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HomeMy WebLinkAboutHAZARDOUS WASTE 9/1990 WZI INC, 4800 Easton Drive, Suite114 Bakersfield, California 93309 805/326-1112 4800 Easton Drive, Suite 114 Bakersfield, California 93309 Post Office Box 9217 Bakersfield, California 93389 805/326-1112 805/326-0191 FAX RECEIVED SEP ', 1990 HA7. MAT. DIV. September 7, 1990 Barbara Brenner Hazardous Materials Planning Technician City of Bakersfield 2101 H Street Bakersfield, CA 93301 Re: Kern /ce & Cold Storage Hazards Analysis Dear Ms. Brenner: Enclosed is one copy of the Hazards Analysis for Kern Ice and Cold Storage. Please do not hesitate to contact us should you have any questions or additional information. require BBB/mw cc: Jesse Daughtry Kern Ice & Cold Storage 1114.0010^ Very truly yours, Bob B. Blalock V.P., Chief Financial Officer EQUALIZING TUBES AIR I NH3VAPOR I NH3UQUID SEPARATOR AIR V~APOR RETURN TO COMPRESSOR VIA TIE INTO LOW · ~f PRESSURE  D SUCIION MNE !_... TOW^TE~ I- / v COOUNG TOWER / COMPRESSOR THRU THE OIL SEPARATOR CONDENSER SYSTEM CONDENSERS KING DETAIL OF EMERGENCY AMMONIA DIFFUSION STATION FIRE DEPT. HOOKUP LOW PRESSURE TO'CANAL r~ ~ HIGH PRESSURE FLOAT VALVE FLOODE0 SyS~ FLOAT ~VALVE l, { PLANNING TO REMOVE IN NEAR FUTURE OIL SEPARATOR 'D AMMONIA DIFFUSION STATION VALVES 4800 Easton Drive, Suite 114 Bakersfield, California 93309 Post Office Box 9217 Bakersfield, California 9.3389 805/326-1112 805/326-0191 FAX HAZARDS ANALYSIS Kern Ice & Cold Storage Submitted to the Hazardous Materials Division of the Bakersfield City Fire Department September, 1990 Section 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.0 6.1 6.2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Summary Hazards Identification Chemical Identity of Acutely Hazardous Materials Location of Acutely Hazardous Materials Quantity Nature of Hazard Hazard and Operability Study Results Summary Release Scenarios Onsite Consequences Offsite Consequences Human Error AnalySis Vulnerability Analysis Vulnerable Zone - Human Populations Critical Facilities Risk Analysis Likelihood of a Release Occurring .Severity of Consequences Page 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 8 8 9 12 12 13 13 14 14 14 EXHIBITS Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5 Exhibit 6 Exhibit 7 Exhibit 8 Exhibit 9 Location Map Hazards Analysis Flowchart Facility Diagram Ammonia Schematic Diagram Map of Surrounding Area Factors Affecting Vulnerable Zone Estimations Neighboring Receptors List of Receptors Worst Case Vulnerable Zone Map Exhibit 10 Worst Case IDLH Exposure Map APPENDICES Appendix B-I Appendix B-II Appendix B-Ill Appendix B-IV Hazard and Operability Study Guideline Hazard and Operability Study Forms Modeling Results Alarms and Control Devices 1.0 INTRODUCTION This hazards analysis of Acutely Hazardous Materials (AHM) has been prepared for the Kern Ice & Cold Storage facility which is located at the intersection of Union Avenue and Thirtieth Street, Bakersfield, Kern County, California (Exhibit 1). This analysis has been prepared in accordance with the EPA/FEMA/USDOT document "Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis: Emergency Planning for Extremely Hazardous Substances, 1987." There are three basic components in hazards analysis (Exhibit 2) which provide the outline of this report: o o o Hazards Identification Vulnerability Analysis Risk Analysis Page 1 2.0 SUMMARY Ammonia releases could occur leading to possible exposure of workers and receptors above the Level of Concern (LOC), 50 ppm, and the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health Level (IDLH), 500 ppm. The worst case credible scenario, determined through the hazard and operability study, is the formation of a dispersion cloud of ammonia released by the rupture of one or more of the ammonia receivers. Liquid ammonia released at a high rate could form a liquid/air dispersion cloud that could migrate to neighboring areas. The area surrounding Kern Ice & Cold Storage is both industrial and residential. \T_b-.e-e~t~t-~f-tb-~-~l~l~l~-_ZOrne_for_.a_worst_ca~e cre-dil~l~el~f~5~-325-pound~-~f ~ 'q u_id- a-m mo_ 'ni'a~d~i.h-~d-t'h r~--b-b~g h~m-o:de:l ['n~.,_~s-ap p fox i.~-~t~l~975~i:le~--~-a_at~1;2)7 m-in'ut/e~~~ T-h-~---I:D:Ei;lqeve I~- -500-p p m,_m a~bYe~r_e~'ch ed-at ;up~to-3~;_3£m i:l:es ~-a~_ay~474_-mit~ft~lea-~-~ This Hazards Analysis showed the Kern ICe & Cold Storage ammonia refrigeration system to be generally in good condition. Present maintenance practices are working to improve the system. Page 2 3.0 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION 3.1 Chemical Identity of Acutely Hazardous Materials Anhydrous ammonia is used at the Kern Ice & Cold Storage facility. No other acutely hazardous materials are stored in reportable quantities. 3.2 Location of Acutely Hazardous Materials The ammonia'in use at Kern Ice & Cold Storage is contained in the ammonia refrigeration system. No other ammonia is used or stored at the plant. Exhibit 3 is a facility diagram. Exhibit 4 is a schematic diagram of the ammonia refrigeration process. 3.3 Quantity The ammonia receivers to the South and outside of the ammonia compressor room contain approximately 5,325 pounds of ammonia. The ammonia is delivered to the plant by road tanker. 