HomeMy WebLinkAboutRISK MANAGEMENT· ;' ROOM 34
ROOM 33
ROOM 32
ROOM 31
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ROOM 26
ROOM 27 """i
ROOM 25 "'-"
ROqM 24
ROOM 23
ROOM 22
ROOM 21 '-,,
ROOM 20
· : ROOM 18
ROOM 16
ROOM 19 "--,,,
OOM 17 .-"-
ROOM 15
ROOM 14 'x
ROOM 12
ROOM 13
ROOM 11 .-'. ~
ROOM 9 .:,
ROOM 10
.4' ROOMS,.,., ..-,., : ~! RO%ML
· = ROOM 6 t ROOM 5
'-' ROOM 4 ~-t ROOM 3.
~' ROOM 2 ~j ROOM 1
REVISED '//%
#1 TO 14
#15 TO 34
LEGEND
FREEZER ROOMS
COOLER ROOMS
WZl INC.
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
FACILITY DIAGRAM
DATE 12/90 I 1114.0010A IEXHIBIT 2
ROOM 34
ROOM 32
ROOM 30
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ROOM 26
· 7. ROO. M 24
ROOM 22
ROOM 33
ROOM 31
ROOM 25
ROOM 23
ROOM 21 '-o.
ROOM 20 ROOM 19 "'"
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ROOM 12
ROOM 15
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ROOM 13
ROOM 11 .-'.
ROOM 10 ROOM 9
ROOM 8 '~ ROOM 7
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ROOM4 ROOM 3.
ROOM2 ~ ROOM1
..... REVISED '¥%
LEGEND
#1 TO 14
#15 TO 34
FREEZER ROOMS
COOLER ROOMS
W Z i ,I N C.:.).~
BAKERSFIEt~D, CALII~ORNIA
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
FACILITY DIAGRAM
DATE 12/90 J, ,4.oo,o^ JEXHIIBIT 2
September 6, 1996
Howard H. Wines, III
Hazardous Materials Technician
Bakersfield Fire Department
Environmental Services
1715 Chester Avenue
Bakersfield, California 93301
RE: Kern Ice and Cold Storage, RMPP August 1996 Revision
Dear Howard:
Please find enclosed the revised RMPP for Kern Ice and Cold Storage. This RMPP has
been revised and updated according to your request. This revision includes the items
addressed in your review of the draft submitted earlier. Please note that Kern Ice and Cold
Storage is currently in the process of updating the entire version of the Business Plan.
Once the Business Plan update is complete, it will be forwarded to your office for
replacement of the current plan in Appendix A.
Should you have any questions or need additional information, please do not hesitate to
contact me.
GMF/tlf
Enclosure
'~:"" ~ Richard Dixon, Kern Ice
~1!40010.010 . :
, ~4700 STOCKDAL~ HIGHWAY, SUITE 120
4100 WESTHEIMER, SUITE 231
Manager
BAKERSFIELp, CALIFORNIA 93309 (805) 326-1112
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77027 (713) 877:1 i'~9
FAX: (805) 326'0191
FAX: (713) 877~1923
ROOM 34 ROOM 33 "'.',-- ~
,
ROOM 32 ROOM 31 '",,
ROOM 30 ZOOM 29
.I '
'~' ROOM 26 ~ ROOM 25
ROOM 24 ~ ROOM 23
ROOM 22 ROOM 21 "-,,
"
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ROOM 18
'.:,' ROOM16 ~ ROOM15 '*'L
· : ROOM 14 ~ ROOM 13 ....
- . . ,~. '¥"' , r-~ ~,.
r. ROOM12 '~ ROOM11 ~.~.
I /
.:4' ROOM6 ~ ROOM5 ,~j~
'": ROOM4 5
~" _ ROOM~_. ~ ROOM1 -*> /
.... REVISED
#1 TO 14
#15 TO 34
LEGEND
FREEZER ROOMS
COOLER ROOMS
WZI INC.
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
FACILITY DIAGRAM
DATE
I1114.0010A I EXHIBIT
12/90 2
AMMONIA
COMPRESSORS
SUCTION ~---~ 2 ~ DISCHARGEN
.~-~1 ~ ~ N__
SUCTION DISCHARGE
KNOCKOUT
VESSELS
TYPICAL
FREEZER ROOM
R E COLD,~.~..,
OW PRESSURE RETURN [LIQUID
OIL
SEPARATOR
·
~~ACC~UMULATOR
EVAPORATIVE
CONDENSER
PRECOOLER
v^Po~ I~
KING VALVE
(MANUALLY
OPERATED),~.,~,
MMONIA RECEIVE~
/
HIGH PRESSURE RETURN I J.~...EIFXLCoEwSS
EXPANSI~ TYPICAL _.~
COOLER ROOM KING VALVE -~
(SOLENOID VALVE
OPERATED)
EMERGENCY
DIFFUSION
TANK
TO COMPRESSOR
SUCTION HEADER
L
KERN ICE AND COLD STORAGE COMPANY
RISK MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION PROGRAM
INCLUDING PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT
December 1990
Revised April 1991
Revised August 1996
Submitted to:
City of Bakersfield Fire Department
Hazardous Materials Division
Prepared by:
WZl Inc.
4700 Stockdale Highway, Suite 120
Bakersfield, California 93309
11140010.002
4700 STOCKDALE HIGHWAY, SUITE 120
4100 WESTHEIMER, SUITE 231
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA 93309 (805) 326-1 112
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77027 (713) 877-1149
FAX: (805) 326-0191
FAX: (713) 877-1923
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IV.
Mo
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
Pa.qe
INTRODUCTION ................................................ 1
REVISION RECORD ............................................. 4
FACILITY DESCRIPTION ......................................... 6
A. Name and Location ......................................... 6
B. Business Telephone ........................................ 6
C. Nature of Business ......................................... 6
D. Business Hours ............................................ 6
ACUTELY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS (AHM) DESCRIPTION ............. 7
A. Anhydrous Ammonia System Capacity .......................... 7
B. Hazardous Properties of Ammonia ............................. 7
AHM PROCESS DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTION ........... 9
A. General Ammonia Refrigeration Processes ...................... 9
B. Operation of the Ammonia System ............................. 9
AHM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY .................... 11
AHM OPERATING PROCEDURES ................................. 20
AHM EQUIPMENT PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION
PROCEDURES AND SCHEDULES ................................. 21
AHM DETECTION, MONITORING AND AUTOMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
PLUS ADDITIONAL RISK REDUCTION MEASURES ................... 22
A. Detection and Monitoring Systems ............................ 22
B. Automatic Control Systems .................................. 22
C. Additional Risk Reduction Measures .......................... 23
AHM HAZARD ANALYSIS ....................................... 24
AHM ACCIDENT/INCIDENT HISTORY, INVESTIGATION, RECURRENCE
PREVENTION AND REPORTING PROCEDURES ..................... 25
A. Accidents at this Location ................................... 25
B. Accident/Incident Investigation and Recurrence Prevention Procedures 25
C. Release Reporting Procedures ............................... 25
D. Emergency Release Follow-Up Notice ......................... 26
Xll.
Xlll.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVll.
XVlll.
XlX.
XX.
XXI.
XXII.
FACILITY AHM EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS .................... 27
RMPP AUDIT PROGRAM ........................................ 28
MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE ..................................... 29
RMPP RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL ............................... 30
RMPP TRAINING PROGRAM ..................................... 31
RMPP SCHEDULE OF ACTIONS .................................. 32
AHM VENDOR AND CONTRACTOR PROGRAM ..................... 33
LOCKOUT/TAGOUT PROCEDURES ............................... 34
HOT WORK OPERATION PROGRAM .............................. 35
RMPP RECORD KEEPING ....................................... 36
QUALIFICATIONS OF CERTIFIERS ................................ 37
Qualified Person ............................................... 37
XXIII. RMPP CERTIFICATION ......................................... 38
EXHIBITS
Exhibit 1
Exhibit 2
Exhibit 3
Exhibit 4
Exhibit 5
Exhibit 6
Exhibit 7
Location Map
Facility Diagram
Surrounding Area
Ammonia Refrigeration System Process Flow Diagram
Ammonia Incident Reporting
Emergency Release Follow-Up Reporting Form and Instructions
Emergency Evacuation Route
APPENDICES
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
Appendix F
Appendix G
Hazardous Materials Business Plan
Operating Procedures
Maintenance Procedures
Hazard Analysis
Emergency Response Plan
RMPP Audit Checklist
RMPP Training Checklist
I. INTRODUCTION
This Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP) has been developed to minimize
the potential for release of Acutely Hazardous Materials (AHM) from the Kern Ice and Cold
Storage Company facility located in Bakersfield, California. The facility utilizes anhydrous
ammonia which is defined as an AHM under Chapter 6.95, Article 2, of the California
Health and Safety Code (H&SC). A copy of the Company's Hazardous Materials Business
Plan is included in Appendix A. At the request of the City of Bakersfield Fire Department,
Hazardous Materials Division, Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company prepared and
submitted the original RMPP in 1990 and later revised it in 1991. Again, at the request of
the City of Bakersfield Fire Department, Hazardous Materials Division, this RMPP was
revised and updated in June, 1996, to reflect the changes in the anhydrous ammonia
system since the 1991 revision.
As required under H&SC Section 25534(h), the Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company
RMPP has been reviewed and revised by WZI Inc. This RMPP, as defined in Section
25532, contains: "all of the administrative and operational programs of a business which
are designed to prevent acutely hazardous materials accident risks, including, but not
limited to, programs which include design safety of new and existing equipment, standard
operating procedures, preventive maintenance programs, operator training and accident
investigation procedures, risk assessment for unit operations, or operating alternatives,
emergency response planning, and internal or external audit procedures to ensure that
these programs are being executed as planned."
11140010.002 1
These administrative and operational requirements are fulfilled through the inclusion of
the following sections, which were included and approved in the original RMPP:
Facility Description
Accident History
Equipment History
Design and Operations
Detection and Monitoring
Operating Procedures
Auditing and Inspecting
Record Keeping
Responsible Personnel
Training Program
Schedule of Actions
Consequence Analysis Summary
Certification
Revisions
This revision of Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company's RMPP also includes all of the
management programs required under California Code of Regulations (CCR), Title 8,
Section 5189 for Process Safety Management (PSM) of AHM. These regulations contain
requirements for preventing or minimizing the consequences of catastrophic releases of
toxic, reactive, flammable or explosive chemicals. Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company's
programs required under PSM regulations parallel those of their RMPP which are also
intended to prevent or minimize releases of AHM and eliminate or reduce the risk to
employees.
11140010.002 2
Under CCR, Title 8, Section 5189, Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company may utilize the
facility's RMPP prepared pursuant to Article 2, Chapter 6.95 (commencing with Section
25531) of Division 20 of H&SC to the extent that it satisfies the requirements of the
stipulated subsections in the PSM regulation. Therefore, this RMPP document has been
updated with additional sections to satisfy both RMPP and PSM regulations and
requirements. These additional sections include:
Facility Emergency Response Plans
Management of Change
AHM Vendor and Contractor Program
Hot Work Operations Program
Lockout/Tagout Procedures
This RMPP revision is based upon an assessment of current processes, operations, and
procedures of the Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company facility and considers results of
hazards and operability studies that identified hazards associated with the storage and
handling of AHM. Programs contained in the RMPP are intended to be used by designated
employees. These employees will implement procedures detailed in this RMPP to improve
upon, maintain and document facility safety.
As specified in Section 25534 (f), Chapter 6.95, Article 2, H&SC, all records involving the
RMPP shall be kept for a minimum of five years. If a modification is made to the facility
that affects AHM handling, a revision of the RMPP must be made within 60 days of the
modification and so documented in Section II of this report (Revision Record).
11140010.002 3
VVZl tNC
II. REVISION RECORD
All records conceming this RMPP shall be kept for at least five years (Section 25534 (f)).
Necessary revisions to the RMPP will be made at least every three years. The RMPP
must be revised within 60 days of a modification that materially affects the handling of an
AHM (Section 25534 (h)). All revisions to this RMPP are to be recorded here.
DATE PAGES/
OF CHANGES/INPUTS MADE TO SECTION
CHANGE DOCUMENT AFFECTED SIGNATURE/DATE
4/91 Audit and Revise RMPP All
6~96 Audit and Revise RMPP All
11140010.002 4
DATE PAGES/
OF CHANGES/INPUTS MADE TO SECTION
CHANGE DOCUMENT AFFECTED SIGNATURE/DATE
11140010.002 5
III. FACILITY DESCRIPTION
A. Name and Location
Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company
120 30th Street
Bakersfield, California 93301
Exhibit 1 is a location map. A diagram of the facility is provided in Exhibit 2. The area
immediately surrounding the Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company plant is Used for
commercial, industrial and residential purposes, as shown in Exhibit 3.
B. Business Telephone
(805) 324-1911
C. Nature of Business
Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company operates a warehouse consisting of cold storage
rooms. Customers pay Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company for use of the rooms.
Ammonia, an AHM, is used as a refrigerant to cool the storage rooms to desired
temperatures.
D. Business Hours
Monday through Friday
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
11140010.002 6
IV. ACUTELY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS (AHM) DESCRIPTION
A. Anhydrous Ammonia System Capacity
Kern Ice and Cold Storage policy requires that the ammonia system is charged with a
maximum of 6,200 pounds of ammonia. Shipments of ammonia are delivered infrequently
to make up for ammonia that has escaped as fugitive emissions from the system.
B. Hazardous Properties of Ammonia
The term "anhydrous ammonia" refers to the compound having the formula NH3, formed
by the chemical combination of nitrogen and hydrogen. Whenever the term "ammonia"
appears in this RMPP, it should be understood as meaning anhydrous ammonia and not
aqua ammonia, aqueous ammonia or ammonium hydroxide, which are solutions of
ammonia in water. Ammonium hydroxide solutions generally range in concentrations of
ammonia from about 30% down to the 2 to 4% found in household ammonia.
These solutions are all commonly known as ammonia, but should not be confused with
liquid anhydrous ammonia, which has a much greater hazard potential. "Anhydrous"
means "free from water".
Because of its physical properties, a release of liquid ammonia has a greater potential to
cause serious injury than gaseous ammonia. Liquid ammonia released at a high rate can
form a dense, ground hugging cloud of small liquid particles dispersed in air. A dense gas
dispersion has the potential to move through surrounding areas. Ammonia vapors, lighter
than air, rise quickly in the atmosphere and are less likely to cause serious injury.
Ammonia vapors released into an unventilated area could reach high concentrations that
present a risk to employees who enter the area unprotected.
11140010.002 7
Ammonia, a colorless gas with an extremely pungent odor, can be detected by smell at
concentrations of 3.5 to 37 mg/m3 (5 to 53 parts per million). Ammonia is corrosive and
irritating to the skin. High concentrations can cause dermal burns, inflammation and
swelling of the eyes and can be temporarily blinding to exposed receptors. Levels of 500
mg/m3 (700 parts per million) can cause eye irritation. Coughing occurs at a level of 1,200
mg/m~ (1,700 parts per million). Exposure to higher concentrations can result in
debilitating injury and death through pulmonary edema. Ammonia is not recognized as a
carcinogen nor does it present a threat to the environment. If involved in a fire, a 16
percent to 25 percent ammonia mixture with air can explode.
The following table, Physiological Effects of Ammonia Vapor, indicates human
physiological response to various concentrations, in parts per million (ppm), of ammonia
in air upon inhalation.
PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AMMONIA VAPOR
EFFECT PPM AMMONIA IN
AIR BY VOLUME
Least perceptible odor 5 ppm
Readily detectable 20-50 ppm
No discomfort or impairment of health for prolonged exposure 50-100 ppm
General discomfort and eye tearing] no lasting] effect on short exposure 150-200 ppm
Severe irritation of eyes, ears, nose and throat; no lasting effect on short 400-700 ppm
exposure
Coughing, bronchial spasms 1,700 ppm
Dangerous, less than 1/2 hour exposure may be fatal 2,000-3,000 ppm
Serious edema, strangulation, asphyxia, rapidly fatal 5,000-10,000 ppm
Immediately fatal over 10,000 ppm
(From "Anhydrous Ammonia", Pamphlet G-2 Seventh Edition, Compressed Gas Association, Inc.)
11140010.002 8
VVZl INC
V. AHM PROCESS DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTION
A. General Ammonia Refrigeration Processes
Mechanical refrigeration is, essentially, the process of lowering the temperature of a
substance to below that of its surroundings for the purpose of heat extraction. At Kern Ice
and Cold Storage, ammonia, the cooled substance, removes heat from both surrounding
space and material substances contained within the facility's freezer and cooler rooms.
Two pressures, high and Iow, are used to enable a continuous cooling process.
Low pressure, heat ladened vapor is compressed raising its pressure level - and as a
consequence, its temperature level as well. The compressed vapor is discharged to a
condenser where heat is removed from the high pressure/temperature vapor through air
circulation and cooling water. The reduction in temperature accompanied by the removal
of heat from the vapor causes it to liquefy and flow to a receiver. The liquid refrigerant
then flows to an expansion valve where pressure is reduced, thereby reducing its boiling
point. The cooled ammonia moves to an evaporator where it absorbs heat from
surrounding substances being cooled and boils to a vapor. Vaporized ammonia then flows
to the compressor suction to complete the refrigeration cycle.
B. Operation of the Ammonia System
Exhibit 4 is a process flow diagram of the ammonia refrigeration system. The system is
designed to run continuously and employs two types of cooling systems: flooded and vapor
cooling. In the flooded system, liquid ammonia flows from the receiver to an accumulator
with liquid ammonia level controls. From the accumulator, liquid ammonia flows through
chiller coils and recold units stationed in each freezer room. As the liquid ammonia boils,
it draws heat in from the room. In the cooler rooms, liquid ammonia is expanded into a gas
by an expansion valve prior to entering the chiller coils. Vaporized ammonia in the coils
11140010.002 9
draws in heat from the rooms. When required, needed ammonia is added to the receiver
from a Department of Transportation approved tanker truck. A hose is used to deliver
ammonia from the tanker truck to the receiver. The receiver sight glass is constantly
watched during delivery to ensure that the proper amount of ammonia is transferred into
the system. The plant engineer supervises ammonia addition.
11140010.002 10
~l~lZ ItNC
VI. AHM EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY
The following equipment makes up the ammonia refrigeration system at Kern Ice and Cold
Storage Company. Each piece of equipment will be listed along with its nature, age and
condition.
Equipment:
Compressor #2
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
Manufacturer:
Model:
Serial Number:
Built in the 1940's.
This equipment is used to compress ammonia vapors. It is vertically
reciprocating, driven by a 60 horsepower electric motor.
Worthington
#VR-8C, 8 x 8
#L-48707
Well maintained, good condition.
Equipment:
Compressor #3
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
Manufacturer:
Model:
Serial Number:
Built in the 1940's.
This equipment is used to compress ammonia vapors. It is vertically
reciprocating, driven by a 50 horsepower electric motor.
Worthington
#VR-8C, 8 x 8
#L-47328
Well maintained, good condition.
11140010.002 11
Equipment:
Compressor #4
Nature;
Age:
Condition:
Manufacturer:
Model:
Serial Number:
Built in the 1940's.
This equipment is used to compress ammonia vapors. It is vertically
reciprocating, driven by a 75 horsepower electric motor.
Worthington
#VR-9E, 9 x 9
#L-52479
Well maintained, good condition.
