consequences Off-Site Consequences Human Error Analysis 4.2 Sulfuric Acid 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.4 4.2,5 Summary Release Scenarios On-Site Consequences Off-Site Consequences Human Error Analysis Page 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 9 9 9 9 14 15 15 18 18 19 19 19 19 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section 5.0 Vulnerability Analysis 5.1 Anhydrous Ammonia 6.0 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 Vulnerable Zone Human Population Critical Facilities 5.2 Sulfuric Acid Risk Analysis 6.1 Anhydrous Ammonia 6.1.1 Release Probability 6.1.2 Severity of Consequences 6.2 Sulfuric Acid 6.2.1 Release Probability 6.2.2 Severity of Consequences References Page 21 21 21 23 24 25 25 25 27 28 28 28 30 Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5 Exhibit 6 Exhibit 7 Exhibit 8 Exhibit 9 Exhibit 10 Exhibit 11 Exhibit 12 Exhibit 13 Exhibit 14 Exhibit 15 Exhibit 16 Exhibit 17 Exhibit 18 EXHIBITS Location Map Hazards Analysis Flow Chart Facility Diagram Bottle Une Processing System Schematic Diagram Can Line Processing System Schematic Diagram Waste Water Treatment System Schematic Diagram Sulfuric Acid Containment Area Compressors Daily Log Waste Water Treatment System Daily Log Map of Surrounding Area Factors Affecting Vulnerable Zone Estimations Neighboring Receptors Worst Case Vulnerable Zone Map Worst Case IDLH Exposure Zone Map Geologic Map Estimate Discharge Rate of Liquid or Gas Evaluation Toxic Vapor Dispersion Hazards. 50 ppm Vulnerable Zone Evaluation Toxic Vapor Dispersion Hazards. 500 ppm IDLH Exposure Zone Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 TABLES Physical Properties of Anhydrous Ammonia Physical Properties of Sulfuric Acid Bakersfield Area Mean Wind Speed and Direction Appendix I Appendix II Appendix III Appendix IV Appendix V Appendix VI APPENDICES Material Safety Data Sheets Anhydrous Ammonia and Sulfuric Acid Hazard and Operability Study Guidelines Anhydrous Ammonia Hazard and Operability Study Forms Anhydrous Ammonia Modeling Results Anhydrous Ammonia Alarms and Control Devices Sulfuric Acid Hazard and Operability Study Forms 1.0 INTRODUCTION This Hazards Analysis of the use of Acutely Hazardous Materials (AHM) has been prepared for the PEPSI-COLA Bottling Company (PEPSI) 215 East 21st Street, Bakersfield, Kern County, California (Exhibit 1). This Analysis has been prepared in accordance with the EPA/FEMA/USDOT document "Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis: Emergency Planning for Extremely Hazardous Substance, 1987." There are three basic components in hazards analysis (Exhibit 2) which provide the outline of this report: 0 0 0 Hazards Identification Vulnerability Analysis Risk Analysis Page I ~ ......... 7'" ~' ~ ~l$ i~9'E : .' ' . , :, a ~ ",' ~~kCliff~ ' , , ................. ~ .... .~ '~;, ~,,,- iZ , ,, ~.', .~ ." ~ --- ~ < ~ ~'c~*L ...... ;~} --i ...... I ..... I ..... ~"'il ": .... :~ ...... ~ '' '1':' ' ~], Illi"-".'"7), ...... ~ "} "1 ~ ~. > . ~. · ~ ' ' . ~ I '-- ~ " Me~c~ Avenue ~ ', I ' - ~ : 7 i ~'~ ' fCC' ' . '~ Ave. ~[ ~ ~ >:% .;;',.=~a.~X%% ........ I~ · "t ....... ! .... 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J ~ ...... l.~ .~ .......... ~. :-"~ · -; ~i., ~ "" ....... ~ N ~ : " ' = ....................... , .......... ~ ..... : .............. ~ ........... i ................. ~ ............................ -----.t-. -4 .. ~ ~ ~ , ~" ~ ! i Ro~ : I ~pus -- ~ . ~o~ ..... ~ ~ David ' ~o~ ~ I CALIFORNIA '. ~l BAKERSFIELD, PEPSI-COLA : BO~LING COMPANY ~ LOCATION MAP DATE 8~1 I1619-~10A IEXHIBIT !ii!i!! CHEMICAL IDENTITY Ii VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS VULNERABLE ZONE HUMAN POPULATIONS CRITICAL FACILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL llitl SEVERITY OF THE Ii!iii REFERENCE: EPNFEMA 1987 DATE WZl INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA PEPSI-COLA Bo~-rLING COMPANY HAZARDS ANALYSIS FLOWCHART 8/91 11619.0010A, [EXHIBIT 2.0 SUMMARY 2.1 Anhydrous Ammonia The term "ammonia" as used throughout this document refers to its merchant name "anhydrous ammonia". Appendix I contains a copy of a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for anhydrous ammonia. The potential for off-site and on-site consequences is presented by the two ammonia refrigeration systems in operation at the PEPSI Bakersfield beverage formulation and bottling facility. Ammonia releases could occur leading to possible exposure of workers and receptors above the Level of Concern (LOC), 50 parts per million (ppm), and the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health Level (IDLH), 500 ppm. The worst case credible scenario, determined through the hazard and operability study, was determined to be the formulation of a dispersion cloud of ammonia released by the rupture of a liquid ammonia line inside the plant. Liquid ammonia released at high rate could form a liquid/air dispersion cloud that could disperse through open doors and could migrate to neighboring residential areas. The immediate area surrounding the PEPSI plant has a school, residential areas and businesses. A community school is immediately across the street from the PEPSI plant. Worst case credible on-site consequences may be experienced with the rupture of a line at one of the surge vessels located inside the building, releasing the liquid contents in a liquid/air dispersion, followed by the subsequent release of liquids and vapors remaining in the system into the building. The extent of the vulnerable zone for a worst case credible release, determined through modeling, is approximately 3.2 miles (5.1 km) at 43 minutes after release, based on releasing the 500 pounds of liquid ammonia from the ammonia surge vessel and related system. The LOC exposure, 50 ppm at 3.2 miles from point of release is expected to last approximately 43 minutes. The IDLH level, 500 ppm, may be reached at up to 1.2 miles (1.9 km) away 16 minutes after release. The IDLH exposure is expected to last approximately 16 minutes at 1.2 miles from the point of release. Page 2 This Hazards Analysis showed both of the PEPSI ammonia refrigeration systems to be highly automated. The design of the Bottle Line Processing System and Can Line Processing System is such that the trained operator needs only to switch on either Processing System and the ammonia compressors for that Process System will automatically begin operation. Only four employees, the Production Manager, Maintenance Supervisor and two mechanics, are authorized to perform maintenance on the ammonia refrigeration systems and ammonia compressors. The mechanics inspect the compressors twice dally and periodically add lubrication oil to the compressor crankcase. Less frequently, make-up ammonia is added to the systems. As part of the Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP), PEPSI will implement a safety audit of the refrigeration systems. The RMPP will focus on minimizing risk and on emergency response. Employee training documentation will be supplemented; as will inventory and procedural record keeping. 2.2 Sulfuric Acid The potential for on-site consequences is presented by a Waste Water Treatment System (WWTS) in operation at the PEPSI Bakersfield beverage formulation and bottling facility. The WWTS utilizes non-fuming sulfuric acid in the water treatment process. Appendix I contains a copy of the MSDS for the sulfuric acid used by PEPSI. Sulfuric acid has a very Iow vapor pressure (<0.001 mm Hg @ 68 °F); therefore, negligible volatility. Essentially no atmospheric dispersion occurs for unheated sulfuric acid. SulfuriC'acid is soluble in water at all proportions. The hazards of sulfuriC acid have been evaluated and it has been determined that the off-site consequences are negligible. Currently only the Quality Control (QC) Supervisor is authorized to perform maintenance on the WWTS. Outside contract personnel are used for repair of the sulfuric acid pumps. The QC Supervisor and laboratory technician are authorized to check and record the daily pH of the treated waste water. Page 3 As part of the RMPP, PEPSI will implement a safety audit of the sulfuric acid system. The RMPP will focus on minimizing risk and on emergency response. Employee training documentation will be supplemented, as will inventory and procedural record keeping. Page 4 3.0 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION 3.1 Anhydrous Ammonia 3.1.1 Chemical Identity of Acutely Hazardous Materials Ammonia is stored and used in reportable quantities at the PEPSI Bakersfield facility. 3.1.2 Location of Acutely Hazardous Materials The ammonia in use at the PEPSI facility is contained in two ammonia refrigeration systems. Exhibit 3 is a facility diagram. Exhibit 4 is a schematic diagram of the Bottle Line Processing System and Exhibit 5 is a schematic diagram of the Can Line Processing System. A minimum quantity of liquid ammonia is retained in the Liquid Ammonia Receivers with the bulk of the liquid ammonia being retained in the Ammonia Surge Vessel of each system. Both of the Processing Systems are located inside the manufacturing building of the facility. A 150 pound ammonia cylinder is chained to a main structural support beam of the building with a safety cap threaded over the outlet valve. This method protects the cylinder and valve from physical damage on a daily basis and from falling debris or equipment during an earthquake. When ammonia is required, the cylinder is unchained, loaded on a dolly and wheeled into the room containing the Ammonia Surge Vessels. The ammonia system is recharged from the cylinders into a line connected to the Ammonia Surge Vessels. Page 5 AMMONIA SUCTION TRAP ~ LOW IPREssURE DRAIN PRE-CHILLER "VILTER" AMMONIA OIL .C_OMP-RES SOR.S S E P A R A T O R S HIGH PRESSURE ~ NO. 1 . V.A.P°R,ixI_~"~"')----i~ · ~2: DRAIN EvApORATIVE l,<)COI~STANT PRESSURE SOLENOID VALVE HIGH PRESSURE NO. 2 NO. 3 LEGEND I:X3 ISOLATION VALVE N CHECK VALVE LOW PRESSURE LIQUID iHIGH PRESSURE /~ VAPOR ~ ,~.~ Z DRAIN HIGH PRESSURE ~ IVAPOR ~ m ~ · ~ DRAIN LOW PRESSURE LIQUID/VAPOR DEAERATOR~ L~Vu~ASAp~Et' IPAssBY' ~ I ' AMMONIA SURGE 'VESSEL AMMONIA INJECTOr __ · LOW PRESSURE LIQUID COMBINATION ISOLATION VALVE & BACK PRESSUREI /REGULATOR . AMMONIA LEVEL AMMONIA INJECTORS AMMONIA ADDED HERE VALVE' HIGH CONDENSER ' KING PRESSURE ~ ~ ~ ~ ~'' I VA.L/I~ VAPOR .-I I ! HIGH PRESSURE ~ ~-I , ' I r" LIQUID ~ , ~ CIRCULATION ! ,~ PUMP LOW PRESSURE LIQUID/VAPOR LOW PRESSURE LIQUIDNAPOR CARBO COOLER AMMONIA INJECTOR LOW PRESSURE LIQUID LOW JRE BY-PASSx I SOLENOID j~VALVE N~ i LIQUID VENT PRV VENTS TO ROOF LIQUID AMMONIA RECEIVER SIGH PRESSURE LIQUID BOI-FLE LINE PROCESSING SYSTEM DATE 8/91 11619.0010A !EXHIBIT 4 AMMONIA SUCTION TRAP ~ LOW "GRASSO' OIL _P_R_ESS_U_ _R E AMMQNIA SEPA-R-ATORS VAPOR COMPRESSORS HIGH .-- PRESSURE ~ ~ 'VAPO~ ~ NO. I , I~I-- EVAPORATIVE HIGH CONDENSER -'"/ HIGh :Z DRAIN PRESSURE PRESSURE ~ = VAPOR ~ ~' '~ '~ '~" ' VAPORI'~"~.~ 0 I '( HIGH PRESSURI. KING HIGH PRESSURE DRAIN ,~,. HO. 2~ N21. r,N I:~ ~ 'd LIQUID , _VALVE I, IauID y~ coo,,_,-.,~~ I ~ \1 v,,, .. RAIN FANS ~ ! WATER (I P VENTSTRov RESERVOIR {-)CIRCULATION ROOF PUMP LOW PRESSURE .~...~ .~..,, _ VAPOR LIQUID AMMONIA I RECEIVER I LOW PRESSURE COMBINATION LOW PRESSURE LIQUID/V,APO, ,ISOLATION VALVE & LIQUID/VAPOR BACK PRESSURE I CARBO COOLER PRE-CHILLER DEAERATOR !/REGULATOR LOW PRESSURE LOW PRESSURE -'" )'LIQUID/VAPOR D BY-~"~.~ ~ioV D LIQUID/VAPOR ~ ROOF %I_ ,, ,, , ,, ,, ,,, _ c , I i AMMONIA SURGE I VESSEL 4~_~' ' ' "~,~;~* "* ~"*'~,~;~i,?_~A~%~!~~' * ~ .-~' *' ' - "~ " ,.. "~'"'~" ~.* -,~i1~ ~"~,'?~, "*~'~'~*,~:~ I ~ow ~ ~ ~ow . LOW PRESSURE ~ ~ LOW PRESSURE LIQUID AMMONIA r~ ~ _ '% ~~-AMMONIA ..... ~! lOlL DROPOUT / / ~uucu ~~ DRUM ~ ~ ~~ '~ ' HERE ~1 WZl tNC. CHECK VALVE CAN LINE PR~ESSING SYSTEM " PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE I I I IIII I 3.1.3 Quantity of Acutely Hazardous Materials The Bottle Line Processing System holds approximately 400 pounds of ammonia and the Can Line Processing System holds approximately 500 pounds of ammonia. The 150 pound anhydrous ammonia cylinder is stored inside the facility and is used to replace ammonia lost as fugitive emissions from the system. 