3.4 Nature of Hazard Ammonia presents the risk of death or debilitating injury to humans exposed to high concentrations. Major releases from the ammonia system may cause high concentrations of ammonia to reach receptors, either in the plant or in surrounding areas. Because of its Physical properties, a release of liquid ammonia is most likely to cause serious injury to receptors. Liquid ammonia released at a high rate can form a dense, ground hugging cloud of liquid ammonia dispersed in air. Ammonia vapors, lighter than air, rise quickly in the atmosphere and are less likely to cause serious injury to r e ce pt o rs. A..m m.o. QLs_y.a..pp.r..s. _r.~eJ_e~ase. d..i,nto_ an...~.u..n, v~e n t il ated a re a_a__co, ul.d-reac h- h i g h concentrations. Page 3 Ammonia, a colorless gas with an extremely pungent odor, can be detected by smell at concentrations at 3.5 to 37 mg/m3 (5 to 53 ppm). Ammonia is corrosive and irritating to the skin. High concentrations can cause dermal burns, inflammation and swelling of the eyes and is potentially blinding to exposed receptors. Levels of 500 mg/m3 (700 ppm) can cause eye irritation. Coughing occurs at a level of 1200 mg/m3 (1700 ppm). Exposure to higher concentrations can result in debilitating injury and death through pulmonary edema. Ammonia is not recognized as a carcinogen. Table 1 lists physical properties of ammonia. Table 1. MOLECULAR WEIGHT 17.03 LATENT HEAT 327 BOLLING POINT -27.4 SOLUBILITY 89.9 SPECIFIC GRAVITY (LIQUID) 0.682 VAPOR DENSITY 0.59 AUTOIGNITION TEMPERATURE 651 EXPLOSIVE LIMITS 16 TO 25 CRITICAL TEMPERATURE 132.9 CRITICAL PRESSURE 11.5 IDLH 350 LOC 35 STEL 25 RATIO OF SPECIFIC HEATS 1.31 1 ppm Physical Properties of Anhydrous Ammonia (NH3) LBM/LBMOLE CALORIE/GRAM oF G/100mI@0oC ' (-33.35 oC/4 °C) (AIR=l) @ 25 oC, 760 mm HG oC (1204 °F) % BY VOLUME IN AIR oC ATM mg/m3 mg/m3 mg/m3 (-77.7 oC) (500 ppm) (50 ppm) (35 ppm) 0.7 mg/m3 @ 25 oC and 760 mm HG The molecular structure of ammonia is composed of one Nitrogen (N) and three Hydrogen atoms (H). The molecular weight of ammonia, 17 Ibm/Ibmole, is significantly less than that of air which is approximately 29 Ibm/Ibmole. As a result, ammonia in the vapor phase is much lighter than air and rapidly rises when released. Liquid ammonia can form a dispersion if released into air at a high rate. Ammonia dispersed in air can form a hazardous ground hugging dense cloud. Psge 4 4.0 Hazard and O_Derability Study Result,~ Appendix I is a copy of the guideline used for the Hazard and Operability Study. Forms used during the Hazard and Operability Study are included as Appendix II. Appendix III contains modeling results, and Appendix IV lists alarms and control devices in the ammonia system. 4,1 Summary. Each study node was reviewed for possible deviations from normal operation, and potential consequences resulting from the deviations were recorded. The sevedty and probability of consequences were rated. It was determined that the greatest risk is presented by release of liquid ammonia, which can form a dense ammonia/air dispersion. A dense dispersion can hug the ground, potentially inflicting fatal or debilitating injury upon receptors. In summary, the most li.kely worst c__. a_se release at Kern Ice & Cold Storage is likely to be a release of the cont~.o.ts~.~f .the ~ar~._monia receivers through a broken line or; through the rupJure of a~ r~_e~e_iy_er. An additional s~cenario deemed §u~ficiently significant to require modeling~.~i~,_t~_~[~..~se of the c2_et~p_t.s o~..f.,the delive~_ank__~er. These worst case credible scenarios have been defined and modeled in Appendix III, Modeling Results. 4.2 Release Scenarios Releases are often not caused by a single factor but are the result of a chain of circumstances. A scenario is an abbreviated description of a specific chain of events that causes a particular outcome such as an AHM release related death, injury, property loss, or other incident. Release scenario characteristics include: 1. Condition: Temperature, pressure of the material released 2. Equipment at which the release originates 3. Time of incident: 4. Cause of release: Day, night, morning, afternoon Over pressurization, ruptured lines, operator error Page 5 5. Direct cause of loss: Exposure to high levels of ammonia 6. Type of loss: Death, injury and/or property loss 7. Receptors: Employees, sensitive receptors 8. Magnitude of loss: Number of people affected, property lost Release scenarios at Kern Ice & Cold Storage are based upon the most likely hazards that were developed through the hazard and operability study. The hazard and operability study consisted of the systematic review of the Kern Ice & Cold Storage plant by the study team. A fixed set of guide words, as detailed on the HAZOP form (included as Appendix II) was applied to study nodes as the team moved through the plant. Causes and consequences of identified deviations from normal system operation were recorded. Causes and consequenCes that were determined to be both realistic and significant were recorded. Probabilities of accidents can be determined through a. study of reliability data. Two main types of reliability data are required: o Equipment and instrument failure rate and repair rate data o Human error probabilities and recovery probabilities The following causes of accidents that can occur in processing plants were reviewed in preparation for the hazard and operability study: o Improl~Sr maintenance methods o Modifications to equipment o Human error o Improper labeling o Improper operating methods Page 6 o Wrong materials used in construction o Faulty Equipment o Fire o Earthquake The condition of the anhydrous ammonia determined to be most hazardous to humans was ammonia in a dispersed state. Liquid ammonia can pool and release high