Equipment:
Compressor #5
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
Manufacturer:
Model:
Serial Number:
Built in the 1950's.
This compressor is used to compress ammonia vapors. It is an
integral two compressor, vertically reciprocating, driven by a 200
horsepower electric motor.
Vilter
#440-VMC, Size 12
Unknown
The compressor was rebuilt in 1991 and is in good condition.
11140010.002 12
Equipment:
Worthington Ammonia Compressor #6
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
Manufacturer:
Model:
Serial Number:
Built in the 1940's.
This equipment is used to compress ammonia vapors. It is vertically
reciprocating, driven by a 125 horsepower electric motor.
Worthington
#VR-10E, 10 x 10
#L-57479
Well maintained, good condition.
Equipment:
Vertical Oil Separator
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
This 12 3/4 inch O.D. by 8 feet seam to seam vertical oil separator
removes oil from the high pressure ammonia vapor discharging from
the compressors. Oil is drained from the separator for reuse in the
compressors.
Manufacturer: Unknown
Model: Unknown
Serial Number: Unknown
Built in the 1940's.
Good.
11140010.002 13
Equipment:
Evaporative Condenser
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
This condenser cools the high pressure vapor ammonia to a liquid.
Air and water flow through the condenser, evaporating and cooling
ammonia flowing through small lines within the unit.
Manufacturer: Baltimore Aircoil
Model: Series 1500
Serial Number: Unknown
Installed new in 1996.
Excellent.
Equipment:
Vertical Purger
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
This McCarthy Steel Inc. purger vessel, 10 3/4 inch O.D. by 3 feet 8
inch seam to seam, vertical, purger vessel, removes air from the
ammonia system.
Manufacturer:
Model:
Serial Number:
Installed in 1940's.
Good.
McCarthy Steel Inc.
Unknown
Unknown
11140010.002 14
Equipment:
Ammonia Receiver
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
This is a high pressure horizontal steel vessel (4' diameter x 24'
length), which has been manufactured to accept and store anhydrous
ammonia. The vessel has been constructed to comply with Title 8
requirements and ASTM code.
Maximum capacity: 2114 gallons
Manufacturer: Roy E. Hanson Jr. Mfg.
Equipment I.D.: Unknown
Installed new in 1996.
Excellent.
Equipment:
Ammonia Receiver Manual King Valve & Solenoid Operated King
Valve
Nature;
Age:
Condition:
The solenoid valve controls liquid flow from the receiver to the
accumulator and freezer and cooler rooms. The King Valve is
manually operated, and the solenoid valve is automatically activated.
Manufacturer: Unknown
Model: Unknown
Serial Number: Unknown
NOTE: To close these valves, compressors must be shut down
with discharge valves closed.
Installed new in 1996.
Excellent.
11140010.002 15
Equipment:
Pre-cooler
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
This 24 inch O.D. by 7 feet 6 inch unit is used for heat transfer with
the ammonia system. Liquid ammonia from the receiver travels
through an internal coil and into the accumulator. Ammonia vapors
from the freezer rooms' recold units return to the pre-cooler, and then
pass to the compressors.
Manufacturer: Unknown
Model: Unknown
Serial Number: Unknown
Built in the 1940's.
Good.
Equipment:
Accumulator
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
The 10 3/4 inch O.D. by 4 feet seam to seam, vertical vessel
maintains the liquid ammonia level for freezer rooms' recold units.
Manufacturer: Unknown
Model: Unknown
Serial Number: Unknown
Installed in the 1940's.
Good.
11140010.002 16
Equipment:
Freezer Room Expansion Valve
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
The expansion valve opens, allowing liquid ammonia to flow through
the recold unit, absorbing heat from the room. The ammonia vapors
from the recold unit then return to the pre-cooler.
Manufacturer: Unknown
Model: Unknown
Serial Number: Unknown
Installed in the 1940's, solenoids replaced in 1990.
Good.
Equipment:
Typical Freezer Room
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
The freezer room recold unit contains coils in which liquid ammonia
absorbs heat from the room and vaporizes. An accumulator controls
the liquid level in rooms 1 and 3, while another accumulator controls
levels in rooms 2 and 4. The other freezer rooms, rooms 5 to 14,
have a level vessel in each room. Liquid ammonia flows from
receivers to the accumulator, past the expansion valve, through the
recold unit, then back to the pre-cooler where ammonia vapor returns
to the compressors.
Installed in the 1940's, solenoid valves replaced in 1990.
Good.
11140010.002 17
Equipment:
Cooler Room Expansion Valve
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
The expansion valve opens, expanding the liquid ammonia to a vapor
phase. The ammonia vapor flows through coils, absorbing heat from
the room. The ammonia vapor from the cooler rooms flows back to
the compressors.
Manufacturer:
Model:
Serial Number:
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Installed in the 1940's, solenoids replaced in 1990.
Good.
Equipment:
Typical Cooler Room
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
Rooms 15 through 34 are cooler rooms. The cooler room has an
expansion valve controlled by a solenoid, and a series of coils.
Liquid ammonia flows to the expansion valve, is expanded to a vapor,
absorbs heat from the room, and is' piped back to the compressors.
Installed in the 1940's.
Good.
Equipment:
Gas/Liquid Separation Vessels
Nature:
Ammonia vapors returning from the freezer and cooler rooms enter
these vessels allowing any remaining liquids to separate from the
vapors, thereby preventing compressor damage.
11140010.002 18
Age:
Condition:
Manufacturer:
Model:
Serial Number:
Unknown
Good
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Equipment:
Ammonia Lines
Nature:
Age:
Condition:
The ammonia lines carry the ammonia through the system.
Most lines have been in service since the 1940's; some lines have
been added as new equipment was added.
Good.
Equipment:
Relief Valve
Nature:
Pressure Relief
Setting:
Age:
Condition:
Dual safety relief valves are connected to the Ammonia Receiver.
These valves protect the system from high pressure. The Ammonia
Receiver is located outdoors, with the relief valve mounted on the top
of the unit approximately 7 feet above the ground. The valve is
vented to the Evaporative Condenser.
Manufacturer: Unknown
Model: Unknown
Serial Number: Unknown
Unknown
Installed in 1996.
Good.
11140010.002 19
VII. AHM OPERATING PROCEDURES
Written operating procedures providing clear instructions for safely conducting activities
involving each AHM process are a necessary step towards an effective RMPP. It is
important that written operating procedures be provided and adhered to by employees
involved with AHM operations to ensure that these tasks and procedures are performed
in a consistent and safe manner. Written operating procedures must be kept current by
documenting any changes that occur in any of the processes. Any changes in written
operating procedures involving AHM shall be communicated to all employees involved,
and be documented in Section II, Revision Record of this RMPP.
Written operating procedures that are readily available to employees and provide clear
instructions for safely conducting activities involved with AHM processes are maintained
at Kern Ice and Cold Storage and provided here in Appendix B. The procedures address
start-up, normal operation, normal shutdown, temporary operations as the need arises,
emergency operations including emergency shutdowns, and who may initiate these
procedures for each operating phase.
11140010.002 20
VIII.
AHM EQUIPMENT PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION
PROCEDURES AND SCHEDULES
A written program for regularly maintaining and inspecting the ongoing integrity of AHM
process equipment reduces the chance of an AHM release due to equipment failure or
malfunction. Kern Ice and Cold Storage has developed preventive maintenance and
written inspection programs for AHM handling equipment. These programs include daily,
monthly, and annual inspections and preventative maintenance checks. Written
procedures are to be followed when repair, maintenance or service is being performed on
certain AHM process equipment.
A copy of maintenance checks performed on the ammonia equipment is provided in
Appendix C. Maintenance records on the date and time of repair or service that was
performed on the AHM equipment is maintained on file at Kern Ice and Cold Storage.
11140010.002 21
IX.
AHM DETECTION, MONITORING AND AUTOMATIC CONTROL SYSTEMS PLUS
ADDITIONAL RISK REDUCTION MEASURES
A. Detection and Monitoring Systems
The nature of ammonia is such that the presence of its vapors would be detected by smell
at very Iow concentrations. A significant release would likely be detected visually as well.
Therefore, AHM releases will be primarily detected by employee sight and/or smell during
daily operations and inspections.
Additionally, an ammonia vapor detector is to be installed in the machinery room, where
the compressor is located. The ammonia dector shall activate visual and audible alarms
when ammonia vapor concentrations reach levels of one half the IDLH (250 ppm). The
detection system is also connected to Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company's central alarm
system which is monitored continuously, 24 hours per day. The central alarm system,
when activated, is set up to contact Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company's on-call
personnel, as well as the Bakersfield City Fire Department. This system meets the
requirements of Article 63 of the 1994 Uniform Fire Code.
B. Automatic Control Systems
The compressor High Pressure Shutdown device and Vibration/Motion Shutdown device
are automatic shutdown controls with manual reset by the plant operator. If either of these
devices actuate, the plant operator shall review the system before restarting the
compressors.
The engine room is also equipped with a continuous ventilation system which discharges
to atmosphere. When high levels of ammonia vapors are detected by the ammonia
monitor in the engine room, the ventilation system will automatically vent to the condenser
11140010.002 22
cooling water system, absorbing the ammonia vapors prior to reaching the atmosphere.
The ammonia monitor will activate this system when ammonia levels reach one half the
IDLH (250 ppm) or greater. This system meets the requirements of Article 63 of the 1994
Uniform Fire Code.
The ammonia receiver is equipped with an excess flow valve as shown on the process flow
diagram (Exhibit 4). In the event of a break in the liquid ammonia supply line, the excess
flow valve is designed to stop the flow of liquid ammonia. The excess flow valve is
estimated to activate when the flow of ammonia exceeds approximately 45 gallons per
minute.
C. Additional Risk Reduction Measures
Additional measures taken at Kern Ice and Cold Storage to reduce or mitigate an AHM
release or accident include:
· Installation of traffic barriers around accessible areas of the ammonia
receiver.
Employees are trained to respond to AHM emergencies,
Fire extinguishers are placed strategically throughout the office,
shop, compressor room, warehouse and plant,
· An emergency evacuation assembly point is established,
Emergency CPR life saving procedures and general first aid training
is completed by all personnel, and
SCBA and other safety equipment training is completed by all
employees.
11140010.002 23
X. AHM HAZARD ANALYSIS
The Hazard Analysis is the cornerstone of an effective RMPP. The Hazard Analysis
includes results of a Hazard and Operability Study which identifies the hazards associated
with the handling of an AHM due to events which may present an AHM accident risk, such
as:
· operating error
· equipment failure
· facility siting
· external events
For the hazards identified in the Hazard and Operability Studies, offsite consequence
analyses are performed for the most credible hazards assuming the most pessimistic
situations and air dispersion modeling and other adverse environmental conditions. This
includes a clearly prepared map noting the location of the facility and surrounding
populations and the zones of vulnerability, including the pessimistic levels of exposure in
each zone.
The Hazard Analysis is contained in Appendix D.
11140010.002 24
Xl.
AHM ACCIDENT/INCIDENT HISTORY, INVESTIGATION, RECURRENCE
PREVENTION AND REPORTING PROCEDURES
A. Accidents at this Location
No reportable accidents involving acutely hazardous materials have occurred in the last
three years.
B. Accident/Incident Investigation and Recurrence Prevention Procedures
After an accident has occurred, an ammonia incident report (Exhibit 5) shall be completed.
A post accident review shall be held in which potential causes of the accident are
discussed. When the cause of the accident has been determined, a method shall be
developed to ensure that the accident will not recur. System design, operating and
maintenance procedures that need updating or alteration shall be noted, and a time
schedule set for implementation of improvements.
C. Release Reporting Procedures
Pursuant to Section 25507 of Chapter 6.95, Article 1 of the H&SC, releases of AHM that
may threaten human life, health and safety or the environment must be reported. The
Manager is responsible for determining the significance and reportability of a release. The
Manager is also responsible for reporting a release. If an ammonia release exceeds 200
cubic feet during a 24-hour period, the event is reportable and the following agencies must
be notified immediately.
11140010.002 25
City of Bakersfield Fire Department
Hazardous Materials Division
Telephone: (805) 326-3979
California Office of Emergency Services
Telephone: (800) 852-7550
National Response Center
Telephone: (800) 424-8802
D. Emergency Release Follow-Up Notice
In addition to the verbal notification, a written follow-up report is required to be completed
as soon as practicable, but no later than 30 days following a release. The completed
report is to be sent to the Office of Emergency Services. A form, approved by the Office
of Emergency Services, is provided in Exhibit 6. This form, when filled out, reports follow-
up information required by Section 25507 of Chapter 6.95, Article 1 of the H&SC and Title
42 United States Code, Section 11004. Instructions for filling out and mailing the form
when complete is also provided in Exhibit 6.
11140010.002 26
Xll. FACILITY AHM EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS
Emergencies involving the use of AHM can result in catastrophic consequences if not
properly handled. For that reason, it is important that employees know what procedures
to follow for emergency shutdowns, evacuation procudures and routes (Exhibit 7),
emergency response notification, and for controlling the emergency at all times. A written
Emergency Response Plan is an effective means of addressing emergency response and
control. Kern Ice and Cold Storage's Emergency Response Plan is provided in Appendix
E.
11140010.002 27
Xlll. RMPP AUDIT PROGRAM
The RMPP Audit Program entails the use of a checklist to provide a method to confirm that
the RMPP is being effectively implemented. A copy of the RMPP Audit Checklist employed
at Kern Ice and Cold Storage is provided in Appendix F. This audit is conducted annually.
Completion of the RMPP Audit Checklist can result in initiating action items such as
establishing training programs and procedure reviews, including regular reviews of audit
results to improve employee participation and implementation of the RMPP. A copy of
each audit shall be kept onsite for a minimum of 5 years, including any action items
generated.
Other goals to be achieved by the ammonia safety audit are:
To pinpoint, actual and potential safety hazards due to design, location,
operation and maintenance of the ammonia system.
To provide a means of objectively assessing and documenting plant safety.
To provide a means of objectively defining needs for upgrading and
modification.
To provide feedback on safety issues.
11140010.002 28
XlV. MANAGEMENT OFCHANGE
VVhen changes are being considered involving the technology of the process, as well as
the facility, it is important to thoroughly evaluate the changes to assure that the impact on
safety and health is analyzed. It is also important to determine if any modifications to
operating procedures are necessary.
Prior to implementing any changes to the AHM systems, Kern Ice and Cold Storage will
establish written procedures to manage changes to process chemicals, technology,
equipment, procedures, and facilities. The following issues will be addressed by the
written procedures:
Technical basis for the proposed change(s).
Impact of the changes on health and safety.
Modification of the operating procedures.
Implementation schedule for the change.
Authorization for the proposed change.
Employees involved with affected processes will be informed of, and trained in the
changes as early as practicable prior to startup of the process involved. Written operating
procedures will be updated as needed. The Hazards Analysis will be amended to reflect
the changes implemented, if necessary.
11140010.002 29
XV. RMPP RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL
As required under Section 25534.(g) of Chapter 6.95 Article 1 of the H&SC,
"The RMPP shall identify, by title, all personnel at the business who are
responsible for carrying out the specific elements of the RMPP and their
respective responsibilities, and the RMPP shall include a detailed training
program to ensure that those persons are able to implement the RMPP."
All personnel who are onsite at the Kern Ice and Cold Storage facility have certain
responsibilities to effectively implement this RMPP. The following list outlines the various
elements of the RMPP and personnel responsible for implementing these elements.
RMPP ELEMENT PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE
FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Plant Manager
Plant Engineer
AHM emergency response and notification Including, but not limited to:
· AHM vapor cloud release
· AHM liquid release
Understand AHM hazards, systems, operating procedures and daily equipment
inspections
Accident/incident livesti~]ation documentation
Perform AHM equipment inspection and preventive maintenance
AccidentJlinvesfigation recurrence preventative Implementation
Ensure all personnel have received required training
Perform RMPP audit
Changes to AHM equipment and/or process-revise RMPP
Update RMPP every three years
Maintain RMPP records
Review RMPP audit results
Plant Engineer
Plant Manager
Plant Engineer
Plant Engineer
11140010.002 30
XVI.
RMPP TRAINING PROGRAM
Effective training programs are necessary to ensure that all plant personnel can
successfully implement the elements of this RMPP. Training will be able to provide a
continuity of safety despite employee turnover. Training ensures that plans and programs
such as emergency evacuation plans will work as designed when they are needed.
The following subjects will be covered by the training program:
Use of Safety Equipment
Ammonia First Aid Procedures
Review of Material Safety Data Sheets, Chemical Hazards
Fire Prevention Response
Release Reporting (Section 2.5)
Evacuation Procedures (Section 8.1)
Earthquake Procedures (Section 8.3)
Spill Containment and Dilution Procedures (Section 8.4)
Daily Operating Procedures (Section 4.1)
Maintenance Procedures (Section 4.2)
Training is verified by testing employees for comprehension of the training programs
developed for the elements of the RMPP that need ongoing implementation. Included in
Appendix G is a master checklist documenting the date and type of training received by
each employee working at the facility.
11140010.002 31
XVll.
RMPP SCHEDULE OF ACTIONS
The following schedule lists target dates or frequency for accomplishment of each element
and/or requirement of the RMPP:
Element Target Date
* Notice for public comment
September 1996
* End public comment period
November 1996
* Install guard rails
May 1997
* Install and test ammonia monitor and June 1997
exhaust vent control system
* Perform RMPP audit-checklist
July, 1997
Training complete for AHM emergency
response and notification procedures
Ongoing
(complete with
change in personnel)
Facility equipment/procedures modification
Update RMPP
Within 60 days of
modification
Update RMPP
Minimum every 3 years
(1999)
11140010.002 32
XVlll.
AHM VENDOR AND CONTRACTOR PROGRAM
When selecting a vendor or contractor to service, repair or perform maintenance on or
adjacent to a process which uses AHM, the contractor's safety performance and programs
will be obtained and reviewed. Kern Ice and Cold Storage will familiarize the contractor
with the inherent hazards of the work area by requiring the contractor to visit the work site
with a qualified plant representative prior to the commencement of work. Contractors shall
be informed of any applicable safety rules of the facility.
11140010.002 33
XIX.
LOCKOUT/TAGOUT PROCEDURES
As necessary, certain AHM equipment will require Lockout and/or Tagout for isolation
during inspection, maintenance and/or repair. All plant personnel, vendors and contractors
are required to abide by Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company lockout procedures.
11140010.002 34
XX. HOT WORK OPERATION PROGRAM
Kern Ice and Cold Storage has developed and implemented procedures for the issuance
of "hot work" permits. Hot work is defined as electric or gas welding, cutting, brazing or
any extreme heat, flame, or spark producing procedures or operations.
The permit, which is kept on file until completion of the hot works operation, shall indicate
the date(s) authorized for hot work, identify equipment to which hot work will be done, and
shall certify that the applicable portions of the fire prevention and protection requirements
contained in CCR, Sections 48488 and 6777, have been implemented prior to beginning
hot work operations.
11140010.002 35
XXI.