3.1.4 Nature of Hazards Ammonia presents the risk of death or debilitating injury to humans exposed to high concentrations. Major releases from the ammonia system may cause high concentrations of ammonia to reach receptors, either in the plant or in surrounding areas. Because of its physical properties, a release of liquid ammonia is likeiy to cause serious injury to receptors. Liquid ammonia released at a high rate can form dense, slow moving cloud of liquid ammonia dispersed in air. Ammonia vapors, lighter than air, rise quickly in the atmosphere and are less likely to cause serious injury to receptors. Ammonia vapors released into an unventilated area can present high concentrations to receptors entering area. Ammonia, a colorless gas with an extremely pungent odor, can be detected by smell at concentrations at 3.5 to 37 mg/m3 (5 to 53 ppm). Ammonia is corrosive and irritating to the skin. High concentrations can cause dermal burns, inflammation and swelling of the eyes and is potentially blinding to exposed receptors. Levels of 500 mg/m3 (700 ppm) can cause eye irritation. Coughing occurs at a level of 1200 mg/m3 (1700 ppm). Exposure to higher concentrations can result in debilitating injury and death through pulmonary edema. Ammonia is not recognized as a carcinogen nor does it present a threat to the environment. Page 6 TABLE 1 PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF ANHYDROUS AMMONIA (NH3) Molecular Weight 17.03 Lbm/Lbmole Latent Heat 327 Calorie/Gram Boiling Point -27.4 °F (-77.7 °C) Solubility 89.9 G/100 mi AT 0 °C Specific Gravity (Uquid) 0.682 (-33.35 °C/4 °C) Vapor Density 0.59 (AIR=l) @ 25 °C, 760 mm Hg Autoignition Temperature 651 o C (1,204 o F) Explosive Limits 16 to 25 % by Volume in Air Critical Temperature 651 o C Critical Pressure 11.5 ATM IDLH 350 mg/m3 (500 ppm) LOC 35 mg/m3 (50 ppm) STEL 25 mg/m3 (35 ppm) Ratio of Specific Heats 1.31 1 ppm 0.7 mg/m3 @ 25 °C and 760 mm Hg The molecular structure of ammonia is composed of one nitrogen (N) and three hydrogen (H) atoms. The molecular weight of ammonia, 17 Ibm/Ibmole, is significantly less than that of air which is approximately 29 Ibm/Ibmole. As a result, ammonia in the vapor phase is much lighter than air and rapidly rises when released. DB/jb 1619.0010.00,8 If involved in a fire, a 16 percent to 25 percent ammonia mixture with air may explode. Keep containers cool to prevent bursting or release of gas. Table 1 lists the physical properties of ammonia. 3.2 Sulfuric Acid 3.2.1 Chemical Identity of Acutely Hazardous Materials Sulfuric acid is stored and used in reportable quantities at the PEPSI Bakersfield facility. 3.2.2 Location of Acutely Hazardous Materials The sulfuric acid used at the PEPSI facility is contained in a 700 gallon, extra heaW wall, high density crosslink polyethylene plastic storage tank. The facility diagram, Exhibit 3, shows the location of the sulfuric acid storage tank. Exhibit 6 is a schematic diagram of the VVWTS which uses the sulfuric acid. Both the sulfuric acid storage tank and WWTS are located outdoors and away from the manufacturing building. The sulfuric acid storage tank and feed pump are located in a containment area (Exhibit 7) constructed of reinforced concrete capable of holding the entire liquid capacity of the tank plus 15 percent safety factor. 3.2.3 Quantity of Acutely Hazardous Materials The sulfuric acid storage tank has a capacity of 700 gallons. The tank is norrnally filled with a maximum of onlY 650 gallons of sulfuric acid to prevent spillage. The storage tank is refilled by a delivery truck when the volume reaches 400 to 450 gallons. Page ? X x E x N X X INJECTION I PUMP X I X INJECTION PUMP x H CONTROL X X x U PANEL O SAFETY SHOWER ~X ~X~X~X~X~X- I X ~X ~X~X~X~X X- INDUSTRIAL RAW WATER FROM PLANT ~ UNDERGROUND CHARGE PUMP BOX ~ SULFURIC ACID AND ~ ~SODIUM HYDROXIDE O~ ~ INJECTION POINTS NEUTRALIZATION TANK UNDERGROUND FLOW SETTLING BOX SULFURIC ACID STORAGE TANK UNDERGROUND FLOW MEASURING/SAMPLE BOX TREATED WATER DISCHARGE TO SEWER SODIUM HYDROXIDE STORAGE TANK CONTAINMENT WALL WZl INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY WASTE WATER TR EATM ENT SYSTEM SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM DATE 8/91 I 1619.0010A I EXHIBIT 6 T LI. SULFURIC ACID STORAGE TANK 61" O.D. 6" WALL THICKNESS TYPICAL VENDING BUILDING NOTES: 1. CONTAINMENT WALL HEIGHT IS 1'-8". 2. CONTAINMENT AREA CAPACITY IS 110 CUBIC FEET OR 822 GALLONS. 3. SCALE IS 1/4"=1' WZl INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY DATE SULFURIC ACID CONTAINMENT AREA 7 3.2.4 Nature of Hazards Sulfuric acid is a strong acid, it is colorless to dark brown, oily liquid, dense, highly reactive and miscible with water in all proportions. Much heat is evolved when concentrated sulfuric acid is mixed with water and, as a safety precaution to prevent spluttering, the acid is poured into the water rather than vice versa. Sulfuric acid is very corrosive and will also char wood and most other organic matter upon contact. Concentrations of sulfuric acid below 80 percent corrode most metals and emits hydrogen gas which is highly explosive. For this reason smoking is not permitted within a 50 foot radius of the sulfuric acid storage tank. Sulfuric acid, though not flammable, can cause ignition due oxidation when in contact with finely divided combustible materials. Sulfuric acid is corrosive to all body tissues. If skin or eyes comes into contact with sulfuric acid, severe burns or blindness may result. Sensitivity to sulfuric acid or mists or vapors varies with individuals. Normally 0.125 to 0.50 ppm may be mildly annoying and 1.5 to 2.5 ppm can be definitely unpleasant. 10 to 20 ppm is unbearable. Sulfuric acid can also affect the body if it is swallowed, but ingestion of the liquid is unlikely in ordinary industrial use. Sulfuric acid is not recognized as a carcinogen. Table 2 lists the physical properties of sulfuric acid. Page 8 TABLE 2 PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF' SULFURIC ACID (H2SO,) Molecular Weight Melting Point Boiling Point Solubility Specific Gravity (Liquid) Vapor Density Autoignition Temperature Explosive Limits IDLH LOC STEL 1 ppm 98.07 Lbm/Lbmole 50 °F (10 °C) 535 °F (280 °C) Miscible G/100 mi @ 68 °F 1.84 @ 68 °F 3.4 (AIR= 1) @ 25 °C and 760 mm Hg N/A N/A 80 mg/m3 (20 ppm) 8 mg/m3 (2 ppm) Unknown 4.08 mg/m~ @ 25 °C and 760 mm Hg Sulfuric acid is a colorless to dark brown, oily liquid, dense, highly reactive and miscible with water in all proportions. Much heat is evolved when concentrated sulfuric acid is mixed with water and, as a safety precaution to prevent spluttering, the acid is poured into the water rather than vice versa. DB/jb 1619,0010,008 4.0 HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY RESULTS 4.1 Anhydrous Ammonia Appendix II is a copy of the guidelines for the ammonia Hazard and Operability Study. Forms used during the ammonia Hazard and Operability Study are included as Appendix II1. Appendix IV contains ammonia modeling results, and Appendix V lists alarms and control devices in the ammonia system. 4.1.1 Summary Each study node was reviewed for possible deviations from normal operation, and potential consequences resulting from the deviations were recorded. The severity and probability of consequences were rated. It was determined that the greatest risk is presented by release of liquid ammonia, which can form a dense ammonia/air dispersion. A dense dispersion can hug the ground, potentially inflicting injury upon receptors. In summary, the most likely worst case release at the PEPSI Bakersfield plant is a release of the contents of an ammonia surge vessel located inside the building through a line broken during a severe earthquake. Appendix IV contains results of modeling the worst case credible release. 4.1.2 Release Scenarios AcCidents'such as firesor hazardous material releases are often not caused by a single factor but are the result of a chain' of circumstances. A scenario is an abbreviated description of a specific chain of events that causes a particular outcome such as an AHM release related death, injury, property loss, or other incident. Page 9 Release scenario characteristics include: 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 Condition: Temperature, pressure of the material released Equipment at which the release originates Time of Incident: Day, night morning, afternoon Cause of release: Over pressurization, ruptured lines, operator error Direct cause of Icss: Exposure to high levels of ammonia Type of loss: Death, Injury and/or property loss Receptors: Employees, sensitive receptors Magnitude of loss: Number of people affected, property lost Release scenarios at the PEPSI Bakersfield plant are based upon the most likely hazards that were developed through the Hazard and Operability Study. Probabilities of accidents can be determined through a study of reliability data. Two main types of reliability data are required. O O Equipment and instrument failure rate and repair rate data Human error probabilities and recovery probabilities The PEPSI ammonia refrigeration systems at the Bakersfield facility, are supervised and operated by highly trained and experienced personnel. The PEPSI personnel are supported by an ammonia refrigeration expert who is readily available on an as needed basis. The ammonia refrigeration systems are well maintained and an ammonia safety audit is conducted and documented yearly by the PEPSI mechanics. Every two years the ammonia refrigeration expert is included as part of the audit group. These regular ammonia safety audits in conjunction with the daily maintenance and inspection programs conducted by PEPSI's highly trained and experienced mechanics minimize the risk of equipment failure~and repairs and provide the basis of reliable data. The PEPSI risk analysis conducted on the ammonia refrigeration systems has rated the probability of equipment failure as generally Iow, based on the minimum repairs of the compressor systems as documented by the major inspection and servicing program. Page 10 The PEPSI ammonia refrigeration systems are highly automated. The design of the Bottle Line Processing System and Can Line Processing System is such that the trained operator needs only to switch on either Processing System and the ammonia compressors for that Process System will automatically begin operation. The highly trained, experienced mechanics inspect the ammonia compressor twice daily. The combination of highly automated systems and highly trained, experienced mechanics reduces the probability of human errors. The following causes of accidents that can occur in processing plants were reviewed in preparation for the Hazard and Operability study: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Improper maintenance methods Modifications to equipment Human error Improper labeling Improper operating methods Wrong materials used In construction Faulty equipment Fire Earthquake Deviations that result in situations that could severely affect on-site or off-site receptors were denoted by a high-medium designation on the HAZOP form. Potentially severe consequences determined through the Hazard and Operability Study included those due to the following deviations. Major leak in system 1. Pooled liquid ammonia outdoors (presents a high concentration of ammonia in a localized area) 2. Dispersed liquid ammonia outdoors (greatest potential to affect large numbers of off-site receptors) 3. Pooled liquid ammonia Indoors (presents a high risk to employees in unventilated buildings) Page 11 Dispersed liquid ammonia indoors (presents a severe risk to employees in the building, ventilated or unventilated) Release of vapor ammonia