concentrations of ammonia in a localized or confined area, however, the number of people affected are limited to the area of the ammonia pool. Vaporized ammonia is very hazardous when concentrated; however, in ambient air, ammonia tends to rise rapidly. Liquid ammonia dispersed in air has proven to pose a significant risk to receptors. A dispersed cloud of liquid ammonia hugs the ground and has the capability to injure or kill receptors in its path. Special circumstances are required for the formation of a significant dispersion cloud; storage of large amounts of high pressure liquid ammonia and sudden release of the ammonia. At Kern Ice & Cold Storage, five receivers contain large amounts of liquid ammonia. A rupture of the receivers or lines between, to or from the receivers could release a dispersion cloud. Potential causes of releases of liquid ammonia, as determined through the hazard and operability study and designated as medium or greater severity and medium or greater probability are: o Damages caused by an earthquake Other potential scenarios determined to be less likely but hazardous enough to merit discussion are: o Damage caused by collision of a vehicle with the receivers o Release of the contents of an ammonia tanker, through collision or hose break Operator error and maintenance procedures were reviewed, but circumstances under which operator action could cause a complete release of the liquid ammonia (excepting a release through the ammonia dump) were not found. Page 7 The worst time for an accident to occu__r..wou_q~ld_b_e_d~Ld.~qg_tbe_r~ight. Residents of homes in the area would be asleep and at home. K_.ern Ice & Cold Sto~ra~r_s_o.r~r~.eLw. ould n-o_L_b..~ oJ%si.t~_t¢_~_fy emergency responders of the re~Lle~a~s~e. A large cloud has the potential to travel over a significant area during a calm, cool night. High winds tend to break up dispersed clouds more quickly, and sunlight tends to vaporize the ammonia. The worst case credible scenario, release of the liquid ammonia from the 'system through an earthquake caused break in a liquid ammonia line, will be modeled. The collision of a vehicle with the receivers will result in a release similar to the release being modeled. In addition, the release of the contents of an ammonia tanker will be modeled. 4.3 Onsite Conseauences The well ventilated compressor room is the most probable site of ammonia release. A release of ammonia liquid or vapor in the compressor room can adversely affect employees in that room (one employee normally), but high levels are likely to dissipate from the ammonia room to the outdoors without adversely affecting offsite receptors. A release rof ammonia in the vapor form will rapidly rise in the atmosphere, out of the range of receptors. Past ammonia releases at the Kern Ice & Cold Storage facility that have lead to high concentrations in the compressor room resulted from compressor shaft seal leakage during power shutdowns. Ventilation has been improve~so that concentrations of ammonia in the room do not reach dangerous levels. 4,4 Offsite Conseauences The ammonia receivers contain the largest amount of liquid ammonia in one place and therefore present the greatest potential for forming a large dense cloud of dispersed ammonia. The most likely potential release of the contents of the receiver to the outdoors was determined to be through a break in an liquid ammonia line leading from the evaporative condenser to the receivers or lines from the receivers to the cooling systems. A cloud of dispersed ammonia from a rapid, large release presents the greatest danger to offsite receptors. Page 8 4.5 Human Error Analysis The purpose of a human error analysis is to identify potential human errors and their effects. Causes of human errors that have occurred in the past may also be identified. 4.5,1 Human Error: Ammonia Loading Procedure When necessary, ammonia is added at the receiver. The supplier delivers a tanker truck of ammonia. A high pressure hose is connected from the tanker to the receiver, connections are checked, and the truck's pump is engaged. A person is assigned to watch the sight glass on the receiver at all times during delivery. A metering device on the truck measures the amount of ammonia delivered. When the level on the receiver sight glass is in the right position, the pump is turned off and the receiver valve is shut. The hose is bled off and removed. In 1975 an accident did occur immediately after ammonia had been added. Too much was added - the safety valve popped off the operator turned off compressor and closed king valve, had this not been done NH3 would have bled off until the safety valve reseated. Blew down in twenty minutes. Fire Department came but no one was evacuated. Change in procedure, ammonia is not delivered without engineer supervisor. The operator supervises ammonia transfer. The following errors are possible during ammonia transfer: Areas for Proposed Ooerator error (~onseouences ~;everitv/Likelihood Mitioation Sight glass Too much ammonia Low/Med Employee not read properly in system; Relief Training valve may relieve Valve not shut Ammonia leak Low/Low Employee off properly Training Worn hose not Ammonia leak Med/Low Use reputable noticed possible ammonia distributor Hose not disconnected Ammonia release Med/Low Inspect hose possible Page 9 Human Error: Maintenance Procedures During normal operation the ammonia system requires little operator action. The ammonia room operator checks the pressure and temperature at intervals and he inspects