RMPP RECORD KEEPING
As required under Section 25534(f) of Chapter 6.95, Article 2 of the H&SC, Kern Ice and
Cold Storage "shall maintain all records concerning the RMPP for a period of at least five
years." The following elements of the RMPP require written records which are to be
maintained for a minimum period of 5 years:
·
·
·
·
·
·
AHM deliveries - dates and amounts (Section IV),
Changes in AHM processes and/or equipment (Section V, VI and XlV),
Changes in AHM operating and maintenance procedures (Section VII,
VIII and XlV),
Preventive maintenance and AHM equipment inspection documentation
(Section VIII),
Changes in AHM monitoring and automatic control systems (Section IX
and XlV),
Revisions to the consequence analysis (Section X),
AHM accident/incident reports (Section Xl),
AHM accident/incident recurrence prevention implementation (XI),
Changes in emergency response and notification plans (Section Xll),
RMPP audit documentation (Section Xlll), and
Training and safety meeting documentation (Section XV).
11140010.002 36
W~I ~nC
'XXII.
QUALIFICATIONS OF CERTIFIERS
Qualified Person
Mary Jane Wilson, President, WZI Inc.
Ms. Wilson received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Petroleum Engineering from
Stanford University in 1972. She is registered as an Environmental Assessor in California.
Ms. Wilson is the President and Chief Executive Officer of WZI Inc. She monitors WZI Inc.
projects to maintain technical standards. She has extensive experience (over 24 years
total) in the petroleum and environmental consulting industries. She has participated in
the design of numerous compliance programs related to the environmental safety of
operating facilities.
Richard Dixon, Plant Engineer
Mr. Dixon has been with Kern Ice and Cold Storage since November, 1989. He oversees
operations and maintenance of the ammonia system. Mr. Dixon is a certified welder and
has received refrigeration training. He was maintenance supervisor for Excel Mineral for
seven years.
11140010.002 37
XXlII.
RMPP CERTIFICATION
Section 25534 (j) of the CHSC requires that the RMPP and any revisions be certified as
complete by a qualified person and the facility operator.
Section 25532 of the CHSC defines a qualified person as "a person who is qualified to
attest at a minimum, to the validity of the hazard and operability studies performed
pursuant to Section 25534, and the relationship between the corrective steps taken by the
handler following the hazard and operability studies and those hazards which were
identified in the studies".
Qualifications of the certified person, Mary Jane Wilson, and the plant engineer, Richard
Dixon, are contained in Section XXII of this RMPP.
I hereby certify that this RMPP is complete, that the hazard and operability studies
performed on the behalf of Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company are valid and that
programs included in this RMPP will mitigate potential hazards determined through the
hazard and operability study.
' .~~ 'J~an~Vil"~n
Expiration Date: June 30, 1@@7
Richard Dixon
Plant Engineer
Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company
11140010.002 38
H KERN GOLF ¢OU~
I i ..t · ! [
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
120 30th STREET
BAKERSFIELD, CA.
T.305. R.26r=
-- -- GREENFIELD
I
T.32S. R.2~E.
T. 12N:...I~,~2W.
T.32S. R.2?E.
[T.12N. R. tgW.
'"~, ~"d'~.. ~t~s "'----
WZl INC.
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
LOCATION MAP
DATE
12/90 1114.0010A I
ROOM 16
ROOM 14 "\ ROOM 13 ....
........ 90 '--" .~ T STATION
.. REVISED 4/91
#1 TO 14
#15 TO 34
LEGEND
FREEZER ROOMS
COOLER ROOMS
WZl INC.
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
FACIL~Y DIAGRAM
" ' lu ...... "- " ~- ~ I- |~ ~_ ~ ~ ~.~0~'. .~~
~um. ..~..nu.~; - ~ . ~ ~ ~ ..... ~ ~ BAKERSFIELD
[ ~neer V/llage~ . ~ ~ ~ -- MEMORIAL
'. ~ ' ' ~ 5T ~ . I '
~.~-'~t~TH .... ;~ ~ ~r ! ~TH a~°~ST~ ~ /o~ ~BEI
--~r~~ ~ t~RD ST I ~ ~RD 3T /
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~TH~ ~ ~ STI~ ........ __ ~ __ ~ ....
. ,
I ~ ~' ':'~1
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,< ..... ~ ~,o,~ ~1
- STATE 178
SLEEP-
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CROAD
WZl INC.
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
MAP OF SURROUNDING AREA
REVISED 4/91 DATE 12/90 I 1114.0010A IEXHIBIT 3
I
I
· 4,' ROOM 28 ROOM 27 .... .~..~
ROOM20 .OOU 9---pJ;
ROOM 18 ~ ROOM 17 ,-- ~ I ; T
====~=__-= I: .. .I
/
ROOM16 '~ ROOMIS -"~--
ROOM 14 ROOM 13
ROOM 12 ROOM 11
· - ROOM 10 ROOM 9 ,,..',:
~ ROOM 8 ~; ROOM 7
· ? ROOM 6 ~; ROOM5 .~
~'" ~: ~ :~_~ ~ ~' ROOM 1 '_ _ _1
T
T
....
#1 TO 14
#15 TO 34
LEGEND
FREEZER ROOMS
COOLER ROOMS
WZl INC.
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
EVACUATION ROUTES
DATE 7~96 11114.0010 IEXHIBIT 7
AMMONIA
COMPRESSORS
SUCTION ~-~ 2 ~ ~SCHARGE
SUCTION DISCHARGE
OIL
SEPARATOR
KNOCKOUT
VESSELS
TYPICAL I
FREEZER ROOM I
RECOLD~__L
.OW PRESSURE RETURN [LIQUID
.~ I ACCUMU LATO R
.--- ,,...1_,/
HIGH PRESSURE RETURN
EXPANSI~
I TYPICAL
COOLER ROOM
VAPOR
EVAPORATIVE
CONDENSER
PRECOOLER
KING VALVE
(SOLENOID
OPERATED)
KING VALVE
(MANUALLY
OPERATED)~
MMONIA RECEI!~
s
VALVE
EMERGENCY
DIFFUSION
TANK
TO COMPRESSOR
SUCTION HEADER
PURGE
VESSEL
AMMONIA INCIDENT REPORT
FACILITY:
DATE OF INCIDENT:
TIME OF INCIDENT:
SEVERITY OF INCIDENT:
VERY SERIOUS
SERIOUS
LOW THREAT
Caused evacuation of the plant or neighbors, or
serious injury, and required the use of SCBA
(self contained breathing apparatus) to contaia.
Caused injury and or damage to property and
required the use of SCBA (self contained
breathing apparatus) to contain.
Required breathing equipment but caused no
injury or damage.
LOCATION IN FACTORY:
SOURCE OF DISCHARGE (TYPE OF EQUIPMENT)
COMPONENT OR ITEM DISCHARGING (SUCH AS SEAL, VALVE, WELD...)
CAUSE OF DISCHARGE:
AMMONIA INCIDENT REPORT PAGE 1
EXHIBIT 5
1114.0010
ACTIVITY AT TIME OF DISCHARGE:
DETAILS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
DEGREE OF CONTROL LOW MODERATE
EFFECTIVENESS OF EMERGENCY PLAN LOW
DEFICIENCIES IN THE EMERGENCY PLAN:
HIGH
MODERATE
HIGH
CONSEQUENCES OF DISCHARGE:
NUMBER OF PEOPLE HURT
NUMBER HOSPITALIZED
EVACUATION:
IMMEDIATE DISCHARGE AREA
ENTIRE FACILITY (Y/N)
NEIGHBORS ~ (Y/N)
ESTIMATED COST OF INCIDENT:
EMPLOYEES OTHERS
EMPLOYEES OTHERS
~ (Y/N)
PROBABLE RECURRENCE OF INCIDENT: LOW MODERATE HIGH
FULL DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT (INCLUDING RELEVANT EVENTS LEADING TO THE
INCIDENT; ACTS, FAILURES TO ACT AND/OR CONDITIONS THAT CONTRIBUTED DIRECTLY TO THE
INCIDENT; WHAT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN TO CONTROL THE INCIDENT; WHAT REMEDIAL ACTION
HAS BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE.
AMMONIA INCIDENT REPORT PAGE 2
EXHIBIT 5
1114.0010
§ 27(}5 BARCLAYS CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS Title 19
c
EM~ERGEaNCY RELEASE FOLLOW-UP NOTICE REPORTING FORM
BUSLNESS NAME
I FACIL[TYEMERGENCYCONTACT& PHONE NUMBER
CHECK IF CHEMICAL IS LISTED IN CHECK IF RELEASE REQUIRES NOTIFICATION
aO CFR 355. APPENDIX A [] :- UNDER al U.S.C. § 9603(a)
[] [] w^TER [] O,HER DAYS HOURS
__ Ml2q UTES
ACTIONS TAKEN
E
K.XOWN OR ANTICIFATED HEALTH EFFECTS (U~ u~¢ comments s~cfion for additional information)
[] ACL-I'E OR IMMEDIATE (exptain~
[] CHRONIC OR DELAYED (explaim
[] NOT KNOWN (expl~im
ADVICE REGARDING .MEDICAL ATTENTION NECESSARY FOR EXPOSED INDIVIDU.M.S
COMMENTS INDICATE SECTION (A-Gl AND ITEM WITH COMMENTS OR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
CERTIFICATION: I hereby ceftiN, under penalty of law ~hat I l'~v¢ personally examined and I am familiar with the
information ~bmitted and believe the submitted information is u'ue. accurate, and complete.
REPORTING FACILITY REPRESENTATIVE (print or
SIGNATURE OF REPORTL~G FACILITY REPRESENTATIVE DATE
Page 120
EXHIBIT 6
N~. I~.-I~ 5-10-96
Title 19 Office of Emergency Ser¥ice~ § 2705
EMERGENCY RELEASE FOLLOW-UP NOTICE
REPORTING FORM INSTRUCTIONS
G ENER.-~L INFOI~MATION:
Chapter 6.95 of Division 20 of the California Health and Sa.t'ety Code requires that v. Titten emergency release follow-up notices pre-
....~--~ """~, ......... .... "~ 42 U.S.C. § !,r~a, ~, ,,.~'~ ~.~,,~;,,~,~.,~,,,,,,,,,.~ ,,~;,, .- ,~,;~ ~,,,,...,.. ~,,~ , ,.vcrtm~;" tcrm.' Non-pe,,-mit~ed ~' ....... ..... .,.~,t' ~,.,.,-,,-, ~.,.~v.,,,...,,,. ...... ,~.-,,.,,,.o';';~ 0f Ex-
tremely Hazard. s Substances (listed in 40 CFR 355. appendix A) or of chemicals that require release reporting under section 103(a)
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation. and Liability Act of 1980 [42 U.S.C. § 9603(a)] must be reported on
the form. as soon as practicable, but no later than 30 days. following a release. The written follow-up report is required in addition
to the verbal notification.
BASIC INSTRUCTIONS:
· The form. when filled out. reports follow-up infcrrnation required by 42 U.S.C § 11004. Ensure that all information requested
by the fcrrn is provided as completely as possible.
· If the incident involves reportable releases of more than one chemical, prepare one report form for each chemical released.
· If the incident involves a series of separate releases of chemical(s) at different times, the releases should be reported on separate
reporting forms.
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS:
Block A: Enter the name of the business and the name and phone number of a contact person who can provide detailed facility infof
marion concerning the release.
Block B: Enter the date of the incident and the time that verbal notil'ication was made to dES. The dES control number is provided
to the caller by dES at the time verbal noti/'icafion is made. Enter this control number in the space provided.
Block C: Provide information pertaining to the lccation where the release cccurred. Include the street address, the city or community.
the county and the zip code.
Block D: Provide infcrrnation concerning the specil'ic chemical that was released. Include the chemical or trade name and the Chemi-
cal Abstract Service (CAS) number. Check all categories that apply. Provide best available information on quantity, time and duratiou
of the release.
Block E: Indicate all actions tal<en to respond to and contain the release as specified in 42 U.S.C. § 11004¢).
Block F: Check the categories that apply to the health effects that cccurred or could result from the release. Provide an explanation
or description of the effects in the space provided. Use Btcck H for additional comments/information il'necessary to meet requirements
specified in 42 U.S.C. § 1 I004(c).
Block G: Include information on the type of medical attention required for exposure to the chemical released. Indicate when and
how this infcrrnation was made available to individuals exposed and to medical personnel, ii' appropriate for the incident, as specii'ied
in 42 U.S.C. § I I004(c).
Block H: List any additional pertinent information.
Block I: Print or type the name of the facility representative submitting the report. Include the official si~ature and the date that
the form was prepared.
MAIL THE COMPLETED REPORT TO:
Chemical Emergency Planning and Response Commission (CEPRC)
Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)
Attn: Section 304 Reports
2800 Meadowview Road
Sacramento; CA 95832
NOTE: Authority. cited: Sections 25503. 25503. I and 9-5507.1. Health and Safety
Code. Reference: Sections 25503(b}(4}. 25503.1. 25507.1. 25518 and 25520.
Health and SafeR Code.
HISTORY:
1. New section filed 9-20-9~. operative 10-20-90 (Register 90. No. 45}.
Page 121
-EXHIBIT 6
MEETING
AREA
ROOM 34 ROOM 33
·
",' ROOM 32
';' ROOM 30
ROOM 31 '".
F~OOM 29
ROOM 28 ROOM 27 ,-',..
'~' ROOM 26
ROOM 25
ROOM 23 .....
· 7. ROOM 24
ROOM 22 ROOM 21
ROOM 20 ROOM 19
": ROOM 18 ROOM 17 ,-'-
ROOM 16 ROOM 15 ~"
ROOM 14 ROOM 13
ROOM 12 ROOM 11
T
· ': ROOM 10 ROOM
~ ROOM 8 ~ ROOM
.OOM
": ROOM4 ~
RCC~
_r-.~.. AMMONIA --
..... DIFFUSION.
;30 ~ 3 T STATION
#1 TO 14
#15 TO 34
LEGEND
FREEZER ROOMS
COOLER ROOMS
WZI INC.
BAKERSFIELD. CALIFORNIA
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
EVACUATION ROUTES
DATE 7/96 11114.0010,1EXHIBIT 7
I
APPENDIX A
Hazardous Materials Business Plan
CITY qf B,qA'ERSFI£LD
· '.~f'£"C. [RE"
KEI~N ICE & COLD STCP~AGE CO~SPANY
{ t3'De or 5rin%
Jessie ~;. Daugh%r¥
name)
ce--4 ~" that I have reviewed r.h...
RECEIVED
JAN 2 z~ 1989
,~s'~
attached
Hazardous Haterials business
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE COMPANY
name of businessl
and that it along with the attached additions
:
er czrrect.±ons constitute a
complete and correct
Business Plan for my facility.
January tO, 1989 ,
~iaUe
LOCFiTiON IZ~ 3~,'),r~ $'f N..'~H HAZP~RD R~'FING Z
O. EMPLOYEE N(Y~'IFICfiTigN / CuA{[I~MFION
I_RST CHANGE IZ/Z3/87 BY EVRMC
SEC Z) PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM - INTERCOM VOCAL ALBRM
LEAVE BY NE~RESI' O00R
OFFICE FORCE ANO PERSONNEL USE GAS MASKS
CALL
E. MITIOATION / PREVENTION /"RBRTEMENT "
LAST CHANGE IZ/Z3/8T BY EVRMC
SEC 1) MAINTAIN SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURES'AT SAFE LEVELS, OPERATE
MATERIAL HANOLING EQUZPI~'NT UrTH CRF~ NEAR"S~TEM COMPONENTS
PAGE 4
'TZ/'20/'BB
MATERIAL SAFETY'DATA SYSTEMS, [NC. (8~S) B.¢8~8~3''''
NORTH
(CH~¢~ OXE)
SITE D [AGRA3!
FACILITY DIAGRAM
, t
I(rnspec~:b~" s .Commemc$):
-OFFICIAL USE ONLY-
- 5A -
~ORTH
sc.~.~:,,o.~ ~t;s;:~ss x~,,~kERN ICE~COLD STG'~°~'~: ~ ~? ~
FACILITY D [AGRA3{ ~'
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(C~ECX ONE)
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FACILITY
.I
rnspec~oF's
Commencs):
-OFFICIAL USE ONLY-
NORTH
~.~-:: ~.' ,,/r~ F,~c::.r'r¥ '~'~'~:WAREHOUSE ~=r:' -':Z ~ "/
FAC. ii. ITY D[AGRAM ~' .
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inspec=oF's Comments):
-OFFICIAL USE ONLY-
- 5A -
OFF'iCE
f~CF I~GE I~ATED
FLL~
WAREHOUSE
.]( Ins?ecl:or' s
Comments):
-OFFICIAL USE ONLY-
- 5A
H'iG?I H.~,iF, F~O R~TTNI:; ',.'
R. 0uER~qLL H~'Z.~F{DOU5 l'l~.£Ei~,[F!l..5
t.F~S'F CHANGE ~J1/lg/8~ 8Y EuAi'IC
TYPE ',' c' ..
~,n:. Mt'~:< AMT UNiT HAZARD
LOC:-; i"! ON LfiN'rA !
, ,,~:~ F USE
f PURE ANHYDROUS r:JMl'l(JN[r'l 13B~")~ FT3
'rHROUGHOUI' FAC I L ['rY [ N PROC .' MILCH t N~Y COOL I NG
tO PE[~CENT COMPONEN~ S
MODERATE
H~ZRR9 LIST
MODERATE ED
PURE LUBE OIL
NW CORNER COMPRESSOR
ID PERCENT COMPONENTS
ZB05~0~ IG~...O MOTOR OIL
300 GAL
DRUMS OR BARRELS MET.. LUBRICANT
UNKNOWN
HAZARD LIST
UNKNOWN
WASTE LUBE OIL/WATER
WEST OF COMPRESSOR ROOM
ID PERCENT COMPONENTS
lABS.AG 1(~3.0 URSTE OIL
Z~ GAL
DRUMS OR BARRELS MET.. LUBRICANT
UNKNOWN
HAZARO LIST
UNKNOWN
WASTE LUBE OIL/WATER
WEST OF COMPRESSOR ROOM
ID PERCENT COMPONENTS
1SgB.~ 1~.0 WASTE OIL
50 GAL UNKNOWN
DRUMS OR BARRELS MET.. OIL TREATMENT
HAZARD LIST
UNKNOWN
B. FIRE PROTECTION / WATER SUPPLIES
LR~T','CHRNGE IZ,'Z3/8? BY EVAMC
SEC 4) 12 - ABC 10'EXTINGUISHERS
Z - ABC S EXTINGUISHERS ' '
I - OXYGEN EXTINGUISHER : '
14 - 1 I/Z" HOSE WITH NOZZELS. REE£S
I -' SCOTT AIR P~CK
SEC S) FIRE HYDRANT SW CORNER OF LOT ON 30TH ST
PAGE 3
MATERIAL SAFETY ORTR SYSTEMS, INt.-. (805) G4.8-G8~XZ)
12120/88 1Z :0'7
We are w~king with the n~cessary authorities, Health, and Fire .Denartment in
otter to acco .m~..lish a oroper training program for all em~_ loyees, and personnel
at %his plan*.. .',e ha~ al:.;ays m%~u%ained a sa~'ety ~.d health program for our
employees in regard to haza=dous ma%eriaZs.