outdoors (presents a localized risk due to high concentrations in the immediate area: ammonia will likely rise before it reaches great distances; dispersion is affected by temperature and wind speed) Release of vapor ammonia Indoors (presents a high risk to employees in an unventilated building, lesser risk in a ventilated building; risk is dependent upon amount, rate of release) 0 Earthquake (pipes may be ruptured in a severe earthquake, quickly releasing large quantities of ammonia within or outside the building) High pressure shutdown control failure (high pressure may lead to an ammonia release through pressure relief valves) Pressure relief valve (prv) failure (high pressure may lead to a rupture in a line or vessel) Discharge valve to compressor closed (high pressure will actuate high ammonia pressure shutdown control) Discharge valve to receiver or surge vessel closed (high pressure may lead to prv release) Fire (high temperatures may result in high system pressures, causing ammonia release) Release during ammonia loading (human error, equipment failure) Deviations that result in scenarios that are likely to occur were listed with a medium to a high probability. Situations of concern that were determined to be likely to occur were results of the following deviations. Page12 0 0 0 Valve closed Incompletely (human error) Minor leak in system (fittings, corrosion) Earthquake One deviation from normal operation was found to have a Iow to medium probability combined with a medium to high severity; an earthquake. The possibility of a release due to ground shaking during an earthquake is mitigated by the design and anchoring of the system. The greatest potential for major release from the PEPSI Bakersfield bottling facility was found to circumstances over which the operators have no control, such as earthquake or fire conditions. Human errors were determined to be likely to result in lesser, non- reportable releases. The likelihood of a fire in the PEPSI facility has been rated Iow for the following reasons: 1. The manufacturing building has been defined as a no smoking area. 2. Smoking is allowed only in approved areas. 3. On-site fire extinguishers are located at strategic points in the facility. o Personnel training in the proper handling and operation of equipment will reduce the possibility of a condition which might create a fire condition. Routine inspection and maintenance of equipment will reduce the possibility of a condition which might create a fire condition. 6. Flammable or combustible materials are stored in only approved areas. Page 13 Trash or waste materials which might contribute as an ignition source are not allowed to "stack up" and are removed from the facility. The administrative offices are equipped with heat sensing devices and alarm pull stations which are monitored by ADT Security Systems. ADT would notify the City of Bakersfield Fire Department if a device was actuated. The metal manufacturing and warehouse building is constructed with three (3) two hour firewalls with fusible link firedoors. The fusible link firedoors would automatically close if a fire should occur which would retard the spreading of a fire. The firewalls are shown on Exhibit 3. 10. The shop, fleet, supply and loading canopy areas are equipped with water sprinklers which are actuated by heat fuses. The sprinklered areas are shown on Exhibit 3. 11. Personnel training in fire prevention methods minimize the possibility of a fire. 4.1.3 On-Site Consequences The compressors, the most probable origin of ammonia release are located inside of the manufacturing building. A release of ammonia vapor from the compressors is likely to occur at a slow rate. The compressors are checked by maintenance personnel three or four times per shift. If a leak is detected the problem is resolved. An indoor release could affect PEPSI's 30 permanent employees and an undetermined number of temporary workers (the number varies from day to day). Any indoor release is dangerous, large or small, because of the potential for a high concentration to build in areas that are not well ventilated. Evacuation and emergency response training help Page 14 to mitigate the potential for on-site consequences. All five ammonia compressors are located in the southeast corner of the processing building. The building has two large expanded metal doors adjacent to the compressors which allow continuous ventilation inside the building. The ammonia surge vessels are located in the Carbo Cooler room which is located in the northeast corner of the processing building. The vessel pressure relief valves are vented to above the roof of the building. 4.1.4 Off-Site Conseauences The ammonia surge vessels and related systems, located inside the building, contain the largest amount of liquid ammonia located where a dispersion cloud could be released towards' off-site receptors. The most likely potential release to the outdoors was determined to be through a break in a liquid ammonia line going to or coming from the surge vessel in one of the systems which would disperse outdoors through any open doors. A cloud of dispersed ammonia from a rapid, large release presents the greatest danger to off-site receptors. 4.1.5 Human Error Analysis The purpose of a human error analysis is to identify potential human errors and their effects. Causes of human errors that have occurred in the past may also be identified. Human Error: Normal Operation During normal operation the highly automated ammonia system requires little operator action. The maintenance mechanic will, in the future, record information regarding system variables onto a daily log (Exhibit 8). Oil is regularly drained manually from the oil receivers. Potential areas for mechanic error during normal operation include: Page 15 PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA OPERATORS LOG VILTER COMPRESSOR NO. 1 Suction Discharge Oil Oil Time Date Press. psi~l Press. psig Press. Added Comments EXHIBIT 8 1619.0010A Areas for Mechanic Error Improper logging Valve not shut off after oil drain Open wrong compressor valve Forget to add oil Neglect high pressures Consequences Poor records Potential for small ammonia release Damage to compressor Damage to compressor Relief valve release Severity/Likelihood Low/Low Low/Low Low/Low Low/Low Med/Low Proposed Miti,qation Employee training Employee training Employee training Auto controls, employee training AUto controls, relief valves, employee training Human Error: Ammonia Addition When necessary, ammonia is added at the ammonia surge vessel. The maintenance supervisor supervises ammonia addition. An ammonia cylinder is wheeled to the carbo cooler room. A hose is attached from the cylinder to a valve on the high pressure inlet line. The sight glass on the ammonia surge vessel is watched while the ammonia is added. After a sufficient amount of ammonia is added, the hose is disconnected and the cylinder removed. The following errors are possible during ammonia addition: Areas for Proposed Mechanic Error Consequences Severity/Likelihood Mitigation Too much ammonia Low/Low in system; Carry over to surge traps Ammonia leak Meal/Low Sight glass not read properly Valve not shut off properly Employee training Employee training Worn hose not Ammonia leak Med/Low Replace hose noticed possible when worn Hose not Ammonia release Med/Low Inspect hose disconnected possible Page 16 Human Error: Emergency Situations Emergency situations include fires, equipment difficulties, ammonia leaks and earthquakes. Areas for Proposed Mechanic Error Consequences Severity/Likelihood Miti.qation Improper use of Employee injury Med/Low Employee training breathing equipment Irnproper fire fighting procedures Employee injury, ammonia release Earthquake response: Increased risk of Improper evacuation employee injury procedures Earthquake response: Improper shutdown procedures Possible increased ammonia release Med/Low Employee training Med/Low Employee training Med (relative to Employee training severity of earthquake)/ Low Human Error: Maintenance Procedures Areas for Mechanic Error Compressor not pumped down for maintenance Consequences Small/medium ammonia release; possible employee injury Severity/Likelihood Med/Low Proposed Mitigation Employee training/ supervision In summary, AHM releases due to human error were found likely to be smaller in magnitude than potential releases from such events such as an earthqUake or fire. The automation of the ammonia system reduces the risk of human error. Increased training of workers will further reduce the risk of human errors in normal, maintenance and emergency operations at the PEPSI Bakersfield plant. Page 17 4.2 Sulfuric Acid Appendix II is a copy of the guidelines for the sulfuric acid Hazard and Operability Study. Forms used during the sulfuric acid Hazard and Operability Study are included as Appendix VI. 4.2.1 Summary Each study node was reviewed for possible deviations from normal operation, and potential consequences resulting from the deviations were recorded. The severity and probability of consequences were rated. It was determined that the greatest risk is presented during the transfer of sulfuric acid from a truck to the storage tank. The likelihood of a sulfuric acid release from a bulk tanker truck during the filling of the sulfuric acid storage tank, has been rated as a Iow probability. The worst case scenario would be a hose coming loose from the pump transferring sulfuric acid from the bulk tanker truck to the storage tank. The bulk tanker truck has a Iow pressure shutdown switch installed on the transfer pump discharge. If a drop in pump pressure occurred the pump would immediately stop. Only one or two gallons of sulfuric acid would be spilled. The bulk tanker truck carries soda ash, which would be immediately applied to the sulfuric acid. The soda ash would neutralize the sulfuric acid and then be diluted with plenty of water. During transfer of the sulfuric acid, the bulk tanker truck parks adjacent to the sulfuric acid storage tank which is approximately 105 feet from Grove street. The sulfuric acid would be spilled on PEPSI's property and would be neutralized and diluted before any sulfuric acid would travel off-site into public areas or enter sewer or storm drains. There would be no damage to public or private property due to a sulfuric acid spill on PEPSI's property. Page 18 4.2.2 Release Scenarios A release scenario at the PEPSI Bakersfield plant was based upon the most likely hazards that were developed through the Hazard and Operability Study. Human error was determined to be the major possibility for an accident or spill of sulfuric acid. 4.2.3 On-Site Consequences The WWTS and sulfuric acid storage tank are located outdoors and away from the manufacturing building. Sulfuric acid has a very Iow vapor pressure (<0.001 mm Hg @ 68 °F); therefore, negligible volatility. Essentially no atmospheric dispersion occurs for unheated sulfuric acid. Sulfuric acid is soluble in water at all proportions. If sulfuric acid is spilled it is neutralized with soda ash and diluted with plenty of water. The on-site consequences would be minimal. 4.2.4 Off-Site Consequences Sulfuric acid has a very Iow vapor pressure (<0.001 mm Hg @ 68 °F); therefore, negligible volatility. Essentially no atmospheric dispersion occurs for unheated sulfuric acid. Sulfuric acid is soluble in water at all proportions. The off-site consequences would be negligible. 