the ammonia system for irregularities as part of his duties. Oil is regularly drained manually from the oil separators, and added to the compressors. Potential areas for operator error during normal operation include: Areas for Proposed Operator error Conseauences Severity/Likelihood Mitiaation Valve not shut off Potential for Low/Med Employee training after oil drain sm. ammonia release Open wrong Damage to Low/Low compressor compressor valve Forget to Damage to Low/Low add oil compressor Neglect Relief valve Med/Low high pressures release Compressor not pumped down for maintenance Employee training Log, Employee Training Employee training Small/medium Med/Low Employee ammonia release; training/ possible emp. injury supervision 4.,5.3 Oil Recovery Procedure The procedure for draining oil from the system is: 2. watches closely and closes valve at that time. Potential areas for operator error during normal operation include' Areas for Ooerator error Valve not shut off after oil drain open wrong compressor valve Open valve to drain oil. When liquid ammonia is mixing with oil the oil becomes cloudy - operator Consequences Severity/Likelihood Potential for Low/Med sm. ammonia release Damage to Low/Low compressor Proposed Mitigation Employee training Employee training Page 1 0 Forget to Damage to Low/Low Log, Employee add oil compressor Training Neglect Relief valve Med/Low Employee training high pressures release 4.5,4 Htjman Error: Emergency Situations Emergency situations include fires, equipment difficulties, earthquakes. ammonia leaks, and Areas for Proposed ~ Conse(~uences ~ Miti(3ation Improper use of Employee injury Med/Low Employee breathing equipment training Improper fire Employee injury, Meal/Low Employee fighting procedures ammonia release training Earthquake response: Increased risk of Low/Low Employee Improper evacuation employee injury training procedures Earthquake response: Possible increased Low (relative to Employee Improper shutdown ammonia release severity of earthquake)/ training procedures Low In summary, AHM releases due to human error were found to be likely to be smaller in magnitude than potential releases from events such as an earthquake. Increased training of workers will reduce the risk of ~.o_Er_r_QEs_ in__.__0o_.r_~_a~l,_r33.ai. Et.e_n._ap_c_e ~nd em~~y_operations at the plant. Page 1 1 5.0 Vulnerability Analysis 5.1 Vulnerable Zone The worst case vulnerable zone radius is the maximum distance from the release to the point at which the airborne chemical concentration equals or exceeds the L.O.C. Exhibit 5 is a map of the area surrounding the Kern Ice & Cold Storage plant. Factors affecting vulnerable zone estimations are summarized in Exhibit 6. Neighboring receptors are identified in Exhibit 7. Exhibit 8 shows the extent of the worst case vulnerable zone. Exhibit 9 shows the area which could be exposed to ammonia concentrations above the IDLH in a worst case release. EPA/FEMA guidelines indicate that decisions about evacuation are incident specific and are to be made at the time of actual release. An estimated vulnerable zone should not automatically be used as the basis for evacuation during emergency response. In this study, the vulnerable zone radius is estimated using assumptions for a credible worst case scenario. (~uantity and Rate of Release to Air The vulnerable zone is proportional to the quantity and rate of release. The Hazard and Operability Study determined that the worst case credible release would be a complete release of ammonia from the ammonia receivers. This worst case release could occur during an earthquake. The ammonia receivers contain the largest amount of liquid ammonia in one location. Meteoroloaical Conditions Wind speed and atmospheric stability have a large effect on the size of estimated vulnerable zones. Increased wind speed and the accompanying atmospheric stability will result ,in greater airborne dispersion and a decrease in the size of the estimated vulnerable zone. Low wind speeds are used in worst case scenarios. Prevailing wind direction is from the northwest. Page 1 2 C. Surrounding Topography The facility is located in an urban residential/commercial area. Level of Concern eL.C.C.) The level of concern for anhydrous ammonia is 50 ppm (0.035 g/m3). 5.2 Human Populations Exhibit 7 is a location map of the Kern Ice & Cold Storage plant and surrounding facilities. Union Avenue and 30th Street are commercial/industrial corridors surrounded by residential areas. The radius of the estimated vulnerable zone and IDLH exposure during a worst case credible release are shown in Exhibits 9 and 10. Sensitive receptors located near the Kern Ice & Cold Storage plant are identified in Exhibit 7. Exhibit 8 lists the sensitive receptors, their approximate distance, and direction from the plant. 5.3 Critical Facilities The fire station nearest to the Kern Ice & Cold Storage buildings is: Fire Station Number 4 130 Bernard Street Bakersfield, California Hospitals in the area are: Bakersfield Memorial Hospital 420 34th Street Bakersfield, California Page 1 3 6.0 RISK ANALYSIS 6.1 Likelihood of a Release Occurring The ammonia system at the Kern Ice & Cold Storage plant has been in operation for more than fifty years. Over that time, one significant release occurred when a preSsure relief valve released ammonia after too much ammonia was added to the system. Risk of release is reduced through training programs at the facility. The Hazard and Operability Study (contained in Appendices I and II) determined that the probability of minor releases is medium; minor releases could occur during maintenance procedures (bleeding down lines) or when the compressors have shut down (seals may leak). The most likely cause of a major ammonia release is a piping failure in a major earthquake. Th.._~e likelihood o~fa major ammonia release from the Kern Ice & Cold St.or~age_plant during a_majar_earthClu~airJy_ ibjgh,_A-majo~r__releas_e_during a~fire .at the plant is possible. Quantitative estimates of actual probability of a release occurring b. re subjective, but a reasonable estimate could be a 2% per year probability of an earthquake related major release. 