LOCAL EMERGENCY MEDtCRL' RSSi'STRNC~
LAST'CHANGE 12/Z3187 BY EVAMC
2A SEC S) MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
420 34TH ST
3Z?-17BZ
ANY CONVENIENT E~ERGENCY MEDICAL FACILITY
PAGE Z
MATERIAL SAFETY ~TR SYSTEMS, [NC'. [gOS) G48-G88Q
1Z/ZO/88 1Z:O?
i . OVEhVt
.$UF:I 5 EOBE
LHST EHRN('.:,E iZ/Z3/~,? BY
· a:;r~£1..D STaTiON ¢)4
(.;RIO i90 ~:F~C~L_rT'f' Ul~l['F~ i HRz~RrD E~I'ING Z
RESPONSE SUMMARY
ZR 5E6 4.) JESS E, RUGHTHY - r~RNRGER
LEON 5'FRNFIELD-- pt.~NT.EI, IGIN%ER
G~RY .JOHNSON - FOREMAN
EMER6ENCY CONTRCTS
JESS DRUTHTRY ~Z4-~9~1 OR 589-Z577
LEON STRNFiELB
UTILITY SHUTOFFS
585-ZS77
1-536-~
831-9373
a) GRS - BETWEEN COMPRESSOR aNB OFFICE BUILDING B) ELECTRICAL - INSIDE COM-
PRESSOR ROOM - SW CORNER C) WATER - EaST OF FIRE HYDRANT
O) S4=ECIAL - NONE E) LOCK BOX - NO
Z. NOTIFICATION / PUBLIC EVaCUaTION
LaST CHANGE 7 /1 /81BY
Approximately 8 years ago we were installing an ev~porater when the crane
operator dropped the unit on a 1%2" amonia line causing a small rupture
and a sma11 amount cf amonia evaporated. We do not hav~ any knowledge of
any additional Ammonia (Anhydrous) leakage, or loss.
< NO INFORMATION REUOROED FOR TRIS'SECTION >
We have adequate gas mask for all personnel, and hav~ begun safety traLuln~
for employees at this plant. We appreciate the coopera%icn by the Fire
Department, and other authorities who hav~ worked with us in order to achie~
our safety program.
PaGE I
1Z/ZO/88 IZ:O~
MATERIAL SAFETY DaTA S¥S~MS, INC. (805) 848-GB(2X~
I ALS' I NVI~ N'I'U {~¥
P
P
M
W-2:
P
'p
2
300
^111111^1o
AMI)till I'
135,.000
hO0
200
5o
100
· l.t I'1;! lit ¥
' IUf I1'^1.
3oo
50
200
100- 200
OHltGIt llAH£t
CIT¥,ZlPf
FACII, ITY UNIT J ....
U tl I T II A H !-,: WARI~[OgSR
I;IIII'I'^I:T:
I't~III'^CT:
IlllS I
PIIOIIE ! t
'7
I,(I(:^TI(IN III TIII6
FACILITy tlNIT
Thru-out facility
N W Corner Compressor ~
o
~ I~y
100
FAUII, ITY
Jt)FF I I:l Al. USE
t)IILY
g
CII£HIt;AL Oil CUHHUtl
Anhydrous Ammonia (NH3)
HAME
CF I II.q
J 1!
~:~NA
Lube Oil
CMLQ
OIIATUII£ t
A [: T ! V I T Y: ....COT.~ STOR3_G~
- Il^ ' __~_.
~,, 0,, ~ , ,.,J 9 ,,,,,,, g.. ~?.~-z n~o/k__~ ~..
6FTE~ BUS. II~S: ~ .....
T I TLS t ~MAHAGER
T ! TI, F, ~~,~ O
LEON STANFIELD - T ! T I, £ I _ENO _INEER
W. of Compressor Rm 99 Lube Oil Water CMLQ
W. of Compressor Rm 50 '. Lube Oil Water CMLQ
Middle of Maint. Shop 100 Oxygen OXID
" " " " 100 ~cetylene FLGS
CITY oj
KERSFIELD
N O N -- 'J' !~ A I.) i-2 S i-. C I~ I_'2 '1' -~
a partnership ,~ ..1.. o~ .2...
.usf.[$s NaM£: Kern Ice & Cold Storage Co. o.~t~ ~a~: Arno~ K~sche~ NA.~ Or T~S F3~ILiT~:~amO aS busin~a~
~OCAT]O.:_ 'l~O-30th S~reet~ A~D.ZSS: F"'0 Box 22 A, STA.D~RD I.D. C~SS CODZ~C.28110-28160
.,~O.Z ,: 32~-1911, '322~6h9-, P.onz .: 3662,)26? ' '- BBB of Babe~~~ ~._ -
, ~,' ~ ~,,~ ~,~ c.~.s. ~_ 7~G-h~7 ~ ,~ ~ s c.,.s. ~
:~ ,n ,~, ~; Tit~ 3-01 - : ~ture of Nitrogen ~n~ tly~ogen,
.... _ ~. ~ ~ c.~.s. ~
densgd by co~ and press~e,,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~.~-~. ~ motors, low carb~ c~ten~.)
~ltk Of ~ ~ltk .............
.~K, ~,~,s ,, ~ON ST~FIE~ ENGIN~ 1-536-8508 . JESS DkUOHI~Y, ~NAGF~ n~2h-1911 Res589-257?
' ,lassie W DaughLry, l'hnagor ~~j~~l~/~. J~u~y 23, 1989
N ('~ N '--: '1' I:t A I) !.-] ~ !~ (7 il lg '1' ~
A co-par[ne~ship "q' .~.. 0' .~.
Kern Ice & Co~ S[orage Co. OWNER Sa~g: Arno~ Kirschonm~ s~,t OF T~ lAbILITY: Sa~ aS buo~t2~s~
,.OC^TIU-: IZU-3U%I~ St,., aODR'~SS: P 0 Box 23 A. S?aSOAnO I,O. cnass cooE]ec.281102281601
.......... )ress~e equivalent ~o a pressure or
- -- r-- r--~ -- C~t I1 h I C.l.S. ~
~tl Irk ol Prfl ~vre ~l It h
APPENDIX B
Operating Procedures
Kern Ice and Cold Storage
OPeratinq Procedures
Daily Operatin,q Duties
Inspect work area and overall system operation.
Check suction temperature and pressure twice per day. Average temperature 15°F
to 25°F and average pressure 10 to 15 psig on the Iow side and 20 to 35 psig on
the high side.
Check discharge temperature and pressure twice per day. Average temperature
275°F and average pressure 90 to 120 psig.
Check oil levels in compressors twice per day.
Check oil pressures in compressors twice per day. Average pressure 25 to 35 psig.
Ammonia System Shutdown
2.
3.
4.
Shut suction valves on compressors
Shut King Valve on receiver to pump all ammonia into the receivers
Turn compressor motor off
Shut compressor discharge valves
Restartinq a Compressor
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Disconnect bleed off hose
Open discharge valve at compressor
Check oil level in crankcase
Turn on compressor motor
Check oil pressure
Open suction valve at the compressor
Compressor is back on line
APPENDIX C
Maintenance Procedures
Kern Ice and Cold Storage
Maintenance Procedures
Addition of Oil to the Compressors
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Close suction valve
Open crankcase valve
Allow compressor to develop a suction in the crankcase
Allow suction to pull oil into the compressor
When finished, the crankcase valve is closed
Open the suction valve
Compressor is back in operation
Draininq Oil from the Separators
Open valve and drain oil into a container
When liquid ammonia is mixing with oil the oil becomes cloudy, operator watches
closely and closes valve at that time
Isolating a compressor for Maintenance
2.
3
4.
Shut suction valve, allow compressor to pump down (remove ammonia)
Turn compressor motor off
Close discharge valve
Hook bleed off hose to the crankcase to bleed off excess ammonia into a bucket of
water
Inspect work area and overall system operation
Check suction temperature and pressure twice per day. Average temperature
15° F to 25'~ F and average pressure 10 to 15 psig on the Iow side and 20 to 35 psig
on the high side.
Check discharge temperature and pressure twice per day. Average temperature
275" F and ave.rage pressure 90 to 120 psig.
Check oil levels in compressors twice per day
Check oil pressures in compressors twice per day. Average pressure 25to 35 psig
Date
Compressor #2
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE CO.
COMPRESSORS
DAILY MAINTENANCE & INSPECTION LOG
Time By.
Oil Level
Packing
Water
Valves
Compressor #3
Oil Level
Packing
Water
Valves
)ressor #4
Oil Level
Packing
Water
Valves
Compressor #5
Oil Level
Packing
Water
Valves
Compressor #6
Oil Level
Packing
Water
Valves
See Reverse for comments, if any.
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE CO.
TEMPERATURES
Date Time
Taken By
ROOM ROOM
NO. NO.
1-3 19
2-4 20
5 21
6 22
7 23
8 24
9 25
10 26
11 27
12 28
13 29
14 30
15 31
16 32
17 33
18 34
~m iNC
APPENDIX D
WZl ,.c.
APPENDIX D
KERN ICE AND COLD STORAGE COMPANY
HAZARD ANALYSIS
December 1990
Revised April 1991
Revised July 1996
Submitted to:
City of Bakersfield
Fire Department
Hazardous Materials Division
1715 Chaster Avenue, Suite 300
Bakersfield, California 93301
Submitted by:
WZI Inc.
4700 Stockdale Highway, Suite 120
Bakersfield, California 93309
11140010.003
4700 STOCKDALE HIGHWAY, SUITE 120 BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA 93309 (805) 326-1112 FAX: (805) 326-0191
4100 WESTHEIMER, SUITE 231 HOUSTON, TEXAS 77027 (713) 877-1149 FAX: (713) 877-1923
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pa.qe
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
INTRODUCTION ................................................ 1
HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION ...................................... 4
2.1 Anhydrous Ammonia ........................................ 4
2.1.1 Identification of AHM .................................. 4
2.1.2 Location of AHM ...................................... 4
2.1.3 Quantity of AHM ...................................... 4
2.1.4 Nature of Hazards .................................... 4
HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HazOp) STUDY GUIDELINE .............. 9
3.1 Normal Operation of the Ammonia System ...................... 12
HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY RESULTS ...................... 13
4.1 Anhydrous Ammonia Summary ............................... 13
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS ...................................... 15
5.1 Anhydrous Ammonia ....................................... 16
5.1.1 Summary of Modeling Results .......................... 16
5.1.2 Receptor Locations .................................. 17
5.1.3 Essential Service Facilities ............................. 17
RISK ANALYSIS ............................................... 19
6.1 Likelihood of a Release Occurring ............................ 19
7.0 REFERENCES ................................................. 21
TABLE D-1
EXHIBIT D-1
EXHIBIT D-2
EXHIBIT D-3
EXHIBIT D-4
EXHIBIT D-5
APPENDIX D-I
APPENDIX D-II
APPENDIX D-III
APPENDIX D-IV
TABLE
PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF ANHYDROUS AMMONIA
EXHIBITS
RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX
CASE #1 MAP OF EXPOSURE ZONE - IDLH & LOC
CASE #2 MAP OF EXPOSURE ZONE - IDLH & LOC
MAP OF NEIGHBORING SENSITIVE RECEPTORS
LIST OF NEIGHBORING SENSITIVE RECEPTORS
APPENDICES
ANHYDROUS AMMONIA MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY FORMS
PROCESS FLOW AND PIPING DIAGRAMS
ARCHIE COMPUTER MODELING RESULTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company, located at the intersection of Union Avenue and
Thirtieth Street in the City of Bakersfield, operates a warehouse consisting of cold storage
rooms. Customers pay Kern Ice and Cold Storage Company for use of the rooms.
Anhydrous ammonia, an Acutely Hazardous Material (AHM), is used as a refrigerant to
cool the storage rooms to desired temperatures.
Due to the quantity of this AHM, a Hazards Analysis has been prepared in accordance with
United States Environmental Protection Agency/Federal Emergency Management
Agencies/United States Department of Transportation (USEPA/FEMA/USDOT) document
"Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis: Emergency Planning for Extremely Hazardous
Substance, 1987." This Hazards Analysis has been prepared as part of a Risk
Management and Prevention Plan (RMPP) and is a necessary step in the comprehensive
emergency planning for the Kern Ice and Cold Storage facility, its employees and the
surrounding community. Comprehensive planning depends upon a clear understanding
of what hazards exist and what risk they may pose for employees and various members
of the community. The analysis represents a means of evaluating potential hazards
resulting from the accidental release of an AHM.
The three basic components in the Hazards Analysis are (1) hazard identification, (2)
vulnerability analysis, and (3) risk analysis.
11140010.003 1
Hazard Identification
The hazard identification process focuses on collecting information pertaining to:
· Type and quantity of hazardous materials used and stored at the
facility.
Physical location of hazardous materials used and stored within the
facility.
Potential hazards associated with hazardous material releases.
Conditions of operation, storage, loading, processing, and using
hazardous materials (Hazard and Operability Study).
Transportation routes and methods used for transporting hazardous
materials.
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability analysis provides information helpful in planning requirements that
include:
· An estimation of the vulnerable zone with air dispersion modeling
using AHM concentrations that represent the Immediate Danger to
Life and Health (IDLH) and the EPA Level of Concern (LOC) along
with the conditions and assumptions that are used to estimate each
vulnerable zone.
11140010.003 2
The population, in terms of numbers and types (e.g., neighborhood
residents, high density transient populations such as stadiums or
auditoriums; sensitive populations in hospitals, schools, nursing
homes and day care centers) that could be expected to be within the
vulnerable zones.
Essential service facilities such as hospitals, police and fire stations,
emergency response centers, and communication facilities.
Risk Analysis
The risk analysis provides a relative measure of the likelihood and severity of various
possible hazardous events. A risk analysis matrix (Exhibit D-l) is used as guidance for
putting each potential situation into perspective in terms of the probability that it will occur
and the resulting effects it will have, and addresses the most likely and most severe
potential hazards.
11140010.003 3
2.0 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
2.1 Anhydrous Ammonia
2.1.1 Identification of AHM
Anhydrous ammonia is used at the Kern Ice and Cold Storage facility. No other acutely
hazardous materials are stored in reportable quantities.
2.1.2 Location of AHM
The ammonia in use at Kern Ice and Cold Storage is contained in the ammonia
refrigeration system. No other ammonia is Used or stored at the plant. Exhibit 3 of the
RMPP is a facility diagram which shows the location of the ammonia refrigeration system.
2.1.3 Quantity of AHM
The ammonia receiver to the south and outside of the ammonia compressor room contains
a maximum of 6,200 pounds of ammonia. The ammonia is delivered to the plant by tanker
truck.
2.1.4 Nature of Hazards
The term "anhydrous ammonia" refers to the compound having the formula NH3, formed
by the chemical combination of nitrogen and hydrogen. The Material Safety Data Sheet
(MSDS) for anhydrous ammonia is contained in Appendix D-I. Whenever the term
"ammonia" appears in this Hazards Analysis it should be understood as meaning
anhydrous ammonia and not aqua ammonia, aqueous ammonia or ammonium hydroxide,
which are solutions of ammonia in water. Ammonium hydroxide solutions generally range
in concentrations of ammonia from about 30% down to the 2 to 4% found in household
ammonia. These solutions are all commonly known as ammonia, but should not be
11140010.003 4
confused with liquid anhydrous ammonia, which has a much greater hazard potential.
"Anhydrous" means "free from water".
The physical properties of ammonia are provided in Table D-1. At room temperature and
atmospheric pressure, ammonia is a pungent, colorless gas approximately 40% lighter
than air. Compressed and cooled, ammonia gas condenses to a colorless liquid about
68% as heavy as water. At atmospheric pressure, the liquid boils at -28°F.
1 ) Primary Hazards
Ammonia acts as an irritant to human tissue in varying degrees depending upon
concentration and exposure.
The pungent and distinctive odor of the vapor, even at Iow concentrations (20 - 50
ppm), provides adequate warning so that no person will voluntarily remain in
concentrations which are hazardous.
Ammonia is not a cumulative metabolic poison; ammonia ions are actually important
constituents of living systems. Depending upon concentration and time, the effects
of exposure to ammonia vapor vary from none or only mild irritation, to obstruction
of breathing from laryngeal and bronchial spasm, to edema and severe damage of
the mucous membranes of the respiratory tract with possible fatal results.
Exposure levels of ammonia vapor which are tolerated by some persons may
produce adverse reactions to others. The following table, Physiological Effects of
Ammonia Vapor, indicates human physiological response to various concentrations,
in parts per million (ppm), of ammonia in air upon inhalation.
11140010.003 5
PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AMMONIA VAPOR
EFFECT PPM AMMONIA IN
AIR BY VOLUME
Least perceptible odor 5 ppm
Readily detectable 20-50 ppm
No discomfort or impairment of health for prolonged exposure 50-100 ppm
General discomfort and eye tearing no lasting effect on short exposure 150-200 ppm
Severe irritation of eyes, ears, nose and throat; no lasting effect on short 400-700 ppm
exposure
Coughing, bronchial spasms 1,700 ppm
Dangerous, less than 112 hour, exposure may be fatal 2,000-3,000 ppm
Serious edema, strangulation, asphyxia, rapidly fatal 5,000-10,000 ppm
Immediately fatal over 10,000 ppm
Reference: "Anhydrous Ammonia", Pamphlet G-2 Seventh Edition, Compressed Gas Association, Inc.
The RMPP Guidelines issued by the City of Bakersfield Fire Department Hazardous
Materials Division recommend using AHM concentrations in completing air dispersion
modeling which is representative of the Immediate Danger to Life and Health (IDLH) and
the EPA Level of Concern (LOC). The IDLH is the maximum concentration of a chemical
from which a healthy adult male should not suffer any irreversible health effects from
exposures of up to 30 minutes. IDLH levels are set by the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). IDLH is defined as "conditions that pose an immediate threat to
life and health, or conditions that place an immediate threat of severe exposure to
contaminants which are likely to have adverse cumulative or delayed effects on health."
The LOC is equal to one tenth of the IDLH.
11140010.003 6
For use in this Hazards Analysis, the following ammonia concentrations will be used
for:
LOC = 50 ppm
IDLH = 500 ppm
2) Other Hazards
a)
Liquid ammonia boils at -28°F under atmospheric conditions, acting as a
refrigerant to remove heat from any warmer object it may be contacting.
Accordingly, liquid ammonia in contact with the skin can cause frostbite.
b)
Liquid ammonia exhibits a high coefficient of cubical expansion. A given
quantity of liquid ammonia therefore expands considerably in volume with
increases in temperature, as shown in the following table:
VAPOR PRESSURE AND VOLUME OF LIQUID AMMONIA
AT VARIOUS TEMPERATURES
VAPOR
TEMPERATURE PRESSURE VOLUME
DEGREES F PSlG GAL/CWT
-28 0.0 17.57
0 15.7 18.10
30 45.0 18.72
60 92.9 19.43
90 165.9 20.25
115 251.5 21.04
130 315.6 21.58
Reference: U.S. Bureau of Standards Circular No. 142
11140010.003 7
For this reason, appropriate measures must be taken to avoid hydrostatic rupture
of containers, piping or other equipment as could be caused by such expansion.
c)
Ammonia vapor, although classified by the U.S. Department of
Transportation as a nonflammable gas, will ignite in the presence of a flame
or spark, but only within the limited range of 16-25% of ammonia in air by
volume. The heat generated by combustion is insufficient to maintain a
flame which therefore will extinguish upon ignition source removal.
11140010.003 8
3.0 HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HazOp) STUDY GUIDELINE
A HazOp study is used to identify potential hazard and operability problems associated
with AHM. The primary objective of the HazOp study is the identification of problems.
Possible solutions to problems may be discussed and recorded during the study. This
HazOp study focused on the following system:
Ammonia Refrigeration System.