4.2.5 Human Error Analysis The purpose of a human error analysis is to identify potential human errors and their effects. Causes of human errors that have occurred in the past may also be identified. Human Error: Normal Operation During normal operation the highly automated WWTS requires little action. The supervisor checks the WWTS once each day and records information on a daily log, Exhibit 9. Page 19 PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA WASTE WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM DALLY LOG pH RANGE 6.0 - 10.0 H2SO4 & Caustic pH Received Time Date Pdman/ Secondar7 H2S04 Caustic Comments EXHIBIT' 9 1619.0010A Human Error: Sulfuric Acid Transfer When necessary, sulfuric acid is added to the storage tank. Prior to commencing the transfer of sulfuric acid the containment basin is inspected to be assured the containment basin drain connection is plugged. The supervisor supervises the transfer of sulfuric acid from the truck to .the storage tank. Required personal safety clothing is worn (gloves, goggles, face shield and apron) whenever handling sulfuric acid and a safety shower/eye wash station is located next to the storage tank. To prevent spillage of sulfuric acid during the transfer, the hose from the truck contains a downspout which is inserted into the storage tank and an isolation valve located just above the downspout. The following errors are possible during sulfuric acid transfer. Areas for Proposed Supervisor Error Consequences Severity/Likelihood Mitigation Chemical reaction Low/Low Deliver wrong product Slight glass Overfill tank Low/Low not read properly Valve not shut Acid release Low/Low off properly Hose failure Acid release Low/Low Employee training Employee training Employee training Inspect hose In summary, a sulfuric acid release due to human error was found to be minimal. The design of the WWTS and the supervised transfer of sulfuric acid into the storage tank reduces the risk of release. Qualified, well trained supervisors reduce the risk of human errors in normal, maintenance and emergency operations at the PEPSI Bakersfield plant. Page 20 5.0 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 5.1 Anhydrous Ammonia 5.1.1 Vulnerable Zone Exhibit 10 is a map of tile area surrounding the PEPSI plant. The worst case vulnerable zone radius is the maximum distance from the release to the point at which the airborne chemical concentration equals or exceeds the LOC. Factors affecting vulnerable zone estimations are summarized in Exhibit 11. Neighboring receptors within 1.2 miles of the release point are shown in Exhibit 12. Exhibit 13 shows the Worst Case Vulnerable Zone, 50 ppm at 3.2 miles from the release point. Exhibit 14 shows the Worst Case IDLH Exposure Zone, 500 ppm at 1.2 miles from the release point. EPA/FEMA/DOT guidelines (1987) indicate that decisions about evacuation are incident specific and are to be made at the time of actual release. An estimated vulnerable zone should not automatically be used as the basis for evacuation during emergency response. In this study, the vulnerable zone radius is estimated using assumptions for a credible worst case scenario. A. Quantity and Rate of Release to Air The vulnerable zone is proportional to the quantity and rate of release. In this study of credible worst case scenarios, a break in a liquid ammonia line located inside the building was determined to present the greatest risk to off-site receptors. In the worst credible release 500 pounds of ammonia would be released from the can line ammonia surge vessel and related system located inside the building. Computer modeling determined that release could' occur in as little as 23 seconds. Page 21 A//ey Business PEPSI PEPSI Office Warehouse A//ey KISCO Residential East 21st Street PEPSI Manufacturing Facility A//ey PEPSI IPEFSI War Grove Street Community School Residential A//ey Berchtold Equipment Company East 19th Street DATE WZI INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY SURROUNDING AREA e/91 J~e'm.omo^ J EXH,B,T 10' EXHIBIT 11 FACTORS AFFECTING VULNERABLE ZONE ESTIMATIONS o Quantity of Release o Physical State (solid, liquid, gas) of Material o Temperature of Stored Material o Pressure of Stored Material O Physical Characteristics of Material (Molecular Weight, Vapor Pressure, etc.) o Surface Area of Spill, if Liquid o Type of Release (Leak, Explosion, etc.) o Rate of Release o Meteorological Conditions ONind Speed, Cloud Cover, Temperature) o Surrounding Topography o Level of Concern of Material DB/jb 1619.0010.006 ~:*;,:R IWEST [COLUMBUS ~~~ ~ ~~S~ ==~ IL, .~ I,',,~ ;=, ~ ~ .... ;,-~ ~ ,.-'"~ I~,~.~~ ,,, [~,. ~1-~,.,,,..~..,.., ..-,..~ .~ ...... ~'~ ..... ~ ........ :' .J~ .o [ ? ~lJ~ I E J .----~--[LANE r, ~,e.l¢~ ~[ : ~' EAST BRUNDAGE ~Brad~dSt,~k ~. .M~,~ ~,'Mait~andD,.~ J ~ ~ .~'-- OL ~J ~Z/-< r~c~ ~. ,, = c Gateway Dr ,ell, l.,r,c~- A ~ .= -m'~L~W~.~ ~ ~ ~J& ~'~:::::"~ecHa*e,race~tl~ ~, ~ .~J ~; ~11,~1~1 >.East~elle---Terr.~ ~j WZl INC,. PEPSI-COLA BO~LING COMPANY ~EIGHBo~ING ~Gfi~IO~S o,.,, , . ~' DATE J J EXH,BIT o-.,, '~Ai. ~g,. 8/91 1619.~10A 12 OILDALE KERN SITE LOCATION 3.25 MILE S REVISED 11/91 TO CORRECT RADIUS :.; I I BAKF:RSFIELD, CALIFORNIA P£PSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY DATE WORST cAsE VULNERABLE ZONE MAP ~,~ I ~.oo~o~ I~×H'~'~ 13 DATE WZl INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY WORST CASE EXPOSURE ZONE MAP EXHIBIT 8/91 1619.0010A 1 4 The second ammonia refrigeration system handles the Bottle Line Processing System. It holds approximately 400 Pounds of ammonia. For emergency planning purposes, it is expected a break of a one inch high pressure inlet line to the Bottle Une ammonia surge vessel, would provide the worst credible release for this system. B. Meteorological Conditions Wind speed and atmospheric stability have a significant effect on the size of estimated vulnerable zones. Increased wind speed and the accompanying atmospheric stability will result in greater airborne dispersion and a decrease in the size of the estimated vulnerable zone. Low wind speeds are used in worst case scenarios. C. Surrounding Topography The PEPSI plant is surrounded by residential homes and apartments, a school and industrial offices and warehouses. D. Levels of Concern The Levels of Concern (LOC) for ammonia is 50 ppm (0.035 g/m3). 5.1.2 Human Populations The neighboring receptors surrounding the PEPSI Bakersfield faCilib/are shown in Exhibit 12. Immediately east of the facility is a school and residential homes, with businesses and apartments located to the southeast. Sensitive receptors located near the facility include: Page 22 Alley II Business PEPSI Office PEPSI Warehouse Alley KISCO Residential East 21s! street PEPSI Manufacturing Facility Community School Residential Alley ~ Alley I PEPSII PEPSI Berchtold Equipment Company Grove Street ,,~,,,. East 19th Street WZI IN.C. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA PEPSI-COLA ' "· BOTTLING COMPANY SURROUNDING AREA '3 Receptor Approximate Distance (miles) Direction 'Community School Fire Station #2 · 'Special Services School Library · -Our Lady of Guadalupe School Fire Station #4 Longfellow School Jefferson School Bakersfield Memorial Hospital Qwens School Kernview Hospital Rafer Johnson School CBC Cancer Center ~ I'~IcKinley School San Joaquin Community Hospital ~Williams School 0.02 E 0.5 E 0.6 SE 0.7 SW 0.7 S 0.9 N 0.9 NW 1.0 NE 1.0 NW 1.0 SE 1.1 NW 1.1 SW 1.2 NW 1.2 SW 1.2 NW 1.2 E Prevailing wind direction is from the northwest. A worst case release (Exhibits 12 and 13) of dispersed ammonia could reach and affect receptors at these locations. 5.1.3 Critical Facilities Critical facilities near PEPSI's Bakersfield plant are: Memorial Hospital 420 34th Street Bakersfield, California Telephone: (805) 327-1792 Bakersfield City Fire Department, Station #2 716 East 21st Bakersfield, California Telephone: 911 Page 23 5.2 Sulfuric Acid Sulfuric acid has a very Iow vapor pressure (<0.001 mm Hg @ 68 °F); therefore, negligible volatility. Essentially no atmospheric dispersion occurs for unheated sulfuric acid. An off-site consequences analysis was deemed not required as hazards to neighboring receptors would be negligible. Page 24 6.0 RISK ANALYSIS 6.1 Anhydrous Ammonia 6.1.1 Release Probability The ammonia refrigeration systems at the PEPSI plant has been in operation for approximately 17 years. The Hazard and Operability Study determined that the probability of minor releases of ammonia through fugitive emission points or through compressor shaft seals during system shutdown was fairly high. The risk of a major release due to human error or system malfunction is much lower, but can be further reduced through procedural changes and an improved training and record keeping program. A release resulting from a major earthquake is interpreted to be tow to moderate probability. The worst case scenario at the PEPSI facility is described as "an on-site release, inside the building, at ground level at a ruptured line going to or coming from the surge vessel in one of the ammonia refrigeration systems. The rupture is caused by ground shaking due to a major earthquake on a nearby active fault". The realistic worst case scenario of one ammonia refrigeration system rupturing is credible because: A major earthquake would not be expected to rupture both ammonia refrigeration systems because the property is not located on a fault and the nearest significant active fault is about 37 miles south o~ the PEPSI facility. The part of the PEPSI facility which houses the ammonia systems was built according to Uniform Building Code in 1974. As a result, facility damage due to ground shaking is anticipated to be minimal. Page 25 A geologic map of the Bakersfield area which indicates there is no faulting on the property is included as Exhibit 15. The property is located on Pleistocene alluvial deposits comprised of sand, silts, and clays. The Kern County Seismic Hazard Atlas which is utilized in emergency preparedness planning does not identify any faults underlying the PEPS1 facility. The PEPSi facility is not located within an Alquist-Prioio Special Studies Zone. The Safety and Seismic Element of the Kern County General Plan (Saint-Armand, Engel, Park, and Williams, 1974) reported the entire central Kern County area is subject to moderate to severe ground shaking. All earthquakes have components of both vertical and horizontal ground acceleration (ground shaking). The ground shaking effect as distance increases from faults is attenuated. The most severe ground shaking would be caused by an earthquake on the White Wolf Fault, which is identified on Exhibit 15. This was determined by reviewing the history of earthquakes in California from records catalogued by the California Division of Mines and Geology (Real, Toppozada and Parke, 1978) since 1900, and more recent updates. From these records and mathematically computing the peak horizontal ground accelerations (Campbell, 1981) at the PEPSI site from various active faults in Southern California, it was determined that ground shaking at the PEPSI site from the largest maximum credible earthquake on the White Wolf Fault, estimated to be 7.8 on the Richter Scale, would be more severe than the largest maximum credible earthquake on any other active fault in California. Peak horizontal ground accelerations from that hypothetical event would be 0.35 g. The largest probable event has horizontal ground accelerations of 0.225 g. The recommended design parameters of the Uniform Building Code take into account ground shaking from the active faults in California to minimize the occurrence of building failure during an earthquake. Buildings built '"[o code" would presumably withstand most of the ground shaking that could occur. Page 26 WZI INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA PEPSI~O~ BO~LING COMPANY st~t~ ~.. GEOL~IC MAP EXPLANATION Glacial dep~ te~ de~tm Pl0ist~ao m~ne m~ne te~ dep~ ~ne n~m~ne Un~d~ ~ne nonm~ne ~p~r ~{~no no~o Up~r PB~e m~no Mid~ and/or lo~ PUerto MiSdle and/or low~ Pli~no m~na Uadt~d~ Mi~ue nonm~e Op~ Mi~e noum~no Up~ Mi~e m~ne Middle Mi~e O!tg~ne nonm~ne OU~ne m~ne Pla~oeene volcanie: Our, ~rhyolit~: O~vU-und~ite; O~vu--baSalt; Op,m ~pyroclp~tt~ rocks -~ Quaternary and/or Pliocene Plioc~na voltaic: o,' -rhyolRo; ~0 -py~odm~tie rock~ Mlo~enavoleanim Mv'~l'hyoUt~) Myu -andante; Mvb--basalt; Otvv --py~oclaStic rOCks *r.,, --pyToela~fe rocks Junm~ic marine 'l'ria~ie marine Pi'&Cmtseeoua metamorphic ~ fac -k~ (la. l~e~tone or dolomite) ~w~':-,~ ~ P~C~trec. ..... t~imenta. ~ (l*. lime.ne or dolomite ~ Mesozoic haksic intrusive rocks Mesozoic ultrabaMc Jura-Trt~ met~volcardc roc~ metamorphic rocks Paleozoic metavolcanic rocka Permian met~volcanie rocku Undivided CarbonR~oua mariue Peur~yl val~iall marine Mim~mippian marine C,arboniferous metavoleanie ~ Devonian marine Devonian metavoicaulc roclm Silurian mm'{ue Pre-Silurian recta- sedimentary Ordo~ Devonian and pre*Devonian? metavolcaaic rocks ~ Prt~ilurian ~ Pn~.Silurian Cambrian marine Precambrian i~ne~ue i Undi~ided Pr,acambrtau metamorphic rocks Later Preeambrlan sedimentary and metamorphic rocks Earlier Pro~ambrtala metamorphic rocks Undivided Preeambrtan ~ranitie rocks B,A, ,KERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY GEOLOGIC MAP LEGEND EXHiarr .... , OATE 11/911 I The ammonia piping of both refrigeration systems has been installed to allow for movement should an earthquake occur. The pipes lay on top of channel iron supports or lay in pipe raceways which allow free movement. The piping system is constructed of schedule 80 material and extra heavy fittings which provide additional strength. 