6.2 Severity of Conseauences The severity of consequences from an ammonia release is moderate because: 1. The quantity of ammonia in the ammonia system is sufficient to cause injury to neighboring receptors in a worst case release. 2. It meets the criteria provided by. the EPA/FEMA severity of consequences to people. Those criteria are: I. Low: Chemical is expected to move into the surrounding environment in negligible concentrations. Injuries are expected only for exposure over extended periods or when individual personal health conditions create complications. Page 1 4 I1. II1. Medium: Chemical is expected to move into the surrounding 'environment in concentrations sufficient to cause serious injuries and/or deaths unless prompt and effective corrective action is taken. Death and/or injuries are expected only for exposure over extended periods or when individual personal health conditions create complications. High: Chemical is expected to move into the surrounding environment in concentrations sufficient to cause serious injuries and/or deaths upon exposure. Large numbers of people would be expected to be affected. Page 1 5 ! I I I I I I. i I I I I I I GL°,AG STRIP ~ ~ 12H '/ " Knob HUI: NORTH KERN GOLF COURSE T.27S. ! .I i T.28S. · '*"31 ~takersfleld KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE 120 30th STREET BAKERSFIELD, CA. GREENFIELD Rd~ : !2- Weedr~tch RANCHO EL TEJOt T.32S. R.26E. -- *Phillip~ Rd T.32S. R.27E. J ~ tn. ,,J . T.I 2N...R.22W. Miles' ?mL 4mi. ' 6mi. 2;' T.~2....~gW. "'~.-='. WZI INC. BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE LOCATION MAP EXHIBIT 9/90 !.' ! IDE~NTIFICATION CHEMICAl IDENTITY LOCATION NATURE OF THE HAZARDS VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS VULNERABLE ZONE HUMAN POPULATIONS CRITICAL FACILITIES ENVIRONMENTAL REFERENCE: EPA/FEMA 1987 EXHIBITi '2 I KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE' I FACILITY DIAGRAM DATE 9/9 0 EXHIBIT. '~ 3 TO SERIES OF RECOLD SYSTEMS IN COOLER AND' COOLER AND FREEZER ROOMS BO°s FLOAT VALVE FLOODED SYSTEM WITH FLOAT VALVE PLANNING TO REMOVE IN NEAR FUTURE ,LEq END BYPASS VALVE SUCTION VALVE DISCHARGE VALVE PUMPOUT VALVE CLOSUREVALVE II CT~P. DTYP. l WZI INC," I · BAKERSFIELD, CALIFOrtNtA KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE AMMONIA REFRIDGERATION SYSTEM DAlE 9/90 EX,.mi ,... ~ 4 KERN OWEN ELECTRIC CLARK =LUMBING KERNCOLD STORAGE RO TH RT_ UNION STORAGE STATE178 MEMORIAL AREA C3111N~Y ~T_ AIR- DRAULICS MINI STOP RESIDENTI,~ AREA SLEEP- NAIR CROADJ ELECTRI~ Nil F~ ~T JEFFERSOI :IFIC ~~, Kj WZl INC. J BAKERSFIELD, CALIFORNIA ERE ICE & COLD STORAGE MAP OF SuE'RouNDING AREA ~DATE ~/90 EXHIBIT . Factors Affectinq Vulnerable Zone Estimations. O Quantity of Release Physical State (solid, liquid, gas) of Material Temperature of Stored Material Pressure of Stored Material Physical Characteristics of Material (Molecular Weight, Vapor Pressure, etc.) Surface Area of Spill, if Liquid Type of Release (Leak, Explosion, etc.) Rate of Release Meteorological Conditions (Wind Speed, Cloud Cover, Temperature) Surrounding Topography Level of Concern of Material REFERENCE: U.S. EPA/FEMA, 1987 6 ,cFARLAHD' McCombs N <son MINTER i* VILLAGE". th Standard $ '$ 7 8 ~G I $1 I J ~. Road I~'~ 11 i FAMOSO7 DRAG STRIP Avenu~ HAGGERTY ~IORTH KERN lCE & COLD STORAGE 120 30th STREET BAKERSFIELD CA. ~t ~ '~'~ 1~ / Knob HUI 34 135 T Round Mtn. · HART Discovery -SHL ROUND OIL lelELD KERN RIVER GOLI~C ,OU~ 3 '1 E ,zer Rd. ~ J~;AfRPARK 11 : BAK..ERSFIELD MLj NI(CIPAL 1=. 2 1 Panama Bakersfl61d lB I 17. 0L0 RIVER PANAMA L30S. GREENFIELb I ¢ Weadpatch .l'bbP ~'oad 'IBear Mtn. 30J 2~ Rd. ) n~a rIKLO Bear Mountain COMPA N Y T,32S. R,26E. 13 2~ [ 27 ~ 32I 33 } 34 28 2T { 26 g 10 t2 I 7 Road [ 12 T.32S, R.27E. 24 I 35 Teale Road 22 Sandrini: le Road , 34 { 35 Kenmar In. Rd.: ~. anchc Point EXHIBIT 8 Receptor Approximate Distance (Miles) 1. · Bakersfield Memorial Hospital 1/3 2, Kernview Hospital 1/3 3, CBC Cancer Center 1/3 4, Longfellow School 1/8 ~ Fire Station #4 1/4 6, San Joaquin Community Hospital 1 7, Bakersfield College 1 8, Kern Medical Center 1 9, East Bakersfield High 1 10, Garces High School 5/8 11, Sierra Junior High 3 1/8 12, Virginia Ave. School 3 5/8 13, Hort School 4 3/4 14, Carden School 5 15, College Heights School 3 7/8 16, Chipman Junior High 3 3/4 17, Highland High School 3 7/8 18, Eissler School 3 3/4 19, Noble School I 3/8 20, Washington Junior High I 1/2 ~', Jefferson High School~ 1 22, Williams High School 1 5/8 23, Fremont School 2 1/8 24, Owens School · 1 5/8 ~,25, Special Services schools I 1/4 26, Vernon School 2 1/2 27, Casa Loma School 3 1/4 28, Revival Tabernacle Christian Academy 8 3/4 29, Mountain View Junior High .8 1/2 30, Fairfax School 5 31, Reg, Occupational Ag, Center School 3 3/8 32, Pioneer Drive School 4 33. Compton Junior High 3 Direction NW NW NW NE NE SW NE SW SW N SE SE SE SE NE