A HazOp team was assembled to review, in a series of meetings, the design and operation
of the above systems using a guide word HazOp format. A HazOp team was made up of
the following three people with their respective areas of experience:
Team Leader:
Gary M. Fuller, Manager, WZI Inc., is a Mechanical Engineer who
has over fifteen years of experience in managing large manufacturing
facilities. His expertise includes operations management, process
development control, environmental control, quality assurance and
engineering. Mr. Fuller has performed hazard analyses,
consequence analyses and implemented hazard communications
programs at manufacturing facilities in both the San Joaquin Valley
and the San Francisco Bay Area. Additionally, he has expedited
hazards and operability studies for other facilities, including those
with ammonia storage within the City of Bakersfield.
Team Member:
Richard Dixon, Ammonia Operations and Maintenance Engineer,
has been with Kern Ice and Cold Storage since November 1989. He
oversees operations and maintenance of the ammonia system and is
very knowledgeable of the ammonia system and details of its
operation. Additionally, Mr. Dixon is responsible for and performs all
11140010.003 9
W~I ~nC
maintenance on the ammonia system. Mr. Dixon is a certified welder
and has received refrigeration training. He was maintenance
supervisor for Excel Mineral for seven years.
Team Member:
Fred Woody, Staff Engineer, WZl Inc., has four years experience in
major industry and as formally educated at Stanford University,
receiving his Masters Degree in Petroleum Engineering. Mr. Woody
participated in and had responsibility in conducting the consequence
analysis and performing a human error analysis as described in the
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, AICHE, 1985.
The team focused on specific points of the design (called "study nodes") one at a time.
At each of these study nodes, deviations in the process parameters were examined using
the guide words. The intention of how the systems are expected to operate during each
specified deviation at each study node was examined.
Deviations or departures from the intention of the normal or expected operation were
reviewed in the study nodes by systematically applying the guide words (e.g. "no
pressure", "high pressure", etc.) to the process and design parameters. Also investigated
in the study nodes were the causes or reasons why these deviations might occur, and if
they were meaningful. These causes would be hardware failures, human errors, external
disruptions (e.g. loss of power, earthquake), etc. The consequences of the deviations,
should they occur, were also reviewed. Trivial consequences relative to the study
objective were dropped.
11140010.003 10
The "guide words" used in the study nodes are simple words used to identify, qualify and
quantify possible deviations. The following guide words were used in the HazOp study:
Guide Word Example
No Power Shutoff
Less Low FIowrate
More High Temperature
Part of Partial Power Shutoff
As Well As Water Added to NH3
Reverse Flow in Wrong Direction
Other Than Earthquake Conditions
Meaninq
Negation of Design Intent
Quantitative Decrease
Quantitative Increase
Quantitative Decrease
Quantitative Increase
Logical Opposite of the Intent
Substitution from Design
Human error analysis was also included in the HazOp study and applied to the study
nodes. The purpose of the human error analysis is to identify potential human errors and
their effects. Causes of human errors that have occurred in the past may also be
identified. Potential areas for operator/human error included:
inadvertent closing or opening any valve
improper or neglected maintenance
accidental damage caused by forklift operator
improper operation of control system
improper procedures during filling
The HazOp forms used in the study nodes are provided in Appendix D-II. Shown on these
forms were the guide words used with the possible deviations, including human errors,
along with the causes and consequences of such deviations. Select Piping and
Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID's) and process flow diagrams used for the HazOp study
are provided in Appendix D-III.
11140010.003 11
3.1 Normal Operation of the Ammonia System
The ammonia system employed at Kern Ice and Cold Storage was sectioned into study
nodes as follows:
Study Node #
1.01
2.01
3.01
4.01
5.01
6.00
7.00
Equipment
Compressors
High Pressure Ammonia Vessels
Freezer Rooms
Cooler Rooms
Gas/Liquid Separation
Loading of Ammonia Receiver
Fire' Department Emergency Refrigerant Control
Box with Sparge System
The ammonia refrigeration system is designed to operate continuously. Gaseous
ammonia enters the compressors and is compressed to a higher pressure and
temperature. After exiting the compressors, the hot gas enters the oil separators and then
to the evaporative condenser. Water and air flowing through the condenser cools the hot
gas into a liquid. The liquid ammonia flows to and is collected in the receiver. From the
receiver, liquid ammonia flows through the lines to the cooling equipment. Vaporized
ammonia is then returned to the compressors to complete the cycle.
Ammonia is also charged into the receiver from an approved tanker truck. A hose is used
to deliver ammonia from the tanker to the receiver. The receiver sight glass is constantly
watched during delivery to ensure that the proper amount of ammonia is transferred into
the system.
11140010.003 12
4.0 HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY RESULTS
4.1 Anhydrous Ammonia Summary
Each study node was reviewed for possible deviations from normal operation and potential
consequences resulting from these events were recorded. The severity and probability
of consequences was then rated. The results of these ratings for each possible deviation
considered in the study nodes are recorded on the HazOp Forms provided in Appendix
D-II.
In summary, the greatest risk is presented by the release of a large quantity of liquid
ammonia. Upon release to atmospheric pressure, liquid ammonia rapidly boils forming a
two-phase dispersion cloud in which liquid ammonia becomes entrained in the evolved
ammonia vapor. Whereas a single-phase (vapor only) ammonia release would quickly rise
into the atmosphere (vapor density of ammonia is 0.59 that of air), the two-phase release
forms a dense fog that can hug the ground, potentially inflicting injury upon receptors. For
this reason, pure ammonia vapor releases were considered less severe than liquid
ammonia releases.
To determine the worst case credible release scenario for the refrigeration system, the
HazOp study deviations were evaluated based on estimates of the relative probability of
occurrence and magnitude of release. In the HazOp study all ammonia release events
that were determined to have a high or medium severity rate were all considered to be Iow
probability events.
11140010.003 13
With this understanding, the worst case credible release at Kern Ice and Cold Storage
Company was considered to be a release of the contents of the ammonia receiver
through partial rupture of a receiver line, even though it was rated as a Iow probability
event. A partial rupture during an event such as an earthquake could release liquid
ammonia to atmosphere at a rate which is not great enough to trigger the shutoff
mechanism of the excess flow limiting valve installed in the tank. The excess flow valve
on the liquid ammonia supply line is estimated at 45 gallons per minute (gpm).
The other remaining pipelines connected to the receiver, such as the inlet to the vapor
return line, is located in the tank's vapor space, and would result in a single phase vapor
release. The liquid fill line is equipped with a check valve which prevents back flow from
the tank through the fill line, so that only ammonia in the line would be released.
Therefore, the maximum release rate for the ~,orst case credible release was determined
to be 45 gpm from the partial rupture of the storage tank liquid ammonia supply line.
Under this scenario, the quantity of ammonia released is limited by the time required to
detect and stop the release. A complete hose rupture or pipe failure resulting from a
significant seismic event would result in an initially high release rate of ammonia until the
shutoff mechanism of the flow limiting valve closed. In addition, the ammonia supply line
is equipped with a manual shutoff valve at the tank outlet. The probability of the event
occurring was defined as Low. The severity of exposure to people was defined as High.
Modeling was performed on this scenario to determine the effect on the surrounding area
for Emergency Response Planning in the unlikely event of its occurrence.
11140010.003 14
5.0 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
Vulnerable zones for the worst case credible release of ammonia were estimated using
air dispersion modeling. The Automated Resource for Chemical Hazard Incident
Evaluation (ARCHIE) computer program was used to model the releases, using the
Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures (FEMA, DO T and U.S. EPA, 1989) as
a guideline.
The ARCHIE program offers a number of hazard assessment modeling options. Option
a, "Estimate Discharge Rate of Liquid or Gas", was used to model the release of AHMs
from storage tanks. Option d, "Evaluate Toxic Vapor Dispersion Hazards", was used to
model the dispersion hazard of the potential release of the AHM into the atmosphere.
The ARCHIE computer program recommends that hazard evaluations for emergency
purposes should strive to assume the worst reasonable and credible conditions. Thus, the
following, most pessimistic atmospheric conditions were chosen for modeling purposes.
Atmospheric Stability Class F
Generally considered the most hazardous atmospheric condition for toxic
gas releases. The stability of Class F results in minimal dispersion of the
potential ammonia release and will occur only at night.
Windspeed - 4.5 mph
Low windspeed results in longer fumigation times and further downwind
distances. Windspeed for Class F conditions ranges from 4.5 to 6.7 mph.
11140010.003 15
Ambient Temperature = 70°F
Class F conditions occur at nighttime. The warmest nighttime temperature
for Bakersfield is about 70°F (July).
In addition to the most pessimistic nighttime atmospheric conditions, modeling was also
performed assuming the most probable daytime conditions. The following depicts the
daytime atmospheric conditions chosen for modeling purposes.
Atmospheric Stability Class B
Windspeed 6.4 mph
Ambient Temperature 77.7 ° F
5.1 Anhydrous Ammonia
5.1.1
Summary of Modeling Results
A summary of the modeling results for the worst case credible release of ammonia is
tabulated below, followed by a brief synopsis of each case. A computer generated hard
copy of the model input and output data files are attached in Appendix D-IV.
Atmospheric Amount Radius of Arrival Radius Arrival
Stability of IDLH Time to of Time to
Case Class Ammonia (miles) IDLH LOC LOC
Number released Radius (Miles) (Minutes)
(minutes)
1 F (nighttime) 6200 1.01 13.5 5.14 68.5
2 B (daytime) 6200 0.13 1.2 0.4 3.8
IDLH = 500 ppm and LOC = 50 ppm
11140010.003 16
W~I
Case 1'
Represents a worst case partial hose rupture or pipe failure from
the ammonia tank filled with 6,200 pounds of ammonia,
assuming worst case nighttime atmospheric conditions. Results
are plotted in Exhibit D-2.
Case 2:
Represents a worst case partial hose rupture or pipe failure from
the ammonia tank filled with 6,200 pounds of ammonia, assuming
most probable daytime atmospheric conditions. Results are
plotted in Exhibit D-3.
5.1.2
Receptor Locations
Neighboring receptors surrounding the Kern Ice and Cold Storage facility are provided in
Exhibit D-4 and are listed in Exhibit D-5.
EPA/FEMA guidelines indicate that decisions about evacuation are incident specific and
are to be made at the time of actual release. An estimated vulnerable zone should not
automatically be used as the basis for evacuation during emergency response.
5.1.3
Essential Service Facilities
The fire station nearest to the Kern Ice and Cold Storage building is:
Fire Station Number 4
130 Bernard Street
Bakersfield, California
11140010.003 17
~INZI INC
Hospitals in the area are:
Bakersfield Memorial Hospital
420 34th Street
Bakersfield, California
11140010.003 18
6.0 RISK ANALYSIS
6.1 Likelihood of a Release Occurring
The ammonia system at the Kern Ice and Cold Storage plant has been in operation for
more than fifty years. Over that time, one significant release occurred when a pressure
relief valve released ammonia after too much ammonia was added to the system. Risk of
release is reduced through training and supervision at the facility. In addition, the
pressure release valves are now vented to a water cooled condenser as a scrubbing
control device.
The Hazard and Operability Study determined that the probability of a minor release was
ranked Medium and could occur during maintenance procedures (bleeding down lines) or
when the compressors have shut down (seals may leak). This occurrence was also rated
to have a Low severity rating. No scenarios were identified in the Hazard and Operability
Study that had a Medium or High probability ranking with a Medium or High severity
ranking.
11140010.003 19
A summary of the onsite and offsite consequences analysis are as follows:
SCENARIO PROBABILITY ONSITE OFFSITE COMMENTS
CONSEQUENCE CONSEQUENCE
1) Partial hose Low High High · Worst Case
rupture or Credible
pipe failure Release
2) Complete or Low High High · Excess flow
pipe hose valve to limit
rupture release
failure
3) Complete Low High High · Excess flow
valve failure valve to limit
release
4) Partial valve Low Low Low · Low quantity
failure pipe release
corrosion · Odor good
warning
properties for
small leaks
5) Vandalism Low High High · Excess flow
valves limit
release
· Perimeter
fencing
6) Ammonia Medium Low Low · PRV activates
overfill · PRV Outlet
Controlled
· Supervision
7) Worn · Preventative
compressor Medium Low Low Maintenance
seals, NH3 · Low
vapor concentrations
· NH3 monitor
with control
and alarms
From the HazOp study, there were no High or Medium consequence ammonia release
scenarios that were considered a High or Medium probability. Therefore, the partial
rupture or pipe failure of a liquid ammonia supply line from the storage tank was
considered to be the worst case credible release.
11140010.003 20
7.0 REFERENCES
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, American Institute of Chemical Engineers,
New York, 1985.
Technical Guidance for Hazard Analysis: Emergency Planning for Extremely Hazardous
Substances, USEPNFEMNUSDOT, Washington, D.C., December, 1987.
Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide, National Response Team, Washington,
D.C., March, 1987.
Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures, FEMA/USDOT/USEPA, Washington,
D.C.
Guidance for the Preparation of a Risk Management and Prevention Program, California
Office of Emergency Services, 1989.
Klaassen, Curtis D., Amdur, Mary O. and John Doull, Casarett and Doull's Toxicology,
Third Edition, Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1986.
Sax, N. Irving and Richard J. Lewis, Sr., Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials,
Seventh Edition, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 1989.
Lewis, Richard J., Hawley's Condensed Chemical Dictionary, Twelfth Edition, Van
Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 1993.
Risk Management and Prevention Guidelines, City of Bakersfield Fire Department,
Hazardous Materials Division, Form FD 1593.
11140010.003 21
TABLE D-1
TABLE D-1
PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF ANHYDROUS AMMONIA (NH3)
Molecular Weight
Latent Heat 327
Boiling Point -28.03
Solubility 89.9
Specific Gravity (Liquid) 0.682
Vapor Density 0.59
Autoignition Temperature 651
Explosive Limits 16 to 25
Critical Temperature 651
Critical Pressure 11.5
IDLH 350
LOC 35
STEL 25
Ratio of Specific Heats 1.31
1 ppm 0.7
17.03 Lbm/Lbmole
Calorie/Gram
oF
Gl100 mi AT 0 °C
(-33.35 °C/4 °C)
(AIR=l) @ 25 °C, 760 mm Hg
°C (1,204 °F)
% by Volume in Air
oC
ATM
mg/m3 (500 ppm)
mg/m3 (50 ppm)
mg/m3 (35 ppm)
mg/m3 @ 25 °C and 760 mm Hg
The molecular structure of ammonia is composed of one nitrogen (N) and three hydrogen
(H) atoms. The molecular weight of ammonia, 17 Ib/Ibmole, is significantly less than that
of air which is approximately 29 Ib/Ibmole. As a result, ammonia in the vapor phase is
much lighter than air and rapidly rises when released.
11140010.003
EXHIBITS
(APPENDIX D)
RISK, AaNALYSIS MATRIX
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
Combinations ot Conclusions
From Risk Analysis that
Identify Situations of Major
Concern
Combinations that Identify
Skuations of Considerable
Concern
Severity of Consequences Due to AHM Release
Combinations o[ Concern
Which. may Require Planning
for Credible Events
(From RM'PP Guidance for the Preoaratiou of a Risk Manazcmeut and Pr,wention Prouam, November,
1989, California Off]ce of Emergency Services.)
LOW:
MEDIUM:
I-IIGH:
QUALITATIVE DEFINITIONS OF PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE
?robab~iity bf occurrence confidered unlikely during the erpected l~etim¢ o[ the fac~ a~amin~
no~al operatio~ and ma~tenance.
Probab~' o~ o~u~en~ co,Meted ~ssible dung the e~ec;~d ~et~e of th~ fac~.
Probab~ of occu~ence co~demd ~c~ent~ ~gh to a~mc ~vent'~I1 ~c~ du~ the
e~ected ~et~e o[ the fac~
LOW:
MED[U'M:
HIGH:
DEFINITIONS OF SEVERITY OF CONSEQUENCES TO PEOPLE
Chemical is exl)ected to move into the surrounding environment La negligible concentrations.
Injuries e~pected ~.nly for exposure over ertended periods or when Ladi¼dual permnal health
conditions create complications.
Chemical is expected to move ~to the surrounding environment La concentrations sufficient to
cause ~crious Laiuries and/or deaths ufless prompt and effective corrective action is taken. Death.
and/or hajuries expected only for g~6sure over emended periods or when ha~ddual persoeal
health conditions created complications.
Chemical is e~ected to move into the su~ounding environment La concentrations sufficient to
cau..~ s~rious injuries ancot deaths upon e~osure. Large numbers of people e~ect:d to be
affected.
(From the EPA Technical Guidance for Hazard Analvsis, 198'7)
-Form FD 1593
EXHIBIT D - 1
1114.0010
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Rd.
Imperial
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)LLEGE
Rd.
MEADOWS
3 FIELD
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:-:
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Norri~" ~ Rd.
c~. KERN ICE l
'-- I COLD STORAGE
!} '
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-c~;:".'~ ''~ .2,'2 r'r' ,.-.:<~. _
~ rr'- La'fie
;; 0
0 Miles 2mi. 4mi. 6mi.
0 Kilometers 5km 1Okra
WZI INC.
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
MAP OF EXPOSURE ZONE
IDLH & LOC
CASE #1 NIGHTTIME CONDITIONS
DATE 7196 I 1114.0010 IEXHISlTD . 2
~drr'
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,
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" Rd. ?.;
KERN ICE &
COLD STORAGE
CALIF.!
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· ..,. ..--: ,, ,,,,.,.,
~ :."~ ;:;:. .'. ,...
.................. .-"CD
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~ '"'"" P~heco ,-. .......
Fairv,ew [ ~ '~1 ::~"'~ =
L a'fie ~ ~:,'t~.. '2;:::..' .......
0 Miles 2mi. 4mi. 6mi.
0 Kilometers 5km
lGkm
WZI INC.
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
MAP OF EXPOSURE ZONE
IDLH & LOC
CASE #2 DAYTIME CONDITIONS
DATE 7/96 I 1114.0010 IEXHIBITD-3
MINTER,
V!L. LAGE:
_Burbank
Avenue
HAGGERTY
=NORTH KERN-GOL
Road
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
120 30th STREET
BAKERSFIELD, CA.
Round Mtn.
T.28S. B.2SE, 1616;
~5
2
KERN RIV~
~OL~CgO~
~'17.,'18', i
OIL FIELO '~
'anal
E
~13
32 33
(ersflald
I'ane
OLD RIVER
~ar Mtn. Rd~. Bear Mountain
d. J BAS FIELD
PANAMA --
--jif--
~;AIRPARK 1i
: BAKERSFIEf D
MLJNI~IPAL
!5
T.30S. R.28E
2~j 27 i26
GREENFIELDI
4 DiGion '
Weedpatch 1'66p
17 '~ent
~ ~ 23
Mountain
27 i'6
~ 25
~. 35 $,6
2
talnvlew
DI
REC.i
~REA ~
WZl INC.
BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA
KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
NEIGHBORING RECEPTORS
OATE 7/96 J 1114.0010 JEXHIBIT D-4
Receptor
EXHIBIT D-5
Approximate Distance
(Miles)
Distance
1. Bakersfield Memorial Hospital
2. Kernview Hospital
3. CBC Cancer Center
4. Longfellow School
5. Fire Station #4
6. San Joaquin Community Hospital
7. Bakersfield College
8. Kern Medical Center
9. East Bakersfield High
10. Garces High School
11. Sierra Junior High
12 Virginia Avenue School
13. Hort School
14. Carden School
15. College Heights School
16. Chipman Junior High
17. Highland High School
18. Eissler School
19. Noble School
20. Washington Junior High
21. Jefferson High School
22. Williams High School
23. Fremont School
24. Owens School
25. Special Services School
26. Vernon School
27. Casa Loma School
28. Revival Tabernacle Christian Academy
29. Mountain View Junior High
30. Fairfax School
31. Reg. OccuPational Ag. Center School
1/3
1/3
1/3
1/8
1/4
1
1
1
1
5/8
31/8
35/8
43/4
5
37/8
33/4
37/8
33/4
1 3/8
1 1/2
1
1 5/8
21/8
1 5/8
1 1/4
21/2
31/4
83/4
81/2
5
33/8
NW
NW
NW
NE
NE
SW
NE
SW
SW
N
SE
SE
SE
SE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
SE
S
S
SE
SE
SE
11140010.005 1
EXHIBIT D-5 (Continued)
Receptor
Approximate Distance
(Miles)
Distance
32. Pioneer Drive School
33. Compton Junior High
34. Harding School
35. Bakersfield Advanced Academy
36. Nichols School
37. Fire Station #1
38. Bakersfield Christian Life School
39. BLM Caliente Res. Area Office
40. Norris Elementary
41. Norris Junior High
42. US Border Patrol
43. Fruitvale Junior High
44. Greenacres School
45. Stockdale Christian School
46. Harris School
47. Fire Station #3
48. Fire Station #1
49. Quailwood School
50. St. Phillips School
51. Stockdale Elementary
52. Post Office
53. St. John's School
54. West High
55. Munsey Elementary
56. Fire Station #7
57. Stine School
58. Thompson Junior High
59. Sandrini School
60. Panama Unified School District
61. Actis Junior High
62. Castle School
4
3
3
21/2
2 3/4
1/4
3 3/4
2 7/8
6 3/8
6 3/8
2 7/8
51/2
51/2
3 3/8
2 3/4
2 3/4
1 1/8
4 3/4
4 3/4
51/2
4
41/4
4 3/8
31/2
4
4 5/8
5 3/8
51/4
8 3/4
5
5 3/8
SE
E
E
E
NE
SW
NW
SW
NW
NW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
SW
11140010.005 2
EXHIBIT D-5 (Continued)
Receptor
Approximate Distance
(Miles) Distance
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70,
71.
72.
73.
74.
Library
Laurelglen School
Fire Station ~9
District School
Cai State University
Olive Knoll School
North Rosedale School
Rosedale School
Rosedale School District
Curran Junior High
Horace Mann School
Friends School
5 1/4 SW
6 1/8 SW
6 1/4 SW
7 1/2 SW
6 SW
4 112 NW
6 7/8 W
7 3/4 W
7 3/4 SW
3 3/4 SW
2 3/4 NE
5 5/8 SW
11140010.005 3
APPENDIX D-I
AMMONIA MSDS
ALPNAC.,J~ DIVISION ....
ALPH'AGAZ
:
Specialty Gas
Material Safety Data Sheet
LIOUIO AIR CORPORATION
One Calllornia Plaza, Suite 350
2121 N. California Blvd.
Walnut Creek, California 94596
ISSUE DATE OCTOBER 1. 1gas
AND REVISIONS CORPORATE SAFETY DEPT.
I~ROOUCT NAME
Nnmoni a
TELEPHONE (415) 977-6500
EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION ON PAGE
TRADE NAME AND SYNONYMS AITIITIoni a,
Anhydrous Ammonia
CHEMICAL NAME AND SYNONYMS A~oni a,
Anhydrous Ammonia
FORMU~ MOLECULAR WEIGHT
NH3 17.0
CAS NUMBER
7564-4t-7
CHEMICAL FAMILY
~i tr-ogen hydride
HEALTH HAZARD DATA
TIME WEIGHTED AVERAGE EXPOSURE LIMIT
25 Molar PPM; STEL : 35 Molar .PPM (ACGIH, '1984-85) ; 50 Molar PPM (OSI~k, 1985)
SYMPTOMS OF EXPOSURE
Corrosive and irritating to the skin, eyes, upper respiratory system and all mucosal
tissue. Depending on the concentration inhaled, it may oause burning sensations,
oughing, wheezing, shortness of breath, headache, nausea, with eventual collapse.
ld concentrations of vapor will cause dermatitis or conjunctivitis. Higher
;ncentrations of vapor or liquid contact will cause caustic-like dermal burns and
inflammation and swelling of the eyes with possible loss of vision. Rapidly evaporating
liquid contacting dermal tissue or the eyes will cause cryogenic "burns."
TOXICOLOGICAL PROPERTIES
'Inhalation: Affects the upper airway (larynx and bronchi) by causing caustic-like burning resulting in edema and
chemical pneumonitis. If it enters the deep lung, pulmonary edema will result.
Toxic level exposure to dermal tissue causes caustic.like burns and skin lesions resulting in early necrosis end
scarring. Burns to the eye result in lesions and possible loss of vision.
Cryogenic "burns" are like frostbite with a change in skin color to gray or white possibly followe, d by blistering.
Listed as Carcinogen National Toxicology Yes [] I.A.~.C. Yes [] OSHA Yes
or Potential Carcinogen Program No x~ Monographs No ~ No
· ~?.CDMI~:ENDED FIRST AID TREATMENT
PRC;.IPT MEDICAL ATTENTION IS MANDATORY ;H ALL CASES OF OVSREXPOSURE TO ~J.~O,.,[A.
~55C~E PE~SOHNEL SHOULD BE EQUIPPED W~TH SELF-CONTA[HED BREATH[HG APPARATUS AHD BE
CCG;t[ZANT OF EXTREHE FIRE AND EXPLOS[O;'.I HAZARD·
inhalation: Conscious persons should be assisted to an uncontaminated area and inhale
fresh air. Unconscious persons should be moved to an uncontaminated area and given
· :.eud.-~o-mouth r~suscitation and', .9~=~ '- . :... Keep the victim wa~ and -u~a~.
q~su:'e that mucus or vomited material does net obstruct the ~irway by pcsitional
(Continued on last.pa~e.)
.... .. . ..... . , :-.....,. · '-." ..... ':I;..?' .....
.... !, ~'-' ' ' '' ' ~ 'r
· ;,.. An~non~a is flammable over a relatively narrow range in ar . It re'acts vig0'~0'Usly
~.';J with fluorine, chlorine, hydrogen chloride, hydrogen bromide, nitrosyl chloride, '
~ chromyl chloride,"trioxygen difluoride, nitrogen dioxide and nitrogen trichloride.
PHYSICAL DATA
LIQUID DENSITY AT BOLLING POINT
42.6 lb/ft3 (682.'kg/m
BOLLING POINT
-2B.14°F (-33.41°C)
V*,ORPRESSURE L~ 70°F (21.1°C) :
128 psia (883 kPa)
SOLUBILITY IN WATER
Very soluble, liberatinq heat
APPEARANCE AND ODOR
Colorless g~ with a pu~ent odor.
FL~SN POINT (METHOD USED)
~INGU,S.~NG MEQI^
SPECb&L FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES
GAS DENSITY AT 70'F 1 aim
.0442 lb/ft3 (.708 kq/m3)
FREEZING POINT
-107.9°F (-77.74°C)
Specific gravity .eT0~F {Air : 1,0)
FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD DATA
j xut'o IGNmON T£MPERATunE j FLAMMABLe: LIMITS % BY ¥OLUME
!274°F (6900Cl LEL : !5 UEL : 27
lE, ~CTnlCXL CU~SSIFICATION
If possible, stop the flow of gas. Since ansonia is soluble in water, it is the
best extinguishing media -- not only extinguishing the fire, but also absorbing
(Continued on last
UNUSUAL FIRE AND EXPLOSION HA~.ARDS
The minimum ignition energy for a~nonia is very high. It is approximately 500
· amm~times greater than the energy required for igniting hydrocarbons and 1000 to
· · ~ ~ ,d.~ ~. ~ · ,~ _-- ~. .~
REACTIVITY DATA
STABILITY CONDITIONS TO AVOID
U~lable X
Stable
~.~66s'~Co~osmo. ,,o~ucts
Hydro~en a:. very h~h
HA~RDOUS POLYMERI~ON CONDI~ONS TO AVOID
Mar
Will Not Olgur X
SPILL OR LEAi( PROCEDURES
STEPS TO -~E TAKEN IN CASE MATERIAL :S RELF~ASED OR SPILL.~D ·
Evacuate all personnel from affected area. Use appropriate protective equipment.
if leak is in user's equipment, be certain to purge piping with an inert gas prior
to atse.?,pting.repairs. If leak is in container or container valve, contact the
closest Liquid Air Corporation location.
:VASTY...".IS;~CSAL :.iE?HO0
Co ~cr. ~:~e~.~.- .:o dispose of '.,;a~t~ or unused quantities. P, eturn in the sh!poino
-,ont~i~--r oro~erlv labei.~d, :;,ith any valve outlet .~!ucs or cads secured :=nd valv
c~c:ion c~= in r.,l~.-_,~: to Liquid Air Corporation fo)- proper disposal. For emereency
s~osa(, conc-cct the c~osest Liquid ~"~
· .~,. Corporation location.
"' . .... A'~ OR NIGHT ~-,..-'R.- ,"'Al.. ,__~ C?:.E ?;! T :--: .=_ ~ .:.-.T .,:.._ ..... ~..:. ~r.', ,t2.1--?2O0
'-': .' SPECIAL PROTECTION'iCh[FORMATION :- ' '
rRES~,~O~P,OTEC~ON~,,,'y~p*) Positive pressure ~r l~ne w~ ~'ask or
b~eathing aop~ratus should be available for emergenc
~ENTI~ON · LOCAL~X~USr lO preven; accumu
Hood with forced '. above the TWA ·
In accordance with electrical codes.
PROTECTIVE GLOVES
Plastic or rubber
Page 3
ISPEC~L'" .-.i. ":". ·
OTHER
EYE PROTECTION
Safety goggles or glasses
OT~HE.R PROTECTJYE ~EOUIPMENT · '
,Safety shoes, safety shower, eyewash "fountain"
.SI:;ECIAL PRECAUTIONS'
'SPECIAL LABELING INFORMATION
'DOT Shipping Name: Ammonia, Anhydrous (RQ 100/45.4) I.D. No.: UN 1005
DOT Shippina Label: Nonflammable Gas DOT Hazard Class: Nonflammable gas
SPECIAL HANDLING RECOMMENDATIONS ~
Use only in well-ventilated areas. Valve protection caps must remain in place unless
container is secured with valve outlet piped to use point. Do not drag, slide or
rol.1 cylinders. Use a suitable hand truck for cylinder movement. Use a pressure
reducing regulator when connecting cylinder to lower pressure (<500 psig) piping
or systems. Do not heat cylinder by any means to increase the discharge rate of
product from the cylinder. Use a check valve or trap in the discharge line to prevent
hazardous back flow into the cylinder.
For ad¢itional handling recommendations consult L'Air Liquide's Encyclopedin de Gaz or Compressed Gas Association Pamphlet P-~.
STORAGE RECOMMENDATIONS
~otect cylinders from physical damage. Store in cool, dry, well-ventilated area of
~on-combustible construction away from heavily trafficked areas and elnergency exits.
Do not allow the temperature where cylinders are stored to exceed 130F (54C).
Cylinders should be stored upright and firmly secured to prevent falling or being
knocked over. Full and empty cylinders should be segregated. Use a "first in-first
out" inventory system to prevent full cylinders being stored for excessive periods
of time. Post "No Smoking or'Open Flames" signs in the storage or use area. There
Should be no sources of ignition in the storage or use area.
For additional storage recommendations consult L'Air Lic:luide's Encyclopedia de Gaz or Compressed Gas AssociaYon Pamphlet P-1.
SP,ECLAL PACKAGING RECOMMENDATIONS
Gaseous or liquid anhydrous ammonia corrodes certain metals at ambient temperatures.
Oxygen presence enhances the corrosion of ordinary or semi-alloy steels. The addition
of water inhibits this enhancement.
anhydrous ammonia systems scrupolously'dry.
GTi-;ER RECC;aMc..,NDATION$ CR PRECAUTIONS
Earth-ground and bond all lines and equipment associated with the ar~'aonia system.
Electrical equipment should be non-sparking or explosion proof. Compressed gas
~,,'inders.~, shcu!d not be r-~filled exce;t by qualified producers of compressed gases.
'hir. ment of .= cemoressed cas cviinder wi~ich has not been filled by the owner or with
(written) cen~en~ is ~ violation cf Federal Law ;mCrFR)
' LIQUID AIR CORPORATION . .. · :. :
RECOh~ENDED FIRST AID TREATMENT: (Continued)
Eye Contact: PERSONS WITH POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TO'AMMONIA SHOULD NOT WEAR CONTACT
LENSES.
Flush contaminated'eye(s) with copious quantities of water. Part eyelids to
assure complete flushing. Continue for a minimum of 15 minutes.
Skin Contact: Flush affected area with copious quantities of water. Remove
affected clothing as rapidly as possible.
Dermal Contact or Frostbite: Remove contaminated clothing and flush affected areas
with lukewarm water. DO NOT USE HOT WATER. A physician should see the patient
promptly if the cryogenic "burn" has resulted in blistering of the dermal surface
or deep tissue freezing.
SPECIAL FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES: (Continued)
the escaped a,~monia gas. Use water spray to cool surrounding containers.
I
APPENDIX D-II
HAZOP STUDY FORMS
HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY FORM
COMPANY: KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
ISystem: AMMONIA REFRIGERATION SYSTEM
Study Nods: 2.01
Equipment: AMMONIA RECEIVER
Drawing References:
3ulde Deviation Cause of the Consequences Resulting from a Severity Probabtl~ Controls In Place Proposed Mitigation
Word Deviation Deviation from Normal Operation Measures
No Ammonia flow Closed valve to vessel None (compressors down) Low Low None None
Ammonia flow Closed valve from vessel High pressure (compressors on) Mad Low Employee training None
Ammonia flow Minor leak in system Release to ambient air (liquid ammonia) Low Mad Regular maintenance None
Ammonia flow System shutdown for maintenance done Low Mad None None
Power Condenser outage (short circuit) Ammonia pressuro and temperature increases, Low Low Sparge system, excess I~ow valve None
activate pressure relief valve {PRV) in receiver
Less Receiver PRV fails
St~uctura ntegr ty
Temperature
Undersized I defective
Corrosion
Closed king valve, compressors on
Increased friction in compressors
High temperatures
Ammonia overfill
Possible line I vessel rapture
Minor liquid ammonia leak
Other I Earth movement I Earthquake .
I Earth movement I Earthquake
I Broken receiver sight glass I Sight glass accidentally hit
I Failed sight glass check valve I Poor condition I failure
I Location I Vossel crushed
Receiver PRV will release
Increased system pressure
Receiver PRV release, vessel failure
Receiver PRV release
Broken lines to vessels
Loss of power to system
Check valves seal off ammonia flow
Ammonia release
Hit by forklift I truck
Description of Equipment Operation:
- 48" O.D. x 24' length x 0.432" thickness - SA-612 Carbon Steel Ammonia Storage Vessel
· All pipe connections Schedule 80
· Maximum load to fill - 6,200 pounds
IMed I Low I Regular maintenance, parts replacement procedures
Low I Low I Non-corrosive ammonia I oil mixture, rourine inspection
I
I
None
None
Low Mad Employee training, operating procedures
Low Low Regular maintenance
Mad Low PRV vented to condenso~ (vapors scrubbed)
LOW Low Employee training, operating procedures, sparge system
High Low Structural integrity
Mad Low Compressor room ventilation, vibration/motion shutdown
Low Low Glass protected, restricted access
Mad Low Regular maintenance
High Low Perimeter fencing, loading procedures
None
None
None
None
Install flex connectors
None
None
None
Install guardrails
HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY FORM
COMPANY: KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
ISystem: AMMONIA REFRIGERATION SYSTEM
Study Node: 2.O1
Equipment: AMMONIA RECEIVER
Drawing References:
Guide Deviation Cause of the Consequences Resulting from a Severity Probability Con~'ols In Place Proposed Mitigation
Word Deviation Deviation from Normal Operation Measures
NO Ammonia flow Closed valve to vessel None (compressors down) Low Low None None
Ammonia flow Closed valve from vessel High pressure (compressors on) Med _ow Employee training None
Ammonia flow Minor leak in system Release to ambient air (liquid ammonia) Low Med Regular maintenance None
Ammonia flow System shutdown for maintenance None Low Med None None
Power Condenser outage (short circuit) Ammonia pressure and temperature increases, Low Low Sparge system, excess flow valve None
activate pressure relief valve (PRV) in receiver
ILees IRecelver PRV fails
IStructural integrity
IMora I Pl'essure
ITemperature
I Pressure
IPfessure
IUndersized I defective
Corrosion
JClosed king valve, compressors on
Increased friction in compressors
High temperatures
Ammonia ovedill
Possible line I vessel rupture
Minor liquid ammonia leak
Receiver PRV will release
Increased system pressure
Receiver PRV release, vessel failure
Receiver PRV release
lOther I Earth movement I Earthquake Broken lines to vessels
I Earth movement I Eadhquake Loss of power to system
I Broken receiver sight glass I Sight glass accidentally hit Check valves seal off ammonia flow
Failed sight glass check valve I Poor condition / failure Ammonia release
Location I Vesse crushed Hit by forld ft / buck
Description of Equipment Operation:
48" O.D. x 24' length x 0.432' thickness - SA-612 Carbon Steel Ammonia Storage Vessel
All pipe connections Schedule 80
Maximum load to fill - 6,200 pounds
Med Low Regular maintenance, p~ts replacement procedures
Low Low Non-corrosive ammonia I oil mixture, murine inspection
None
None
Low Med Employee training, operating procedures
Low Low Regular maintenance
Mm] Low PRV vented to condensor (vapors scrubbed)
Low Low Employee baining, operating procedures, sparge system
High Low Structural integrity
Med Low Compressor room ventilation, vibration/motion shutdown
Low Low Glass protected, resbicted access
Meal Low Regular maintenance
Hgh Low Per meter tencing, oading procedures
None
None
None
None
Install flex connectors
None
None
None
Install guardrails
HAZARDS AND OPERABILI HAZOP) STUDY FORM
COMPANY: KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
ISystem: AMMONIA I~EI-NIGERAIION SY$[b.M
Study Node: 1.01
Equipment: COMPRESSORS
Drawing References:
Guide Deviation Cause of the Consequences Resulting from a Severity l Probability Controls In Place Proposed Mitigation
Word Deviation Deviation from Normal Operation Measures
No Power Power failure Compressor shutdown, possible ammonia seat leak Low Med Manual controls on suction, murine inspections, Sch. 80 line None
Power Bad control circuit Compressor shutdown, possible ammonia seal leak Low Low Manual controls on suction, routine inspections, Sch. 80 line None
Power High temperature or pressure shutdown Compressor shutdown, possible ammonia seal leak Low Low Manual controls on suction, routine inspections, Sch. 80 line None
Water Operator failure to turn valve Compressor shutdown, motor burn out Low Low High temperature shutdown None
Oil Plugged oil passage Compressor will freeze up Low Low Routine maintenance None
Belt(s) Broken belts Compressor shutdown Low Low Routine inspections and maintenance None
Motor Motor burned out Compressor shutdown Low Low System bypass to other compressors, maintenance None
Ammonia flow Operator failure, closed king valve Possible line rupture, compressor shutdown High Low High pressure shutdown switch (240 psi), sparge system, PRY None
Ammonia flow Closed discharge valve Open relief valve Low Low Hicjh pressure shutdown switch, sparge system, training None
I Partially closed Possible line rupture, compressor shutdown Low Low High i , None
~Lesa [Ammonia flow IWorn seals king valve Low Med Emp oyee tra n ng, routine maintenance
i iAmmonia flow Ammonia gas leak
More ~Temperature
~Tomperature
ITemperature
IPressure
IAmmonia flow
Other:
Earth movement
Earth movement
Earth movement
Flood
Fire
Operator error
Operator error
Operator error
Operator error
No water
Closed discharge valve
Closed discharge valve, open suction
System overfi
Earthquake
Earthquake
Earthquake
Canal overt'low
Short circuit
Valve not shut off alter oil drain
Wrong compressor valve opened
Forget to add oil
Compressor not pumped down
for maintenance
Compressor shutdown
Compressor shutdown
Compressor shutdown
Belts would slip, motor overload/shutdown
~ctlvate high level shutdown switch
Fracture ammonia gas lines
Power outage, possible seal leak from compmssers
Fracture vapor return line
Short circuit I motor burn out
Pipes may rupture
Potential for ammonia release
Compressor damage
Compressor damage
Potential ammonia release, employee injury
Description of Equipment Operation:
- Each compressor is equipped with a temperature and pressure gauge.