6.1.2 Severity of Consequences The severity of consequences from an ammonia release is "high" because: The quantity of ammonia in the ammonia system is sufficient to cause injury to neighboring receptors in a worst case release. It meets the criteria provided by the EPNFEMA (1987) of "high" severity consequences to people. Those criteria are: Low: Chemical is expected to move into the surrounding environment in negligible concentrations. Injuries expected only for exposure over extended periods or when individual personal health conditions create complications. II. Medium: Chemical is expected to move into the surrounding environment in concentrations sufficient to cause serious injured and/or deaths unless prompt and effective corrective action is taken. Death and/or injuries are expected only for exposure over extended periods or when individual personal health conditions create complications. Ill. High: Chemical is expected to move into the surrounding environment in concentrations sufficient to cause serious injuries and/or deaths upon exposure. Large numbers of people would be expected to be affected. Page 27 6.2 Sulfuric Acid 6.2.1 Release Probability The WWTS at the PEPSI plant was placed in operation in April 1990. The Hazard and Operability Study determined that the probability of a major or minor release of sulfuric acid was minimal. 6.2.2 Severity of Consequences The severity of consequences from a sulfuric acid release is "low" because: The release of any sulfuric acid would be in very small amounts and' would be retained by the containment area. The poured concrete retaining walls should last in excess of 30 days when continuously exposed to 93 percent sulfuric acid. PEPSI plans to coat the containment basin with an acid resistant material. The RMPP, section 11.2, defines the implementation schedule for performing the coating work. The RMPP was submitted as a separate document. If a problem occurred at the PEPSI VVVVTS and sulfuric acid was exposed to the concrete retaining walls, the maximum exposure time would be three to four days. Sulfuric acid has a very Iow vapor pressure (<0.001 mm Hg @ 68 °F); therefore, negligible volatility. Essentially no atmospheric dispersion 'occurs for unheated sulfuric acid. Any spilled sulfuric acid would be neutralized with soda ash and diluted with plenty of water. It meets the criteria provided by the EPA/FEMA (1987) of "low" severity consequences to people. Those criteria are: Page 28 Low: Chemical is expected to move into the surrounding environment in negligible concentrations. Injuries expected only for exposure over extended periods or when individual personal health conditions create complications. II. Medium: Chemical is expected to move into the surrounding environment in concentrations sufficient to cause serious injured and/or deaths unless prompt and effective corrective action is taken. Death and/or injuries are expected only for exposure over extended periods or when individual personal health conditions create complications. III. High: Chemical is expected to move into the surrounding environment in concentrations sufficient to cause serious injuries and/or deaths upon exposure. Large numbers of people would be expected to be affected. Page 29 REFERENCES Saint-Armand, P., Engel, R., Park, W. H., and Williams, B. F., 1974, Geology and Earthquake Hazards Planning Guide to the Seismic Safety Elements to Kern County Council of Governments. Real, C. R., Toppozada, T. R., and Parke, D. L., 1978, Earthquake Catalog of California, January 1, 1900-December 31, 1974, First Edition, California Division of Mines and Geology Special Publication 52, 15 pp. Campbell, K. W., 1981, Near-Source Attenuation of Peak Horizontal Acceleration, Bulletin of the Seismological Society of American, Vol. 71, No. 6, pp 2039- 2072. Page 30 APPENDIX I MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS ACUTELY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ANHYDROUS AMMONIA SULFURIC ACID :, Oener. ul _ -- ,- Chem ¢ul RODUCT SAFETY DATA SHEET SULFURIC ACID TRADE NAME (COMMON NAME) SULFURIC ACID CHEMICAL NAME AND/OR SYNONYM SULFURIC ACID Synonym: battery acid FORMULA H2 SO 4 (Various Concentrations) in water lEI c.~.s, so. [] GENERAL PRODUCT CODE 7664-93-9 MOLECULAR WEIGHT 98.08 ADDRESS (No., STREET, CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE) GENERAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION 90 East Halsey Road Parsippany, N,J. 07054 CONTACT Manager of Product Safety PHONE NUMBER (201) 515-1840 ,I LA3T ISSUE DATE I "July, 1989 CURRENT ISSUE DATE May, 1990 EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBER (800) 63!-8050 SKIN OR EYES: Immediately flush with plenty of water continuing for at least 15 minutes. Remove contaminated clothing while washing, Continue flushing wit.h water if medical attention is not immediately available. INGESTION: Do not induce vomiting. If conscious, give several glasses of milk (p;ef;rred) or water. INHALATION: Remove to fresh air. Observe for possible delayed reaction. If breathing has stopped, give ar{~ficial respiration. If breathing with difficulty, give oxygen, provided a qualified operator is available. GET IMMEDIATE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE for ingestion, inhalation, eye contact, irritation, or burns. HEALTH INHALATION Inhalation of fumes or acid mist can cause irritation or corrosive burns to the upper respiratory system, including nose, mouth, and throat. Lung irritation and pulmonary edema can also occur. LC 5o (mist, animals): 20-60 mg/cu.m. - Ref. (a). INGESTICN Can cause irritation and corrosive burns to mouth, throat, and stomach. Can be fatal ii'swallowed. Applicable to dilute solutions: LD 5o (rat): 2140 mg/kg -- Reference (b). ;KIN Can cause severe burns. EYES · Liquid contact can cause irritation, corneal burns, and conjunctivitis. Blindness may result, or severe or pormanent injury. Mist contact may irritate or burn. Reference (b). PERMISSIRLE CONCENTRATION: AIR BtOLOGICAL (SEE SECTION J) 1 mg/m3 (as H 2SO 4) (OSHA) TLV: same (ACGIH) IDLH 80 mg/m 3 None. UNUSUAL CHRONIC TOXICITY (1) Erosion of teeth, (2) lesions of the skin, (3) tracheo-bronchitis, (4) mouth inflammation, (5) conjunctivitis, (6) gastritis. -- Reference (a). ND - NOT DETERMINED 1 NA- NOT APPLICABLE · ~; r_,Y~r,.~; ! D}.I'(e,~]~ iq · FIRE AND EXPLOSION R.A~N POINT O C I AUTO IGNITION ...... I TEMPERATURE ~ - I~1o! llammaole I OffAL FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS' Not applicable oc FLN~IMABLE LIMITS IN AIR (% BY VOL.) LOWER- Not'applicable UPPER- Not applicable Flammable and potentially explosive hydrogen gas can be generated inside metal drums and storage tanks. Concentrated sulfuric acid can ignite combustible materials on contact. FIRE EXTINGUISHING AGENTS RECOMMGNDEO If involved in a fire, use water spray; avoid spraying water into containers. If only a small amount of combustibles is present, smother fire with dry chemical. FiRE EXTINC~ISHING AGENTS TO AVOID Use water spray or other suitable agent for fires adjacent to non-leaking tanks or other containers of sulfuric acid. SPECIAL FIRE FIGHTING PRECAUTIONS DO not use solid water streams near ruptured tanks or spills of sulfuric acid. Acid reacts violently with water and can spatter acid onto perrsonnel. VENTILATION Sufficient to reduce vapor and acid mists to permissible levels. Packaging and unloading areas and open proCessing equipment may require mechanical exhaust systems. Corrosion-proof construction recommended. Closed ventilation systems (e.g. vapor hoods) are frequently used in the electronics industry. NQRMAL HANDLING Do not get in eyes, on skin on clothing. Do not breathe vapor or mist. Use protective equipment outlined in Section E. Procedures are deta led n references listed in Section J. Do not add water to acid. When diluting, always add acid to water cautiously and with a~litation. Use onl~/with adequate ventilation. tect from physical damage. Store in cool, well-ventilated area away from combustibles and reactive chemicals. Keep out of sun and away from heat. Keep containers upright. No smoking in storage area. SPILL OR LEAK (ALWAYS WEAR PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT- SECTION E) Dilute small spills or leaks cautiously with plenty of water. Neutralize residue with alkali such as,soda ash or lime. Adequate ventilation is required for soda ash due to release of CO2 gas. (See Section I for disposal methods). No smoking in spill area. Major spills must be handled by a predetermined plan. Diking with soda ash is recommended. Consult References, Section J.. Attempt to keep out of sewer. Any release to the environment of these products may be subject to Federal and/or state reporting requirements. Check with .appropriate agencies. SPECIAL: PRECAUTIONS/PRocEDURES/LABEL INSTRUCTIONS SIGNAL WORD - DANGERI LooSen closures carefully. For carrying glass bottles, use rubber protective enclosures. If stored in metal containers, vapors can contain explosive hydrogen gas. RESPIRATORY PROTECTION SEE PAGE 5. EYES AND FACE SEE PAGE 5. HANDS. ARMS, AND BODY jEE PAGE 5. OTHER CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT SEE PAGE 5. iMATERIAL IS (AT NORMAL CONDITIONS): [] LIQUID [] SOLID [] BOILING POINT MELTING POINT SOLUBILITY IN WATER (% by Weigh~) EVAPORATION RATE [] GAS Approx. 310 o C For 94% Approx.