NE NE NE NE NE SE SE SE SE SE SE S S SE SE SE SE E EXHIBIT 8 (continued) Receptor Approximate Distance {Miles) 34, Harding School 3 35. Bakersfield Advanced Academy 2 1/2 36, Nichols School 2 3/4 37, Fire Station #1 1/4 38, Bakersfield Christian Life School 3 3/4 39. BLM Caliente Res, Area Office 2 7/8 40. Norris Elementary 6 3/8 41, Norris Junior High 6 3/8 42. US Border Patrol 2 7/8 43, Fruitvale Junior High 5 1/2 44. Greenacres School 5 1/2 45. Stockdale Christian School 3 3/8 46. Harris School 2 3/4 47. Fire Station #3 2 3/4 48, 'Fire Station #1 1 1/8 49. Quailwood School 4 3/4 50, St, Phillips School 4 3/4 51. Stockdale Elementary 5 1/2 52, Post Office 4 53. St. John's School 4 1/4 54. West High 4 3/8 55, Munsey Elementary 3 1/2 56. Fire Station #7 4 57, Stine School 4 5/8 58, Thompson Junior High 5 3/8 59. Sandrini School 5 1/4 60. Panama Unified School District 8 3/4 61, Actis Junior High 5 62, Castle School 5 3/8 63, Library 5 1/4 64. Laurelglen School 6 1/8 65, Fire Station #9 6 1/4 66, District School 7 1/2 67, Cai State University 6 Direction E E NE SW NW SW NW NW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW SW I '1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Receptor 68. Olive Knoll School 69, North Rosedale School 70. Rosedale School 71. Rosedale School District 72. Curran Junior High 73, Horace Mann School 74. Friends School EXHIBIT 8 (continued) Approximate Distance (Miles) 4 1/2 6 7/8 7 3/4 7 3/4 3 3/4 2 3/4 5 5/8 Direction NW W W SW SW NE SW m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m FARLAND' McCombs · 1 At .RPOR3' I~lighwa¥ ~ ),F,TER MINTER - i' VILLAGE th Standard Road lo'~ 11 I~ FAMOSO? U DRAG STRIP Avenu~ HAGGERTY i T.275. i Fll, 1~ ltt. Poso i ~ 12157 16 :' 17 KERNICE & COLD STORAGE 1203~hSTREET BAKERSFIELD, CA· ~ 26 · Knob Hill · A 2505 G RAN'ITC STATION Red Hill _ ChaJk Cliff · 3 i ~- 30 , 26 25. 3 ! 2 ; Round Mtn. ~ ~: T,28S, ~...28~. 1616' ~ s ~ . 2E~ '.~7 ]'26 ~.'~ART Disc~ WEll. .~L ROUND MTN.~ ,. ,-P,,,~,.~ H'~'I OIL FIELD .KERN RIVER G.OLF~ C ,OUl ,zer Rd. ~ Panama [~ane dd33 OLD RIVEi ..9.5 MILE RADIUS ·PANAMA-- r'.~l'R PA RK 1i : BAKERSFIEED M'tJNI~ClPAL : T.30S. R.26E~ GREENFIELD Rd~ ) I Weadpatch I talnVleW GIORGIO 1 23 I. 24 ~ear Mtn. Bear Mountain Rd. ! ~a rlCLO Ilux COMPANY T.32S. R.26E. 24 I 12 T.32S. R.27E. 24 I. 15 t REC. t 34 3s ~..R~ ~2 3 2 J l'n' Kenm~r I..n. ARVIN Rd.: ~, Comanch~ Po~t McComb$ Dresser 7th Standard $ i FIo.d 10'~ 11 i FAMOSOTI BRAG STRIP ~E.~ I Avenui HAGGERTY ,NORTH KEF 16 i 15 T.275. oo , KERN ICE & COLD STORAGE 120 30th STREET BAKERSFIELD, CA. "e-'T'--Chalk Cliff ~ .I 2~ 24 · Knob Hill 34 135 i 11 1.4 il 13 I Round Mtn. I T.28S. ir~..28E. 1616' KERN~ ~R~V£~- 28 '.27 ~-~: 26 I HART MIll. 3 I 26 35 36 .ouN6 .TN} ,ra'~d I'I'~'1 RIVER ~.OL~C,OUI ~zer Rd. ~ Panama Canal J 13 31 t 32 33 Bakersfield ;OLD RIVER 11 12 17. 23 j . 24 Bear Mountain Rd. I a~a fIELD 6 5 21: T.32S. R.26E. I 2? 32 I 33 34 Road 26 j$5 24 ~._' PANAMA -- 1 Fnillil:~ Rd. 34!35 36 ' lerring Roed I 12 T.32S. R.27E. 23 I 24 !. lg J33 I .~,~t Coous RPARK 1i : BAKERSFIELD MUNICIPAL 3.3 MILE RADIUS 30S. R.28E 2~J 27 j~6 GREENFIELD Rdff 3 4 OiGior W~l~ateh talnv~ew ~.EC.i Teale Ro~d '.s. R128E. J ~ T.32S.; 22 Sendrini; 24.~ 19Road 20 j 31 · 34 35 I 38 Road . David Road GIORGIO Kenm~r Lit. ARVIN I Rd.. ~, Comanche Point } ~ Appendix B-I Hazard and Operability Study Guideline Appendix B-I Hazard and Operability Study Guideline Contents 1. Introduction 2. Hazard and Operability Study Team Members and Qualifications 3. Study Nodes 4. Intention: Normal Operation of the Ammonia System 5. Deviations 6. Causes of Deviations 7. Consequences 8. Guide Words 9. Focus of Study Introduction A Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is used to identify hazards and operability problems. The primary objective of the HAZOP is identification of problems. Special situations to be considered include earthquake (Magnitude 8.3) and fire in the plant. Possible solutions to problems may be discussed and recorded during the study. This HAZOP study will focus on the ammonia refrigeration system. Hazard and Operability Study Team Members and Qualifications Jessie Daughtry, Manager Mr. Daughtry will certify the RMPP as complete. Mr. Daughtry has been manager of this facility for 17 years. He will assist in maintaining quality standards during this study. Mr. Daughtry oversees safety and training programs. Mr. Daughtry's experience and training include diesel engineering, auto mechanics, aerodynamics, chemical warfare, and general engineering. Richard Dixon, Ammonia Operations and Maintenance Engineer Mr. Dixon has been with Kern Ice and Cold Storage since November, 1989. He oversees operations and maintenance of the ammonia system. He will perform quality control for this study. Mr. Dixon is a certified welder and has received refrigeration training. He was maintenance supervisor for Excel Mineral for seven years. Appendix B-I Page 1 Linda Knowles, Staff Chemical Engineer, WZl Inc. Ms. Knowles is a degreed chemical engineer (Texas A&M University, 1980). She has two years of experience in the chemical process industries and two years of experience in the environmental consulting industry, focusing on safety and risk assessment. Ms. Knowles will act as team leader. She will conduct the consequence analysis and perform a human error analysis as described in the Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, AICHE, 1985. A meeting will be held before the initial walk through to discuss the system, process diagrams, and the reporting forms.._ Additional meetings and plant walk throughs will be scheduled as needed. 