- Each compressor is equipped with an automatic high pressure shutdown switch with manual reset.
Low Low Automatic high pressure shutdown, employee training None
Low Low Automatic high pressure shutdown, employee training None
Low Low Automatic high pressure shutdown, employee training None
Low Low Pressure relief valve, employee training None
Low Low Qua fled t~ ers~ employee training None
Med Low Schd. 80 pipe, Seismic zone 4 construction
Low Med ' Minor (seal) leaks = <200ppm, NH3 monitor alarm set @ 250 ppm
Meal Low ~ Flex hose connection, excess flow valves. Remote shutoff valve
Low ~ Low I Floordrain
Med ~ Low I Fire prevention measures
Med l Low ~ Employee training, operating procedures
Low ~ Low ~ Employee training
Low J Low J Employee training, Icg
I Med I Low I Employee training, maintenance procedures
Install air monitor
Leaks detected by smell
None
None
None
Supervision
None
None
Supervision
Each compressor has one bypass and one suction valve, manually controlled.
Gaseous ammonia enters the compressor through the suction line which is controlled by the suction valve. After compression, the gaseous ammonia leaves the compressor through the discharge line.
Maintenance is ongoing, inspections daily.
The compressors are equipped with an automatic vibration/motion shutdown switch with manual reset.
6r3/96
clients~kernhazo.wbl
HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (H P) STUDY FORM
COMPANY: KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
Isystem: RJ~MONIA
Study Node: 2,01
E({ulpment: AMMONIA RECEIVER
Drawing References:
Guide Deviation Cause of the Consequences Resulting from a Severity Probability Controls In Place Proposed Mitigation '
Word Deviation Deviation from Normal operation Measures
No Ammonia flow Closed valve to vessel None (compressors down) Low Low None None
Ammonia flow ~leeed valve from vessel High p~essure (compressors on) Meal Low Employee training None
Ammonia flow Minor leak in system Release to ambient air (liquid ammonia) Low Med Regular maintenance None
Ammonia flow System shutdown for maintenance INone Low Med None None
Power Condenser outage (short circuit) ~,mmonla pressom and temperature Increases, Low Low Sperge system, excess flow valve None
acUvate preseum relief valve (PRV) in receNer
Less Receiver PRV fails Undersized I defective Possible line I vessel rupture Med Low Reg ', F
Structure integrity Corrosion Minor liquid ammonia leak Low Low Non-corrosive ammonia I o I mb~ure, rouUne inspection None
ITemperature
Other I Earth movement
I EaKh movement
]Broken receiver skjht glass
lFalled sight glass check valve
ILacation
Closed king vaiva, compressors on
Increased friction in compressors
High temperatures
Ammonia ove~lll
Earthquake
Earthquake
Sight glass accidentally hit
Poor condition / failure
Vessel crushed
Receiver PRV will release
Increased system pressure
Receiver PRY release, vessel failure
Receiver PRY release
Broken lines to vessels
Loss of power to system
Check vanes seal off ammonia flow
Ammonia release
Hit by forklift I truck
Low Med Employee training, operating procedures
Low Low Regular maintenance
mED Low PRY vented to condensor (vapors scrubbed)
Low Low IEmployee tm ning. operating procedures, sparge system
High Low Structural integrity
Med Low Compressor room ventilation, vibration/motion shutdown
Low Low Glass protected, restricted access
Med Low Regular maintenance
High Low Perimeter fencing, oading procedures
None
None
None
None
Insfalt flex hoses
None
None
None
Install guardra#s
Deecrlptlon of Equipment Operation:
- High pressure vessels confain ammonia as it travels from the compressors, through the oil separator, passed ~e condenser, to the receiver,
6/3J96
cliant~ernhazo.wbl
HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY FORM
COMPANY: KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
ISystem: AMMONIA REFRIGERATION SYSTEM
Study Node: 3.01
Equipment: FREEZER ROOMS
Drawing References:
Guide Deviation Cause of the Consequences Resulting from a : Severity Probabillt~ Controls in Place Proposed Mitigation
Word Deviation Deviation from Normal Operation Measures
No Ammonia flow Plugged valves in storage rooms Inefficient room cooling Low Low Operator training, murine inspections None
Water Valve closed Poor condenser operations Low Low Operator training, murine inspections None
Power Power failure Poor condenser operations Low Low Operatol' training None
Ammonia Solenoid fails closed System shutdown Low Low High pressure shutdown, rourine maintenance, inspection None
:Ammonia Expansion valve broken System shutdown Low Low High pressure shutdown, murine maintenance, inspection None
More IAmmonia flowin rooms
lAmmonia flow in rooms
I Prassure
ITemperature
IOther I Earth movement
I Location
IFira
Dnscdptlon of Equipment Operation:
- Rooms 1 - 14 are freezer rooms.
- Recold units are water defrost.
Solenoid stuck open Coil pressure build up, may trigger system shutdown
Manual bypass left open Coil pressure build up, may tgigger system shutdown
Coil pressure build up, may trigger system shutdown
FireFire inin storageSt°rage roomsr°°ms Col pressure build up. may trigger system shutdown
Earthquake Fracture lines, ammonia leak
Vehicular collision Fracture vapor line
Fire
Ppefa ura
- A float valve (operated by* a solenoid valve) in the accumulator tanks controls liquid flow through the Recold coils.
Low Low Routine inspections, maintenance, high pressure shutdown None
Low Low Operator training, high pressure shutdown None
Low Low Automatic high pressure shutdown None
Low Low Automatic high pressure shutdown None
Med Low Vibration shutdovm, excess flow valve, Sch. 80 lines None
Low Low Low pressure sensor, guard posts protect to the sldd None
Med Low Excess flow valve, routine inspections, operator tm ning None
6/3/96
clients~kernhazo.wbl
HAZARDS AND OPERA TY (HAZOP) STUDY FORM
COMPANY: KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
System: AMMONIA REFRIGERATION SYSTEM
Study Node: 4.01
Equipment: COOLER ROOMS
Drawing References:
Guide Deviation Cause of the Consequences Resulting from a Severity Probability Controls in Place Proposed Mitigation
Word Deviation Deviation from Normal Operation Measures
No Ammonia Solenoid fails closed System shutdown Low Low High pressure shutdown, routine maintenanse, inspection None
Ammonia Expansion valve broken System shutdown 'Low Low High pressure shutdown, routine maintenance, inspection None
Power Power failure Compressor shutdown, poor condenser operations ~ Low Operator training None
Water Valve cL_nsed_ Poor condenser operations Low Operator training, routine inspections None
IMore IAmmon~
. IAmmonla
lAmmonia llow in rooms
~Ammonia flow in rooms
] Pressure
I Temperature
Solenoid fails open
Expansion valve fails
Solenoid stuck open
Manual bypass left open
Fire in storage rooms
Fire n storage rooms
I Less efficient operations .ow Med None
Less efficient operations .ow Med None
Pressure in coils will build up, may trigger system shutd .ow Low Routine inspections, maintenance, high pressure shutdown
Pressure in coils will build up, may t~igger system shutd .ow Low Operator training, high pressure shutdown
Pressure in coils will build up, may trigger system shutd .ow Low Automatic high pressure shutdown
Pressure in coils will bu!td up, may.trii3ger system shutd .ow Low Automat c high pressure shutdown
I Other IEarth movement Earthquake IFracture lines, ammonia leak Med Low Vibration shutdown, excess flow valve, Sch. 80 lines INone
I Location Vehicular collision IFracture vapor line Low Low Low pressure sensor, guard posts protect to the skid I None
Med ILow Excess Ilow valve, rout ne nspections, operator training INone
I IFire Fre IPipe failure
Description of Equipment Operation:
- Rooms 15 - 34 are cooler rooms
None
None
None
None
None
None
6/3/96
clients~kernhazo.wbl
HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY FORM
COMPANY: KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
ISystem: AMMONIA REFRIGERATION SYSTEM
Study Node: 5,01
Equipment ,* GAS/LIQUID SEPARATION VESSEL
Drawing References:
Guide DevlaUon Cause of the Consequences ResulUng from a Severity Probabilit~ Controls in Place Proposed MlflgaUon
Word Deviation Deviation from Normal Operation Measures
No Ammonia flow System shutdown None Low Meal Routine maintenance None
Ammonia pump Pump motor burned out Excess liquid in unit, system pressure increase Low Low High pressure shutdown, murine maintenance None
Ammonia pump Broken belt Excess liquid in unit, system pressure increase Low Low High pressure shutdown, murine maintenance None
Float control Float fails Compressor damage from liquids Low Low Routine maintenance, inspection !None
IOther I Earth movement Earthquake
I Fire F re
Description of Equipment Operation:
- Tank receives liquids and gases from freezer and cooler rooms
ILines to separator break
High pressures tdgger shutdown, line failure
Well supported lines, vibration shutdown, routine inspections None
Excess flow valve, murine inspections, operator tm ning None
6/4/96
clients~kernhazo, wbl
HAZARDS AND OPERABILIT~ STUDY FORM
COMPANY: KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
System:
Study Node:
Equ pment:
AMMONIA REFRIGERATION SYSTEM
6.00
LOADING OF AMMONIA RECEIVER
Drawing References:
INulde IDeviation
ord
o IAmmonia flow into tank
IAmmonia vapor returns
I ~p~e?nia flow from truck
Cause of the
Deviation
Inlet valve closed
IReturn line valve closed
lCheck valve on liquid fill
IPower failure
Consequences Resulting from a
Deviation from Normal Operation
Overpressurize line, hose rupture
IOVerePressurize line. hose rupture
Less IAmmonia flow into tank
lAmmonia vapor returns
IAmmonia vapor returns
IAmmonia flow from truck
IMore IAmmonia flow into tank
IPressure in tank
ITemperature
IOther IEarth movement
I Location
]Operator error
~Operator error
~Operator error
~Operator error
] Driver error
~Operator error
Inlet valve closed
Return line valve closed
High pressure in storage tank
Check valve on liquid fill
N/A
Higher ambient temperature
Higher ambient temperature
Earthquake
Vehicular collision
Vehicle moves
Sight glass improperly read
Valve not shut off propedy
Worn hose not noticed
Vehicle accident
Fill hose connected to vapor line
Overpressurize line, hose rupture
Overpressurize line, hose rupture
PRY opens
None
LiN'mAlt flow dudng filling
IIncrease pressure, f ow potential
Rupture lines
Rupture hose
Rupture hose, fill line
Too much ammonia in system, PRY releases
Ammonia leak
Possible ammonia leak
Rupture tanker
Compressor pulls liquid and stalls. No hazard
Severity Probability Controls In Place
l High I Low I PRVs, operator present dudng filling, written procedures
High ILow I PRVs, operator present during filling, written procedures
High Low PRVs. operator present during filling, written procedures
High Low PRVs, operator present during filling, written procedures
Low ILow ~Sparge system for PRY
ILow Low 1None
I ~A IJ~A IN,A
Low ILow ITraining. vapor return line, PRVs
Low ILow ITraining. written procedures
Proposed Mitigation
Measures
~lone
None
None
None
;None
None
~one
~one
High Low ICheck valve on fill line Install
High Low Cordoned off area during filling None
High Low IWheels chocked, written procedures None
Low Med PRY activates, training I None
Med I Low Employee b'aining I None
MOd ILow Inspection procedures ~ None
I None
High I Low DOT approved vessel, BFD approved route, licensed operator I None
Low ~ Low Hoses have different sized connectors
flex hose
6/3/96
clients~kernhazo.wbl
HAZARDS AND OPERAE (HAZOP) STUDY FORM
COMPANY: KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE
ISystem:
Study Node:
Equipment:
AMMONIA REFRIGERATION SYSTEM
7.iX)
FIRE DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY REFRIGERANT cONTROL BOX WITH SPARGE SYSTEM
Drawing References:
Deviation
Cause of the I Consequences Resulting from a
Deviation ~ Deviation from Normal Operation
Raw water tank leak with dump valve op |Release of ammonia
I
Raw water tank leak with dump valve op [Release of ammonia
I
Overfill tank None
Raw water tank isolation valve closed Rupture line
More IWater
IPressure in sparge line
IOther Dump valve open
· I Earth movement
ILocation
Operator error
Earthquake
Vehicu ar collision
Release of ammonia to diffusion tank
Fracture liquid line
Fracture liquid line
Description of Equipment Operation:
Control box equipped with dump valves to divert ammonia to sparge tank in case of emergency.
10,000 gallon raw water tank se~ves as the diffusion tank.
Carbon steel piping meets ANSI B16.5, ANSI 31.1 requirements.
Controls In Place
inspection
inspection
Proposed Mitigation"
Measures
Install sparge tank gauge
INone
N/A N/A Routine inspection
High Low Routine inspection
INone
Lock valve
open
Low Low Operator training, emergency dump system
I Ic°ntmls will be secured
I Low I Low Excess flow valve
ILow ILOW IExcess low va ve, pedmeter fencing
None
None
None
6/3/96
clients~kernhazo.wbl
APPENDIX D-Ill
PROCESS FLOW AND PIPING DIAGRAMS
~ ~.~o ~p~ ~ ~o ~P- T.o.~. O) ~ ~ '~"~
T~, - · .... . .......F'_: ..... · --
. ~ I~ .... ~"' ' ' ' ....
$ ;<.['. '.0'.: :' :.) J':~' c~ ,' :;, :, . · , ~ ,, ·
~ ,. .............. ~~ .'" ' , ,"-: :':...n;~ I / ,o
- J 2' ": ..... '"' ,'.'...~:~:r..'~ .,...~: ~.~;', ..... :..~, I '"
a' l; ..... '~'~ ~...,...c .:.:'.:u.'.'x.% ~:;; .'.-.., :.. '.';I , ~ .....
- s..L::.'~: :, :-..- ....... . : ....... · · ~IH. ~' ....... : ~ _
- ~ - ~- : - -',':' "~ ~"-. ' .............. ." ':"':'
~.~.., .... ...~.,, ? ?, ~ ~... ,;,,... ....... ~ ~ ~ ·
I';" r,'i.i¢ :.n 3 d ;:.;. ::.-,.,.-.-: '. ' ' II ' - ....... J G ~~ Il ~,, - v % , ~
I " ' ..... " " ....... :' . ' _, ~ ~ I; ~r.~ ¢¢~ IH I ~
- t ~':,r,'r~ --. ........... ~ '
~,,,~...',~,, : ............. ,~i,,.~. .y /'~~
~:l .~= ~ ' · l~! E-:I:-JZ¢..,. ' / % % . ~,, / /, ~.rr. /
....... ~-~ ~ ~ ........ 14~' ~~ ... · , ~~~ ~'~n.s~c.~Eu ~ '- _)J -'~-~-
· h~ I ~ ~.~ L ~1 ',~ i /~ - I. ~.p:.-' . , /li~-- ,~,-~ ........
- ~ ...... % ..... F ~, '~-=*.- ~ _r~_ _: f ~J / ¢! ........ ~1 BY fW[161tT. ~EFO~ FiLI.IN6. ALL
~ ~.~f F- . . , ~ 192400MPTO
APPENDIX D-IV
ARCHIE COMPUTER MODELING RESULTS
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
ADDRESS \ LOCATION
DATE OF ASSESSMENT
NAME OF DISK FILE
= ANHYDROUS AMMONIA
= KERN ICE / BAKERSFIELD
= JUNE 1996
= KERNIDLH.ASF
*** SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
CASE 1
--- PARTIAL LINE BREAK (45 GPM)
--- NIGHTIME CONDITIONS (CLASS F)
--- IDLH CONCENTRATIONS (500 PPM)
******* DISCHARGE RATE/DURATION ESTIMATES
Liquefied gas discharge from outlet <= 4 in. from tank
Average discharge rate
Duration of discharge
Amount discharged
State of material
= 292.8 lbs/min
= 21.3 minutes
= 6230 lbs
= Mix of gas/aerosol
******* TOXIC VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
Downwind distance to concentration of 500 ppm
-- at groundlevel = 5330 feet
Note: Minimum computable answer is 33 feet!
Actual hazard distance may be less.
Note: User changed vapor emission rate prior to use of toxic
or flammable vapor dispersion model. Final user provided
rate was 292.8 lbs/min.
Note: User changed vapor emission duration prior
toxic or flammable vapor dispersion model.
provided duration was 21.3 minutes.
to use of
Final user
Note: See last page of printout for list of results originally
computed by ARCHIE.
See attached table(s) for further details.
TOXIC VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
,nd Distance Groundlevel
Concentration
(feet) (miles) (ppm)
Source Height
Concentration
(ppm)
Initial Evacuation
Zone Width*
(feet)
100 .02 542012 542012 73
474 .09 28003 28003 350
848 .17 9974 9974 620
1221 .24 5327 5327 890
1595 .31 3403 3403 1170
1968 .38 2405 2405 1440
2342 .45 1813 1813 1710
2715 .52 1429 1429 1980
3089 .59 1164 1164 2250
3462 .66 973 973 2520
3836 .73 829 829 2800
4209 .8 718 718 3070
4583 .87 630 630 3340
4956 .94 559 559 3610
5330 1.01 500 500 1
*Usually safe for < 1 hour release. Longer releases or sudden wind shifts
may require a larger width or different direction for the evacuation zone.
See Chapters 3 and 12 of the guide for details. Source height specified
by the user for this scenario was 0 feet.
TOXIC VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
Downwind Distance
(feet) (miles)
Contaminant Arrival Time
at Downwind Location
(minutes)
Contaminant Departure Time
at Downwind Location
(minutes)
100 .02 .3 21.9
474 .09 1.2 23.7
848 .17 2.2 25.6
1221 .24 3.1 -27.5
1595 .31 4.1 29.4
1968 .38 5 31.3
2342 .45 6 33.2
2715 .52 6.9 35.1
3089 .59 7.9 37
3462 .66 8.8 38.8
3836 .73 9.7 40.7
4209 .8 10.7 42.6
4583 .87 11.6 44.5
4956 .94 12.6 46.4
5330 1.01 13.5 48.3
CAUTION: See guide for assumptions used in estimating these times.