-27 o C Complete (Eth~- ~) [] Not applicable APPEARANCE AND ODOR Oily, colorless to slightly yellow, clear to turbid liquid. Odorless. SPECIFIC GRAVITY (H20- 1) (liquid) 1.842 1% solution: pH = 0.9 % VOLATILES BY VOLUME (At 20'C) Not applicable VAPOR DENSITY (AIR. 1} Not applicable VAPOR PRESSURE (,~ HG,,, 2o'c) K! (PSK~) [] 0.001 STABILITY [] UNSTABLE [] STABLE CONDITIONS TO AVOID Temperatures of 300 deg. C or higher: yields sulfur trioxide gas, which is toxic, corrosive, and an oxidizer. INCOMPATIBILITY (MATERIALS TO AVOID) Nitro compounds; carbides, dienes, alcohols (when heated): cause explosions -- Refs. (g,h). Oxidizing agents, such as chlorates and permanganates: cause fires and possibly explosions. Allyl COmpounds and aldehydes: undergo polymerization, possibly violent -- Ref. (g), (continued, Section K). HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION PROOUCTS Sulfur trioxide gas: see above. Also this is a fire risk if in contact with organic materials. HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION [] MAY OCCUR [] WILL NOT OCCUR CONDITIONS TO AVOID NA MATERIAL OR COMPONENT / C.A.S. # WI'. % HAZARD DATA (SEE SECT. J) NOT APPLICABLE 3 ' ' " ...... * - PROPRIETARY - TRADE SECRET ,G4~)RADA B IL ITYIAQ UAT lC TOXICITY quatic Toxicity: .5 ppm/24 hr./bluegill/lethal/fresh water 42.5 ppm/48 hr./prawn/LCso/salt water IOCTANOL/WATER PARTITION COEFFICIENT ND EPA HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 1000 (CLEAN WATER ACT SEC. 311) [] [] IF SO REPORTABLE QUANTITY: [ (100% H2 S04 basis) YES NO 40 CFR 116-117 W.ASTE DISPOSAL METHODS (DISPOSER MUST COMPLY WITH FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL DISPOSAL OR DISCHARGE LAWS) Treatment or disposal of waste generated by Use of this product should be reviewed in terms of applicable federal, state and local laws and regulations. Users are advised to consult with appropriate regulatory agencies before discarge, treatment or disposal. RCRA S'~ATUS OF UNUSED MA'I'ERtAL IF DISCARDED EPA Hazardous Waste HAZARDOUS WASTE NUMBER; (IF APPLICABLE) No. D0002 (corrosive) 4O CFR 261.22 PERMISSIBLE CONCENTRATION REFERENCES (1) OSHA Z-List; 29 CFR 1910.1000 (Revised 1989) (2) ACGIH 1989-90 List, "Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances...". Am. Conf. of Governmental industrial Hygienists, Cincinnati 45202. REGULATORY STANDARDS D.O.T. Hazardous Materials Table 49 CFR 172.101 D.O.T. CLASSIFICATION: Corrosive material DOT ID Number: UN 1830. iENERAL Documentation of the Threshold Limit Values, 4th Edition, 1981, Am. Conf. of Governmental Hygienists, Cincinnati 45202. (b) NIOSH, Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, 1982-83, Accession #WS 556 00 000, PB81-154478, Nat. Tech.lnfo. Service, Springfield, VA 22161. (c) "Criteria for a Recommended Standard...Occupational Exposure to Sulfuric Acid", NIOSH U.S. Dept. of HHS, 1974, PB233098, Nat. Tech. Info. Service, Springfield, VA 22161. I49CFR 173 J. REFERENCES -- General (continued) (d) NIOSH/OSi-IA, "Pocket Guid~; to Chemical Hazards...", September, 1985. (e) "NIOSH/OSHA -- Occupational Health Guidelines for Chemical Hazards -- Sulfuric Acid", 1978. (f) Allied Chemical Technical Service Report for storage and handling procedures. (g) NFPA Manual 491M, ;Manual of Hazardous Chemical Reactions, 1987 Nat. Fire Protection Assoc., Boston 02210. (h) Bretherick, L., Handbook of Reactive Chemical Hazards, 3rd Ed., 1985 Butterworths, Boston. G. REACTIVITY DATA - Incompatibility (continued) Alkalis, amines, water, hydrated salts, carboxylic acid anhydrides, nitriles, olefinic organics, glycols, aqueous acids: cause strong exothermic reactions. -- Refs. (g h). Carbonates cyanides sulfides, sulfites, metals such as COpper: yield toxic gases. -- Rels. (h). AlsO for metals, see hydro~'en generation, Section C. PSDS FiLE NO. - GC-20(X) Sulfuric Acid Page 5 of 5 SECTION E PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 1. HEAVY HANDLING Respiratory Protection Where required, use a respirator approved by NIOSH for sulfuric acid. If misting above I mg H2SO4'/wear: (a) gas mask with acid gas canister and also with high-efficiency particulate filter; (b) High-efficiency particulate respirator; (c) other choices, Reference (d). Eyes and Face As a minimum, wear hat, chemical safety goggles, and optionally full-face plastic shield. Do not wear contact lenses. H~nds, Arms, and Body As a minimum, wear acid-resistant* apron, protective clothing, boots, and gloves for routine product use. For increased protection, include acid-resistant trousers and jacket. 2. SPECIALIZED HANDLING (only applicable when using the closed ventilation system mentioned on p. 2): Respiratory Protection Generally not required. For emergency, e.g. a misting situation, use a respirator approved by NIOSH for sulfuric acid. See this page, under '1. HEAVY HANDLING - Respiratory Protection'. Eyes and Face As a minimum, safety glasses 'with nonperforated sideshields. Add a face shield if pouring liquid. For leak or spill or other emergency, use chemical safety goggles and optionally, full face shield. Do not wear contact lenses. Hands, Arms, and Body As a minimum, wear add-resistant apron and gloves*. For leak or spill or other emergency, use full protective clothing (see this page under '1. HEAVY HANDLING - Hands, Arms, and Body)". Other Clothing and Equipment Eyewash and quick-drench shower facilities. Neutralization supplies and equipment. *Preferably rubber. LIQUID AIR CORPORATION ALPHAGAZ DIVISION ALPHAGAZ Specialty Gas Material Safety Data Sheet LIQUID AIR CORPORATION ALPHAGAZ DIVISION One California Plaza, Suite 350 2121 N. California Blvd. Walnut Creek, California 94596 ISS.UE DATE OCTOBER 1, 1985 AND REVISIONS CORPORATE SAFETY DEPT. PRODUCT NAME Ammo n i a TELEPHONE (415) 977-6500 EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION ON PAGE 2 TRADE NAME AND SYNONYMS Ammoni a, Anhydrous Ammonia CHEMICAL NAME AND SYNONYMS Ammoni a, Anhydrous Ammonia FORMULA MOLECULAR WEIGHT NH3 17.0 CAS NUMBER 7564-41-7 CHEMICAL FAMILY Nitrogen hydride HEALTH HAZARD DATA TIME WEIGHTED AVERAGE EXPOSURE LIMIT 25 Molar PPM; STEL = 35 Molar PPM (ACGIH, 1984-85) ; 50 Molar PI~M (OSI4A, 1985) SYMPTOMS OF ~POSURE Corrosive and irritating to the skin, eyes, upper respiratory system and all mucosal tissue. Depending on the concentration inhaled, it may cause burning sensations, coughing, wheezing, shortness of breath, headache, nausea, with eventual collapse. Mild concentrations of vapor will cause dermatitis or conjunctivitis. Higher concentrations of vapor or liquid contact will cause caustic-like dermal burns and inflammation and swelling of the eyes with possible loss of vision. Rapidly evaporating liquid contacting dermal tissue or the eyes will cause cryogenic "burns." TOXICOLOGICAL PROPERTIES Inhalation: Affects the upper airway (larynx and bronchi) by causing caustic-like burning resulting in edema and chemical pneumonitis. If it enters the deep lung, pulmonary edema will result. Toxic level exposure to dermal tissue causes caustic-like burns and skin lesions resulting in early necrosis and scarring. Burns to the eye result in lesions and possible loss of vision. Cryogenic "burns" are like frostbite with a change in skin color to gray or white possibly followed by blistering. Listed as Carcinogen National Toxicology Yes [] I.A.R.C. Yes [] OSHA Yes [] or Potential Carcinogen Program No [] Monographs No [] No [] RECOMMENDED FIRST AID TREATMENT PROHPT HED[CAL ATTENTION IS HANDATORY IN ALL CASES OF OVEREXPOSURE TO AHHON[A. RESCUE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE EQUIPPED N[TH SELF-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS AND BE COGNIZANT OF EXTREHE FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD. Inhalation: Conscious persons should be assisted to an uncontaminated area and inhale fresh air. Unconscious persons should be moved to an uncontaminated area and given mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and supplemental oxygen. Keep the victim warm and quiet. Assure that mucus or vomited material does not obstruct the airway by positional drainage. (Continued on last page.) Judgements as to the suitability of information herein for purchaser's purposes are necessarily purchaser's responsibility. Therefore, although reasonable care has been taken in the preparation of such information, Liquid Air Corporation extends no warranties, makes no representations, and assumes no responsibility as to the accuracy or suitability of such information for application to purchaser's intended purposes or consequences of its use. Since Liquid Air Corporation has no control over the use of this product, it assumes no liability for damage or loss of product resulting from proper (or improper) use or application of the product. Data Sheets may be changed from time to time. Be sure to consult the latest edition. AG 05202 Page 2 HAZARDOUS MIXTURES OF OTHER LIQUIDS, SOLIDS, OR GASES Ammonia is flammable over a relatively narrow range in air. It reacts vigorously with fluorine, chlorine, hydrogen chloride, hydrogen bromide, nitrosyl chloride, chromyl chloride, trioxygen difluoride, nitrogen dioxide and nitrogen trichloride. PHYSICAL DATA BOILING POINT -28.14°F (-33.41°C) VAPOR PRESSURE La 70°F (21.1°C) : 128 psia (883 kPa) SOLUBILITY IN WATER Very soluble, liberating heat APPEARANCE AND ODOR Colorless gas with a pungent odor. FLASH POINT (METHOD USED) Gas EXTINGUISHING MEDIA Water IAUTO IGNITION TEMPERATURE 1274°F (690°C) SPECIAL FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES LIQUID DENSITY AT BOIUNG POINT _ 42.6 lb/ft3 (682 kg/m3) GAS DENSITY AT 70°F I atm · 0442 lb/ft3 (.708 kg/m3) FREEZING POINT -107.9°F (-77.74°C) Specific gravity ¢70°F (Air : 1.0) is .59, FIRE AND ExpLosION HA~RD DATA FLAMMABLE LIMITS % BY VOLUME LEL = 15 UEL = 27 IELECTRICAL CLASSIFICATION Class l.. C~rnlJp D If possible, stop the flow of gas. Since ammonia is soluble in water, it is the best extinguishing media -- not only extinguishing the fire, but also absorbing (Continued on last na~e.l UNUSUAL FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS ' ~ The minimum ignition energy for ammonia is very high. It is approximately 500 t t imes greater than the energy required for igniting hydrocarbons and 1000 to 10:000 times greater than that reqtJir~d for hydrogen REACTIVITY DATA STABILITY CONDITIONS TO AVOID Unstable X Stable INcoMpATIBILITY (Materials to avoid) See Hazardous Mixtures of Other Liquids, Solids or Gases. HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS Hydrogen at very high temperatures (1544°F; 840°C) HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION CONDITIONS TO AVOID May Occur Will Not Occur X SPILL OR LEAK PROCEDURES STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN CASE MATERIAL IS RE~ASED OR SPILLED Evacuate all personnel from affected area. Use appropriate protective, equipment. If leak is in user's equipment, be certain to purge piping with an inert gas prior to attempting repairs. If leak is in container or container valve, contact the closest Liquid Air Corporation location. WAST DISPOSAL METHOD Do not attempt to dispose of waste or unused quantities. Return in the shipping container properly labeled~ with any valve outlet plugs or caps secured and valve protection cap in place to Liquid Air Corporation for proper disposal. For emergency disposal, contact the closest Liquid Air Corporation location. EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION IN CASE OF EMERGENCY INVOLVING THIS MATERIAL, CALL DAY OR NIGHT (800) 231-1366 OR CALL CHEMTREC AT (800) 424-9300 SPECIAL PROTECTION INFORMATION Page 3 RESPIRATORY PROTECTION (Speclty type) Positive pressure air line with mask or SelT-containeQ ibreathin~ apparatus should be available for emergenc7 use. VENTILATION- LOCAL EXHAUST To prevent, accumulation SPECIAL !Hood with forced above the TWA OTHER MECHANICAL (.Gen.) ventilation In accordance with electrical codes. PROTECTIVE GLOVES Plastic or rubber EYE PROTECTION Safety goggles or glasses OTHER PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT Safety shoes, safety shower, eyewash "fountain" SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS* SPECIAL LABELING INFORMATION DOT Shipping Name: An~nonia, Anhydrous (RQ 100/45.4) I.D. No.: UN 1005 DOT Shippinq Label: Nonflammable Gas DOT Hazard Class: Nonflammable gas SPECIAL HANDLING RECOMMENDATIONS Use only in well-ventilated areas. Valve protection caps must remain in place unless container is secured with valve outlet piped to use point. Do not drag, slide or roll cylinders. Use a suitable hand truck for cylinder movement. Use a pressure reducing regulator when connecting cylinder to lower pressure (<500 psig) piping or systems. Do not heat cylinder by any means to increase the discharge rate of ~roduct from the cylinder. Use a check valve or trap in the discharge line to prevent hazardous back flow into the cylinder. For additional handling recommendations consult L'Air Liquide's Encyclopedia de Gaz or Compressed Gas Association Pamphlet po1. SPECIAL STORAGE RECOMMENDATIONS Protect cylinders from physical damage. Store in cool, dry, well-ventilated area of non-combustible construction away from heavily trafficked areas and emergency exits. Do not allow the temperature where cylinders are stored to exceed 130F (54C). Cylinders should be stored upright and firmly secured to prevent fall!,~ or being knocked over. Full and empty cylinders should be segregated. Use a rst in-first out" inventory system to prevent full cylinders being stored for excessive periods of time. Post "No Smoking or Open Flames" signs in the storage or use area. There should be no sources of ignition in the storage or use area. For additional storage recommendations consult L'Air Liquide's Encyclopedia de Gaz or Compressed Gas Association Pamphlet P-1. SPECIAL PACKAGING RECOMMENDATIONS Gaseous or liquid anhydrous ammonia corrodes certain metals at ambient temperatures. Oxygen presence enhances the corrosion of ordinary or semi-alloy steels. The addition of water inhibits this enhancement. Keep anhydrous ammonia systems scrupulously dry. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS OR PRECAUTIONS Earth-ground and bond all lines and equipment associated with the ammonia system. Electrical equipment should be non-sparking or explosion proof. Compressed gas cylinders should not be refilled except by qualified producers of compressed gases. Shipment of a compressed gas cylinder which has not been filled by the owner or with his (written) consent is a violation of Federal Law (49CFR). *Various Government agencies (i.e., Department of Transportation, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Food and Drug Administration and others) may have specific regulations concerning the transportation, handling, storage or use of this product which may not be contained herein. The customer or user of this product should be familiar with these regulations. LIQUID AIR CORPORATION ALPHAGAZ DIVISION Page 4 ADDITIONAL DATA RECOMMENDED FIRST AID TREATMENT: (Continued) Eye Contact: PERSONS WITH POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO AMMONIA SHOULD NOT WEAR CONTACT LENSES. Flush contaminated eye(s) with copious quantities of water. Part eyelids to assure complete flushing. Continue for a minimum of 15 minutes. Skin Contact: Flush affected area with copious quantities of water. Remove affected clothing as rapidly as possible. Dermal Contact or Frostbite: Remove contaminated clothing and flush affected areas with lukewarm water. DO NOT USE HOT WATER. A physician should see the patient promptly if the cryogenic "burn" has resulted in blistering of the dermal surface or deep tissue freezing. SPECIAL FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES: (Continued) the escaped ammonia gas. Use water spray to cool surrounding containers. APPENDIX !1 HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY GUIDELINE APPENDIX II HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY GUIDELINE CONTENTS 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Introduction Hazard and Operability Study Team Members and Qualifications Ammonia Study Nodes Intention: Normal Operation of the Ammonia Systems Waste Water Treatment System Study Nodes Intention: Normal Operation of the Waste Water Treatment System Deviations Causes of Deviations Consequences Guide Words Focus of Study 1. Introduction A HAZOP study is used to identify hazards and operability problems. The primary objective of the HAZOP study is identification of problems. Possible solutions to problems may be discussed and recorded during the study. This HAZOP study will focus on the ammonia refrigeration systems and waste water treatment systems (WWTS). The WWTS utilizes sulfuric acid in the waste Water treatment process. 2. Hazard and Operability Study Team Members and Qualifications The PEPSI-COLA Bottling Company (PEPSI) HAZOP team is made up of the following individuals: Bill E. Bentley: Production Manager, PEPSI, Bakersfield, California Mr. Bentley has worked in PEPSI's Bakersfield plant for 32 years, the last 17 as Production Manager. Kevin Phillips: Warehouse Manager, PEPSI, Bakersfield, California Mr. Phillips has worked in PEPSI's Bakersfield plant for 12 years. He was responsible for the construction and start-up of the WWTS. Barrington Lewis: Quality Control Supervisor, PEPSI, Bakersfield, California Mr. Lewis has worked in PEPSI's Bakersfield plant for 8 years, the last 2 years as Quality Control Supervisor. He is responsible for the daily operation of the WWTS. Appendix II Page I Pete Roddy: Torrance, California Mr. Roddy worked for Mojonnier Bros. Company for 10 years as a Service Engineer performing start-up and trouble shooting functions on beverage refrigeration systems. He has been a beverage refrigeration consultant for the last twelve years. He has worked at the PEPSI's Bakersfield plant for over 20 years. David Butt, Senior Engineering Advisor, WZl Inc. Mr. Butt worked in the petroleum industry for 29 years related to the design, installation and operating of petroleum process equipment. Mr. Butt will act as team leader. He will conduct the consequence analysis and perform a human error analysis as described in the Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, AICHE, 1985. Pete Roddy and David Butt will preform the Hazard and Operability study for the ammonia systems. Bill Bentley is on-site and available for consultation. Kevin Phillips, Barrington Lewis and David Butt will perform the Hazard and Operability Study for the WWI'S. Bill Bentley is on-site and available for consultation. 3. Ammonia Study Nodes The study nodes (locations at which the process parameters are to be investigated for deviations) in the PEPSI plant are listed below: 2. 3. 4. 5. Vilter Compressor #1, #2 and #3 Evaporative Condensers Liquid Ammonia Receivers Ammonia Surge Vessels Carbo Coolers and Pre-Chiller Deaerators Appendix II Page 2 o Ammonia Suction Traps Ammonia Lines Grasso Compressors #1 and #2 4. Intention: Normal Operation of the Ammonia Systems Both the Bottle Line Processing System and Can Line Processing System operate the same and contain the same major components. The systems are designed to operate continuously. Gaseous ammonia enters the compressors and is compressed to a higher pressure and temperature. After exiting the compressors, the hot gaseous ammonia enters the evaporative condenser. Water running over the condenser coils cool the hot gaseous ammonia into liquid ammonia. The liquid ammonia enters the liquid ammonia receiver located inside the building. From the receiver, liquid ammonia flows through steel pipe lines to the ammonia injectors. The liquid ammonia flows through the injectors pulling liquid ammonia from the surge vessel into the coils of the carbo cooler and pre- chiller deaerator. The liquid ammonia absorbs heat from the carbo cooler and pre-chiller deaerator and flows to the ammonia surge vessel as a liquid/gaseous phase. Gaseous ammonia from the ammonia surge vessel flows to the ammonia suction trap. The suction trap prevents liquids from entering the compressors. The gaseous ammonia is pulled into the compressor suction. When required ammonia is charged from a 150 pound cylinder into the systems to maintain the correct operating level. 5. Sulfuric Acid Study Nodes The study nodes (locations at which the process parameters are to be investigated for deviations) in the PEPSI plant are listed below: Appendix II Page 3 2. 3. 4. 5. Delivery of sulfuric acid Sulfuric acid storage tank Sulfuric acid pump Sulfuric acid lines Neutralization Tank 6. Intention: Normal Operation of the Waste Water Treatment System The Waste Water Treatment System is designed to operate continuously unattended. Sulfuric acid is injected with a positive displacement pump into the waste waters from the plant to reduce the alkalinity of the waste water to a range of 6 to 10 pH, before the waste water is disposed into the sewer. The rate of sulfuric acid injected is controlled by a pH monitor. ~ 7. Deviations Deviations are potential departures from the intention of the plant. Possible deviations are discovered by systematically applying HAZOP guide words (no, more) to process parameters such as pressure and temperature. 8. Causes of Deviations Causes of deviations may be human error, equipment failure, etc. Deviations and causes will be listed during the HAZOP study. 9. Consequences Consequences are results of deviations from normal process operation. Consequences which could negatively impact process safety will be discussed and recorded. Deviations which have no effect on process safety will be dropped from the HAZOP study. Appendix II Page 4 10. Guide Words Guide words are simple words used to identify, quality or quantify possible deviations. The following guide words will be used in the HAZOP study: Guide Word Example Meanin.q No Power Shutoff Less Low Flowrate More High Temperature Other Part of As Well As Reverse Other Than Partial Power Shutoff Water added to NH3 Flow in Wrong Direction Earthquake Conditions Negation of Design Intent Quantitative Decrease Quantitative Increase Qualitative Decrease Qualitative Increase Logical Opposite of the Intent Substitution from Design Each guide word will be applied to process variables at each study node. This purpose of this study is to determine the most likely point of release and most damaging release of ammonia to the atmosphere. 11. Focus of Study The following specific consequences will be considered in this study: O O Threats to Employee Safety Threats to Safety of Off-Site .Receptors DB/ib 161 g. O010.005 Appendix II Page 5 HAZOP FORM: PEPSI Study Node Number': -:/.- Equipment: ~ot,,XP~e_$c.o~~. -V~-C.I'i~-~--S-¥'7-:F----~--~- Guide Consequences Resulting from a Causes of the * Prob- l~ Proposed Word Deviation Deviation from Normal Operation Deviation Severity~ability** Con rols in Place Mitigation More o~ ~e ,, Other NO~. ~. o~e~e - ~/~ Description of Equipment Operation · Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries or death unless corrective measures are taken), High (expecled to cause injury or death to receptors) · *Drnhohilih/' Hinh m~diilm nr Inw HAZOP-FORM. PEPSI-- --r--r _ = ,_ J,., Guide Consequences Resulting from a Word Deviation Deviation from. Normal Operation Less S-t~-d~-N~-d~-N~be r: 2, Causes of the Deviation 'E q u i p- r n-e-n- t-.' --E.V-~ 'P < 2-¢,-¢,--~W E~ * Severity Prob- ability** Lord Conl rols in Place Proposed Mitigation ~ W More Other l~o'ro~5 LOV,J L. oV,,/ -r'~a:) J~ / ~ ~.-~ :T/~,~ u/~F-~ ~ Description of Equipment Operation J~ *Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries or death unless corrective measures are taken), High (expected to cause injury or **Probability: High, medium or Iow death to receptors) HAZOP-FORM-:--PEPSI 8o - F- "-'-~'~: SD-d~-No-de-NfJmb-er:--3- Equipment:_z._/_,~_ck,.o . ~,-t,.,,-~,,~OM-L~- Guide Consequences Resulting from a Causes of the * Prob,- Proposed Word Deviation Deviatior~ from Normal Operation Deviation Severity ability** Con..rols in Place Mitigation '- I Description of Equipment Operati°n *Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries or death unless corrective measures are taken), High (expected to cause injury or **Probability: High, medium or Iow death to receptors) Guide Consequences Resulting from a Causes of the * Prob-** lois in Place Mitigation Proposed. Word Deviation Deviation from Normal Operation Deviatidn Severity ability Cont Description of Equipment Operation *Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries or death unless corrective measures are taken), High (expected to cause injury or **Probability' High, medium or Iow death to receptors) HA-ZOP-FORM-:--PEPSI' - Stu-d,~-N0de-Number:--~ -Ecl uipm e nt :~-,~. ¢,:'~c>. ~-oo-~'-... Guide , Consequences Resulting from a Causes of 'the * Prob- Proposed Word Deviation Deviation from Normal Operation Deviation Severity ability** Conlrols in Place Mitigation , More ~ ~OT N~L~C ~U~ I Description of Equipment Operation *Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries or death unless corrective measures are taken), High (expected to cause injury or **Probability: High, .medium or Iow death to receptors) HA-ZOP-FO'RM:--PEPSt ~ ~ ~ m Study-Node-Number:--(,c:, Equ.ipm.ent:--A-t,~-~t-~.