3. Study Nodes The study nodes (locations at which the process parameters are to be investigated for deviations) are listed below: 1. Compressors 2. Vessels Containing High Pressure Liquid Ammonia a. Oil Separators b. Vertical Evaporative Condensers c. Evaporative Condenser d. Ammonia Receivers 3. Freezer Rooms '" 4. Cooler Rooms 5. GasNapor Separation Vessel HAZOP forms to be used for each study node are attached. Appendix B-I Page 2 4_, Intention: Normal Operation of the Ammonia S_vstem The plant is designed to operate continuously. Gaseous ammonia enters the compressors and is compressed to a higher pressure and temperature. After exiting the compressors, the hot gas enters the oil separators, then the evaporative condensers. Water running through the condensers cools the hot gas into a liquid. The liquid ammonia flows to and is contained in the receiver. Ammonia is charged into the receiver from a road tanker, usually a Hill Brothers tanker. A hose is used to deliver ammonia from the tanker to the receiver. The receiver sight glass is constantly watched during delivery to ensure that the proper amount of ammonia is transferred into the system. From the receiver, liquid ammonia flows through the lines to the cooling equipment. Vaporized ammonia is pulled into the compressors to be compressed and cooled into liquid form. 5. Deviations Deviations are potential departures from the intention of the plant. Possible deviations are discovered by systematically applying HAZOP guide words (no, more) to process parameters such as pressure and temperature. 6. Causes of Deviations Causes of deviations may be human error, equipment failure, etc. Deviations and causes will be listed during the HAZOP study. 7..~. Consequences Consequences are results of deviations from normal process operation. Consequences which could negatively impact process safety will be discussed and recorded. Deviations which have no effect on process safety will be dropped from the HAZ©P study. Appendix B-I Page 3 Guide words are simple words used to identify, qualify or quantify possible deviations. The following guide words will be used in the HAZOP study: Meaning No Less More Other Part of As Well As Reverse Other Than Power Shutoff Low FIowrate High temperature Partial Power Shutoff Water added to NH3 Flow in Wrong Direction Earthquake Conditions Negation of Design Intent Quantitative Decrease Quantitative Increase Qualitative Decrease Qualitative Increase Logical Opposite of 'the Intent Substitution from Design Conditions Each guide word will be applied to process variables at each study node. This purpose of this study is to determine the most likely point of release and most damaging release of ammonia to the atmosphere. Consequences resulting from a fire and an 8.3 or greater earthquake will be considered. FOCUS of Study The following specific consequences will be considered in this study: O O Threats to Employee Safety Threats to Safety of Qffsite Receptors (Note: used to model offsite exposures.) ARCHIE will be Appendix B-I Page 4 Appendix B-II Hazard and Operability Study Results Consequences Resulting from'a .' Causes'of'the '· Deviation from Normal operation ' Devta'tlon · ' ,no ~ Severity Prob- ability** .con[r!!s in Place Icl Proposed :*;litigation , / '[ 67o0 operation and Maintenance ~u~ ,ut~ d~u ~u~u otu~gu UtudyNode Number: ,~ Equipment: '\ f~r.~u~'~ L..-tc~U~ ~¢IF~o¢~.._ v6c~'-eA~ O.----OU' Consequences ReSulting from a Causes of the * Prob- ,n Deviation from Normal Operation Deviation Severity ability** controls in Place Proposed Mitigation " , ~ ,, .. , ..... . .... ..~ -- .,, ¢~ ¢: ,., - , , - . ~ ~ ~ ,, . . ¢ . ,; ~ ,, es unlikely), MediUm (may cause injuries or death unless corrective measures are taken), High (expected to' cause injury or nedium or Iow :leath Io receptors) J .J Consequences Resulting from a Deviation from Normal Operation CauSes of the. Deviation o'u~-Clo~.a o,r ~-7/_o,~ v,,J~ Severit¢ Prob- abll!ty**' controlls in PlaCe Proposed Mit'lgatlon- ' Consequences Resulting from a CauSes of the. * Prob- Deviation from Normal. Operation Deviation Severity ability** Contr¢ls. . in Place I' ~ · ~/ 'Operation and Maintenance '~11 ~o~r ~~. ~. ~~ ~,~ Z-3 ~,. ~s .~ Proposed ~,litlgatiOn Consequences Resulting '[rom a Deviation from Normal Operation Causes of the 'Deviation SeVerit,v ~). Operation and Maintenance Prob- ability** · L ContrOl in Place Proposed Mitigation ' Appendix B-Ill Modeling Results Appendix B-III Modeling Results Summary_ The Automated Resource for Chemical Hazard Incident Evaluation (ARCHIE) computer program was used to model theorized worst case credible releases. The Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis Procedures (F.E.M.A., U.S.D.O.T., and U.S.E.P.A., 1989) was used as a guideline for modeling. Modeling results indicated that a worst case credible release could pose a significant risk to offsite receptors. A Risk Management and Prevention Plan is being prepared and will be implemented to reduce the probability and severity of accidents. Werst Case Credible Scenario The worst case credible release, as determined through the hazard and operability study, was found to be a potential release of the liquid contents of the ammonia receiver into outside air. The release scenario judged to be most dangerous to offsite receptors is a release of ammonia during an earthquake. In this potential worst case scenario, the rapid release of liquid