INPUT PARAMETER SUMMARY
PHYSIOCHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF MATERIAL
NORMAL BOILING POINT
MOLECULAR WEIGHT
LIQUID SPECIFIC GRAVITY
VAPOR PRES AT CONTAINER TEMP
TOXIC VAPOR LIMIT
= -27.4 degrees F
= 17
= .52
= 90 psia
= 4657 mm Hg
= 500 ppm
CONTAINER CHARACTERISTICS
CONTAINER TYPE =
TANK DIAMETER = 4
TANK LENGTH = 24
TOTAL WEIGHT OF CONTENTS = 6230
WEIGHT OF LIQUID = 6200
LIQUID HEIGHT IN CONTAINER = 2.5
WEIGHT OF GAS UNDER PRESSURE = 30.4
TOTAL CONTAINER VOLUME = 301.6
LIQUID VOLUME IN CONTAINER
= 2256
= 191.1
= 1429
110.6
.55
.62
60
VAPOR/GAS VOLUME IN CONTAINER =
DISCHARGE HOLE DIAMETER =
DISCHARGE COEFFICIENT OF HOLE =
TEMP OF CONTAINER CONTENTS =
Horizontal cylinder
feet
feet
lbs
lbs
feet
lbs
ft3
gals
ft3
gals
ft3
inch (es)
degrees F
ENVIRONMENTAL/LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS
AMBIENT TEMPERATURE = 70
WIND VELOCITY = 4.5
ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS = F
VAPOR/GAS DISCHARGE HEIGHT = 0
degrees F
mph
feet
KEY RESULTS PROVIDED BY USER INSTEAD OF BY EVALUATION METHODS
NONE OBSERVED
KEY RESULTS OVERRIDDEN BY USER AT SOME POINT AFTER COMPUTATION
VAPOR EVOLUTION RATE = 5330 lb/min
VAPOR EVOLUTION DURATION = 1 minutes
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
ADDRESS \ LOCATION
DATE OF ASSESSMENT
NAME OF DISK FILE
= ANHYDROUS AMMONIA
= KERN ICE / BAKERSFIELD
= JUNE 1996
= KERNIDLH.ASF
*** SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
CASE 1 --- PARTIAL LINE BREAK (45 GPM)
--- NIGHTTIME CONDITIONS (CLASS F)
--- LOC CONCENTRATIONS (50 PPM)
******* DISCHARGE RATE/DURATION ESTIMATES
Liquefied gas discharge from outlet <= 4 in. from tank
Average discharge rate
Duration of discharge
Amount discharged
State of material
= 292.8 lbs/min
= 21.3 minutes
= 6230 lbs
= Mix of gas/aerosol
******* TOXIC VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
Downwind distance to concentration of 50 ppm
-- at groundlevel = 27095 feet
Note: Minimum computable answer is 33 feet!
Actual hazard distance may be less.
Note: User changed vapor emission rate prior to use of toxic
or flammable vapor dispersion model. Final user provided
rate was 292.8 lbs/min.
Note: User changed vapor emission duration prior
toxic or flammable vapor dispersion model.
provided duration was 21.3 minutes.
to use of
Final user
Note: See last page of printout for list of results originally
computed by ARCHIE.
See attached table(s) for further details.
TOXIC VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
nd Distance Groundlevel
Concentration
(feet) (miles) (ppm)
Source Height
Concentration
(ppm)
Initial Evacuation
Zone Width*
(feet)
100 .02 542012 542012 73
2029 .39 2288 2288 1480
3957 .75 790 790 2890
5885 1.12 431 431 4290
7813 1.48 283 283 5690
9741 1.85 205 205 7100
11670 2.22 159 159 8500
13598 2.58 128 128 9900
15526 2.95 107 107 11310
17454 3.31 90.3 90.3 12710
19382 3.68 78.3 78.3 14110
21311 4.04 68.9 68.9 15520
23239 4.41 61.3 61.3 16920
25167 4.77 55.2 55.2 18320
27095 5.14 50 50 1
*Usually safe for < 1 hour release. Longer releases or sudden wind shifts
may require a larger width or different direction for the evacuation zone.
See Chapters 3 and 12 of the guide for details. Source height specified
by the user for this scenario was 0 feet.
TOXIC VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
Downwind Distance
(feet) (miles)
Contaminant Arrival Time
at Downwind Location
(minutes)
Contaminant Departure Time
at Downwind Location
(minutes)
100 .02 .3 21.9
2029 .39 5.2 31.6
3957 .75 10 41.3
5885 1.12 14.9 51.1
7813 1.48 19.8 60.8
9741 1.85 24.6 70.5
11670 2.22 29.5 80.3
1359'8 2.58 34.4 90
15526 2.95 39.3 99.8
17454 3.31 44.1 109.5
19382 3.68 49 119.2
21311 4.04 53.9 129
23239 4.41 58.7 138.7
25167 4.77 63.6 148.5
27095 5.14 68.5 158.2
CAUTION: See guide for assumptions used in estimating these times.
INPUT PARAMETER SUMMARY
PHYSIOCHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF MATERIAL
NORMAL BOILING POINT
MOLECULAR WEIGHT
LIQUID SPECIFIC GRAVITY
VAPOR PRES AT CONTAINER TEMP
TOXIC VAPOR LIMIT
= -27.4 degrees F
= 17
= .52
= 90 psia
= 4657 mm Hg
= 50 ppm
CONTAINER CHARACTERISTICS
CONTAINER TYPE
TANK DIAMETER
TANK LENGTH
TOTAL WEIGHT OF CONTENTS
WEIGHT OF LIQUID
LIQUID HEIGHT IN CONTAINER
WEIGHT OF GAS UNDER PRESSURE
TOTAL CONTAINER VOLUME
LIQUID VOLUME IN CONTAINER
VAPOR/GAS VOLUME IN CONTAINER =
DISCHARGE HOLE DIAMETER =
DISCHARGE COEFFICIENT OF HOLE =
TEMP OF CONTAINER CONTENTS =
= Horizontal cylinder
= 4 feet
= 24 feet
= 6230 lbs
= 6200 lbs
= 2.5 feet
= 30.4 lbs
= 301.6 ft3
= 2256 gals
= 191.1 ft3
= 1429 gals
110.6 ft3
.55 inch(es)
.62
60 degrees F
ENVIRONMENTAL/LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS
AMBIENT TEMPERATURE = 70
WIND VELOCITY = 4.5
ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS = F
VAPOR/GAS DISCHARGE HEIGHT = 0
degrees F
mph
feet
KEY RESULTS PROVIDED BY USER INSTEAD OF BY EVALUATION METHODS
NONE OBSERVED
KEY RESULTS OVERRIDDEN BY USER AT SOME POINT AFTER COMPUTATION
VAPOR EVOLUTION RATE = 5330 lb/min
VAPOR EVOLUTION DURATION = 1 minutes
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
ADDRESS \ LOCATION
DATE OF ASSESSMENT
NAME OF DISK FILE
= ANHYDROUS AMMONIA
= KERN ICE / BAKERSFIELD
= JUNE 1996
= KERNIDLH.ASF
*** SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
CASE 2 --- PARTIAL LINE BREAK (45 GPM)
--- DAYTIME CONDITIONS (CLASS B)
--- IDLH CONCENTRATION (500 PPM)
******* DISCHARGE RATE/DURATION ESTIMATES
Liquefied gas discharge from outlet <= 4 in. from tank
Average discharge rate
Duration of discharge
Amount discharged
State of material
= 292.8 lbs/min
= 21.3 minutes
= 6230 lbs
= Mix of gas/aerosol
******* TOXIC VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
Downwind distance to concentration of 500 ppm
-- at groundlevel = 645 feet
Note: Minimum computable answer is 33 feet!
Actual hazard distance may be less.
Note: User changed vapor emission rate prior to use of toxic
or flammable vapor dispersion model. Final user provided
rate was 292.8 lbs/min.
Note: User changed vapor emission duration prior
toxic or flammable vapor dispersion model.
provided duration was 21.3 minutes.
to use of
Final user
Note: See last page of printout for list of results originally
computed by ARCHIE.
See attached table(s) for further details.
TOXIC VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
~ownwind Distance
(feet) (miles)
Groundlevel
Concentration
(ppm)
Source Height
Concentration
(ppm)
Initial Evacuation
Zone Width*
(feet)
100 .02 18739 18739 350
139 .03 9910 9910 490
178 .04 6137 6137 620
217 .05 4178 4178 760
256 .05 3031 3031 890
295 .06 2301 2301 1030
334 .07 1808 1808 1110
373 .08 1458 1458 1060
412 .08 1202 1202 1000
451 .09 1008 1008 930
490 .1 857 857 850
529 .11 739 739 750
568 .11 643 643 620
606 .12 565 565 450
645 .13 500 500 1
*Usually safe for < 1 hour release. Longer releases or sudden wind shifts
may require a larger width or different direction for the evacuation zone.
See Chapters 3 and 12 of the guide for details. Source height specified
by the user for this scenario was 0 feet.
TOXIC VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
Downwind Distance
(feet) (miles)
Contaminant Arrival Time
at Downwind Location
(minutes)
Contaminant Departure Time
at Downwind Location
(minutes)
100 .02 .2 21.7
139 .03 .3 21.8
178 .04 .4 22
217 .05 .4 22.1
256 .05 .5 22.3
295 .06 .6 22.4
334 .07 .6 22.5
373 .08 .7 22.7
412 .08 .8 22.8
451 .09 .9 23
490 .1 .9 23.1
529 .11 1 23.2
568 .11 1.1 23.4
606 .12 1.1 23.5
645 .13 1.2 23.6
CAUTION: See guide for assumptions used in estimating these times.
INPUT PARAMETER SUMMARY
PHYSIOCHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF MATERIAL
NORMAL BOILING POINT
MOLECULAR WEIGHT
LIQUID SPECIFIC GRAVITY
VAPOR PRES AT CONTAINER TEMP
TOXIC VAPOR LIMIT
= -27.4 degrees F
= 17
= .52
= 90 psia
= 4657 mm Hg
= 500 ppm
CONTAINER CHARACTERISTICS
CONTAINER TYPE =
TANK DIAMETER = 4
TANK LENGTH = 24
TOTAL WEIGHT OF CONTENTS = 6230
WEIGHT OF LIQUID = 6200
LIQUID HEIGHT IN CONTAINER = 2.5
WEIGHT OF GAS UNDER PRESSURE = 30.4
TOTAL CONTAINER VOLUME = 301.6
LIQUID VOLUME IN CONTAINER
= 2256
= 191.1
= 1429
110.6
.55
.62
60
VAPOR/GAS VOLUME IN CONTAINER =
DISCHARGE HOLE DIAMETER =
DISCHARGE COEFFICIENT OF HOLE =
TEMP OF CONTAINER CONTENTS =
Horizontal cylinder
feet
feet
lbs
lbs
feet
lbs
ft3
gals
ft3
gals
ft3
inch (es)
degrees F
ENVIRONMENTAL/LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS
AMBIENT TEMPERATURE = 77.7
WIND VELOCITY = 6.4
ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS = B
VAPOR/GAS DISCHARGE HEIGHT = 0
degrees F
mph
feet
KEY RESULTS PROVIDED BY USER INSTEAD OF BY EVALUATION METHODS
NONE OBSERVED
KEY RESULTS OVERRIDDEN BY USER AT SOME POINT AFTER COMPUTATION
VAPOR EVOLUTION RATE =, 5330 lb/min
VAPOR EVOLUTION DURATION = 1 minutes
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
ADDRESS \ LOCATION
DATE OF ASSESSMENT
NAME OF DISK FILE
= ANHYDROUS AMMONIA
= KERN ICE / BAKERSFIELD
= JUNE 1996
= KERNIDLH.ASF
*** SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
CASE 2 --- PARTIAL LINE BREAK (45GPM)
--- DAYTIME CONDITIONS (CLASS B)
--- LOC CONCENTRATION (50 PPM)
******* DISCHARGE RATE/DURATION ESTIMATES
Liquefied gas discharge from outlet <= 4 in. from tank
Average discharge rate
Duration of discharge
Amount discharged
State of material
= 292.8 lbs/min
= 21.3 minutes
= 6230 lbs
= Mix of gas/aerosol
******* TOXIC VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
Downwind distance to concentration of 50 ppm
-- at groundlevel = 2092 feet
Note: Minimum computable answer is 33 feet!
Actual hazard distance may be less.
Note: User changed vapor emission rate prior to use of toxic
or flammable vapor dispersion model. Final user provided
rate was 292.8 lbs/min.
Note: User changed vapor emission duration prior
toxic or flammable vapor dispersion model.
provided duration was 21.3 minutes.
to use of
Final user
Note: See last page of printout for list of results originally
computed by ARCHIE.
See attached table(s) for further details.
TOXIC VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
Distance Groundlevel Source Height Initial Evacuation
Concentration Concentration Zone Width*
(feet) (miles) (ppm) (ppm) (feet)
100 .02 18739 18739 350
243 .05 3366 3366 840
385 .08 1370 1370 1340
527 .1 742 742 1830
669 .13 466 466 2320
812 .16 320 320 2820
954 .19 233 233 3310
1096 .21 178 178 3570
1238 .24 140 140 3380
1381 .27 113 113 3150
1523 .29 93.2 93.2 2870
1665 .32 78.3 78.3 2540
1807 .35 66.7 66.7 2110
1950 .37 57.5 57.5 1520
2092 .4 50 50 1
*Usually safe for < 1 hour release. Longer releases or sudden wind shifts
may require a larger width or different direction for the evacuation zone.
See Chapters 3 and 12 of the guide for details. Source height specified
by the user for this scenario was 0 feet. ~
TOXIC VAPOR DISPERSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
Downwind Distance
(feet) (miles)
Contaminant Arrival Time
at Downwind Location
(minutes)
Contaminant Departure Time
at Downwind Location
(minutes)
100 .02 .2 21.7
243 .05 .5 22.2
385 .08 .7 22.7
527 .1 1 23.2
669 .13 1.2 23.7
812 .16 1.5 24.2
954 .19 1.7 24.7
1096 .21 2 25.2
1238 .'24 2.2 25.7
1381 .27 2.5 26.3
1523 .29 2.8 26.8
1665 .32 3 27.3
1807 .35 3.3 27.8
1950 .37 3.5 28.3
2092 .4 3.8 28.8
CAUTION: See guide for assumptions used in estimating these times.
INPUT PARAMETER SUMMARY
PHYSIOCHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF MATERIAL
NORMAL BOILING POINT
MOLECULAR WEIGHT
LIQUID SPECIFIC GRAVITY
VAPOR PRES AT CONTAINER TEMP
TOXIC VAPOR .LIMIT
= -27.4
= 17
= .52
= 90
= 4657
= 50
degrees F
psia
mm Hg
ppm
CONTAINER CHARACTERISTICS
CONTAINER TYPE =
TANK DIAMETER = 4
TANK LENGTH = 24
TOTAL WEIGHT OF CONTENTS = 6230
WEIGHT OF LIQUID = 6200
LIQUID HEIGHT IN CONTAINER = 2.5
WEIGHT OF GAS UNDER PRESSURE = 30.4
TOTAL CONTAINER VOLUME = 301.6
= 2256
= 191.1
= 1429
110.6
.55
.62
, 60
LIQUID VOLUME IN CONTAINER
VAPOR/GAS VOLUME IN CONTAINER =
DISCHARGE HOLE DIAMETER =
DISCHARGE COEFFICIENT OF HOLE =
TEMP OF CONTAINER CONTENTS =
Horizontal cylinder
feet
feet
lbs
lbs
feet
lbs
ft3
gals
ft3
gals
ft3
inch(es)
degrees F
ENVIRONMENTAL/LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS
AMBIENT TEMPERATURE = 77.7
WIND VELOCITY = 6.4
ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS = B
VAPOR/GAS DISCHARGE HEIGHT = 0
degrees F
mph
feet
KEY RESULTS PROVIDED BY USER INSTEAD OF BY EVALUATION METHODS
NONE OBSERVED
KEY RESULTS OVERRIDDEN BY USER AT SOME POINT AFTER COMPUTATION
VAPOR EVOLUTION RATE = 5330 lb/min
VAPOR EVOLUTION DURATION = 1 minutes
APPENDIX E
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
APPENDIX E
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
1. General Evacuation
Employees are verbally notified of emergencies by the Plant Engineer or his designee. All
employees are to leave the facility immediately through the nearest exit and regroup on
30th Street on the west of the canal. The following page (Exhibit 7) also shows the
emergency evacuation routes. Emergency responders will be notified through 911.
2. Fire
If a fire occurs, all employees are to leave immediately through the nearest exist and
regroup at the front of the building. Emergency responders will be notified through 911.
Fire Station #4 is the closest fire station at 130 Bernard Street. The fire department should
be apprised of the existence of ammonia in the plant. Water spray can be used to dilute
ammonia vapors. Cooling the receiver with water can prevent the release of ammonia.
3. 'Earthquake
Employees should remain in safe, stable locations (in doorways, under sturdy desks) until
earth movement has ceased. After the earthquake, all employees are to leave immediately
through the nearest exit and regroup at the front of the building, far enough from the
building to avoid falling masonry.
11140010.009 1
4. Ammonia Release
In the event of a significant ammonia release, all employees are to be verbally notified by
the Plant Engineer or his designee. All employees are to follow the instructions given to
them by the Plant Engineer or designated emergency responder. This may included
evacuation to a designated spot or staying indoors, closing all doors and windows and
shutting down ventilation systems, depending upon the location and type of ammonia leak.
11140010.009 2
APPENDIX F
RMPP AUDIT CHECKLIST
Kern Ice and Cold Storage
Date
APPENDIX F
RMPP AUDIT CHECKLIST
Name Signature
* Has a Facility Modification affecting AHM handling been documented in
RMPP?
Yes No N/A
If yes, does Hazard Analysis need to be modified?
Yes No
* Are all written operating procedures provided in Appendix B up to date?
Yes No
* After an unannounced spot check, were the standard operating procedures
(SOP) performed as written?
Yes No
Date and time of SOP spot checks ~
If no, has training been scheduled to review written procedures?
Yes No
* Have changes in SOP or New SOP been documented in RMPP?
Yes No N/A
* Have all maintenance inspections, and PMs been performed?
Yes No
* Have all safety relief valves been inspected/replaced annually?
Yes No
* Has each AHM accident/incident been investigated including method
developed to prevent reoccurrence been documented?
Yes No N/A
* Has an AHM release been reported as required under Section XI of the
RMPP?
Yes No N/A
* Have changes made to AHM system, processes and operations been
reviewed under management of change procedures, as described in
Section XIV of the RMPP, prior to implementation.
Yes No N/A
* Is all AHM safety equipment available and in good condition?
Yes No
* Has list of all current employees been reviewed against master training
checklist provided in Appendix G of RMPP?
Yes No
* If yes have all employees received the training listed on checklist?
Yes No
* If no, has training been scheduled to bring all employees current?
Yes No
11140010.RMPPAUD.FRM
WlZl INC
APPENDIX G
RMPP TRAINING CHECKLIST
APPENDIX G
TI~,AINING I~EQUII~EDICOMPLETED
Manager J.W. (CPR) first aid Completed Completed 4 Completed 4 ongoing with training
Daughtry 6/30/90 4/times/year times/year times/year
Warehouse foreman
Gary Johnson ......
Engineer
Richard Dixon ..........
Warehouseman
A. Rodriguez ......
Office Manager ........
Dixie Arvizu
11140010.008