~-~-,~- '5-,Jc'T- -o,4 Guide ~ Consequences Resulting from a Causes of the * Prob- .. Proposed Word Deviation Deviation from Normal Operation Deviation Severity ability** Controls in Place Mitigation Description of Equipment Operation *Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries or death unless corrective measures are taken), High (expected to cause injury or **Probability: High, medium or Iow death to receptors) FIAZOP-FORM. --PEPSI Guide Word Deviation Less More Consequences Resulting from a Deviation from Normal Operation S-IU-d~- Nb-d ~-N~b~"~ Causes of the Deviation Eq0ipm-ent:--/~.--~.t- t.7,,-o-~ -i-~-- ~- ~ * Severity Prob- ability** L..OV,,J Cont rols in Place t~ L_o~J Proposed Mitigation DescriPtion of Equipment Operation *Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries **Probability: High, medium or Iow or death unless corrective measures are taken), High (expected to cause injury or death to receptors) · .H-A-Z-O-P-FO-RM~-PEPS! Guide Word Deviation Consequences Resulting from a Deviation from Normal Operation Study-Node-Number: Causes of the Deviation I L. E55 More Other Severity: LC,V,/ uo,,~,J Lo'v,./ L. ov, J L. OV,J Prob- ability** ~_o~,,/ L_O~J V. L.OV,./ v'. t..ovJ Contr(,Is in Place Low/ t_ow/ uovJ t_ow/ I L..Ot,,J' T-YP-E Proposed Mitigation Description Of Equipment Operation F___.~ *Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries or death unless corrective measures are taken), High (expected to cause injury or d **Probability: High, medium or Iow ,ath to receptors) APPENDIX IV ANHYDROUS AMMONIA MODELING RESULTS APPENDIX IV ANHYDROUS AMMONIA MODELING RESULTS Summary The Automated Resource for Chemical Hazard Incident Evaluation (ARCHIE) computer program was used to model theorized worst case credible releases. The Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures (FEMA, U. $. DOT and U. S. EPA, 1989) was used as a guideline for modeling. Modeling results indicated that a worst case credible release could pose a significant risk to off-site receptors. Worst Case Credible Scenario The worst case credible release, as determined through the Hazard and Operability Study, was found to be a potential release .of the liquid contents of an inside ammonia surge vessel into the atmosphere. The potential release scenario determined to be dangerous to off-site receptors is a release of ammonia during an earthquake. Lines to and from the ammonia receivers located inside the building contain liquid ammonia. A break in the liquid ammonia lines could release all of the ammonia in a surge vessel to the atmosphere. In this potential worst case scenario, the rapid release of liquid ammonia could form an air/ammonia dispersion that would act as a cloud of dense gas. Appendix IV Page 1 Choice of Modeling Options The ARCHIE computer program offers a selection of hazard assessment modeling options. Option a, "Estimate Discharge Rate of Liquid or Gas", was used to model the release of ammonia into the atmosphere. This model was chosen because the potential worst case scenario involves the emptying of a surge vessel through open lines. Option d, "Evaluate Toxic Vapor Dispersion Hazards", was used to model the release of liquid ammonia into the atmosphere from broken lines to or from a surge vessel. Table 3 contains mean wind speeds and prevailing wind directions for the Bakersfield area. Climatological data was gathered at Meadows Field Airport and compiled by the National Climatic Data Center. Modeling Results A discharge from a broken liquid ammonia line may release 500 pounds of ammonia in 23 seconds. Scenario results have been plotted in Exhibit 13 for the vulnerable zone and Exhibit 14 for the IDLH exposure zone. Modeling printouts are shown as the following exhibits; Exhibit 16 Estimate Discharge Rate of Liquid or Gas Exhibit 17 Evaluation Toxic Vapor Dispersion Hazards. 50 ppm Vulnerable Zone. Exhibit 18 Evaluation Toxic Vapor Dispersion Hazards. 500 ppm IDLH Exposure Zone. DB/jb 1619.0010.012 Appendix IV Page 2 TABLE 3 BAKERSFIELD AREA MEAN WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION Month Wind Speed (mph) Wind Direction January 5.2 NW February 5.8 ENE March 6.5 NW April 7.1 NW May 7.9 NW June 7.9 NW July 7.2 NW August 6.8 NW September 6.2 WNW October 5.5 NW November 5.1 ENE December 5.0 ENE The yearly average mean wind speed is 6.4 mph, originating from the Northwest. DB/jb 1619.0010A.013 CURRENT PARAMETER VALUES FOR DISCHARGE RATE ESTIMATION METHODS 4 DISCHARGE HOLE DIAMETER = 1 5 DISCHARGE COEFFICIENT = .62 6 LIQUID HEIGHT IN CONTAINER = .5 feet 7 WEIGHT OF CONTAINER CONTENTS = 500 lbs 8 TEMPERATURE OF TANK CONTENTS = 35 deg F 9 AMBIENT TEMPERATURE = 70 deg F 10 CHEM VAP PRES IN CONTAINER = 150 psia 12 NORMAL BOILING POINT = -27.4 deg F 13 LIQUID SPECIFIC GRAVITY = .52 MODEL RESULTS: Peak discharge rate Duration of discharge Amount discharged State of material inch(es) = 1295.3 lbs/min = .387 minutes = 500 lbs = Mix of 9as and aerosols EXHIBIT 16 0619.0010A CURRENT PARAMETER VALUES FOR TOXIC GAS OR VAPOR HAZARD EVALUATION 1 MOLECULAR WEIGHT = 17 2 TOXIC VAPOR LIMIT : 50 3 VAPOR/GAS DISCHARGE HEIGHT = 0 4 ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS = F 5 WIND VELOCITY AT SURFACE = 4.5 6 AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE = 70 7 VAPOR/GAS EMISSION RATE = 1295.3 8 DURATION OF EMISSION = ,387 MODEL RESULTS: Downwind toxic hazard distance at groundlevel = 17083 ppm feet mph deg F lb/min minutes feet EXHIBIT 17~-1 0619.0010A Downwind Distance (feet) (miles) Groundlevel Source Height Initial Evacuation Concentration Concentration Zone Width~ (ppm) (ppm) (feet) 100 .02 1314 .25 2527 .48 3740 .71 4953 .94 6166 1.17 7379 1.4 8592 1.63 9805 1.86 11018 2,09 12231 2,32 13444 2,55 14657 2.78 15870 3.01 17O83 3,24 ~Usually safe for < 1 hour require a larger width Downwind Distance (feet) (miles) 1000000 1000000 75 18503 18503 960 4360 4360 1850 1736 1736 2730 892 892 3610 531 531 4490 348 348 5380 244 244 6260 179 179 7140 137 137 8030 108 108 8910 86,3 86,3 9790 70.8 70.8 10680 59.1 59.1 11560 50 50 1 release. Longer releases or sudden wind shifts may · or different direction for the evacuation zone. Contaminant Arrival Time Contaminant Departure Time at Downwind Location at Downwind Location (minutes) (minutes) 100 .02 1314 .25 2527 .48 3740 .71 4953 .94 6166 1.17 7379 1,4 8592 1.63 9805 1,86 11018 2.09 12231 2.32 13444 2.55 14657 2,78 15870 3.01 17083 3.24 CAUTION' See guide .3 .9 3,4 7,1 6.4 13.2 9,5 19.3 12.6 25.5 15.6 31.6 18.7 37,7 21.7 43.8 24.8 50 27,9 56, 1 30.9 62,2 34 68,3 37.1 74,5 40, 1 80.6 43.2 86.7 for assumptions used in estimating these times! EXHIBIT 17-2 O619.O010A CURRENT PARAMETER VALUES FOR TOXIC GAS OR VAPOR HAZARD EVALUATION 1 MOLECULAR WEIGHT : 17 2 TOXIC VAPOR LIMIT : 500 3 VAPOR/GAS DISCHARGE HEIGHT : 0 4 ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS = F 5 WIND VELOCITY AT SURFACE = 4.5 6 AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE = 70 7 VAPOR/GAS EMISSION RATE = 1295,3 8 DURATION OF EMISSION : ,387 MODEL RESULTS: Downwind toxic hazard distance at 9roundlevel = 6322 ppm feet mph deg F lb/min minutes feet EXHIBIT 18-1 0619.0010A Downwind Distance Groundlevel Source Height Initial Evacuation Concentration Concentration Zone Width~ (feet) (miles) (ppm) (ppm) {feet) 100 .02 1000000 1000000 75 545 .11 96330 96330 400 989 ,19 32475 32475 730 1434 .28 15416 15416 1050 1878 ,36 8573 8573 1370 2322 ,44 5296 5296 1700 2767 ,53 3529 3529 2020 3211 ,61 2488 2488 2340 3656 .7 1832 1832 2670 4100 ,78 1396 1396 2990 4544 ,87 1093 1093 3310 4989 .95 876 876 3640 5433 1.03 716 716 3960 5877 1.12 594 594 4290 6322 1.2 500 500 1 *Usually safe for < I hour release. Longer releases or sudden wind shifts may require a larger width or different direction for the evacuation zone. Downwind Distance (feet) (miles) Contaminant Arrival Time at Downwind Location (minutes) Contaminant Departure Time at Downwind Location (minutes) 100 .02 .3 .9 545 ,11 1.4 3.2 989 ,19 2,5 5,4 1434 .28 3.7 7,7 1878 ,36 4,8 9,9 2322 .44 5.9 12,2 2767 .53 7 14.4 3211 ,61 8.2 16,7 3656 ,7 9,3 18,9 4100 .78 10.4 21,1 4544 .87 11.5 23.4 4989 ,95 12.6 25,6 5433 1.03 13.8 27.9 5877 1.12 14,9 30.1 6322 1.2 16 32,4 CAUTION: See guide for assumptions used in estimating these times! EXHIBIT 18-2 0619.0010A APPENDIX V ANHYDROUS AMMONIA ALARMS AND CONTROL DEVICES APPENDIX V ALARMS AND CONTROL DEVICES Equipment All Compressors Alarms and Control Devices Type High High Ammonia Pressure Shutdown Automatic Details Manual Reset All Compressors High Ammonia Pressure Shutdown Automatic Manual Reset All Compressors Low Oil Pressure Shutdown Automatic Manual Reset Vilters Compressors Vessels High Oil Temperature Shutdown Pressure Relief Valves Automatic Automatic Manual Reset Automatic Reset Evaporative Condensers Flow Control Solenoid Valves Ammonia Pressure Starts Water Pump and Fans High Ammonia Pressure Shutdown Automatic Automatic Automatic Reset Automatic Reset DB/jb 1619.0010.011 APPENDIX VI SULFURIC ACID HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY FORMS FiAZOP-FORM Guide Word Deviation More Consequences Resulting from a Deviation from Normal Operation S-tb-d~-N~-d~-N~ber: Causes of the Deviation 'Pto-c-e-do-re-:--~&-a.-t-w-E * Severity Prob- ability** Con :rols in Place Less 12)rCtVg,~' ~ ~/~,i~f~-.vt~ocP. '~T.~¥ L. OV, J Lo v,..] ~_ov, J Lo,,,,J LoW LoV,./ Other Proposed Mitigation '1 '/'"/,4 Description of Procedure *Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries or death unless corrective measures are taken), High (expected to cause injury or death to receptors) **Probability: High, medium or Iow HAZOP-FORM-: Guide Word Deviation ~JA%T~ PEPS! T ~ e ~,T ~ ~--~----r'---~-,:-r'-~--r"F__.-t',~--S'tgdy-N-o-d-e-N'u'mb-e-r :--~. Consequences Resulting from a Causes of the 'P roced * Prob- Proposed Less More ~Other Deviation from 'Normal Operation Deviation Severity LOv~J L~3u, J ability** L.o ~,.] C011 trois in Place Mitigation Description of Procedure *Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries or death unless corrective measures are taken), **Probability: High, medium or Iow High (expected to cause injury ,r death to receptors) 'H-A-ZOP-FORM-:--PEP SIT ~ e .~ T Lvt-F__.Wa-T--S-W'*~T-8. t'ct--S t ud y-Nod~e-N'u'm'b-e'r :--~- Guide Word No Consequences Resulting from a Deviation Deviation from Normal Operation Less More Other L. F_.A,Z,,. ~50'4. /~ELP_.A-5 E Proc.e-dure:-:5-c)L-/~d-,~-r~ ~'~"~ 'k Severity bOv,J Causes of the Deviation t._o,,,.J LOv,J Prob- ability** L-o~J L.O~J LOv, J o[:FE'C-..TI VF___, FI TTz~I6t LOV,,] Lov.] Co~trols in Place · [2 o u--t-- t ~'i Proposed Mitigation Description of Procedure *Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries or death **Probability: High, medium or Iow unless corrective measures are taken), High (expected to cause injury ~r death to receptors) W A%'T E V,J A'T P_.P-, HAZOP-FORM: P-EPSI-r- E ~,-'r ~ ~'T'~?-S-?E~-"t--St~-d~-N~-d~-N~ber: ,'~ Pro-c-e-do-re-:-~X]-A-s'T-F_--w./-~-r"e.-~; 'T-~-E.-A-T--~,~-P--~-'T - Guide Consequences Resulting from a Causes of the * Prob- Proposed. Word Deviation Deviation from Normal Operation Deviation Severity ability** Cortrols in Place Mitigation I' IMore Other Description of Procedure *Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries or death unless corrective rneasures are taken), High (expected to cause injury r death to receptors) **Probability: High, medium or Iow HAZOP FORM: Guide Word Less More Other Deviation --'PE-P-S-I--rcze ~,-r ~_~-r s ~'%~-~-~- Consequences Resulting from a Deviation from Normal operation Study N~-d~-N~ber: Causes of the Deviation Pr~-dure: 5(JL. FD-~)¥¢ Severit! Prob- ability** Con L O CAT ~'D trois in Place PropoSed Mitigation Description of Procedure *Severity: Low (injuries unlikely), Medium (may cause injuries or death unless corrective measures are taken), High (expected to cause injury **Probability: High, medium or Iow death to receptors)