ammonia could form an air/ammonia dispersion that would act as a cloud of dense gas. Choice of Modeling Options- Program ARCHIE Option a, Estimate discharge rate of liquid or gas, was chosen to model the release of liquid ammOnia into the atmosphere. This model was chosen because the potential worst case scenario involves emptying the receiver through 'open lines. Option b, Evaluate toxic vapor dispersion hazards, was used to model a 5,325 pounds release of the total contents of the received during an earthquake. Appendix B-III Page I Modeling Results A discharge from a broken liquid line serving the receiver may release 5,325 pounds of ammonia in 1.4 minutes. Results have been plotted in Exhibit 8, Worst Case Vulnerable Zone Map, and Exhibit 9, Worst Case IDLH Exposure Map. Modeling printouts are attached. Although unlikely, the release of the contents of a tanker truck carrying 30,000 pounds of ammonia was modeled. At an emission rate of 30,000 Ib/min, a cloud of 500 ppm NH3 may extend over 7 miles after one and one half hours. The following table contains mean wind speeds and prevailing wind directions for the Bakersfield area. Climatological data was gathered at' Meadows Field Airport and compiled by the National Climatic Data Center. 1989 Mean Wind Speed and Direction, Bakersfield Area Month Wind Speed (mph) Wind Direction January 5.2 NW February 5.8 ENE March 6.5 NW April 7.1 NW May 7.9 NW June 7.9 NW July. 7.2 NW August 6.8 NW September -' 6.2 WNW October 5.5 NW November 5.1 ENE December 5.0 ENE The yearly average mean wind speed for 1989 is 6.4 mph, originating from the Northwest. Appendix B-III Page 2 CURRENT PARAMETER VALUES FOR TOXIC GAS OR VAPOR HAZARD EVALUATION ! I I i I I I ! I I I I I i I i 1 MOLECULAR wEIGHT = 17 2 TOXIC VAPOR LIMIT = 50 3 VAPOR/GAS DISCHARGE HEIGHT = 0 4 ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS = F 5 WIND VELOCITY AT SURFACE = 4.5 6 AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE = 70 7 VAPOR/GAS EMISSION RATE = 5456.3 8 DURATION OF EMISSION = .976 MODEL RESULTS: Downwind toxic hazard distance at groundlevel = 50141 *** Press ENTER to View Various Tables *** ppm feet mph deg F lb/min minutes feet Downwind Distance GroUndlevel Source Height . Concentration Concentration (feet) (mii~s) (ppm) (ppm) Initial Evacuation Zone Width* (feet) 100 .02 1000000 1000000 73 3675 .7 14512 14512 2680 7249 1.38 3507 3507 5280 10823 2.05 1442 1442 7880 14398 2.73 762 762 10490 17972 3.41 465 465 13090 21546 4.09 312 312 15690 25121 4.76 222 222 18290 28695 5.44 166 166 20890 32269 6.12 129 129 23490 35844 6.79 103 103 26100 39418 7.47 83.5 83.5 28700 42992 8.15 69.4 69.4 31300 46566 8.82 58.5 58.5 33900 50141 9.5 50 50 1 *Usually safe for < 1 hour release. Longer releases or sudden wind shifts may require a larger width or different direction for the evacuation zone. ****** Press ENTER to Continue ****** Downwind Distance (feet) (milles) contaminant Arrival Time at ~ownwind Location (minutes) Contaminant Departure Time at Downwind Location (minutes) 100 .02 .3 1.5 3675 .7 9.3' 19.6 7249 1.38 18.4 37.6 10823 2.05 27.4 55.7 14398 2.73 36.4 73.7 17972 3.41 45.4 91.8 21546 4.09 54.5 109.8 25121 4.76 63.5 127.9 28695 5.44 72.5 146 32269 6.12 81.5 164 35844 6.79 90.6 182.1 39418 7.47 99.6 200.1 42992 8.15 108.6 218.2 46566 8.82 117.6 236.2 50141 9.5 126.7 254.3 CAUTION: See guide for assumptions used in estimating these times! Want to rerun the model with different input values (Y/N or <cr>)? CURRENT PARAMETER VALUES FOR TOXIC GAS OR VAPOR _ HAZARD EVALUATION MOLECULAR WEIGHT = 17 TOXIC VAPOR LIMIT = 500 VAPOR/GAS DISCHARGE HEIGHT = 0 ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS = F WIND VELOCITY AT SURFACE = 4.5 AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE = 70 VAPOR/GAS EMISSION RATE = 5456.3 DURATION OF EMISSION = .976 MODEL RESULTS: Downwind toxic hazard distance at groundlevel = 17391 *** Press ENTER to View Various Tables *** ppm feet mph deg F lb/min minutes feet Downwind Distance Groundlevel Source Height _ Concentration Concentration (feet) (mii~s) (ppm) (ppm) Initial Evacuation Zone Width* (feet) 100 .02 1000000 1000000 73 1336 .26 85297 85297 980 2571 .49 28152 28152 1880 3806 .73 13552 13552 2770 5041 .96 7654 7654 3670 6276 1.19 4800 4800 4570 7511 1.43 3244 3244 5470 8746 1.66 2317 2317 6370 9981 1.9 1727 1727 7270 11216 2.13 1331 1331 8170 12451 2.36 1054 1054 9070 13686 2.6 853 853 9970 14921 2.83 704 704 10870 16156 3.06 590 590 11770 17391 3.3 500 500 1 *Usually safe for < 1 hour release. Longer releases or sudden wind shifts may require a larger width or different direction for the evacuation zone. ****** Press ENTER to Continue ****** Downwind Distance (feet) (miles) Contaminant Arrival Time at_Downwind Location (minutes) Contaminant Departure Time at Downwind Location (minutes) 100 .02 .3 1.5 1336 .26 3.4 7.8 2571 .49 6.5 14 3806 .73 9.7 20.2 5041 .96 12.8 26.5 6276 1.19 15.9 32.7 7511 1.43 19 39 8746 1.66 22.1 45.2 9981 1.9 25.3 51.4 11216 2.13 28.4 57.7 12451 2.36 31.5 63.9 13686 2.6 34.6 70.1 14921 2.83 37.7 76.4 16156 3.06 40.8 82.6 17391 3.3 44 88.9 CAUTION: See guide for assumptions used in estimating these times! Want to rerun the model with different input values (Y/N or <cr>)? I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i I I Appendix B-IV Alarms and Control Devices I I I Appendix B-IV 'Alarms and Control Devices Alarms and Control Devices Type All Compressors High P cutoff Automatic Ammonia Receiving Supervision Manual Appendix B-IV Page I Details Manual reset